Corporate Ethics Codes: A Waste of Time?

Ethics codes are not enough; that is to say, making applications of ethical principles explicit is not sufficient, even where they are grilled into employees in recurrent training sessions. Indeed, individuals or a dominant coalition can use a code’s existence as window-dressing. For example, in his letter on July 1, 2000 announcing Enron’s new and improved 65 page Code of Ethics, Ken Lay wrote, “Relations with the Company’s many publics . . . will be conducted in honesty, candor, and fairness.” If Ken Lay could get away with trumpeting a code of ethics, who’s to say who is out there now acting unethically in business under the cover of an effervescent code?

Fundamentally, ethical conduct is a matter of individual character, the more questionable sort being readily influenced by a sordid corporate culture. Therefore, looking out for character in hiring is paramount. Lest it be thought that candidates will ignore social desirability and readily give clues as to an unethical predilection in answer to facile “what would you do if” interview questions, common sense may dictate that references should be followed up and permitted to go on at length on the candidate’s character as per ethical conduct. In getting a sense of one’s ethical character, it is not enough to rely on stock questions.

Of course, if the managers with power, such as Ken Lay, are unashamedly unethical in their conduct, stiff intangible penalties would be involved in acting ethical further down the line, even if unethical candidates have been screened out. Furthermore, if the CEO is also chairman of the board of directors, the board itself may be compromised in policing ethics in upper management. It can thus be said that the CEO-Chair combo is inherently unethical for a publicly-traded company. 

However, if a company’s dominant coalition is serious about bringing its ethical code to life in the organization, compensation for ethical conduct must go beyond “rewards” or prizes. That is to say, compensation for such conduct must rival compensation for profitability. To say that ethics is important and then to relegate its bearers to receiving praise and recognition, plus perhaps a prize, is to introduce hypocrisy into the organization, from which point an unethical culture can easily take root.

In terms of whistleblowers, not tolerating retaliation is just a start. Compensation for the whistleblowers must be upped, for they risk much and thus show tremendous courage and fortitude—qualities that can come into play in taking a profitable strategy and running with it to fruition against seemingly daunting obstacles.

In short, stockholders, directors and upper echelon managers must put their money where their mouths are to be taken seriously as having a credible code of ethics that is alive in their organization and not merely window-dressing that can serve as a viable subterfuge for nefarious conduct.

See Cases of Unethical Business, available at Amazon.

A Gay Judge on California's Anti-Marriage Proposition in 2010: A Judicial Conflict of Interest?

In 2010, Chief Federal District Judge Vaughn Walker issued a ruling that declared Proposition 8 (against gay marriage) an unconstitutional violation of gay Californians’ civil rights. After retiring in February of the next year, the judge revealed that he was in a 10-year-old relationship with a same-sex partner. The question is whether a reasonable belief that the judge would stand to benefit from the ruling means that there was a personal conflict of interest sufficient to have the judge’s ruling vacated. Amid the emotions swirling around issues such as gay marriage that involve the uneasy mix of personal matters and public scrutiny, an urgent need exists for ethicists and jurispruds to isolate the pernicious problems inherent in the conflict of interest phenomenon so we all can have faith that such issues are decided impartially in substance as well as appearance.
Andrew Pugno, one of the lawyers defending Proposition 8, has stated that the Judge Walker’s long-term relationship “creates this unavoidable impression that he was just not the impartial judge that the law requires.” That the judge withheld the information until well after his ruling suggests that even he may have thought the very existence of his relationship (even aside from any intention to wed) would be sufficient to trigger claims of a conflict of interest because he could stand to benefit personally from the ruling, according to the lawyer. Therefore, the conflict of interest lies not in the judge’s sexual orientation or in his particular state of mind, but, rather, in his being in a long-term relationship that could benefit from the option to marry. Obviating a personal conflict of interest based solely on one’s sexual orientation would be too general and it would constitute prejudice. Likewise, deciding another’s intentions is too subjective a basis for a judicial ruling on a conflict of interest.

