The SEC enforcement staff, including its chief, Robert Khuzami, decided to kick a gift horse in the mouth rather than to “take a lesson” and perhaps come out stronger for it. At issue was the rejection by U.S. District Judge Jed Rakoff of the SEC’s proposed $285 million settlement with Citigroup. In his ruling, Rakoff denounced the penalty as “pocket change” to the bank, which would not even have to admit to any wrongdoing. Investors duped into buying into a $1 billion deal called Class V Funding III had lost $700 million. Betting at the time of issue against half of the assets in the deal, Citigroup did not share knowledge of its hedge with the investors.
The reaction of the SEC staff in Khuzami’s department was simply to “put down their pencils” and wonder how they should go about arranging settlements with financial firms accused of misconduct before and during the financial crisis of 2008. The SEC “doesn’t know what to ask for anymore in the settlements,” one of the people familiar with the Citigroup settlement said. Rather than take the judge’s judgment to heart, Khuzami urged the five-person commission running the SEC to vote to approve an appeal, and they did so. Rather than take the less convenient course of insisting that the banks too big to fail that manipulated their own clients at least admit wrong-doing and reimburse the losses, Khuzami viewed the judge’s ruling as if it were a political obstacle to be obviated by asking an appellate court to ignore it. Given the political muscle that must surely go with Citigroup’s wealth, Khuzami could have been assuming that the bankers would see to it that sufficient pressure would plied on enough appellate judges to make the obstacle easily avoidable. In other words, Khuzami was likely assuming that Rakoff was a fluke, given Citi’s influence—perhaps even in the SEC itself.
Considering the power of regulated banks such as Citigroup, it is not unreasonable to expect the chief executive of the U.S. Government, the President of the United States, to deviate from his avocation of influencing legislation far beyond his minority role as a veto. Rather than spending so much time hitting the stump to get voters to 1) influence their representatives in the legislature and 2) re-elect him, the president could get involved in the question of whether the verdict would be appealed. Lest it be said that that would introduce politics into the mix, I would counter that politics were already very much in the mix both in terms of the five-person SEC vote and in Khuzami’s response to the ruling (i.e., as an obstacle rather than as something to incorporate into future settlement offers). I would even say that politics was involved in Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner’s blessing of the decision to appeal, and therefore also likely a factor in the president’s decision not to intervene. Citi (and one of its major stockholders) had been Geithner’s sponsor when he was chosen to be president of the New York Federal Reserve.
Politics might also have been involved in the timing of the SEC’s announcement on the day following the appeal decision that the agency was suing the former chief executives of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac for misleading investors and Congress on the volume of subprime mortgages on the books. Khuzami made the announcement himself, and it was well-covered in the media. Lest the decision to appeal in order to save a settlement deemed by a judge as too friendly to a major Wall Street bank be viewed with lackluster by the public, the timing of the Fannie and Freddie announcement could be anticipated to quickly impose a perception of going after the bad guys—even if the two conveniently-demonized organizations had been taken over by the very government that was suing them. The public would not be likely to suspect a double-standard for private-sector, well-connected banks, such as Citigroup.
Regardless of the political connections of Wall Street banks, for the U.S. president to tell the public that Wall Street should be held accountable only to look the other way on the SEC’s appeal decision—perhaps with the stated reason that politics should not be involved—seems duplicitous at best. As the chief executive, the president has a legitimate superordinate role to play in overseeing the decisions in the agencies within the executive branch. For a chief executive to claim that he or she should not impose on a subordinate department is a good indication that a subterranean agenda is in play. Furthermore, such an excuse evinces a refusal to assume responsibility (see #2 above). Too accustomed to seeing presidents obsess over pending legislation and propose still more (and act as commander in chief as well as figure head), the American citizenry has nearly lost any appetite for holding its presidents accountable as the chief executive of the executive branch—which extends beyond the West Wing. In the case of the SEC’s decision, the president was doubtless not willing to overrule his Treasury Secretary for political reasons.
Rather than deciding to appeal the ruling, the SEC should have accepted—with the president’s (or Treasury Secretary’s) intervention if necessary—the judge’s feedback as valid. Given the power and “too big to fail” risk of financial institutions like Citigroup, the government regulators act recklessly in accepting a “pocket change” no-guilt settlement. In announcing the decision to appeal, Khuzami said Rakoff’s position was “at odds with decades of court decisions that have upheld similar settlements by federal and state agencies across the country.” Precedent for precedent’s sake could merely be a vote for the status quo that favors even the fraudulent on Wall Street. We cannot assume that the stream of past court decisions necessary warrant being kept.
Clearly, Khuzami believed that requiring wrongdoers on Wall Street to admit to the wrongdoing would backfire on the government. Requiring an admission of guilt from defendants “could in practical terms press the SEC to trial in many more instances, likely resulting in fewer cases overall and less money being returned to investors,” Khuzami said. Just because powerful banks have a lot of money and power to throw at a trial, however, does not mean that the U.S. Government should cower over in trepidation or try to out-maneuver an inconvenient ruling that can actually be useful. Had he kept to the judge’s ruling, Khuzami could have gone back to Citi to say that more would be needed to avert a trial. It would not be his own opinion, after all, and contrary to Khuzami’s view, a judge’s opinion is not just an opinion; it is a ruling.
As for the issue of money damages and the number of trials, Khuzami was missing the forest for a few trees. For the viability of the U.S. and global financial system (and economy), banks too big to fail should be held accountable. It is therefore worthwhile even going to trial and staying the course through any appeals fueled by the banks’ deep pockets. At the very least, establishing a few precedents in terms of seeing that justice is served might have aided in the SEC’s credibility in negotiating settlements with teeth. Higher money damages would undoubtedly have followed.
In short, it would appear that the staff at the SEC needed more of a public service mission in which they could feel that they were making a difference in standing up to real power. In other words, they were not sufficiently fighters for the public good—the viability of the financial system and the economy as a whole. Instead, they were too interested in taking the route that is most convenient in terms of fear and stasis. It is in this realm that the chief executive can and should lead, if indeed he has that fire in his belly.
Jean Eaglesham and Suzanne Kapner, “SEC Cops Want to Fight U.S. Judge,” The Wall Street Journal, December 15, 2011.
David Hilzenrath, “SEC to Appeal Federal Judge’s Rejection of Citigroup Deal,” The Washington Post, December 15, 2011.
Chad Bray and Nick Timiraos, “SEC Sues Former Fannie, Freddie Executives,” The Wall Street Journal, December 16, 2011.
