Mutual Cooperation as Insufficient as E.U. Defense Policy

The words mutuality and cooperation have positive connotations politically, whereas divisive and exclusive do not. To be sure, mutual cooperation has the drawback of relegating competitiveness, which can foster greater efficiency and effectiveness. In the policy domain of defense, however, wherein nuclear weapons live, competition between weaponized polities can be dangerous and thus not worth any improvements from competing. The Cold War in the twentieth century attests to the superiority of mutuality and cooperation at the international theatre wherein polities act as sovereign militarized entities. Within a federal Union, however, relying on the mutual cooperation between states is, I contend, woefully deficient and inadequate. In fact, relying on states to assume the burden of defense can lead to the violent break up of a Union, as was dramatically demonstrated in what some Americans have called the War between the States (1861-1865), but is more accurately called the war between the U.S.A. and the C.S.A.(the Confederate States of America). Two political unions of very different balances of power between the respective federal and state levels of governance. It is precisely with this historical example in mind that the comments made by E.U. (Commission) President Von der Leyen at the Munich Security Conference in February, 2026 should be analyzed. Relying in going forward from that time on the E.U. states to build up their respective military forces, or militias in American-speak, under the assumption that those states would mutually cooperate military is a very risky strategy for the E.U. at a time in which its cousin across the Atlantic Ocean was pulling back from Europe in terms of military protection.

Von der Leyen’s notion that the E.U. could rely on its states in defense (as well as foreign policy) must contend with reservations previously made by Mark Rutte, NATO’s Secretary General, on Europe being able to defend itself without American cover at least in the medium term. Specifically, Rutte had opined just a month earlier, “if anyone thinks here, again, that the European Union, or Europe as a whole, can defend itself without the US, keep on dreaming. You can’t. We can’t. We need each other.”[1] Still the aggressor in Ukraine, Russia’s Putin was still a reality check on European “deams” of self-sufficiency in defense. Even so, Von der Leyen limited the E.U.’s enhanced defense-capabilities to reliance on its member-states. “I believe the time has come to bring Europe’s mutual defence clause to life,” she said. “Mutual defence is not optional . . . it is an obligation.”[2] She was referring to Article 42.7 of the E.U.’s basic law, which “states that ‘if an E.U. [state] is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other E.U. [states] have an obligation to aid and assist it by all means in their power.’”[3] This article is similar to Article 5 of the NATO international alliance. Besides ignoring the qualitatively and quantitively closer integration of states in a federal Union, copying the article of an international alliance leaves open the greater possibility—one that was foreseen by the American Founders on that Union being in part to prevent internecine wars between the states—that E.U. states could utilize their bolstered militaries to fight each other rather than just cooperate in a mutual action to push Russia out of Ukraine. In other words, Von der Leyen’s decision to rely on Article 42.7 rather than propose a federal army capable of united action beyond mutual cooperation (and to aid in the cooperation of the state militias) ignores the qualitative difference between a federal Union of states (i.e., European integration) and an international alliance. Besides the greater likely of conflicts between states in a Union, the E.U.’s foreign policy competency could lead to offensive rather than merely defensive united action, as for example could have been waged in Ukraine to push the Russian troops out in the first months of that invasion. In other words, the fact that governmental sovereignty in the E.U. is divided, albeit too unevenly, between the E.U. and the state governments means that relying on mutual cooperation between the states for military action is insufficient and even arguably contradictory. The latter treats the E.U. as it were like the U.S.’s Articles of Confederation, under which the 13 states were sovereign countries. Even without the dual-sovereignty that the E.U. federation enjoys, General Washington was (barely) able to hold together a continental army rather than rely on the mutual cooperation of the armies of the 13 American countries in that Union. How much more should the E.U. have a federal army, as per the dual-sovereignty-feature of its federal system! Lest it be countered that the E.U. states were still sovereign in 2026, the voting method of qualified-majority itself represents a transfer of sovereignty to the federal level, as a state could (and has) found itself on the losing side of those votes.

Finally, there is the danger in relying on the states to develop their own nuclear-weapons capability rather than assigning control of those weapons to the federal level institutions, including the European Council, which represents the state governments at the federal level directly. As Rutte said about European sufficiency in defense, “You’d have to build up your own nuclear capability” because “you would lose the ultimate guarantor of our freedom, which is the U.S. nuclear umbrella. So, hey, good luck!”[4] 

I would simply, add, good luck with Vickor Orbán of the E.U. state of Hungary having nuclear weapons as leverage against other states and even the ECJ and the Commission as they try to punish the Hungarian government for violating E.U. law. Moreover, good luck trying to minimize the chance that any E.U. state might use its strengthened military might to invade another state, with no federal army to push back the aggressor. Especially in the context of years of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Von der Leyen’s misjudgment in stopping at Article 42.7 is startling, especially as her speech came shortly after Mario Draghi’s speech urging more federal competencies in the E.U. to strengthen the federal system from being too dominated by its states at the expense of united action that goes beyond even mutual cooperation.