A reasonable conclusion that a person stands in a particular position to gain a specific benefit can carry muster in a legal ruling dealing with a person’s conflict of interest. According to Pugno, it is “all about the fundamental principle that a judge really can’t sit to hear their own case when they have an interest in the outcome.”  

In deciding on whether Walker should have recused himself, Judge Ware conflates particular and general interests, arguing in effect that the former do not constitute a conflict of interest because the latter should not. "The presumption that Judge Walker, by virtue of being in a same-sex relationship, had a desire to be married that rendered him incapable of making an impartial decision, is as warrantless as the presumption that a female judge is incapable of being impartial in a case in which women seek legal relief," Ware wrote in his decision. Ware treats the specific connection of benefit between being in a 10 year same-sex relationship and having same-sex marriage legalized as equivalent to the general connection between a woman ruling on a case involving a woman.

Similarly, Ted Olson, whose wife died in the attacks on 9-11-2001, has argued that requiring judges to reveal elements of their personal lives sets a dangerous precedent. “What would a judge do who was Mormon knowing the Morman Church took such an active role” in campaigning for Proposition 8? What would a judge who had a nephew or niece or son or daughter who was gay or lesbian do? We have an unlimited number of permutations of what a judge might be asked to disclose.” In short, Olson sees a slippery slope toward a most undesirable outcome wherein recusals could be commonplace and at times for rather intimate reasons.

However, the slippery slope argument may be overdrawn, and it may be surmountable altogether, especially if one distinguishes between specific and general connections. Vikram Amar, a law instructor in California, argues that a recusal should be required because of “a specific and imminent benefit” rather than “some abstract and future benefit.”  According to Amar (and Ware), Judge Walker does not meet this test. I disagree.

That the judge was in a long-term relationship and was sufficiently old to retire means that the benefit would be both specific (i.e., him getting married) and imminent (i.e., given his age). For a couple discussing marriage, the discussion is not abstract. In fact, it can get down to whether a joint checking account would be opened and whether there would be a prenuptial agreement. Furthermore, couples who discuss marriage do not typically say, “maybe in ten or twenty years, we might get hitched.” The time frame is usually months or a few years, with a realistic expectation that a decision to marry would result in marriage.

One might counter that an intention must also exist—that it is not sufficient for a specific and imminent benefit to be possible.  For instance, in hearing the recusal case on June 13, 2011, Judge Ware asked the Prop. 8 lawyer, “I’m asking you to tell me what fact you would have the court rely on to suggest that Judge Walker wanted to change, not maintain, his relationship?” The mere fact that Judge Walker had been in a serious relationship “does not put him in the shoes of what the plaintiffs were doing, unless you cite to me some facts that he was desirous of the relief they were seeking,” Judge Ware said.

However, pegging desire is a tricky business, and far too subjective to serve as the linchpin of a judicial ruling; someone in a personal conflict of interest would only need to deny having been interested in one of the interests in conflict. When a conflict of interest is observed, the two interests involved are viewed as standing in themselves, rather than being conditional on being desired. That is, in recognizing a conflict of interest, the very existence of the interests is sufficient. Therefore, a recusal ruling should not stand on whether an intention or a desire was present. Given human nature, standing to gain is sufficient to make a conflict of interest situation sufficiently baleful that it should be eviscerated. Judge Walker stood to gain specifically and imminently even if he did not intend to marry. Therefore, we need not inquire as to his personal views or plans in order to conclude that his ruling ought to be vacated on account of his particular conflict of interest.

I would add, moreover, a criterion to Amar’s test for a personal conflict of interest in order to better counter the squalid slippery slope argument. Specifically, it is significant whether the benefit is to the person himself (or herself) or to a person or organization related to the person. To be sure, even having a relative or friend standing to benefit can be sufficient to give rise to a personal conflict of interest.

