Wealth and Ethics in American Fiscal Policy

In a struggle between wealth and ethics, practically speaking the former tends overwhelmingly to win hands down, even if the form of government is at least nominally a representative democracy, but in fact an oligarchy or plutocracy. The influence of the moneyed interest both in the E.U. and U.S. is likely much stronger than most of the respective citizenries know. When the poorest of the poor are to be made worse off financially by cuts in certain government programs while defense contractor companies stand to get more, which tends to mean higher bonuses for executives (and campaign contributions for elected representatives), the skew toward the gilded and away from the most vulnerable economically can be viewed as an x-ray of sorts indicative of rule by wealth rather than by the People. U.S. President Trump’s fiscal budget enacted in 2025 is a case in point by which the questionable morality of the plutocracy or oligopoly form of government can be gleaned.

Plato laid out the following as alternative forms of government, from the best to the worst:

1.       The Ideal State (kallipolis): everyone is doing their respective jobs well; philosophers with knowledge of the good are in charge of making decisions pertaining to public policy.

2.       Timocracy: (e.g., Sparta): people who love honor, social status, and competition are in control. In other words, a military. 

3.       Oligarchy: producers (or suppliers) of goods and services (i.e., business executives and or companies) are in control. That is business runs the government.

4.       Democracy: the “mob” is in control. Direct democracy. Such “mob rule” is volatile, with enacted policies swinging back and forth. This does not include representative democracy, which is better, but not as good as having a philosopher king rule because reason should control the passions in a mind and a city.

5.       Tyranny: a tyrant is in control. This is the worst form of government, for obvious reasons, as an autocrat faces no worldly constraint in unleashing suffering and death on a population. In 2023 through at least 2025, the Israeli government was a tyranny in Gaza.

The three highest Hindu castes fit the three highest Platonic forms of government, with Brahmins, who are ideally priests (or philosophers), soldiers/generals, and merchants in descending order in Hindu society. The “mob” in Plato’s scheme corresponds to the laborers in the caste system. That business managers (including CEOs) running (and thus controlling) government are higher than direct democracy may sound strange to modern ears in the West, even in the E.U., in which Greece is a state unless the difference between well-paid modern elected representatives and a mob of mostly uneducated (i.e., unprofessional) laborers in ancient Athens is grasped. Even in modern representative democracies, complete with terms of office to buffer the momentary passions of the people—passions that can contradict a people’s long-term best interests (i.e., the public good)—corporate interests likely view themselves as superior and thus legitimately at the helm in what is known as a plutocracy, or rule by wealth. The moneyed interests could cite Plato’s hierarchy of government-types without bothering to point out that Plato had mob-rule rather than the U.S. Senate in mind as democracy. We need not pit the reasoning, albeit skewed by self-interest, of CEOs on public policy against what a disorganized mob might come up with as the public good (over partial interests), but we might want to consider whether corporations and individual CEOs should have so much monetary sway with elected representatives and their appointees that a representative democracy is de facto a plutocracy serving the relatively narrow interests of capital. The pecuniary interests of American defense-contractor companies in manufacturing and selling weapons, planes, and tanks to the U.S. Government for use in Israel as it pummeled 2 million residents of Gaza in 2024 and 2025 were not necessarily in the best interests of the United States, which might have been more accurately represented and instituted by the American electorates than business political-action-committees helping representatives get re-elected. Not that any member of Congress cares about that, of course.

Or take the “Big Beautiful Bill” passed by the Republican lawmakers in both chambers of Congress and signed by President Trump in 2025. The projected economic impacts on the different economic tiers of Americans supports Adam Smith’s fear that company managements and government officials would work together at the expense of workers and even competitive markets themselves. On August 11, 2025, the Congressional Budget Office made public its estimates “that the 10% poorest Americans will lose roughly $1,200 a year as they experience restrictions on government programs like Medicaid and food assistance, while the richest 10% of Americans will see their income increase by $13, 600 from tax cuts. Overall , American households will see more income from the tax cuts in the legislation, including middle income households, but the largest benefit will go to the top 10% of earners.”[1] Such a distributional impact could be expected in a plutocracy, even in the form of a hijacked representative democracy. Very poor disabled Americans living on Social Security (SSI) of less than $1,000 a month already faced reductions if they negotiate a good deal on rent, or a friend or relative helps out with utilities or rent. That the U.S. Defense Department budget was increased, with corporate defense contractors set to reap additional profits as a result, illustrates the questionable ethics in taking from the poorest of the poor, who cannot work, and giving more to wealthy corporations (with higher bonuses, everything else equal, going to executives). Additionally, just for added fun, roughly “2.4 million people won’t be eligible for the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program [i.e., food stamps] under new work requirements” for poor Americans who have not been declared disabled by the Social Security Administration.[2] Food has thusly been declared not to be an unconditional human right. As the work requirement applied to Medicaid, the government program that funds healthcare for the very poor, access to medical services—and thus good health—was also declared to not qualify as an unconditional human right.

In short, the American social contract between the federal government and its people was changed in ways that stood to make many of the poorest Americans poorer while defense contractors could make even more money from that government. The new social contract reflected a plutocracy or oligarchy in the guise of a representative democracy. Although arguably superior to mob rule, such a trajectory for representative democracy may trouble a good many people, financially or otherwise perhaps in conscience. A person need only read John Rawl’s Theory of Justice to realize that a plutocracy gearing public policy to the narrow interests of a part rather than the whole of a society is diametrically opposed, or antipodal, to a system of government and economy in which the poorest of the poor are looked to first such that they can survive and lead decent, albeit not wealthy, lives before other, increasingly better off tiers are taken into account. In a school yard, only a bully goes after the kids with the least to eat for lunch so to enrich himself and his buddies.

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1. Stephen Groves, “Trump’s Tax Law Will Mostly Benefit the Rich, While Leaving Poorer Americans with Less, CBO Says,” The Associated Press, August 11, 2025.
2. Ibid.

We the People: Invigorating Popular Sovereignty by Referendi

A republic is characterized by the citizenry electing representatives, who in turn legislate (i.e., make law). As an alternative, the citizenry itself could vote directly on legislative proposals. The latter is called direct democracy. Ancient Athens, for example, practiced it. In the United States, the republic form is the prevalent form of government.  In spite of Wilson’s comment made in the constitutional convention that representation “is made necessary only because it is impossible for the people to act collectively,”[1] direct democracy has typically limited to an occasional “referendum” question even though more vital questions could be put to the body politic directly. 

