It is ironic that even though
European political theorists, including Immanuel Kant, Johannes Althusius, and
Kenneth Wheare, made substantial contributions on the topic of federalism, even
political leaders in the E.U. as late as 2025 were stumbling over the basics,
getting the very concept wrong. Unfortunately, that has caused journalists to
trip and fall too, leaving E.U. citizens grappling over the apparent problem of
being citizens both of their state and the E.U. even though, according to
former European Central Bank President Mario Draghi spoke in 2025 in favor of “’pragmatic
federalism’ as the political conditions for a true, federal union do not exist
in the E.U. at the moment.”[1]
The claims that “pragmatic federalism” is somehow not indicative of “true”
federalism, and, moreover, that somehow the E.U. has states that are
semi-sovereign (as the E.U. itself has exclusive competences) and yet federalism
does not apply are patently absurd. Draghi was confusing the politics of the
moment, in which the anti-federalist, Euroskeptic ideology was still too
powerful for more governmental sovereignty to be moved to the federal level
from the states, with whether the E.U. had a federal system already. In other
words, “political conditions” are distinct from whether the E.U. has a federal
system of public governance. Draghi’s assertion is all the more astounding not
only because of his governmental experience at the federal level, but also
because the dual-sovereignty (of the states and the Union) means that the E.U.
fits within the category of modern federalism rather than confederalism (using
Wheare’s terminology). Europeans have quite understandably been confused in
trying to classify the E.U. away from the pull of the anti-federalist ideology
in Europe.
That ideology has been a major
impediment to the E.U. being able to govern. Although qualified-majority voting
applies to some of the E.U.’s enumerated powers, or competencies, enough of the
important matters of policy and law have been requiring unanimity in the European
Council and the Council of Ministers that the veto-power of each of the 27
state governments has “thrown a wrench” in the governmental machinery at the
federal level, especially in foreign policy and defense. Whereas the U.S. at
first federalized those areas, the E.U.’s initial emphasis was on economic
policy and law, so drifting over to include the more traditionally-federalized
domains has been stymied by recalcitrant governors threatening to wield their
respective vetoes in the Council even in the face of an overwhelming consensus.
For example, between 2011 and
2025, “Hungary vetoed E.U. proposals more than any other member state . . .,
with a total of 19.”[2] A
“total of 46 vetoes,” moreover, were “exercised in the E.U. by 15 member states
across 38 issues.”[3]
Poland ranked second with seven vetoes. “Hungary has vetoed a significant
number of joint foreign policy statements, but it has also blocked proposals to
lend concrete support to Ukraine and start formal E.U. accession talks,” which
are necessary for Ukraine to become the 28th state in the Union.[4]
It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the Commission, the E.U.’s executive
branch, was by the end of 2025 “deliberately structuring its proposals [for
legislation and foreign policies] in order to avoid requiring unanimous consent”
from the states in the councils, which, after all, represent the states whereas
the European Parliament represents E.U. citizens.[5]
With such governmental machinery, plus the E.U.’s supreme court, the European
Court of Justice, residing at the Union level, the claim that the E.U. is not a
true federal union of states is utterly untenable. “Pragmatic” federalism,
which is actually a governmental tool in the E.U.’s basic law, does not nullify
the E.U.’s federal system, rendering the E.U. as a “multi-speed bloc.” That
label actually signifies decadent jargon rather than any kind of governmental
system that is capable of enacting federal laws that are binding on the states
and anyone on the E.U.’s territory.
Pragmatic federalism is simply
a tactic that the Commission can use to bypass the requirement of unanimity in
the Councils, which, like the U.S. Senate, represent the states. The tactic was
used, for example, to pass federal legislation to phase-out “Russian fuels
under the REPowerEU framework” and to “extend the freeze on the Russian assets.”[6]
So too, in passing legislation enabling the E.U. to issue debt to support
Ukraine militarily, the European Council “bypassed the need for unanimity among
member states” by “gathering those [state governors] who wanted to work
together while keeping Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic out of the deal
as a condition for it to go forward. In doing so, the E.U. . . . showed a new
path forward—one where the unanimity requirement need no longer obstruct” the
passage of legislation at the federal level.[7]
States could be exempted, such as had been done in the Schengen Agreement and
the Stability Pact. The exemption of particular states from a federal program,
policy, law, or regulation does not invalidate the federal system; rather, the tool
merely renders the federal system more flexible. In fact, the U.S. could benefit
by adopting the mechanism, especially because so much power has accrued especially
since 1865 at the federal level at the expense of state differences. Exempting
certain states from a given proposal would not nullify America’s federal
system.