Indeed, on the very day of the recusal hearing on Judge Walker, the U.S. Supreme Court handed down a unanimous decision that state ethics rules that bar public officials from voting on matters because of a conflict of interest do not violate free-speech rights because voting is not the representative’s speech, but, rather, “a mechanical function of government.” In my view, treating voting (or  money) as speech evinces a category mistake, so Scalia’s opinion for the Court is “spot on” in this regard. For our purpose here, it is significant that the ruling approved the disputed Nevada law, which prohibits officials from “voting on an issue when their judgment could be affected by a relationship to someone in their household, a relative, business partner, or a person ‘substantially similar’ to those specified.” That is, a personal conflict of interest is assumed to extend to benefits to people bearing a significant relation to the person in the conflict.

The vagueness in the “substantially similar,” which was left to the state court to evaluate, may evince the possibility of a slippery slope in extending beyond benefit to the person himself. That is to say, extending the personal conflict of interest to include other people standing to benefit introduces a problem not present in a specific and imminent benefit to the person himself. Therefore, I contend that “benefit to the person” should be added to Amar’s criteria of specificity and temporality, with “benefit to others in a significant relation to said person” being added too, though secondarily and with receding importance as per the significance of the relation.

Even aside from the vague language, no clear boundary line exists between “significant” and “insignificant.” Nevada would have done better in using “significant relation to” and cited examples such as relative, friend, and business associate. Furthermore, a specific and imminent benefit to oneself can be localized, whereas one’s affinities to other people and organizations can be wide-open. Generally speaking, the bigger or broader the group/organization, the less an individual is apt to be invested in a benefit to it. For this reason, and because benefits to others are not as motivating as benefits to oneself (given the salience of self in self-interest, and self-interest in turn in human motivation), a distinction between “benefit to others” and “benefit to self” can and should be made in reference to personal conflicts of interest. To be sure, both are worthy of note in terms of personal conflicts of interest, but “benefit to self” ought not be held back due to problems associated with invoking “benefit to others.”

Therefore, in cases in which the person in a personal conflict of interest stands to benefit in a specific and imminent way, the slippery slope argument that can apply to “benefit to others” should not be invoked. In other words, “benefit to the person” should be added to Amar’s criteria, while “benefit to others” should be tailored so as to obviate any such slope and applied differentially depending on the degree of significance in the relation. Cases in which a spouse or close relative stands to benefit would come after “benefit to self” in importance, followed by cases involving friends and business associates. Similarly, a hierarchy can be established based on organizational affinities. For instance, a Republican would have more interest in a benefit to the Republican Party than to a more general organization such as the United Nations. My point is that discerning degrees of significance need not detract from the applicability of the “benefit to the person” criterion, or even from the secondary “benefit to others.”

Judge Walker himself stood to gain something specific and imminent that could reasonably be expected to benefit him even if he didn’t desire it at the time of the case on Proposition Eight. His standing to benefit is of more importance than had a significant relation to him, such as a gay son or daughter, stood to benefit. That is, he had a material vested interest in the ruling sufficient for him to have recused himself, given a judge’s deontological (duty-based) interest (i.e., responsibility) in being impartial—including having the appearance thereof. The latter is particularly important given the importance of legitimacy in judicial rulings (courts not having their own police force to enforce their rulings). Therefore, I contend that Vaughn Walker should have recused himself and that the Prop 8 advocates have a case in having his ruling vacated on the grounds of a conflict of interest particular to him.

Lest it be suggested that Walker should merely have made his conflict of interest known before the case, merely announcing a conflict of interest is not sufficient to nullify its force or appearance. Better than knowing that a judge has a personal conflict of interest, another can be assigned without such a conflict. As there are presumably other federal judges in California, the conflict of interest could have been easily obviated. That it was not tells me that we as a society discount the problems inherent in the conflict of interest phenomenon.

I suspect that we do not realize sufficiently the ethical problems that conflicts of interest can cause. Even if people do not always act unethically when in a personal conflict of interest, I contend that such conflicts are inherently unethical. Society seems not to agree. As a result, we do not do enough to avoid or otherwise deconstruct them. We believe that somehow such conflicts do not really matter, or that they lose their power if they are made transparent. In other words, we are a bit too naïve for our own good, and then we are surprised when someone in a conflict of interest acts unethically.