Typically, referendums have tended to do with elections (and thus with representative rather than direct democracy) or with general taxing or spending limits for a government. The rationale for putting general taxing or spending limits up for referendum is that they apply to a government as a whole—this perspective being from that of popular sovereignty (i.e., the citizenry, whose electoral power transcends their government). Rarely, an “issue” is put up to be decided directly by the voters. By 2024, several of the member-states in the U.S. had had referendi on legalizing marijuana. I contend that many more matters of policy could be decided directly by the voters. 

Since the elected representatives represent the citizenry, the former should not be presumed as having the definitive right of such decision. Deciding on matters of general policy are primarily value-judgements, rather than requiring expertise.  Issues such as abortion, gay marriage, the Bush tax cuts, and the Iraq and Afghanistan wars could—and I would argue should—be decided by the voters directly. Beyond issues, the voters could decide more general governance questions, such as whether federalism should be continued. Such a question could lead to more specific proposals at the next election. 

For example, if the majority of American voters want the US to be of federalism, representatives could work on not only constitutional amendments, but also proposals for the voters on which broad areas of power would be transferred back to the states (or the voters could be asked—assuming a majority still want federalism—whether X or Y areas of power should be transferred back to the States). Should elected representatives counter that we should not trust the people to make such decisions, I would argue that it is nonsensical for an agent to contend that his principal is somehow inferior to himself. In a representative democracy, the representatives are the agents of the people; it is not the other way around.

In short, I contend that popular sovereignty ought to be strengthened rather than vitiated. Elected representatives are best suited to working out the technical details rather than deciding broad questions of policy.  An election campaign is a bricollage of factors; it is rare for a victor to be able to claim a mandate on a particular issue. In fact, a representative may be elected for reasons having nothing to do with his or her positions on “the issues.” 

The midterm election of 2010, for example, could have been informed by a mix of factors; it was not even clear whether people voting Republican, for example, were saying yes to that party’s platform or no to the previous two years of legislation (which was informed by both Democratic and Republican law-makers—neither party being able to enact its platform as given).  Even voters blaming the Democratic Party for the resulting legislation is not strictly speaking accurate, as compromises had to be made with Republicans.  So an election of representatives is a broad brush that cannot be divined as a mandate on particular issues.  

Regarding particular policies—even foreign policy, such as whether the US Government should continue to support Israel—the only way to know if there is a mandate is to put the matters up for decision by the voters. Political parties could have a say on how the questions are worded so they are objective (or two versions could be provided). Courts would still be able to declare the resulting law unconstitutional, but even here constitutional amendment is possible.  Even in terms of amendments, the voters, rather than their constitutional delegates or state or federal representatives, could decide directly.  

For example, the voters could decide whether US Senators should continue to be elected, or whether they should be appointed by the state governments or be the governors themselves (the US Senate being like the European Council of the E.U.). The voters could also decide whether abortion should be decided by the state or U.S. courts, or directly by the voters—by state or US—as an amendment.

At the very least, basic decisions would be made that have been mired in disputes between governmental institutions and/or government officials. We are depending much too much on elected and appointed government officials to “make” policy. Ultimately, the will of the people should be freed up and exercised beyond the confines of simply electing representatives—being subject only to the judiciary protecting individual rights (which can be overruled by constitutional amendment, which can be of the people).  Sadly, those in power—the elected representatives—will naturally and ironically resist efforts to expand the will of the people. 

Because the election of a representative involves many elements, an elected representative could easily get around interpreting his or her victory as a mandate to expand the will of the people.  This is precisely part of the problem, and it maintains the monopoly of power that our elected representatives enjoy.  I suspect this is no accident. Hence I am not optimistic on any expansion of popular sovereignty any time soon.  Even so, I hope my thoughts here are thought-provoking. 

Although not the best person to quote, Richard Nixon pointed in one of his books to the need for political development: “In terms of material progress, the twentieth century has been the best in history, but in terms of political progress the record has been disappointing.”[2]  

What I am suggesting is that our political system is so antiquated that were it to develop as technology has, our use of elections could make quite a leap forward.  In spite of all the technological change, we tend to hold very rigidly to the way things have “always been done” in politics.  It is time for politics to catch up. In fact, the technological progress could facilitate the expansion of popular sovereignty.  For example, voters could surf the internet for information before voting on general policy areas. The challenge may well be in how to enable illiterate voters to be able to take part.  As one possibility, voters could vote at desks (as in a classroom) while a reader reads through the questions on the ballot. My point is that we can begin to think outside the box and shake loose our assumptions.

1. James Madison, Notes in the Federal Convention of 1787. New York: Norton, 1987, p. 74.
2. Richard Nixon, 1999 Victory Without War, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1988, p. 16.

Instant Gratification Rules in American Fiscal Policy

With an expected deficit of $1.2 trillion for 2018-2019, the U.S. Government in December, 2017 enacted a tax cut with an expected revenue loss of nearly $1 trillion over a decade (assuming some growth from the tax stimulus) and, two months later, a budget deal passed adding $300 billion to federal spending in the next fiscal year.[1] All this was done with the U.S. debt at over $20 trillion—higher than the annual GDP at the time. With the  economy humming along with a low unemployment rate, the prospect for any fiscal discipline was bleak. Put another way, if budget surpluses could not come at the boom end of an economic cycle, then deficits would be likely in good times and bad. Behind the structural imbalance of contiguous deficits and an ever-growing debt is the all-too-human preference for instant gratification without a corresponding value being placed on self-discipline.

In a republic, the electorate elects representatives in part because direct democracy has no constraint on the immediate passions of a people. In the case of the U.S. Congress and White House,  the representatives had not by 2018 at least resisted the instinct for immediate benefit for the good of the American republics and their peoples—which together constitute the United States. Thomas Jefferson and John Adams agreed in retirement that an educated and virtuous citizenry is vital to a viable republic. The $20 trillion federal debt reflects back on Americans not in a good way in this respect.

