A Teachable Moment for Americans: Solidarity as a Shared Value in European Identity

Speaking at the Schloss Bellevue palace in Berlin, President Joachim Gauck used a televised speech in February 2013 to make the case for more European integration. At the time, calling for “more Europe” in terms of shifting still more governmental sovereignty from the state governments to that of the Union was not a very popular task. Further limiting the power of his message is the fact that the German presidency is largely ceremonial , unlike the office of governor in an American state. Nevertheless, Gauck was determined to put the contemporary condition of the “European project” in favorable perspective. The most striking—and even effective—aspect of his speech is his repeated references to “European citizens.” Had he used “Germans” instead, he would have subtly undercut his own message. The prime minister of the E.U. state of Britain at the time would never have used the term, "European citizens." Nor would he have agreed with the E.U. value of solidarity and especially the ensuing social policy. The American media tended to follow suit, rather than covering the otherness of the other—the European Union as having a societal political value that has been very recessive in the United States. In this regard, I contend, the American media companies let down the American people, who would have stood to benefit from the wider perspective that would have enriched American political debates from the tyranny of the hegemonic value ensconced in American culture: that of the self-sustaining individual ideally in the state of nature, economically speaking. Reporting on the principle of solidarity would have given Americans the acccurate picture of the E.U. as being more than just a trading "bloc." This point in turn could have resulted in Americans coming to the realization that the E.U. is equivalent to the U.S.—both being empire-scale federal systems wherein governmental sovereignty is split.

Acknowledging the fiscal and structural imbalances that gave rise to the debt crisis in several E.U. states  and the problems entailed in “patching up” the problems by emergency measures, Gauck nonetheless pointed to non-economic elements of the European project that were also in crisis. “It is also a crisis of confidence in Europe as a political project. This is not just a struggle for our currency; we are struggling with an internal quandary too.”[1] This problem was predicated on the point that the strengthening of a European identity comes out of a recognition of shared values, rather than in differentiation from other cultures outside of Europe.

Too often, Europeans have artificially restricted their values to their particular state. Typically, Europeans would preface a self-referential remark with, “In my country,” only to describe a custom or value that is by no means limited to, distinctive in, one particular E.U. state. Even in saying “more Europe means a European Germany,” Gauck risked falling into this trap, at least in terms of keeping Europe as secondary. More in line with his thesis would have been the expression, more Europe means more European. More European in turn means more of a consciousness of values that European citizens (and residents) share, whether or not people in Africa, Asia, or America happen to esteem those values too. So the question facing European citizens is this: What values do you share?

From an American perspective, the salience of the value of solidarity held by Europeans would be so obvious, were it made transparent by the American media, because solidarity has been such a recessive value in the United States. Ironically, World War II was perhaps the last time solidarity in terms of “we’re all in it together” was explicitly pushed and acknowledged in America. Even then, the value was more in terms of sacrificing for a common purpose rather than seeing to it that the most vulnerable among us do not fall through the cracks in terms of sustenance. In Europe, solidarity has more of a social welfare quality.

Moreover, whereas Americans have tended to apply human rights only to the harm caused by tyrants abroad, Europeans have tended naturally to extend to the value to covering the basic sustenance rights of one’s own fellow citizens as well. The shift needed for a stronger European identity has included becoming aware of the duty to apply the value domestically to other Europeans rather than merely to people in one’s own state, or “country.” By implication, “European Germans” would feel solidarity with starving “European Greeks.” This element twas largely missing from the austerity response of E.U. finance ministers to the debt crisis from 2010 to 2012. So even in the E.U., the principle can succumb to greed and interstate clashes of economic interests. I submit, therefore, that “more Europe” involves not only a stronger value-fueled-identity, but also more fiscal redistribution at the federal, or E.U., level. Put another way, Europeans surely have more shared values than that of austerity. It is a pity that the American media failed to capture this point in reporting on Greek austerity, which more closely resonates with the values dominant in the U.S.