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1. Alice Tidey, “Von der Leyen Rebukes NATO Chief over ‘No Security Without US,’ Calls for European Mutual Defence,” Euronews.com, December 14, 2026.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.

A Drone Wall for the E.U.: Russian Aggression Assuages Euroskeptic States

Speaking after his meeting with U.S. President Trump in Alaska during the summer of 2025, Russia’s President Putin said that if no agreement is reached with Ukraine, the force of arms would decide the matter. In other words, might makes right, or at least military incursion is a legitimate way to decide political disputes between countries. I would have hoped that such a primitive mentality would be antiquated in the twentieth century, but, alas, human nature evolves only at a glacial pace undetected within the lifespan of a human being. In September, 2025, the United Nations was under attack from within the General Assembly because of the continuance of the veto held by five countries in the Security Council; the U.S. had just vetoed a resolution for an immediate cession of Israeli destruction in Gaza. As a former deputy secretary of the UN had admitted to me during the fall of 2024, the veto itself renders the UN unreformable; a new international organization would have to be established sans vetoes for efficacy to be possible. Even so, absent a real enforcement mechanism, such as a military force, a resolution even of a vetoless organization would merely be parchment. The impotence of the UN is one reason why NATO, a defensive military transatlantic alliance, has been valuable in the face of military threats by Russia. Yet in September 2025, after Russian drones had flown into four E.U. states, E.U. President Von der Leyen felt the need to take the lead by again stressing her proposal for a drone wall along the E.U.’s eastern border; she was not deferring to any international alliance, much less to the United Nations. I submit that Von der Leyen’s initiative is yet another means by which the E.U. can be distinguished from international “blocs,” alliances, and organizations. Unlike the latter three, the E.U. has exclusive competencies and is thus semi-sovereign (and the same goes for the state governments).

The full essay is at "A Drone Wall for the E.U."

On the 2025 Political Convention of the European People’s Party

Competition within a pollical party and recognition that a political party is indeed a political party are essential or at least advantageous to any political party in a democratic system. Moreover, a republic, even if it contains smaller republics but is not just them in aggregate, deserves to be recognized as such rather than implicitly relegated by erroneous nomenclature that is designed to appease skeptics so they won’t rise up to resist the federal republic itself. “Let the chips fall where they may” is, I believe, an expression from gambling. Another expression comes from playing cards: Call a spade a spade. These two expressions evince truth and power, whereas hiding behind false notions is sheer weakness. Much of my writing on the European Union is oriented to strengthening it, as well as to gleam lessons for both the E.U. and U.S. by comparing and contrasting them as federal empire-scale unions of states.

Rubber-stamping closed-room decisions is hardly uncommon at conventions of political parties. The E.U.’s European People’s Party is no exception. At the annual convention in 2025, the party’s leadership appeared “quite monarchic” in spite of the fact that the E.U. was “the world’s second largest democracy,” and that President Von der Leyen had been touting the value being placed on democracy.[1] At the convention, Manfred Weber was re-elected by 502 of 563 votes “while his loyal ally Dolors Montserrat was elected unopposed to the position of secretary general with 91% of the votes cast.”[2] The lack of intra-party competition could be expected to have an impact politically on the E.U. itelf, as the “ascendant” EPP included E.U. Commission President Von der Leyen, 13 commissioners, and 188 representatives in the Parliament.[3]

With the E.U. being a few years over 30 years old, the EPP in the E.U. could be likened to the Congress Party in India during the twentieth century. To be sure, the latter party eventually lost its dominance, and the EPP could be expected to lose its early foothold too. Beforehand, however, a democracy deficit can exist not only when one party dominates at the federal level of an empire-scale polity of polities, but also when such a party is monocratic at the party level.

In other words, a multiplier effect can be in the mix when dominance is salient within a party that in turn is dominate in a government, and an executive branch, a legislative chamber elected by citizens, and a supreme court do indeed constitute a government even if denial has a firm foothold in the public square. In fact, for the media to mislabel a political party’s convention as a congress, which is actually an international meeting of sovereign countries, and a union such as the E.U. as a bloc undermines the credibility of a party and union. Both a democracy-deficit and enervating ideological (i.e., Euroskeptic) misnomers imperil a federal system, especially if the states hold most (but not all!) of the governmental sovereignty. 