For a republic—including one that is also a federation of republics—to be viable over the long term, some allowance for the long term must be made in the form of fiscal discipline. This is essentially self-discipline on a societal level. In the case of the tax cut and additional federal spending, Americans could “expect some of the strongest economic growth” in years.[2] This made the urge for instant gratification particularly alluring. In the medium term, Americans would face “more risk of surging inflation and higher interest rates—fears that were behind a steep stock market sell-off” in early February, 2018.[3] Notice that the negatives begin only in the medium term; hence they do not detract from the instant gratification. In the long term, the U.S. could have less flexibility fiscally in enacting a stimulus to combat a recession or even a crisis like that which had hit Wall Street in September, 2008. Additionally, “higher interest payments could prove a burden on the federal Treasury and on economic growth.”[4] The short term boost in an already booming economy could be expected at the time to hamper economic growth perhaps at a time of recession! Yet the force of this anticipation had no power in the enacting of the tax cut and additional spending. Knowledge, it appears, requires virtue manifesting as self-discipline. That it was missing reflects especially on the elected representatives of both parties, but also on the American electorate that elects and re-elects those representatives with impunity.

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[1] Neil Irwin, “Austerity Era Comes to End,” The New York Times, February 10, 2018.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid.

Should Same-Party-Affiliation Exclude Investigations on an Elected Official’s Misconduct?

A survey taken in February, 2017 of 1,571 political scientists on democracy in America reveals a possible problem regarding the extent to which government officials are sanctioned for misconduct. More than half of the respondents believed that the United States only partly meets or does not meet this criterion, whereas about 80 percent of the scholars insisted that the criterion is essential or important to democracy.[1] I submit that partisanship is a major obstacle to performance being able to meet expectations.

When the survey was released, Congress was on a week’s recess. Representatives and senators alike were facing contentious constituents back in the districts and states, respectively. An estimated 1,000 people attended Rep. Jason Chaffetz (R-Utah) “town meeting.” Recalling the yelling and screaming, he later said, “I thought it was intended to bully and intimidate [me].”[2] Democracy is messy. Moreover, the making of law, which binds an otherwise free people, is inherently conflictual as different interests and ideologies contend for influence on the final legislative output. Given the delegated trust placed in elected legislative representatives, their misconduct should be subject to real sanctions.

Ideally, misconduct should be extended to placing party above integrity—that is to say, giving elected officials a pass on their misconduct simply because they are of the same political party. Constituents can be out in front of even veteran members of Congress on this point. In his “town hall,” Chaffetz heard a constituent insist that Republicans in the U.S. House of Representatives should investigate President Trump’s conflicts of interest for instances of impropriety.[3] Even though much of the federal conflicts-of-interest law does not apply to the president, the American people arguably should know of actual instances in which the president has or is exploiting the relationship between his governmental power and business interests. Party should not trump integrity as concerning the obligation of members of Congress to provide a check on the executive branch, including the president.

I suspect that the force of partisanship on members of Congress stems in part from the political atmosphere in Washington, D.C.—such that the role of partisanship is perceived as being more significant than it should be and is to constituents back home. Of course, the threats doubtlessly made from higher in the party “food chain” provides an impetus to members of Congress to look the other way concerning the possible misconduct of colleagues of the same party. That a constituent expects her elected representative to put integrity before party in regard to investigating misconduct shows just how decadent the inbred culture of a political elite can be, even in a viable democracy. In other words, it is telling when an angry constituent is the adult and her representative is the child.

Democratic theory holds just the opposite—namely, that an elected representative can withstand the momentary excessive passions of the moment that have no such check in a direct democracy, wherein people vote directly on proposed laws such as was the case in ancient Athens. Put another way, representative democracy itself is a check against mob rule. It is telling, therefore, when someone from an angry mob is the adult in the room.

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[1] Claire C. Miller and Kevin Quealy, “Democracy in America: How Is It Doing?” The New York Times, February 23, 2017.

[2] Andrew Kaczynski, “Rep. Jason Chaffetz: People at My Town Hall ‘Intended to Bully and Intimidate’ Me,” CNN.com, February 23, 2017.

[3] “Morning Edition,” National Public Radio, February 23, 2017.

Analysis of Italy’s 2016 Referendum: Beyond the Euro and the E.U.

The predominate axis of analysis in the wake of the Italian referendum in early December, 2016 centered on the euro, the federal currency of the European Union. 

The full essay is at "Essays on the E.U. Political Economy," available at Amazon.

Iceland’s Pirate Party on Systemic Change in Developing Democracy

Rarely does systems theory become a political issue; instead, political parties and their respective candidates brandish policy positions geared to fixing particular issues (i.e., parts of systems). In Iceland, the Pirate Party proffered an exception leading up to the 2016 election. “We do not define ourselves as left or right but rather as a party that focuses on the systems,” said Birgitta Jónsdóttir, the party’s leader.[1] In other words, the party made system itself the issue. “We stand for enacting changes that have to do with reforming the systems, rather than changing minor things that might easily be changed back,” she said.[2] Even if the minor things could not be easily changed back, I contend that fixing them is still sub-optimal when the systems of which they are part are warped, and thus deficient as wholes. Therefore, a political party’s emphasis on systems as themselves being in need of reform presents the world’s population with a practical way to redress systemic problems.

In Iceland alone, the economy collapsed after the banks failed in the 2008 financial crisis, and in 2016 the prime minister resigned after being named in the Panama Papers scandal. The corruption itself indicates that the political economy—as a system—was broken. The nexus of business and government was particularly in need of reform beyond little fixes. Hence, the Pirate Party’s platform included “advocating for direct democracy” and “total government transparency.”[3] Wikileaks had already given the world’s population an idea of just how valuable transparency can be; at the very least, it had shown just how corrupt the world’s political elite was.

The move to direct democracy makes sense under the circumstances. Were major policy decisions themselves taken by electorates on election day—rather than lumping such decisions with those of which candidate to vote for—the political elite, including elected officials, would have less power. Given the level of corruption revealed by Wikileaks, reducing the power makes sense. Were electorates able to vote on major policy positions, the winning candidates would be obliged legally to implement the winning policies because the popular sovereign (i.e., an electorate) is the source of governmental sovereignty (i.e., the power of governments in republics).

Were policy positions distinguished from the question of who should fill a public office, no longer would voters be put in the position of voting for a candidate in spite of disagreeing with some of his or her policy positions; the decision on candidates would pertain to them (e.g., competence and trustworthiness). Voters not in favor of any of the candidates (e.g., they are all corrupt) could bypass that line and still vote on policies, and thus still participate as a citizen. I suspect that many Americans could have benefitted from such a reform in 2016.