Beyond “pragmatic” federalism
in the E.U., the question of rendering the state-veto obsolete was being
seriously considered by the end of 2025. With 27 states in the E.U. and Russia
invading Ukraine just east of the E.U.’s territory, the E.U. could ill-afford
the continuance of the veto, especially in the domains of foreign policy and
defense. That unanimity would be required to amend the E.U.’s basic law to rid
the union of the state-veto is itself a problem, but it could be solved by any states
objecting to such a change being exempted from any “enhanced cooperation” that would
be switched from unanimity to qualified-majority voting. In short, the precedents
of the Schengen Agreement and the European Stability Pact, which are not incompatible
with federalism, could be followed. In terms of such competencies of the E.U.
that would be added to those that are already subject to qualified-majority voting,
states like Hungary and Slovakia could be exempted. This is not to say that
there would be a union, such as the “EU-26,” within the union, or a foreign
policy union, a defense union, and so on. Such jargon, as well as the euphemistic-sounding
“enhanced cooperation” and, even worse, “multi-speed bloc,” only obscures the
point that in a federal system, states can be exempted from particular federal legislation
(and policies) without the federal system itself being nullified. Also, to
refer to exempting certain states as allowing for “voluntary co-operation” in “coalitions
of the willing” is also misleading because there is nothing voluntary about
being subject to qualified-majority voting on an E.U. competency manifesting as
law. Reducing the E.U. to voluntary cooperation and coalitions of the
willing undermines the European Union itself by detracting from what strength it
does have as a “true federal union.” The extent of vacuous, ideological jargon
outdoes even that of the American retail sector, in which customers are called “guests”
and even “members,” customer orders are considered “perfect,” and one of the
official public holidays is singled out intentionally to be (ideologically)
obscured passive-aggressively as “happy holidays.” But I digress.
To be sure, within the E.U.,
the state-veto has been seen by some people as “the last resort to protect”
state rights.[8]
Tamás Lattmann, an international-law expert, said, “A veto power is the last line
of defence of vital interests. Every case of circumvention has led to a set of
new problems, often the inoperability or discrediting of the system itself.”[9]
However, that states could be exempted means that their vital interests would
not be threatened. Also, exempting states would not discredit the E.U.’s federal
system. In fact, the U.S. federal system could arguably benefit by being more
flexible, as so much governmental power has been federalized and “one size does
not fit all” in an empire-scale federal union, whether in North America or
Europe.
The argument that the state-veto
“serves as an equalizer between smaller and larger member states” has also been
made, especially because the European Parliament has representation by
population.[10] During
its debt crisis, for example, the state of Greece could have made the case that
E.U. policy reflected the interests of German creditors to the extent that even
the anti-austerity party was pressured to accept continued austerity. Furthermore,
the smaller eastern states could legitimately argue that the large states in
the west have disproportionate (even in terms of the population part of
qualified majority voting) informal as well as formal power. The problem is in relying
on a mechanism, the state veto, that has been such a detriment to the enactment
of federal policy and law. In the U.S.
Senate, which was established principally to safeguard the interests of the
small member states, the filibuster, which can be overridden by 60 votes (out
of 100), is typically viewed as sufficient for the minority on any given
question. To be sure, a minority is not the same as one state. In E.U.
competencies subject to qualified majority voting, a single state, whether
large or small, could vote no and yet be subject to a federal policy or law.
The case of tariffs on Chinese imports was a case in point in 2025. If the
filibuster mechanism is sufficient protection for small states in a legislative
chamber in which each state has the same number of votes, then the
number-of-states set at 65% in qualified majority voting could be deemed
sufficient. Generally speaking, a majority of 65 percent has more democratic
legitimacy than does a simple majority—a point that Americans might want to
consider.
In conclusion, the Commission
and Council could hardly be blamed for trying to obviate the state-veto without
subjecting objecting states, for their vital interests are untouched because
they are exempted. With enlargement of the Union being an issue, as well as the
need for federalized defense and foreign policies given the military aggression
of Russia and even Israel, the Union could no longer afford the veto-mechanism
itself even by 2023. The mechanism actually pertains to confederalism, in which
governmental sovereignty is retained by the states, rather than to modern
federalism, in which the atom of governmental sovereignty is split, though not necessarily
evenly, in a federal system between the states and the federal level. That the
E.U., even initially in 1993, has the salient feature of dual sovereignty means
that that union has never been a mere confederal system; the E.U. is thus well-within
being a “true federal union.” Even though it has been in the interest of E.U.
officials to appease Euroskeptics so to as to render them more docile, ideological
denial has cost the European project severely, and the state-veto has played a major
role in the self-inflicted federal impotency.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