For the Commission to be able to enforce even its exclusive competencies (i.e., enumerated powers), it is important that that executive branch be representative rather than oligarchic and known to be something more than of a bloc, which is a temporary grouping for one purpose. The E.U. was not intended to be temporary or of just one pillar. Indeed, the third pillar belies any claim that the E.U. is merely an economic international organization. International organizations such as NATO and the UN have no governmental sovereignty of their own, and do not have legislative chambers whose representatives are directly elected by citizens. International organizations do not even have citizens! A little intellectual honesty can go a long way.

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1. Jeremy Fleming-Jones, “The EU’s Biggest Political Party Met in Valencia—What We Learned,” Euronews.com, 30 April 2025.

2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.

Rearm Europe: What’s in a Name?

The children’s adage, “Sticks and stones may break my bones, but names will never hurt me,” ignores the fact that words can cause psychological pain, which in turn can trigger physical fights that break bones. My point is that words do matter—whether applied to people or social, political, and economic entities. An appellation can promote or disparage, and even frame a political debate. When deciding what to call something involves a category mistake, the violation of logic is typically to passively insist on a particular ideological view such that it will gain currency in a society or at a global level without people being aware of the ploy (i.e., that they are being manipulated). An ideology never sits still in a human mind; the innate tendency is expansionary. As in the belief in Hinduism that attachment to both good and bad karma must be stopped before a person can be liberated (moksa) from the cycle of reincarnation (samsara), both good and bad ideologies held by a person involve the urge to proselytize, even by stealth. The E.U. itself has been especially subject to this phenomenon, and the harm to the union itself is seldom if ever discussed. Words are definitely used as subterranean weapons in open view in the context of ideological warfare.

On March 21, 2025, the E.U.’s Commission—the federal executive branch—“confirmed it would phase out the term ‘Rearm Europe” to describe its multi-billion initiative to rearm Europe after backlash from the leaders of [the E.U. state governments] of Italy and Spain” on account of the name being “excessively charged and risks alienating citizens.”[1] That the federal executive branch of the U.S. would hardly heed such an objection from two large member-states is just one indication of the shift toward consolidation in that federal union since it was thirty-two years-old. It should not be inferred that either the U.S. in 1821 or the E.U. in 2025 could be characterized as a “bloc,” which refers to “a temporary combination of parties in a legislative assembly” or “a combination of persons, groups, or nations forming a unit with a common interest or purpose.”[2] Neither the E.U. nor the U.S. is a combination, as both have federal legislative, executive, and judicial governmental institutions, and neither union is for a common interest or purpose, as federal legislation in both unions involve more than one policy area. The EEC and the Articles of Confederation could qualify as economic and military blocs, as both were single-purpose and sovereignty was retained by the countries.

And yet, the media company, Euronews, which is oriented to the E.U.-level rather than being focused on the state level and the intergovernmental relations there, incessantly refers to the E.U. as a bloc. For instance, in reporting the new name of “the plan to ramp up defence capabilities and production across the bloc will be known as ‘Readiness 2030,’” Euronews uses the word bloc even in referring to a program that the Commission rather than a state was spearheading.[3] I contend that the word-choice enervates the E.U. itself.

When David Cameron was the prime minister of the E.U. state of United Kingdom, he referred to the E.U. as one of the networks that Britain happened to be in. When the people of that state voted to secede from the union, taking back the governmental sovereignty that had been delegated to the federal level in the E.U.’s basic law was a significant reason. So based on one of the rationales for seceding from the union, Cameron’s use of “network” to name the E.U. is erroneous. In fact, he was making a category mistake because a federal union wherein governmental sovereignty is divided is not a network of sovereign states.