Sources:

The Associated Press, “Gay Judge Targeted for Same-Sex Marriage Ruling,” msnbc.com, June 13, 2011.
The Associated Press, “Judicial Bias Is Alleged in a Ruling on Marriage,” The New York Times, June 14, 2011.

Joan Biskupic, "High Court Says Ethics Rules Don't Violate Speech," USA Today, June 14, 2011.
Lisa Leff, “Gay Judge’s Same-Sex Marriage Ruling Upheld,” Associated Press, June 14, 2011.

See also: Institutional Conflicts of Interest, available at Amazon.

On the Value of Creating a Hybrid Industry by Appropriating High Tech: The Case of Amazon and Borders

From the ten-year chart of Amazon.com's stock, a clear upward trajectory can be discerned from the days of financial panic in the last quarter of 2008 even in spite of the plateau in mid-2010. On May 10, 2011, AMZN was trading at around $204 a share. At the time, Amazon's new "cloud music" service was said to be behind the surge. In general, the general uplift since late 2008 can be ascribed to the company being on the right side of the computer technology changes that were transforming not only industries, but modern society itself. As Amazon.com was benefiting from its move into music, Microsoft was buying Skype for $8.4 billion in order to get into communications. The hefty price tag can itself be taken as a confidence vote in the continuance of the technological shift as well as the value in moving to a new, hybrid industry model rather than limiting the company to its existent industry model. In other words, even in companies facing a serious technological threat in the business-environment, even top managers can fail to adopt a broader perspective within which the threat can be seen as an opportunity to change the company and even its own "micro-climate," or immediate industry. Hence by 2019, Borders no longer existed whereas Amazon was still profiting. Even the dinosaur McDonalds had tried to shift into a hybrid coffee-shop/restaurant industry model. 

10 year Amazon.com stock chart from Investorguide.com

  

Almost a decade earlier, in 2011, Borders had found itself holding paper books, music CDs and movie DVDs even as e-readers such as Kindle, on-line music in Cloud--both at Amazon.com, and on-line delivery of movies at Netflix were growing by leaps and bounds. To be on the heels of momentous technological change is very different from riding the crest of its wave.

Rather than fighting gravity itself, Borders executives would have been smart to pivot off reliance on the antiquated forms to expand on the one area that was not doomed to replacement--namely, Borders' cafe. Borders strategists would have been wise to think beyond a narrow conception of a particular industry sector. Rather than looking over at Amazon.com and Netflix, Borders executives could have studied why McDonald's was engaged in a $1 billion face lift designed to move the restaurants closer to Starbucks, a place where customers could buy a beverage, connect to wifi, and read material on the internet. In other words, Starbucks was expanding its food products (even going into consumer packaged foods in grocery stores) while McDonald's was moving closer to the coffee house model, a hybrid restaurant-coffee shop, just as Borders was clinging to paper books, CDs and DVDs rather than forging a new, hybrid industry for itself. 

Were Borders executives to have spoken to their customers, perhaps the suits would have discovered that being able to get a latte and some food, find a comfortable seat, and spend an hour or so looking at magazines and books were a significant part of the "Borders experience." Rather than being viewed as a way for customers to evade buying books, the customer experience could have been given more priority in Borders' business strategy. 
More tables and comfortable chairs could have been added in the stores throughout the store; this would play on a strength that was not so much at odds with technology. In fact, flat screen televisions could have been mounted in the expanded cafe area of a store, while other areas remained quiet.  Expanding on drink and food products--even going into premium products--would have enabled Borders to capitalize on an existing strength, using it to sell--even integrating technology with it. For instance, ebooks could have been linked; customers could perhaps have been able to "rent" ebook readers and a timed access to read from or even peruse the books.