The Pirate Party was essentially saying that humanity needs to catch up with democratic theory; existing systems being warped by political and business elites. Because a given candidate typically takes positions on several issues, a voter is essentially voting on all those positions in voting for the candidate even if that voter does not agree with all those positions. This is a structural flaw in representative democracy that stems from putting too much emphasis on office-holders. To be sure, they could still have discretion on policy matters not on the ballet that are either minor at the time of the election or come up during the term of office. Separating out the policies from decisions on candidates for the offices would provide a closer fit for the voter’s preferences on the major policies as well as the candidates—including on their judgment, which would theoretically apply to the remaining discretion on minor or upcoming policy matters.

To the extent that democracy, which can be viewed as a hybrid of direct and representative, reflects the will of the people, that system of government is rightly deemed legitimate. Given the spread of democracy in the world since the early modern age, addressing the system itself of how candidates are elected and major policies are adopted and implemented would represent a major step in political development for our species.

Unfortunately, systemic change is labeled “radical” by the interests of the status quo. In its article on Iceland’s Pirate Party, USA Today begins with “Iceland’s radical Pirate Party.”[4] The value-judgment that goes with radicalism antedates the judgment of the Icelandic people and thus subtly works against systemic change even though there is a good case for it. The world could do worse than read of a party whose platform makes systemic change explicit (and as being valuable).

Ideally, electorates, as the popular sovereign in democracies, will someday take up the power to decide directly rather than by party (or candidate) on alternative systemic changes. Even the question of whether major policy decisions should be made by electorates on election day apart from voting for candidates for public offices could be put before the electorates in a binding fashion. Few political elites would willingly cede such power willingly, without pressure from an electorate. This is why Iceland’s Pirate Party is so significant; in short, it may show the way.

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[1] Kim Hjelmgaard, “Hacker-founded Pirate Party Could Win Iceland’s Election,” USA Today, October 28, 2016.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid.

The U.S. Senate Approves Fast-Track for Pacific Trade Deal: Overstating the General Will

The way the world works is not in itself reason enough to dismiss the possibility of an ideal being more fully realized, and to refuse to take practical steps to its realization. Horse-trading is a staple in politics. The expression “making sausage” is typically used to refer to political horse-trading because people generally do not know—nor do they want to know—how sausage gets made; and it is probably best that way, at least according to the politicians. I propose that we “get under the hood” anyway, because only then can we ask ourselves whether political horse-trading is overused; a better way may be possible and even practical under some conditions.

Political horse-trading occurs when one elected representative (Mr. X) agrees to go along with another representative’s (Mr. Y) piece of legislation, which isn’t very important to X’s constituents but is to Y’s, in exchange for Y’s vote on another bill, which isn’t important to Y’s constituents but is to X’s folks back home. With enough support and horse-trading both bills stand a good chance of becoming law, whereas without the practice perhaps neither bill would pass. Although the legislative output of the legislative chamber is increased, that the support for each bill is overstated—the votes in favor being more than the number of representatives who support the legislation itself. A minority of representatives in the chamber may be for drilling for oil in natural parks, for example, but a bill whose express purpose is to permit such activity by oil companies could pass anyway due to horse-trading. The general will as per the representatives as a whole would not be in line with the legislation passed, meaning theoretically at least that the will of the people would not be in favor of drilling; so is more legislative output necessarily a good thing in a representative democracy? Rousseau would point to the general will as having been thwarted by ambitious politicians looking out narrowly for the particular will of their respective constituencies or even just themselves. Out of an original social contract comes “a moral and collective body made up of as many members as the assembly has voices, and which receives by this same act its unity, its common self, its life and its will.”[1] This will is the general will. If particular interests make out well at the expense of the good of the whole, then the general will is thwarted or compromised. Hence, horse-trading may not be justified by its facilitative impact in terms of legislative output.

In May 2015, the U.S. Senate rebuffed the U.S. President’s request to have the proposed Pacific trade treaty (PTT) voted “up or down” without amendments (i.e., “fast-track” authority). The U.S. House of Representatives had already approved the fast-track authority. In spite of Democratic senators claiming that workers would not be adequately protected as the trade deal had been negotiated, enough of those senators turned around and voted a week or so later to end the debate. Sixty-two senators voted for cloture, enabling the fast-track authority to go through. The U.S. president and the Senate’s majority leader had enough power to do the necessary horse-trading.

The vote nearly failed—being a few votes shy of the 60 needed to end debate. “It only succeeded after about a dozen senators engaged in a tense discussion in the middle of the Senate floor, well after the time for the vote had expired.”[2] The bending of the Senate’s rules on the duration of the vote is itself suspect; it could be the smoke over cloaked horse-trading. According to several U.S. senators, "the key was Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) promising Sen. Maria Cantwell (D-Wash.) to have a vote on reauthorizing the Export-Import Bank, which backs loans in places where there might not otherwise be sufficient funding to purchase products from the United States. A key beneficiary is Boeing, in Cantwell's state."[3] Does this constitute horse-trading, or would the reauthorization of the Export-Import Bank make the Pacific trade deal better for U.S. workers?

As an instance of corporate welfare, the Bank would primarily benefit American businesses that export to the impoverished countries getting the loans. The companies’ shareholders and to some degree the workers would also benefit from the additional business. Even so, reauthorizing the Bank would not mean that workers in countries that are party to the TPP would be protected or that the free-trade deal would not result in American workers being laid off. The A.F.L.-C.I.O. contended at the time that 700,000 jobs in the U.S. had been lost or displaced due to NAFTA.[4] Presumably the figure would not have been higher without the corporate welfare that the Export-Import Bank was dolling out. We can conclude, therefore, that Cantwell’s horse-trade with McConnell did nothing to remove Cantwell’s concerns about worker-protections under the TPP—assuming she really had concerns!

Moreover, we can conclude that the support for fast-tracking the TPP deal was less than 62 senators who voted in favor of ending debate, since the horse-trading made the difference in the cloture vote. In effect, McConnell broadened the scope of the vote by making a promise regarding another issue. In doing so, he blurred the general will and thus compromised the democratic principle wherein the people’s representatives vote on the merits of the same thing—rather than some of the representatives essentially voting on one thing and other representatives voting on something else. The legislative output is greater, but so is the risk that bad legislation will go into effect.