1. Ian Johnson, “German President Joachim Gauck Uses Major Speech to Call For “More Europe,” DW, February 22, 2013.

“USA!” at Ryder Cup 2012: Silent “EU!” Wins

The Ryder Cup of 2012, held in Illinois, can be read as payback for the European team at the expense of the Americans because the latter had come back from the same 10-6 deficit to win at the previous Cup.  The Associated Press reported that the European team’s “rally was even more remarkable, carried out before a raucous American crowd that began their chants of "USA!" some three hours before the first match got under way.” I can just imagine the looks on the Europeans’ faces amid the primal shouts some three hours before play. “Why are they doing that now? Should we get our few people in the crowd to start pumping their fists in the air while shouting “EU! EU! EU! EU!”? I can just hear a German on the team (if there was one) ask, “But what purpose would that serve?” A Brit would interrupt to make his observation known, that he cannot take part in such a cheer as it diverts from “hip hip!” and thus may interfere with being proud to be British, as Maggie used to say. A Belgian of Flemish and Walloon parentage (if such a thing exists) would try to split the difference in proposing that the small crowd of European groupies chant “hip hip EU!” The Brit would undoubtedly veto that one in a split second and the European team would be left with having to listen to the primal chants of the Americans. Of course, the warlike chant has no meaning in itself. Even a patriotic American would wonder why in the midst of a fireworks show on July 4^th young men (16-25ish) suddenly feel the need to aggressively shout “USA!

                                     Europe's Martin Kaymer celebrates Europe's win at the Ryder Cup.     Reuters

USA!” as if the exploding bombs (i.e., fireworks) were some signal known only to them that we were about to invade another country. I witnessed this at a Fourth-of-July fireworks at an upscale golf course in 2012. The chants seemed so out of place, coming out of nowhere, that I could not help but wonder what was behind the impulsive act.

Was there a sort of blind, patriotic “America the Powerful” brewing at a primal level among guys who are at the prime age for military service? Is there some instinct for war in young men that was not getting satisfied by the 11-year-old war in Afghanistan? Or was it simply a problem of not getting enough sex?  Maybe the pounding fists in the air and shouted grunts are some kind of instinctual way of attracting American females who are otherwise too obsessed with their careers.  I suppose it is preferable to pissing to mark one’s territory. Nietzsche would point to the instinct “will to power,” though it is difficult to see how much of that can come out of hitting a little white ball into a hole. It seems to me that American football would be the more fitting venue.

Today I met two Europeans, one from Spain and the other from Poland. I suggested that perhaps they had not realized how much they have in common as Europeans until they came over to America. Relative to the Americans, the two women could see how much more they have in common. “Yes!” the two women added as if on cue. “You know that many Euro-skeptics over there think there is no such thing as being a European,” I stated matter-of-factly. The both nodded affirmatively. “But now you can see that there is—that you can be both Spanish and Polish and European.” Again, they nodded, perhaps more surprised to be hearing such a thing from an American than to be suddenly aware of their own federal nature—both Spanish/Polish and European. Things like this can sneak up on a person perceptually, even though it is happening to oneself.  One might not see it in oneself even though outsiders do.

So even though the Europeans in the crowd at the Ryder Cup did not add “EU!” to replace the chants of “USA!” as the Europeans turned their deficit into victory, pro-Europe slogans will come, though hopefully without the fist-pumping and aggressive shouting.  Sometimes it takes time for the perception to catch up with the changed situation on the ground.

Source:

Christopher Clarey, “Europe’s SurgeLeaves Americans in Shock,” The New York Times, September 30, 2012. 

Royalty: Natural or Exaggerated?

On April 29, 2011, the world watched in utter fascination as a crown prince in one of the E.U. states married a wealthy commoner in London's Westminster Church--the same edifice in which Queen Elizabeth had married in 1947.  The prince is of course William, and his bride is Kate (or Catherine to the purists), who in one hour's time went from being the daughter of two wealthy commoners to royalty.  It is as though she leap-frogged from “the many” past “the few” to join “the one”--the firm. My question is whether these distinctions, involving birth as well as wealth, are natural in terms of human nature or exaggeraged artifices borne of excessive privilege and power.