Of course, no strategy is problem-free. Increasing food and drink around books could mean that more customers would render books unsaleable by spills or smears on the pages. Also, customers could have spent time in the stores only to read paper books and magazines for free. Retaining books could therefore have been difficult financially even if they contributed to the in-store experience. 
On the other hand, the strategy could have meant that Borders would eventually have been able to compete directly with McDonalds and Starbucks even as links are made with Amazon.com and Netflix. The "free use" risk would decrease as the food and beverages, as well as paid access to material via technology become more prominent in terms of revenue. In short, Borders could have morphed into a "hybrid" industry-wise while gradually departing from the traditional book-and-mortar bookstore model to capitalize uniquely on the evolving technology. 

In general terms, companies cannot long afford to be behind the curve while a relevant technological change is altering how customers prefer to get or use the products. The managers would do well to think beyond the steady industry in which they have been comfortable to consider more broadly how the new technology could be integrated even in creating a hybrid or new industry. Amazon.com has clearly been a beneficiary of "high tech," so there was no need to shift from a status-quo industry to a hybrid; Amazon itself could be said to have begun as its own industry, and thus qualitatively different from Walmart and Target, two traditional retailers. Simply arranging loans of $50 million to pre-pay publishers was not enough for Borders; in fact, the response evinces a traditional rather than novel perspective.

Sources:

Amazon on Investor Guide

Bruce Horovitz, "McChanges," USA Today, May 8, 2011, p. A1.

See also Kit Eaton, "Amazon Sells More E-Books than Paper Ones," Fast Company, May 19, 2011.

The U.S. Government Spying on Americans: Was It Ethical?

In early June, 2013, while Barak Obama was the U.S. president, Americans learned of the U.S. Government’s domestic surveillance program, under which the Verizon Business Network Services subsidiary had been turning over call logs “on an ongoing daily basis” to the National Security Agency[1] The order, signed by a judge on the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court in April of that year, was "lawful,” U.S. Senator Dianne Feinstein contended.[2] The program analyzed time and number logs that did not include the calls’ content. According to U.S. Senator Chambliss, “All of these numbers are basically ferreted out by a computer, but if there’s a number that matches a [suspicious] number that has been dialed . . . , then that may be flagged. And they may or may not seek a court order to go further on that particular instance. But that’s the only time that this information is ever used in any kind of substantive way.”[3] Harry Reid, Majority Leader in the U.S. Senate at the time, added that the phone-data program had “worked to prevent” terrorist attacks.[4] Does it make any difference. ethically speaking, that the program had helped stop a domestic attack? Shortly after The Guardian broke the story on Verizon’s subsidiary serving corporate customers, The Wall Street Journal reported, “[T]he initiative also encompasses phone-call data” from AT&T and Sprint, as well as from Verizon itself (i.e., beyond its business subsidiary).[5] Does this revelation on the vast scale of the program make any difference ethically? Moreover, does a positive collective consequence--or the lack of a negative harm to the public good--justify forays into the privacy of a vast number of individuals? 

Not surprisingly, privacy advocates were alarmed at the sheer scope of the program. Kate Martin of the Center for National Security Studies, a civil liberties advocacy group, said that “absent some explanation I haven’t thought of, this looks like the largest assault on privacy since the N.S.A. wiretapped Americans in clear violation of the law” under the Bush administration.[6] Her statement raises the question of whether the fact that the Obama administration had confined itself to court orders makes the program ethical.

Whereas the content of the phone conversations, including the parties’ names, were said to be not included in the trove of data turned over to the government, internet companies had been providing the contents of emails, online chats, Facebook accounts, Skype video calls, and web searches to the government as per court orders (i.e., not through direct access).[7] Does the inclusion of content make any difference, ethically speaking? Applying a few ethical theories may get us closer to some answers. 