What if legislative votes were like straw polls wherein each representative would be asked what he or she thinks of a proposal, such as drilling in national parks. The matter requires judgment as well as information. Looking into an issue and making a judgment on it is what elected lawmakers are presumably supposed to do. Political horse-trading impedes or compromises the judgment and perhaps even the information-gathering. To be sure, judgment is involved in deciding which bills to trade; however, this sort of judgment is not the same as judgment on a particular issue, with a vote ensuring from it. Theoretically at least, being satisfied as a country with legislative output reflecting legislative judgments on the respective bills, rather than informally grouping them so they all get through, has the benefit of better public policy unless the lawmakers’ judgment capacity is bad (i.e., voters making bad choices in who they vote for). Put another way, if enough senators (technically, states) judged that the PTT negotiated by the Obama administration would be a bad treaty, then the fast-track status should not have been approved; the check-and-balance in the Senate’s power to ratify treaties would be of value.

Practically speaking, Obama and McConnell could not be expected to hold back on using their power to reach 60 votes. To assume otherwise would be tantamount to expecting a stream to run uphill. Horse-trading could be made illegal, but enforcement would be a bitch given the nature of the beast. Making use of referendums at the policy level, such as whether the U.S. Government funds should cover abortion, or whether pot should be legalized, would preempt legislative horse-trading, though voters could of course use their vote in a referendum for another purpose rather than to signify their judgment on the issue at hand. Even so, considering the prevalence of horse-trading in legislative chambers, the general will stands a better shot at being reflected if referenda are included on ballots. Voting only for a candidate—theoretically in part because of the candidate’s good judgment—implies that he or she would use it on issues rather than merely to horse-trade well. The prevalence of legislative horse-trading means that the electorate should not rely so much on voting to fill offices; some direct democracy should also be in the mix. Perhaps then legislative rules (with teeth) clamping down on horse-trading would be enough to pick up the slack. Even more idealistically, perhaps voters might vote for candidates who find contributing to the general will rather than obfuscating it to be fulfilling and of value. Of course, if the electorate deems (i.e., the general will) that good legislation is the aggregation of bills satisfying various parts (i.e., constituencies) of the whole, then the voters will favor candidates who value horse-trading. To the extent that such candidates get elected (and reelected) even though the majority of the voters believe that their representative should use his or her judgment on each issue rather than horse-trade, then at least part of the problem lies with representative democracy itself.

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1. Jean-Jacque Rousseau, The Social Contract, in The Social Contract and Other Political Writings, Victor Gourevitch, ed. and trans. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 50.

2. Michael McAuliff, “Senate Advances Fast-Track for Obama Trade Deals,” The Huffington Post, May 21, 2015.

3. Ibid.

4. Kevin Granville, “The Trans-Pacific Partnership Trade Deal: What It Would Mean,” The New York Times, May 11, 2015.

The Swiss Vote to Restrict Immigration: Direct Democracy in Action

On February 9, 2014, the Swiss voted in a non-binding referendum by a narrow margin (50.3%) in favor of immigration quotas and an end to “mass immigration.”[1] This result took the government by surprise; officials had been urging the people to vote no. So too had the Swiss bankers—only coincidentally of course. Just enough voters rebuffed the establishment of power and wealth for the referendum to pass. Johann Schneider-Ammane, the Swiss Economy Minister, suggested that a “culture of excess” in the pursuit of profit sometimes at the expense of the common good had discredited the political and business elite in the eyes of ordinary people.[2]

Johann Schneider-Ammane, the Swiss Economy Minister. Rarely does a prominent member of the political/business elite publicly criticize it while stressing how it differs from the people. 

(Image Source: Ruben Sprich of Reuters)

Put more abstractly, direct democracy broke from the grips of a firmly-established plutocracy (rule by wealth), even if only for a day.  This caveat is important, for the referendum’s non-binding feature means that the government is not bound to craft the majority vote into law. Put another way, the game-rules were tilted or rigged in favor of the financial sector and the government, and thus of representative over direct democracy, and, moreover, of plutocracy over democracy itself. If the check on popular passions afforded by representative democracy (e.g., terms of office) does not trump the value-added from the direct will of the people in direct democracy, the non-binding rule is sub-optimal.

As yet another drawback, E.U. government officials did not miss a beat in exploiting the non-binding feature by publicly pressuring the legislators of the independent state to resist writing the referendum’s result into law. Besides what this high-level squeeze says about the tilt toward representative democracy and even plutocracy at the expense of the people’s will having direct effect, I submit that the distinction between the nature and scale of an empire and those of polities on par with the empire’s constituent political units (i.e., states) is disregarded as well.

Martin Schultz, the president of E.U.’s parliament at the time of the referendum, immediately accused the Swiss citizens who voted yes of having succumbed to “the lowest instincts” rather than being led “by rational arguments.”[3] If the statement sounds like rhetoric designed to influence a vote already taken, the underlying intent may have been to exploit the referendum’s non-binding feature by pressuring the government of the independent state to act contrary to the will of the majority.[4] That is to say, Schultz and other E.U. government officials sought to exploit the distinction between direct and representative democracy.

The question of fairness in government officials of an empire-scale union of states pressuring legislators in an independent state largely flew under the world’s radar screen. As various E.U. officials hinted that the maintaining the free movement of workers is a requirement in the European free-trade agreement (EEA), no one bothered to recall that an empire-scale “territory of territories” consists of many cultures, whereas within a state (or even an independent state-scaled republic like Switzerland) cultural or ethnic diversity does not necessarily exist, at least not anywhere near that of an empire-scale federal union. In fact, the E.U. citizens and residents moving from one state to another are actually “quasi-immigrants”—a hybrid status that reflects the dual-sovereignty that exists in modern federalism (e.g., the E.U. and U.S.). Therefore, inter-state movement of people within the E.U. is more necessary than the free movement of immigrants in the independent state of Switzerland (whose cantons are roughly equivalent in scale to counties in some E.U. and U.S. states). 

Is it fair that a policy stemming from the nature of an empire-scale “compound” polity be pushed on an independent state? At the scale of polities that are states (in empire-scale Unions-of-states) or regions (in China), or republics (in Russia), homogeneity (e.g., a shared culture) has been the default, and indeed arguably of value in terms of solidarity (which an empire typically has trouble achieving, given the inherent interstate diversity).

To be sure, the Dutch and German states had been empires in medieval times; that Switzerland was as well can be seen in the linguistic and cultural diversity still remaining there. Yet by early modern standards, those federations were on the scale of the early-modern nations (hence then on the state-scale, rather than that of empire). The strengthening of centralized monarchs and the related military advances effectively extended the quarters of homogeneity, and thus pushed out the scale of empire (as consisting of those nations).

