The Right of Political Protest in the U.S.: Nullified in the Outback by Intimidation

The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution states in part, “Congress shall make no law respecting . . . the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of Grievances.” Peaceable protest, even to protest a government or an official thereof, has come to be regarded as a staple of American democracy. In practice, however, the right can be eviscerated such that peaceful protesting is simply not worth the trouble. Such trouble can be orchestrated by a police force or even a government within the United States.
Implicit in the right to protest is the value put on tolerating the expression of contrary opinions. Conservative and progressive views, even those of racists and anarchists, respectively, are generally accorded the right to peaceably protest in a public way. If a State is sufficiently one-sided, however, public officials, including governors, majors, and police chiefs, can reflect the dominant attitude of residents that protests on behalf certain political, economic, or social ideologies should not be allowed. If they must be allowed, then massive shows of police force can—it is assumed--legitimately be used to intimidate the protesters.

The placement of the three posters illustrates pictorially that business and authoritarian political interests can co-exist comfortably in a broader political coalition. In Nazi Germany, for instance, the industrialists were part of Hitler's authoritarian political coalition. Besides receiving purchase orders from a state that is able to resist popular calls for government spending, business likes the political stability that a "law and order" police-state can provide. 

In Arizona, for example, prior to the 2020 election, a conservative candidate for sheriff of Maricopa County, which includes the Phoenix metropolitan area, displayed signs containing the imperative, “Stand Up to the Mobs!” Just above that line was another imperative—that the laws be enforced. Presumably the unenforced laws on car-emission limits and mask requirements on public transportation were not on the candidate’s mind. Presumably he was not planning on holding the transit authority accountable for allowing passengers without masks to ride the buses and light rail. A supervisor at Metro Valley told me by phone at the time that the county law (and ordinances of the cities) that face masks must be worn on public transportation does not have “legal force” because it is just a requirement. Stunned, I did not point out that her company was in violation of the requirement because even bus drivers did not have to wear masks; I had already investigated the strange messages coming out of that company, such as, “Masks are required and we will allow passengers to board without wearing them.”
The candidate for sheriff was likely referring back to the protests against police brutality (otherwise known as abuses of power). That he did not use the word, “Rioters,” instead of “Mobs” implies that he was including peaceable protests too. Given the bad connotation of the word, “Mobs,” as “a large and disorderly crowd of people” according to the Merriam-Webster dictionary, a negative attitude toward at least certain peaceful protests can be inferred. I had heard enough Arizona residents conflate “liberal” peaceful protests with riots to know what the candidate meant by mobs. “They are all violent,” one conservative resident insisted to me as I thought of the state’s pre-college education rating of 49^th out of the 50 States.
A few years after the 2016 presidential election, some students of Arizona State University told me that protests against Donald Trump had not really been allowed on campus. One student even observed that Arizona does not tolerate “liberal” protests. Besides the errant assumption that any mob of people is bound to become violent (which in turn rests on an extremely negative view of human nature rivaling that of John Calvin), anger against “liberals,” which was clearly evident locally, was likely behind the excessive police force designed to intimidate even peaceful protests.
With ASU police regularly staked out in jeeps parked on sidewalks and even academic courtyards, an excessive show of force has been the authoritarians’ tactic of choice to intimidate protesters even if they happened to be 20 students in the Global Politics of Human Rights class whose final project was a class protest on campus on April 13, 2017. The students protested against Trump’s policies on immigration, LGBT rights, women’s rights, Black Lives Matter, and even the prison system. 

The class was fluid in its movements, rather than being intent on blocking a sidewalk. (Source: Connor Bolget of The Republic)

As vaguely reported by a local newspaper, “At one point, Arizona State University personnel asked the group to relocate in order to stop blocking the sidewalk. Protesters then stood in a staggered line, with about a foot between each person, instead of standing shoulder to shoulder. Campus police then were called to the scene, as the protesters changed from holding signs to linking arms, walking back and fourth [sic] in front of the grassy area of Hayden Lawn.”[1] The word lawn is important, as the area is a large square of grass with sidewalks on the periphery.
Who were the opaquely labeled university personnel? In addition to the routine police presence on the campus, students working essentially as police aides typically have the campus covered (even sidewalk intersection to intersection). I have seen those security students keeping a particular eye on outdoor “political” tables near the student union building. It is possible that those student-security personnel notified the campus police of the class’s final project as a protest, which the police would have understood as such rather than as an academic project.