                        I. Utilitarianism

Utilitarianism maintains that conduct is ethical if it provides the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people. This can be in terms of pleasure over pain or benefits over costs. In terms of phone records, the question is whether the harm from attacks that are prevented by the program outweighs the harm from the loss of privacy. Put another way, do the benefits of prevented attacks exceed the costs in terms of privacy that is lost?
That at least one attack had already been prevented indicates that benefits do indeed exist—but for how many people (saved)? Furthermore, how grave would the attacks have been? Attacks can vary in their severity and breadth of harm. The reduction in the fear of a possible attack is also a benefit, and the program, once exposed, can be expected to have put that fear at ease, at least to some degree. That these factors require judgment means that different people are likely to come to different conclusions on a given issue.
On the harm or cost side, the number of people whose calls have been reported is relevant. Judgment again intrudes in the determination of the harm from the loss of privacy if the parties are not aware of it, and then if they are aware of it. That the contents of the calls are not reported suggests that the cost or harm may not exceed the program’s benefits, even though the data provided covers a great number of people. In other words, it is reasonable to conclude that the harm to them pales in comparison to the harm that would be unleashed by mass attacks were they not prevented by the program. In the twenty-first century, access to chemical weapons and nuclear bombs can translate into massive harm. Anyone having parents, a brother or sister, or a child living in a major city would likely judge that giving the government access to his or her phone log is worth the loss in privacy. In terms of utilitarianism, therefore, the phone-records government program can be regarded as ethical because it is consistent with the greatest net happiness for the greatest number. The pain prevented would likely have been severe, whereas, even though the phone-logs involve many more people, the costs in terms of loss of privacy are far less intense. In other words, saving legs and lives is a benefit so significant that the loss of some privacy of many more people would likely be less overall than the benefits overall. To be sure, weighing and relating benefits and costs both in terms of severity and the number of likely people involves considerable uncertainty. Utilitarianism is therefore often a matter of judgment rather than mathematical calculation. The value of the theory here may be in comparing the two programs.
For example, going on to the Prism program, it can be regarded as less ethical from a utilitarian standpoint because of the extent of content provided. The possibility of government “Nixonist” abuse is greater here. Further, it could be asked whether the sheer amount of content is necessary to prevent attacks. In other words, would more attacks in the works be prevented, and if so, would this increased benefit be worth the added cost in terms of privacy lost? Even though judgment again comes into play, the Prism program is likely less ethical than the phone-log program—perhaps even unethical.

            II. Kantianism

Kant argued that treating others as ends in themselves rather than only as a means is a duty owing to the value of rational nature, given that it assigns values to things. The people whose calls are being reported are in one sense being used, but it is also possible that they or their loved ones could be saved from being killed or wounded as a result of the program. The more people whose calls are being reported, the stronger is the case that they themselves are being protected, and thus treated not merely as means, but also as ends in themselves. That three major phone companies have been submitting the logs suggests that the people can be regarded as the point of the program, rather than only as the means. The program can thus be viewed as ethical in Kantian terms.
In regard to the Prism program, the inclusion of so much content makes it easier to argue that the people are being used. At the same time, that so much from the internet is included means that more people are included. The assertion that the people harmed are also those being protected is thus stronger. However, it is also true that a lower proportion of those whose data is being mined would likely be those saved from the prevented attacks. A person could feel uncomfortable knowing that government employees could be reading his or her emails and tweets as well as looking at his or her Facebook pictures even though it is unlikely that he or she, living in the woods in Idaho, would ever be a victim of a terrorist attack. Such a person would rightly feel used for the sake of others’ safety.
For the Prism program to be ethical under Kantian ethics, one would be on more solid ground asserting that “the People” are being used and protected. As a government policy oriented to the general welfare, the program may thus be ethical. Even so, particular individuals could claim that they are being used.  

                        III. Social Contract: Rights and Obligations

Even if people have not sat down in the state of nature to agree to a social contract as a basis for a society, the balance of rights and obligations can be understood in terms of a contract. The rights and obligations are both for the good of the people. The question for us regarding the phone program is whether the obligation to allow one’s calls to be noted and used secretly by a government agency would be viewed by actual or hypothetical contract negotiators as going too far in encroaching on the right to privacy. That is, the question is whether people in the state of nature would agree to giving up that right in exchange for being (or feeling) protected. Because the contents of the calls and the names of the callers are not part of the obligation, people in the state of nature could reasonably agree to it in exchange for feeling or actually being protected.
Regarding the Prism program, people devising a social contract would be less likely to agree to provide their emails, web-searches, blogs, tweets, and Facebook contents in exchange for feeling or being more secure in a society. From a social contract perspective, the Prism program can be regarded as unethical. This approach assumes that the right to privacy is created in the making of a social contract, rather than being a natural right. If the right is “hardwired” into human beings, we could not simply “trade it in” without an enduring psychological cost.