In conclusion, in threatening the Swiss government with exclusion from the free-trade area because a slight majority of the Swiss voting yes felt that the diversity already extant in their state-scale polity was compromising unity possible at that scale (but not at that of an empire), the E.U. officials were conflating the nature of an empire with that of the political units therein. In other words, to apply the level of inter-state “immigration” needed in the E.U. to state-scale Switzerland involves a rather fundamental political category mistake. What is necessary and fitting for one level of governance is not necessarily so at another level.  

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[1] Euronews, “Switzerland Votes in Favour of Capping Immigration into the Country,” February 9, 2014.

[2] Edward Taylor, “Swiss Immigration Vote Shows Loss of Trust in Business Elite: Minister,” Reuters, February 12, 2014.

[3] Euronews, “Swiss Voters Cause Upset with EU over Support for Immigration Quotas,” February 10, 2014.

[4] Actually, the majority of 50.3% is only barely a majority. Considering that only half of the eligible voters voted, the “majority” is actually a minority of the electorate, not to mention the general population. 

Should Britain Secede from the E.U.?

The real purpose of the E.U. is not economic, but political. It began as the ECSC, which was geared to making sure that Germany would not re-militarize by extracting iron from the Rhine region. The purpose of the E.U. is to obviate the sort of bloodshed that Britain saw in WWI and WWII. If the British people don't want to be in the E.U., then you should leave. I don't believe that even your own government should keep you from deciding such a matter as a people, directly. That said, with great power comes great responsibility, and this applies to popular sovereignty. In other words, the people taking up the mantle of direct democracy in a constitutional referendum should make an informed decision, looking beyond even the people's own immediate interests. The stakes are much, much higher than whether being in the E.U. is an economic net loss or gain to Britain on a yearly basis, or even whether the City is crimped or inconvenienced. Much more is at stake.

After watching Downton Abbey(season 2), War Horse, or Saving Private Ryan, you might want to reflect on the risks involved in secession. You might just be anticipating a future war between you and the continent. You might even be starting a chain reaction that could result in Europe itself being fractured. The Hungarian right, for instance, is urging Hungary to secede. Lest you think there is no long-term benefit in Eastern Europe being in the E.U., you might study Serbia a bit more than a century ago.

Oh, and by the way, the word from Switzerland is that the EEA is just about as restrictive as the E.U. because the EEA had to adopt most of the E.U.'s economic regulations in order to trade with the E.U.'s states. So be careful what you wish for—you might find that you have even less impact on trade regulations that bind you. You might be better off with a “multi-track” E.U. that, unlike the U.S., accommodates different preferences among the states. In other words—and I suspect this will not be lost on any of you—you can be part of something that outdoes the U.S. by improving immensely on modern federalism at the empire-level by showing the world how flexibility can be built in. Or, you can sit on the sidelines as the E.U. continues on to "ever closer union" while accommodating those states that want more room yet are nonetheless part of the union—part of the effort to obviate war in Europe for your generation and your posterity. The choice is yours.

Scott Walker’s Recall in Wisconsin: Mob Rule?

In early March, 2012, unions and conservative groups had already “turned Wisconsin’s battle over labor rights into a national, multimillion-dollar war.”[1] In 2011, the two sides had spent $44 million in it. The unions began an effort in that year to recall Scott Walker, the government’s figurehead and chief executive, and several senators in Wisconsin’s Senate “after they pushed through legislation restricting the collective-bargaining and organizing powers of workers belonging to government-employee unions.”[2] While this depiction is cogent—a battle over labor rights involving legislation restricting collective-bargaining rights for government employees—I contend that the assumed linkage between the battle and the recall is deeply flawed.

It is one thing to contend politically over labor rights, and it is quite another to recall a sitting head of state (and senators). To cut short the term of an elected official simply because he or she favored legislation that one opposes is to violate one of the main pillars of representative democracy. Specifically, terms of office exist to enable representatives to act or vote for what they believe is in the best interest of the people even if it is not favored by popular passions of the moment. In other words, removing an elected representative from office because he or she supported or voted for legislation that one opposes is to reduce representative democracy to whatever passion happens to be felt strongest by the mob.

There is a reason why Plato and Aristotle depict two kinds of democracy in their respective typologies of government. The good form of democracy is “rule by the many” while the bad is “mob rule.” Electing representatives and giving them a fixed term of office is a principal way in which “rule by the many” (as opposed to the one or the few) is protected from sliding into the decadent “mob rule.” Seized by an ideological and partisan fever, the pro-recall Wisconsinites have been blind to their own culpability in violating a basic tenet of representative democracy.

In other words, there is a reason why the U.S. constitution requires “high crimes and misdemeanors” rather than mere legislative or ideological disagreement for the impeachment and removal of office of a U.S. President. Were disagreement itself over a piece of legislation sufficient to remove a representative from office—even if as in Scott Walker’s case the office-holder had campaigned on the issue by taking the position in question—then elections themselves are relegated. “Elections have consequences” only holds if it is agreed that the winner is not justifiably removed from office as soon as he or she starts to act (lawfully) on the campaign promises. Even if the proposal or vote had not been something mentioned in the campaign, it is not sufficient to remove a representative simply out of disagreement with his or her proposal or vote. Besides eviscerating representative democracy itself, such a recall is utterly unfair to the particular officeholders.

Were I a Wisconsinite in 2011, I would have opposed the proposal to balance the budget by restricting collective bargaining rights. Besides there being other ways, the proposal seemed like a subterfuge for union-busting to me. Not being a citizen or even resident of Wisconsin, I was merely a bystander as the recall effort, or “battle over labor rights,” unfolded given the nature of federalism and the fact that Wisconsin, like France, is a semi-sovereign republic. Generally speaking, it is inappropriate that people and organizations outside of Wisconsin contributed so much money to intervene on a political matter that was properly for the citizens and residents of Wisconsin to decide. The over-reaching by outside vested interests only added to the conflation of the issue of a recall with that of union bargaining rights.

The question for Wisconsinites was whether Scott Walker and the senators abused their respective offices by signing and voting for a piece of legislation. As their respective offices include signing and voting on legislation, doing so cannot constitute abuse of office or criminal behavior. Otherwise, it would be penalize someone for doing what they are supposed to do. It is like shooting a bird for flying. “What the hell else should I have been doing?” such a bird might wonder in loud chirps while falling to earth. It is obvious that to shoot a bird simply for flying is not fair to the bird because it is designed to fly, and yet it was difficult for many Wisconsinites to grasp that sheer disagreement with the choices made by elected officials as per the design of their respective offices does not justify removing the officials as if they had acted improperly.

