The Payroll Tax Cut: A Luxury?

As U.S. deficits and thus the federal government's debt had been increasing since the Clinton Administration in the late 1990s, proposals for a payroll tax-cut entailed risking the financial condition of the U.S. Government. To be sure, increasing government spending above inflation was risky too. Here, though, tax policy as it relates to deficits, and thus debt, is analyzed. 

During the summer of 2011, Rep. Eric Cantor (R-Va), the U.S. House's Majority Leader, opposed continuing a tax cut. It was not the tax cut that had been enacted under George W. Bush that disproportionately benefitted the top brackets. That tax cut was sold to the American public as good under the supposition that the growth of jobs would result. The tax cut opposed by the Majority Leader in 2011 pertained to the payroll tax. Workers’ contributions to social security were to be cut from 6.2% to 4.2% until the end of 2011. A spokesman for the Majority Leader argued that if “the goal is job creation, Leader Cantor has long believed that there are better ways to grow the economy and create jobs than temporary payroll tax relief.”[1] However, it could be argued that whereas the tax cuts at the upper-income brackets tend to be saved because the wealthy already have the means to purchase what they want, workers tend to spend any extra disposable income precisely because they don’t have the means to buy even all that they need, particularly in the case of families. Moreover, workers would feel the end of a tax cut more than a rich person would.

It does appear that the Republican party’s support of tax cuts hinged on the financial interest of the rich—tax cuts are not created equal. This asymmetry eclipses the party’s ideological goal of smaller government, for otherwise any tax cut would be sought because it would mean less government taking as well as the possibility of starving government spending. Furthermore, the asymmetry trumped a priority on reducing a deficit that had been over $1 trillion in 2010. A deficit is the annual addition to the U.S. Government’s debt, which was around $14 trillion at the start of 2011. On the heels of S&P downgrading that debt to AA, continuing any tax-cut, even to prop up the economy, can be reckoned as foolhardy unless the money that taxpayers would otherwise pay in taxes is spent or invested sufficiently to boost the economy enough that the government would take in more tax revenue than the amount lost due to the tax-cut.

It is possible that Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae could have done more for the economy by allowing homeowners in trouble to refinance to the lower interest rates in 2010 and 2011 than would have been lost from ending the tax cuts. If so, it could be that we could do better in lowering deficits while stimulating the economy. Even with some drag on the economy, the numbers on the baby boomers retiring suggests that the social security fund could not afford the payroll tax cut in 2012. In fact, it could be that the fiscal impacts of government policy are less significant on the overall economy than on the deficits and debt, which are more immediate to the government's financial position. Debating whether to continue tax cuts with respect to economic growth (and even jobs) may reveal a lack of attention on reducing public debt as a priority if the tax revenue given up by the Internal Revenue Service is more than additional tax revenue to be obtained from the added economic growth from the tax-cuts. Indeed, analysis of the Bush tax cuts had shown that the tax revenue given up was more than the induced take. In technical language, the Laffer Curve had already been discredited by 2011. Therefore, ignoring the cost of a tax cut in terms of tax revenue, and thus higher deficits, is negligent and irresponsible, whether by Congress, the media, or the citizenry itself.

1. Jennifer Steinhauer, “For Some in G.O.P., a Tax Cut Not Worth Embracing,” The New York Times, August 26, 2011.

A Self-Inflicted Compromise on the Debt-Ceiling in the U.S.

On August 1, 2011, the Republican and Democratic Congressional leaders and the Democratic President came to an agreement--a compromise of sorts--on raising the debt-ceiling and spending. According to the deal, cuts of roughly $920 billion over ten years would be followed either by adopting a twelve-member Congressional committee's recommendations (including possible cuts and revenue increases) or watching another round of automatic across-the-board spending cuts. Structurally, this arrangement is unbalanced with respect to the nature of compromise between the two parties. In short, it proffers a relatively easy out for the Republicans.

Specifically, the "enforcement mechanism" that would automatically activate should the "super" committee's recommendations not be voted and signed into law contains only cuts even though the Democratic position is for a mix of cuts and revenue. In other words, the mechanism itself is biased to the default of one of the parties. The only incentive the Republican party would have to accept the committee's recommendation would be to avoid the military cuts in the automatic cuts. To obviate any revenue increases, even if only for the wealthy, the Republicans in Congress need only scuttle the committee's work or vote it down. The mechanism being counted on as "teeth" for the committee's work to be adopted should have included both across the board cuts AND revenue increases (including on the very rich). The incentive would have been on BOTH parties to work something out in committee.