Nor does the fact that federal law in the E.U. includes directives to be implemented by state governments, and the Commission’s proposal to relax the debt-limit on the states is oriented to the states being able to spend up to €650 billion mean that the E.U. is thereby a bloc. Initially the U.S. heavily relied on state armies, and even after about 250 years, the states have armies even though the federal president could call on them for temporary use. Moreover, residual sovereignty still applies both in the U.S. and the European Union. Regardless of how much power is on the state and federal levels, dual sovereignty itself distinguishes modern federalism from confederalism.[4]

To be sure, the relative amounts of governmental sovereignty held respectively at the state level and at federal level in a federal system wherein sovereignty has been divided according to the federation’s basic (i.e., fundamental) framework do matter. In the case of the E.U. in 2025, and of the U.S. before the twentieth century, dissolution is a risk that goes with the state governments having a lot more authority and power than does the union itself at its federal level. This risk became very real in 1861 in the U.S., when some of the member-states tried to exit the union. When Britain seceded from the E.U. to take back the sovereignty being exercised at the federal level, the risk that other states might follow was essentially the risk of dissolution. Given this risk facing the E.U. as it watched Russian military aggression in Eastern Europe just beyond the E.U.’s eastern border, coordinated military effort by the E.U. could not afford the enervating connotations that go with referring to the modern federal system as just a bloc. It is no accident that Euro-skeptic political ideologues want a weakened E.U, and this is precisely the point of intentionally mislabeling the E.U. as a bloc.

Such erroneous naming can be used as anti-federalist, and anti-E.U. fodder by Euro-skeptic state officials desiring to take back more sovereignty from Brussels even though the E.U. was even by 2025 too “bottom-heavy.” Because the E.U. Parliament has elected representatives of E.U. citizens rather than officials from the state governments, the alleged democracy deficit has not represented as much risk of dissolution as has the erroneous notion that the E.U. is a mere network or bloc, from which state governments can easily leave as if the E.U. were NATO or a trade agreement. Euronews implies as much in the using the following parallelism in referring to Russia’s “necessary capabilities to launch an attack against an EU or NATO member state.”[5] A federal system wherein governmental sovereignty is split between the state-level and the federal level is qualitatively different than a military alliance. Treating the E.U. as if it were an international organization like the UN or a military alliance like NATO, ignoring the fact that the E.U. law and ECJ decisions are binding on the state governments and that the E.U. has three federal branches—executive, legislative, and judicial which together do constitute a government—keeps the E.U. from being able politically to redress the “bottom-heavy” imbalance of sovereignty, so the deliberate mislabeling by association increases the risk of dissolution. For it is easier for an E.U. state government to leave the UN or NATO than to secede from a federal union wherein governmental sovereignty is split up between two governmental systems—federal and state—or, it is easy to accuse the Commission of not being succeed at its competencies when the mislabeling keeps the executive branch from getting the authority needed and to accuse the European Council and Council of the E.U. of paralysis because the states won’t replace the principle of unanimity with qualified majority voting on important matters because the E.U. is just a bloc.

The false parallelism between the E.U. on the one hand and NATO and the UN on the other, as if the E.U. were an international alliance or organization (of sovereign countries), plus labeling the E.U. as an informal bloc oriented to only one policy-domain makes it more difficult for the governmental institutions at the federal level to justify getting enough authority to be able to competently exercise the competencies that they have, and this includes reducing the application of the principle of unanimity in the European Council and the Council of the E.U., for those two federal institutions, made up of state officials, hold the Commission and the Parliament back as those state officials exploit both personal (i.e., their power) and institutional (i.e., state power) conflicts of interest at the expense of the benefits that could otherwise be had from achieving adequacy in the collective efforts of the union. With Russia invading Ukraine, tying one hand behind one’s back is not the best strategy for the E.U. as it seeks not only to help Ukraine, but also protect the union itself from any future aggression from the east. It may be hard to see how a name can be a subtle but heady head-wind for the E.U., but the union has indeed been incurring the costs, even the opportunity costs of the foregone benefits of collective action.

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1. Jorge Liboreiro, “Brussels Rebrands ‘Rearm Europe’ Plan after Backlash from Leaders of Italy and Spain,” Euronews.com, March 21, 2025.
2. The Merriam-Webster dictionary.
3. Jorge Liboreiro, “Brussels Rebrands ‘Rearm Europe’ Plan after Backlash from Leaders of Italy and Spain,” Euronews.com, March 21, 2025, italics added.
4. Kenneth Wheare, Federal Government.
5. Jorge Liboreiro, “Brussels Rebrands ‘Rearm Europe’ Plan after Backlash from Leaders of Italy and Spain,” Euronews.com, March 21, 2025.

Budget Austerity in the E.U.: Turning the Russian Invasion of Ukraine into an Advantage

With economic growth in the E.U. flat-lining in mid-2014 after a modest recovery, pressure mounted to relax the federal "austerity" constraints on the state budgets. According to The New York Times at the time, "(p)olitical and financial instability related to Russia's confrontation with Ukraine and the effects of escalating economic sanctions between [the E.U.] and Russia have further clouded the economic outlook."[1] Mired in the austerity vs. fiscal stimulus dichotomy, E.U. leaders may have been missing an opportunity here.