Looking in from the outside, I do not think much of the strategy Scott Walker and the Republican legislators used to balance Wisconsin’s budget (though I give them credit for balancing it). Even so, it would have been highly unfair to them, were I—assuming I were a Wisconsinite—to have urged Walker’s ouster simply because he signed a law he had campaigned on (the same holds even if he had not done so). I believe in representative democracy as against mob rule more than I cherish my own ideology.

It is a pity that there were not more adults in Madison and Milwaukee in 2011. As John Adams and Thomas Jefferson wrote in their letters to each other, an educated and virtuous citizenry is vital to a viable republic; otherwise, it is apt to slide into mob rule where simply being disliked is enough to mean the end of a person. There is a reason why the delegates to the U.S. constitutional convention in 1787 distrusted partisanship. I do not believe that ideological disagreement ought to have so much sway over representative democracy itself as it has in Wisconsin.

“Elections have consequences” and “rule of law” may seem like strong pillars in Western civilization, but under the weight of vice they can quickly become woefully pliable, given the self-serving denial that is possible in human nature. Perhaps the struggle here boils down to the necessity that is in law as against the vicissitude that is in human nature. Do we respect law more than our own likes and dislikes? That is to say: as moderns, are we as civilized as we presume we are? Can presumptuous children self-govern as a people simply because they claim to be mature? These are questions for all of us who live in republics to ponder and reflect on, for they are being played out in our own day and not necessarily on some distant galaxy.

1. Alicia Mundy, “Wisconsin Recall Realigns Campaign Spending,” The Wall Street Journal, March 6, 2012.
2. Ibid.

Gay Marriage in New Jersey

Just after New Jersey’s legislature passed a law legalizing gay marriage, Gov. Chris Christie followed through on his promise to reject the bill by quickly vetoing it and renewing his call for a ballot question to decide the issue. In returning the bill to the Legislature, Christie reaffirmed his view that voters should decide whether to change the definition of marriage in New Jersey. "I am adhering to what I've said since this bill was first introduced – an issue of this magnitude and importance, which requires a constitutional amendment, should be left to the people of New Jersey to decide," Christie said in a statement; "I continue to encourage the Legislature to trust the people of New Jersey and seek their input by allowing our citizens to vote on a question that represents a profoundly significant societal change. This is the only path to amend our State Constitution and the best way to resolve the issue of same-sex marriage in our state.”[1] Why stop at issues requiring a constitutional amendment? Although technical legislation requires representatives to wade through and discern specific ramifications pro and con, broad policy questions could also be subject to binding referendums. That is to say, representatives could be seen as doing only what the electorate cannot viably do.

Whether enacted by a legislature or by direct democracy, a law that takes basic rights away from a minority such as gays could be illegitimate even though passed democratically. Democrats in the New Jersey legislature argued “that same-sex marriage is a matter of civil rights, and that civil rights should not be subject to referendum.”[2] In other words, there are limits even to direct democracy, and the courts have a legitimate role in interpreting whether individual rights have been inordinately oppressed by the will of the majority.

In terms of legitimacy, passing gay marriage by referendum is the most legitimate, and without any need for the courts to step in to look at the matter of individual rights. Next legitimate would be such a law passed by a legislature. Again, the judiciary would not need to look at whether a minority is being tyrannized by a majority. Where a referendum or legislature passes a law or constitutional amendment forbidding gay marriage, as in 30 of the American republics at the time of Christie’s action, the democratic rights of a majority are pitted against the civil rights of a minority. Courts could look at existing constitutional articles to assess whether an amendment is constitutional. However, it is conceivable that such articles could be changed such that an amendment that refuses the right of a minority could not be touched by a court.

To take another example, all of the federal and state constitutional articles that prohibit slavery could be repealed and a new amendment making the practice legal would make it constitutional. No court could touch it because courts are limited to interpreting constitutions. In the case of gay marriage, the current equal protection language could be used to declare a federal amendment barring gay marriage unconstitutional. What if the due process language were changed by amendment and an anti-marriage amendment added? The U.S. Supreme Court could be forced to defend the new amendment if nothing else in the U.S. constitution could render the addition unconstitutional. Where the amendment is to a state constitution, planks from the federal constitution could be used, as was the case in California on Proposition 8 a week or two before the New Jersey legislature passed gay marriage.

From this, we can take away the following points:

1. On matters of broad policy, in which ideological judgment is more salient than technical knowledge, direct democracy is more legitimate than representative democracy. Such policy need not be limited to matters requiring constitutional amendment. Invading Iraq and extending the federal debt ceiling are two cases in point.

2. The majority acting to protect minority rights by legislative means or a referendum is the best case scenario in a republic because no constitutional interpretation by judges is necessary. 

3. Where legislation or a referendum bars a minority from exercising a right, the legitimacy of majority rule is pitted against that of individual rights. Accordingly, the judiciary has a legitimate interpretive role as such matters must be judged.

1. Angela Santi, “New Jersey Gay Marriage Bill Vetoed By Chris Christie,” The Huffington Post, February 17, 2012. 
2. Kate Zernike, “Gay Marriage, Passed, Awaits Veto by Christie,” The New York Times, February 17, 2012.

Direct and Representative Democracy: Colorado on the Hot Seat

In ancient Athens as well as Renaissance Florence, direct and representative democracy co-existed. The representatives elected or chosen by lot were viewed (and viewed themselves!) as standing in for the people assembled. From a practical standpoint, it is difficult even to legislate by town hall meeting or by a series of referendums on election day. Accordingly, power in democracies has been delegated to representatives and even appointees. In February 2012, this principle, and direct democracy itself, were set to be challenged in a federal lawsuit against Colorado. In my view, the principle is valid whereas the suit is not. Direct democracy outranks representative democracy—the latter having been created not to save a people from themselves but out of sheer practicality.

Colorado's Capitol (seat of government)       Matthew Staver/NYT

The object of the lawsuit is Colorado’s 20-year-old taxpayer-controlled budgeting process known as Tabor, which requires that tax increases (and presumably spending increases) be passed by referendum rather than legislative vote. The 33 plaintiffs argue that Colorado’s Taxpayer Bill of Rights “blocks the ability and jurisdiction of the . . . Legislature to properly do its job.”[1] The rationale is that subjecting tax increases and budget figures to popular referendum usurps Colorado’s legislature’s prerogative. In the early U.S., James Madison had “pushed strongly for a barrier between the passions of the popular will and sober governance . . . through a legislative branch.”[2] Representative governance, in other words, has the benefit of acting as a check on popular passions in the best interest of the people. This objection could be obviated by requiring a revote in a year or two to make the referendum’s results final.