Therefore, if I am correct, the structure, or arrangement, of the compromise is itself unbalanced, at least from the standpoint of incentives. It would seem that even with the possible cuts to defense, the compromise itself is a win for the Republicans. Once again, Democrats can be left wondering why their representatives gave up the store, or at least kept the door unlocked. In terms of the public option in the health-insurance reform, the matter of breaking up the biggest banks (too big to fail), and finally in permitting a spending-cuts-only outcome to the debt problem, Democrats, it seems to me, have real cause in withholding their votes from "their" man in the White House in 2012. Yet they have no practical alternative absent a primary challenger. They may be in a very tight box in "staying the course," lest they want to risk seeing the keys of the White House store formally change hands to the other party.

In Defense of the Tea Party

In the wake of the U.S. House’s “Tea Party” caucus in the Republican caucus on July 28, 2011, which effectively delayed the Speaker’s bill for raising the debt ceiling, it might be useful to row against the current for a moment if only to present a defense of the Tea Party’s agenda. To be sure, problems exist in it, but a defense can be made. I submit that the media has not been particularly accurate, or fair, concerning the movement or its involvement in the U.S. Government.

Most notably (but not obviously), Tea Party representatives are correct that August 2^nd does not necessarily bring with it default, for that refers only to the Treasury department not making the required interest and principal payments on the debt. That some government agencies have to shut down does not constitute default, for the latter pertains ONLY to serving debt. Indications are that the U.S Government could service its debt August from incoming tax revenue. If so, default would only be voluntary—if the Treasury should decide to use the tax revenue for other uses.

It is more accurate to say that delaying raising the debt-ceiling would increase the likelihood that the U.S. Government’s credit rating will be lowered to AA from AAA. On this front, the refusal to compromise can be excoriated. For its part, the Tea Party might say that it is worth risking if a structural re-alignment could occur.

What does the Tea Party really want: a reduction in government or a reduction in the federal government? Or both? Other things equal, I suspect that the party would prefer a given domestic program to be at the state level, but even there the spending (and taxing) would receive some ire. If the goal is primarily to restore federalism, the Tea Party is on firmer ground. Since the CSA-USA war (1861-1865), the United States has been trending toward political consolidation at the expense of the innate diversity coming with an empire-scale. Nothing—not even Ronald Reagan and his Supreme Court—could turn the tide. One could not blame the Tea Party for saying: if not now, when? Indeed, the existence of a $14.3 trillion U.S. Government debt—roughly the amount of the annual GNP—can be viewed as a manifestation, or symptom, of the imbalance.

So it makes sense to pick the debt-ceiling as the matter on which structural adjustments can be made. However, what if the majority of the people, or branches, prefer consolidation to federalism in any meaningful sense? Is it fair to foist a structural shift on the majority? Would not it be fairer to promote a constitutional amendment directed on the question of federalism?

Of course, the Tea Party representatives could simply be opposed to the debt, and therefore of increasing it. If it is unsustainable already, then raising the debt ceiling might make matters worse even if it assuages short-term difficulties. If the leverage possible in a debt-ceiling decision is given up, there might not be another chance to stop the trend of more and more debt being added to what is already unsustainable. Rather than force massive short-term spending cuts in federal programs and agencies, however, the leverage could be used to agree to longer-term cuts, say over ten years. This is what the Tea Party has been for, though at the risk of short-term shock.

However, it could be countered that were the Tea Party really focused on reducing the debt, the objection to increasing tax revenue, especially for the rich whose effective rate is eighteen percent, would not exist. That is to say, even if citizens and residents are being taxed too much, it is not too much relative to the debt (past spending that was borrowed). This is different than saying that spending should be cut, for that applies to current and future deficits. An enhanced Tea Party position would be to come down hard on the debt (and further deficits), and thus be for both spending and revenue means of closing the gap. Even combined, it will be difficult to pay off the $14.3 trillion.  From this perspective the spending/revenue debate is premised on a false dichotomy wherein one or the other is assumed to be sufficient. The magnitude of the debt relative to GNP—the highest since the end of WWII in the twentieth century—suggests that the Tea Party is not radical enough.