                        IV. Natural Rights

That privacy is typically subject to questions of how much it benefits us relative to how much the loss of privacy benefits society suggests that the right is not natural. However, when a person’s privacy is not respected, such as by someone demanding personal information, it is natural to react in anger—to have what Hume calls a sentiment of disapprobation. Hume claimed this emotional reaction is the moral judgment itself that some conduct is unethical. In other words, that we react rather instinctually to someone who presumes access to personal information or ignores personal space suggests that the right to privacy stems from a natural right built into being constituted as a human being. From this basis, both programs can be regarded as unethical—the Prism program being even more unethical than the phone program because of the additional contents being provided to the government.
That just suspecting that a stranger might be reading one’s personal email or seeing a personal photo from Facebook would make the typical person cringe suggests that something unethical is going on—that the person is being violated in a way that cannot be justified. As the news reports of the programs were being digested by the American people, a collective negative emotional reaction was palpable with such immediacy that it must have been natural, and thus triggered by the violation of a natural right. Even people who reasoned that security justifies the loss of privacy doubtlessly had the emotional reaction too. From this perspective, it can be predicted that the more privacy, or access to that which the person regards as person, is compromised, the more psychological harm to the person is incurred as a result. A person adopting the social-contract approach might agree to trade some privacy for security, but the natural right theory would stress the psychological cost and thus be much less inclined to “trade” the right.

In conclusion, whether or not the phone and Prism programs were unethical depends on not only judgment and which factors are included, but also the particular ethical theory being used. It is unlikely that a definite ethical “answer” can be obtained or even exists unless the breach of privacy was so grave (i.e., harmful to the individuals being spied on) that utilitarianism and natural rights would become inflamed. Even so, that the ethical theories analyzed above do not give the same answer suggests that at least some ethicists would still object. From my own analysis above, two factors strike me as decisive: how personal the information that being provided (and how much) is, and how useful a given amount of information is in preventing attacks. A trade-off is implied here, and it in turn is related to the long-standing trade-off between privacy and security, or, moreover, rights and related harms of individuals and the public good. Surely at some point, it becomes unethical to extract too much from certain individuals--especially if they are many--for the public good. Yet we should not be hoodwinked into thinking that all ethical theories speak with the same voice. This grayness can be expected to diminish as the harm increases. Also, the grayness may give way only on a gradual slippery slope, and thus not be detectable either by the general public. For example, when the Nazis invaded The Netherlands, Jews there were subject to a gradual tightening (i.e., adding) of restrictions--the purpose of the "bit by bit" approach was doubtless so the Jews would not raise an uproar, for who would for a slight change? Spying on citizens by the U.S. Government probably also increased by small iterations, each of which, on its own, could easily be justified in governmental circles. Herein lies a danger to liberty even in a democracy.  

1. Charlie Savage and Edward Wyatt, “U.S. Is Secretly Collecting Records of Verizon Calls,” The New York Times, June 5, 2013.

2. Charlie Savage and Edward Wyatt, “U.S. Maintains Vast Database of Phone Calls, Lawmakers Say,” The New York Times, June 5, 2013.

3. Ibid.

4. Siobhan Gorman, Evan Perez, and Janet Hook, “U.S. Collects Vast Data Trove,” The Wall Street Journal, June 7, 2013.

5. Ibid.

6. Charlie Savage and Edward Wyatt, “U.S. Is Secretly Collecting Records of Verizon Calls,” The New York Times, June 5, 2013.

7. Siobhan Gorman, Evan Perez, and Janet Hook, “U.S. Collects Vast Data Trove,” The Wall Street Journal, June 7, 2013.