The seemingly-eternal tripartite division was on display during the wedding, as throngs watched large screens in large parks and crowded pubs while a relative few, which had been invited to attend the ceremony in person, took their seats inside the church after which the royal family arrived with great attention to each individual member. Of course, “the one” literally refers to the person of the monarch, Queen Elizabeth II, who uniquely stood deliberately silent as the congregation sang “God Save the Queen.” One might ask whether having a living human be the subject of a national anthem evinces a category mistake wherein a person is taken for the nation as a whole (i.e., an abstraction). Does aristocracy go so far as to end up as standing for a nation itself?

Thomas Jefferson and John Adams both referred to a natural aristocracy of virtue and talent. Such differences do indeed exist between people, and thus are generally agreed to be quite natural. Indeed, most people view it fitting that distinguishing people by their character or effort is a perfectly valid basis for rewards. The two American founders also wrote of an artificial aristocracy based on birth and wealth. While nobility and royalty are typically associated with the latter, a monarch may also serve as a check on the sort of artificial wealth that grabs more than it is entitled to on the basis of character and effort. In other words, a king or queen, being in the job for life, can in theory protect titles from simply being bought. This potential benefit of royalty implies a downside to the aristocracy in the American republics wherein what counts is the size of one’s bank account rather than whether one has been raised well and is talented.

In virtually any of the American states, for example, a boorish used-car businessman or subprime mortgage salesman who has become newly rich by providing lemons could join a country club and thus be reckoned as part of his city’s aristocracy. Similarly, wealthy CEOs like Lew Glucksman and Dick Fuld of Lehman Brothers could be members of the most exclusive country club in New York and yet lack “gentlemanly traits.” Such qualities cannot be purchased like some commodity traded by investment banks; instead, a gentleman is fashioned from birth. Such natural aristocracy is beyond the reach of the vast wealth of the sort like the envious Glucksman and the childish Fuld even if they could buy themselves into exclusive country clubs. In a European state such as Britain, however, the monarch could theoretically forestall a grasping capitalist from buying a title. Hence, even a rich CEO in Europe can remain a commoner regardless of his or her wealth, which in an American state would clearly differentiate him or her from the masses in terms of exclusivity and privilege.  This is not to say, however, that European aristocracy and royalty are without their downsides.

That Kate Middleton, a millionaire’s daughter, would be lumped together with the other “commoners” only to become royal in marriage ignores the rather obvious economic distinction between rich and poor. That is to say, because of Kate's parents’ wealth, there was something artificial in Kate being referred to as a commoner before her wedding. Moreover, royalty itself might be a highly artificial construct in so far as royals come to believe they do not share humanness with other people.

The director Ken Loach points to the irrationality in the behavior of “commoners” when they ignore the artificiality that is in the expectations of royals. Good people “have knelt before the Queen at some point in their lives. . . . the woman you’re kneeling before represents all that is wrong with this country—inherited wealth, inherited privilege, the apex of the class system. Let’s have a bit more dignity than to crawl before that woman, please.” In other words, subjects as well as monarchs are adults and they should all act the part. There is something undignified for people such as the Middletons who created a business from scratch regressing to childlike behavior in front of a person simply because that person is regarded as the symbol of the state. Furthermore, there is something insulting in the royals referring to the Middletons as commoners because the appelation does not recognize the family's achievement in business.

Perhaps Europeans have the potential benefit in royals acting as a check on ugly usurpers grabbing off too much societally, yet at the cost of artificiality in the royal-aristocrat-commoner distinction wherein the common human denominator in all three is ignored or relegated. Ironically, I suspect that the royals themselves may be among the casualties in the severing of a recognition that we are all human beings. In addition to holding themselves to standards of behavior that may be at odds with human nature itself, royals may tend to forget that commoners are just as human as are nobles and royals. For example, we all die, and none of us knows what, if anything, is in store for us after death. So while there are real and artificial distinctions, there is also the shared basis in all of us being human. Accordingly, my instinct should I come in contact with a royal would be to relate to him or her simply as another person, whose need for genuine human contact is just as real as mine.

Source on Ken Loach: “Between Commodity and Communication: Has Film Fulfilled Its Potential?” International Socialist Review, 76 (March-April 2011), 28-44, p. 44.

See my related essay, "On the "Wedding of the Century': History Made or Manufactured?"