The walkie-talkie-clad "eyes and ears" for the campus police are ubiquitous on the main ASU campus--sometimes at every sidewalk-intersection even as observant police jeeps are stationed during the day on sidewalks and even academic courtyards. 

Did the university personnel and police over-react? The local newspaper reported, “Passers-by had some difficulties finding their way around the linked demonstrators, so ASU’s campus police stepped in to give a second warning, this time directly” to the professor.”[2]  That the protesters were few (20 with some add-ons) and were generally fluid (i.e., mobile) suggests that both the university personnel and the caller over-reacted. It would not be a crisis for by-passers (especially students) to walk on the grass, especially at that square. The police stepped in to give a second warning, so who gave the first? The student security workers? Given that students ordinarily walked on the grass and the small group was mobile, were two warnings really necessary? Should a university police force be able to interfere with a class project without permission from an upper-level academic administer? I suspect that the police took it upon themselves to threaten the professor as if she deserved to be arrested because students had to make a slight detour on grassy square. I also suspect that the police viewed the event as a political protest rather than as an academic project. That it was the latter means that the police should not have intervened without the permission of an academic administrator. Instead, the incident reflected the local culture wherein mobs protest and protests can be expected to turn violent. With such a negative view of protests even as a class project, it is easy to understand why threats and intimidation would be used with impunity.
Hence even the people in the peaceful protests against abuse-of-power by the police in Phoenix during the summer of 2020 (as distinct from the riots, which rightly have no constitutional protections) had to contend with massive police shows of force. Even a small protest on behalf of Ryan Whitaker had to put up with a police helicopter circling overhead as if twenty people might suddenly lose control of themselves and go on a rampage. A resident who lived near a park where protests against police violence took place told me that even peaceful protests walking to the park had to contend with an overwhelming police presence. I was talking to the other Midwesterner after a police car hit a parking lot curb as the police employee quickly swerved closely by me as I was walking from the main library, which was closed. No one was in the nearby park or even in the library’s parking lot that early afternoon during a weekday. Even though protests were taking place nightly, I contend that the police were over-reacting to one person walking through the parking lot. The aggressive driving was totally uncalled for, and yet the police employee likely, given the culture there, regarded it as measured rather than hyperactive. The underlying assumption, which I had heard from both local police and residents, is that any grouping of citizens in public is likely to turn violent without intimidation from an exaggerated show of force. That very assumption is what puts Arizona at odds with the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.
During that summer, the city’s mayor was bragging about how minimal the protests were there compared with those in other big cities in other States. If that differential was the result of intimidating peaceful protesters under the subterfuge that they would inevitably become violent because mobs are unruly, then the “success” came by trampling on the right of the people to assemble peaceably, which means without feeling intimidated. I would not call that success.

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1. Conner Borgelt, “ASU Class Holds Protest as Part of Its Final Assignment,” The Republic (azcentral.com), April 14, 2017.
2. Ibid.

Judicial Ethics: Friendship and Philanthropy

Harlan Crow was a Dallas real estate magnate and a major contributor to conservative causes. He did many favors for his friend, Clarence Thomas, “helping finance a Savannah library project dedicated to Justice Thomas, presenting him with a Bible that belonged to Frederick Douglass and reportedly providing $500,000 for [Virginia] Thomas to start a Tea Party-related group.” The two friends spent time together at “gatherings of prominent Republicans and businesspeople at Crow’s Adirondacks estate and his camp in East Texas.” Crow also “stepped in at Thomas’ urging” to finance the multimillion-dollar purchase and restoration of the cannery that had employed the justice’s mother. Crow’s restoration “featured a museum about the culture and history of Pin Point that has become a pet project of Justice Thomas’s. . . . While the nonprofit Pin Point museum is not intended to honor Justice Thomas, people involved in the project said his role in the community’s history would inevitably be part of it, and he participated in a documentary film that is to accompany the exhibits.”