With yet another round of sanctions in the works on the heels of a recent Russian invasion and unemployment at a stubborn 11.5 percent, and the threat of runaway deflation hitting wages in particular, the E.U.'s economy looked poised for an ongoing onslaught of stag-deflation. The E.U. "is menaced by long and possibly interminable stagnation if we don't act," Francois Hollande of the state of France warned.[2]  He had in mind some movement along the ongoing relaxation vs. austerity dichotomy in the direction of larger state deficits--something the governor over in Germany was still fiercely resisting. We "really must question whether we can go on receiving less than we spend, so that our debts keep on growing. Indeed," Angela Merkel pointed out, "a whole crisis of confidence has grown out of that."[3] Such a basic imbalance in state finance undercuts the equilibrium that is so vital to the survival of the macro system in the long run.

So, it would appear that the well-worn dichotomy had reached a dead-end, or the proverbial brick wall. I contend that in such a case thinking beyond the either/or strictures is advisable. To illustrate my point, I present a thought-experiment of sorts (i.e., unrealistic, but it gets the point across).

Let's imagine that the president of Ukraine met with the European Council as Russian troops were crossing the border into Ukraine with the eventual aim of separating the eastern half of the independent state from Kiev.

"I come before you with an admittedly unorthodox suggestion," President Poroshenko might have told the Council. "Without a massive infusion of support from the E.U., my country will split apart and Russia will gain the eastern half."

"What kind of support do you have in mind," the Council's Van Rompuy might has asked.

"Well, the sort that would make your fast-track accession process look like a snail's pace," Ukraine's head of state might have replied with a curious grin that told of something very new coming. "Make Ukraine a state; my government will accept all of your conditions without reservation. Send in your Commission's bureaucrats right away to implement the conditions. To protect them, I recommend that you send along military troops from your state militias as well as the small federal army you have. We could even request that U.N. peace-keepers come along. Putin is already in hot water at the U.N. for continuing his KGB tactics as president."

"What if he keeps sending in Russian troops?" Merkel might have asked.

"This is why speed would be so vital, both in Ukraine's accession, which could be of a limited term if that is easier for you, and the influx of bureaucrats and others doing the E.U.'s business and protecting them. Ukraine would agree to the Schengen Agreement on open borders, and I would request that the E.U. attend immediately to the external border--meaning that which we share with Russia. Securing that border has precedent for the E.U., does it not?" In fact, the need to protect the E.U. bureaucrats pouring into the eastern parts of Ukraine with troops from the state armies would mean that NATO would be relevant. This point, if made explicit, could deter Putin from sending in still more military hardware and troops.

"Please excuse us as we discuss this proposal," Van Rompuy might have politely yet curtly told the Ukrainian head of state. After all, the E.U. leaders do their best work behind closed doors. The point is that their minds need not be closed either. Lemons can indeed be made into lemonade.

Even if this scenario is too outlandish to be taken seriously in a world so wetted to the status quo as its default, thinking in such terms "outside the box" could stimulate more realistic policy prescriptions going beyond the austerity vs. fiscal stimulus dichotomy. For example, the notion of troops and hardware from state militias in the E.U. going along to protect federal bureaucrats might prompt an E.U. leader to suggest that the state armies transfer even more to the small federal army of 60,000 troops. Doing so would enable the state budgets to accommodate both more fiscal stimulus and lower deficits as less military spending would be needed. I am assuming the E.U. would pick up the tab for the operation of the added hardware and the salaries of the additional troops. From the perspective of the E.U., the shift would mean less duplication. How likely is it really that Belgium and Portugal, for example, would need to use their respective armies anyway? In the context of continued stag-deflation, such nationalist luxuries are difficult to justify, especially considering the opportunity cost in terms of stimulating the economy.

In short, the E.U. need not have faced a future of stagnation. Ideas hitherto undiscovered can indeed have great value in practical results. The key is to think beyond the confines of what are presumed to be the only possibilities. The human brain has a tendency to shrink the possible in a way that cuts off many potentially fruitful possibilities without any recognition of doing so. The advisable condition of receptivity is to welcome such ideas into the public discourse rather than going with the knee-jerk reaction of "that's too radical!" or "that would never see the light of day." We might be surprised what could see the dawn and beyond.

1. Liz Alderman and Alison Smale, "Divisions Grow as a Downturn Rocks Europe," August 29, 2014.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.