I submit, however, that Madison’s concern is trumped by a more basic relationship that undergirds the relationship between direct and representative democracy: that between the popular sovereign and government. Arguing on the basis of a benefit such as checking passions, for example, is not to furnish a rationale for prerogative. In other words, that the popular sovereign may not always be wise or prudent does not mean that its agents therefore trump their principals—the people. Even if an agent has expertise that his or her principal does not have, this does not, as in the business judgment rule, necessarily mean that the agent becomes the principal (and the principal, the agent). In the case of corporations, maximizing profit is merely the default—something the owners should be able to deviate from and their hired hands (e.g., executives) would be obliged to devise strategy in line with the new mission.

If, as the plaintiffs claim, Colorado’s legislature is “unable to raise and appropriate funds” and thus “cannot meet its primary constitutional obligations” under the “guarantee” clause of the U.S. constitution, it is because the principal has taken that constitutional role back, through fully constitutional means, which the popular sovereign, as the principal, has the right to do. Remember, the people as a group have delegated authority to representatives.

In other words, popular and governmental sovereignty are not incompatible. Constitutions are ratified not by the member governments, but, rather, by the people, precisely because the authority of the people goes beyond that of their agents. The popular sovereign does not have to continue even with its constitutions. Indeed, that sovereign could change any American constitution in any way that sovereign desires, as per the Constitutional Convention of 1787. We could even hold a convention proposing a totally new constitution and with its ratification the current one would instantly be dust. Remember that the Constitutional Convention of 1787 tossed out the guidelines set by the Continental Congress limiting the convention to amending the Articles of Confederation. The convention started over and invented modern federalism in the process. I raise this point only to show that a popular sovereign trumps its government—really by definition. Yet it seems that the legislators in Colorado have their arrows crossed concerning this relationship—most likely a case of good old-fashioned arrogance.

Rather than the Colorado legislature being hamstrung, it is the obligation of the dutiful agents to furnish their master, the popular sovereign, with options that do not privilege the agents themselves or their body over the principal. General tax policy and overall budget numbers decided by the popular sovereign are more legitimate than had they been decided by legislative means even if the people are stupid and willful. This difference in legitimacy exists because the popular sovereign is politically superior to its agents. It is not really a question even of getting the best policy—“best” at this level involves judgment rather than the expertise of a legislator, professional or scholar, anyway.

Instead of being usurped by agents who take themselves as principals and thus somehow illegitimate in a democracy, direct citizen lawmaking is an ideal toward which we should strive to the extent that it is practicable. The agents have too often succeeded in limiting the actual sovereign to speaking once every two or four years, and then only on the vague decisions of filling offices, leaving policy decision to themselves. All too often, this means nothing gets decided, which I submit reflects the tenuous authority of the agents to be definitive for the people. One reason why the Congressional vote on health-care did not settle the matter is because the people themselves did not have a direct say on such an important, life or death, matter. Similarly, the ongoing controversy on abortion partially reflects the “limbo” status from how it was decided (i.e., not by us, as in direct democracy).

Policies like declaring war (in a non-emergency), abortion, whether to extend a tax cut, overall deficit spending, overall drug policy (e.g., legalization), and especially constitutional amendments bearing on government should be up to the people, with the judiciary stepping in when needed to protect individual rights against either legislative or popular encroachment via majority rule. Should abortion be decided by the states? Should the Bush tax cuts be extended for all or excluding the rich? Should the U.S. get out of Afghanistan?  (Should the U.S. have invaded Iraq?)  Should pot be legalized?  Should financial regulation be strengthened or is deregulation the general principle we want to follow? Considering health-insurance, should it be by a public single-payer, a public option with private options, or exclusively by existing private insurers? Should everyone be covered or just those who can pay? The questions would have to be very basic and oriented to basic judgment calls, rather than requiring expertise; our legislators could see that it is incorporated under the rubric of the general principles decided by us.

Along this line, constitutional questions bearing on our system of government are particularly legitimate for direct decision—such as on the role of the states and whether we should have more of a federal or consolidated system. Should corporations be considered as persons, politically? Should money be deemed as “speech” politically? A degree in law is not required to make a judgment on such basic governmental questions. Even the Greek slave Meno knew geometry without being taught, according to Socrates. In fact, experts, like legislators, are properly agents of the popular sovereign, rather than being an alternative wiped out by direct democracy but somehow integral to the legislative process. Federal constitutional amendments in the U.S. could be ratified by referendums (as is already the case in some of the E.U. states in ratifying amendments to E.U. basic law). Amendments could even be sourced in referendums. As it stands, the American people have no direct say on changes to the U.S. Constitution—either in proposing or ratifying amendments. Nor do we have the opportunity to have a say on the existing planks—something Jefferson thought every generation has as a right. Would it be so traumatic were sections of the U.S. constitution forced to compete with a few alternatives, taking say one Article every four years? This is just one of many ways the American people could decide on what binds us.

Admittedly, such changes expanding direct democracy would indeed alter the nature of legislative business; it would more closely resemble what one would expect to find from agents (e.g., technical working out of broad policies already decided and working on submissions for further “instructions”). As a people, we have allowed ourselves to be hoodwinked into viewing our agents as our principals, and this is reflected in the power they have with respect to a near-monopoly on decisions. It is no wonder that the Colorado legislators feel threatened by something that is decided by others. Those legislators suffer from a rather basic category mistake: conflating themselves with their principals. Out of this error has come the representatives’ assumed false entitlement to the near-monopoly that they have enjoyed while the rest of us have been asleep. I can’t even add “at the wheel,” for we have ceded that to our driver without even supposing that we have the right—as the owner of the car—to tell him where to go. We are Ms. Daisy sleeping off a hang-over in the back seat while Morgan Freeman decides where we’ll go. We even expect him to decide, as if it were his job. We are indeed quite asleep. Perhaps we don’t deserve direct democracy?

1. Kirk Johnson, “Colorado Lawsuit Challenges Wisdom of the Ballot Box,” The New York Times, January 31, 2012. 
2. Ibid.