News “of Mr. Crow’s largess provoked controversy and questions, adding fuel to a rising debate about Supreme Court ethics. But Mr. Crow’s financing of the museum, his largest such act of generosity, previously unreported, raises the sharpest questions yet — both about Justice Thomas’s extrajudicial activities and about the extent to which the justices should remain exempt from the code of conduct for federal judges. Although the Supreme Court is not bound by the code, justices have said they adhere to it. Legal ethicists differed on whether Justice Thomas’s dealings with Mr. Crow pose a problem under the code.”

The code says judges “should not personally participate” in raising money for charitable endeavors, out of concern that donors might feel pressured to give or entitled to favorable treatment from the judge. In addition, judges are not even supposed to know who donates to projects honoring them. . . . (T)he restriction on fund-raising is primarily meant to deter judges from using their position to pressure donors, as opposed to relying on ‘a rich friend’ like Mr. Crow, said Ronald D. Rotunda, who teaches legal ethics at Chapman University in California.” On the other side of the argument, Deborah L. Rhode, a Stanford University law instructor who has called for stricter ethics rules for Supreme Court justices, said Justice Thomas “should not be directly involved in fund-raising activities, no matter how worthy they are or whether he’s being centrally honored by the museum.”

Ethical Analysis:

Ethical analysis is hardly an objective science. Nietzsche’s view that a philosopher’s philosophy is merely a reflection of his or her most dominant instinct expressed via cognition seems particularly relevant. In other words, out of the tussle of one’s instincts one remains and it can be expressed as one’s thought. For instance, the thought that first came to my mind in reading the Times article was that exempting U.S. Supreme Court justices from the judicial ethics code violates the ethical principle of fairness. This “first find” ethically-speaking seems to me to be the most indubitable conclusion of the case, ethically-speaking. However, my perception as well as “the salience” of the principle of fairness may have more to do with which of my instincts is most dominant in my psyche than any objective determination of ethical outcome.

The principle-instinct of fairness could be so dominant for me because it was conditioned as such through my early years. Specifically, I have a brother who is 1.5 years younger than me, and the closeness in age meant that the principle of fairness was seldom far removed when we were kids. For instance, awhile after we moved to a house my parents had had built, they made split our large, shared bedroom into two. The question not far from the surface all around was “is the space equal?”—as if square feet would matter to two boys (we eye-balled it and concluded the rooms were “fair enough”).

What instinct and supporting personal experience lies behind the lawyer’s thou shalt not claim that justices should not be involved in fundraising PERIOD? Is there an ethical principle in that asseveration? Considering that the lawyer at Stanford does not have a graduate degree in ethics (or law, for that matter), her declaration is highly likely based on a dominant instinct that has an urge to express itself in the garb of ethical language.

The lawyer at Chapman is more discerning, pointing to the purpose in the ethical prohibition on fundraising: the point is to keep justices from using their influence to get rich people to donate. In the case of Justice Thomas, it appears that Harlan Crow has wanted to make his donations. This, unlike had Thomas used his influence to secure the gifts, is not ethically problematic. The ethical problem would arise should a matter of concern to Crow come before Thomas’ court; the justice would be ethically obliged to recuse himself to obviate his personal conflict of interest. Announcing such a conflict would not be sufficient, as the underlying temptation to lean in favor of the benefactor would still exist; it would simply be apt to be better camouflaged by legalese. Of course, should a justice choose not to know the sources of beneficial donations, recusals to avoid such conflicts of interest would be less likely.

Therefore, one way to play it ethically is to allow the particular justice to decide how much he or she wants to avoid having to recuse based on knowing the identity of a benefactor. Hardly objective, this ethical strategy is one of several that are possible. It reflects empowering individual justices to determine the extent to which they want to subject themselves to the possibility of having to recuse to avoid a conflict-of-interest. The principle of boyhood fairness insists that the strategy be applicable for any federal judge, without exception. 

Last but not least, the field of judicial ethics would be better served if American law schools would follow their European counterparts in hiring legal scholars (i.e., holders of the doctorate in law, the J.S.D.). Also, a scholar of judicial ethics should have at least one degree in philosophy (ethical theory)—preferably a masters or a joint Ph.D./J.S.D.

Source:

Mike McIntire, “Friendship of Justice and Magnate Puts Focus on Ethics,” The New York Times, June 18, 2011.