Poverty Impeding Development

In the 1980s, the advent of some newly-industrializing countries (NICs) in east Asia, such as Taiwan and South Korea, was generating excitement around the world that the gap between the least developed countries (LDCs) and the developed countries (DCs) then had a viable bridge through foreign direct-investment; that is, what had been a dichotomy was becoming a spectrum. The hope that globally-circulating capital might raise even the LDCs out of poverty. Of course, there was scarce any thought that the combined pollution of an economically developing world would raise global air and sea temperatures above 1.5C. Human beings are too near-sighted for that, and, of course, there is the allure of profits and higher salaries and wages. Also, the sheer inexorability, or stubborn persistence, of poverty in scaring off rather than being lifted up from foreign-direct investment may have been minimized by the hope. Roughly forty years later, Oriana Bandiera of the London School of Economics spoke on the theory that economic opportunities are impacted by how much wealth a person has at the outset—the alternative theory being that the opportunities are just as good for the poor as for the rich because differences are due to exogenous (i.e., outside) factors. The micro-level condition of a country’s poor impacts the attractiveness of a country to foreign direct-investment.

Poor people are more likely to be doing casual, self-employed work than running a small business or raising livestock, according to Bandiera. Wage-labor tends not to go to the poor. Sustenance-level casual work, which is not as regular as wage-labor, is typically not enough to accumulate savings, which could be spent on training or education, or to buy livestock or equipment to increase production of crafts such that economies of scale might be realized. A bimodal structure thus emerges with equilibria being at subsistence level and middle-class, but not in between them. In terms of public policy, craft-oriented small-business loans can perhaps increase the number of poor people who can enter the interim space between the two equilibria. Only governments would be willing to take the risk, and should be willing to make sure that the loans are not spent on consumption, for pressing consumption needs are part of the reason why the poor do not save money on an ongoing basis.

Similarly on the macro level, the Asian NICs were distinguished from the LDCs in Latin America in the 1980s because only the former group had governments strong enough to withstand the political pressure from the people for increased government spending for consumption. Strong states, even if they are authoritarian rather than democratic, can resist popular pressure to exhaust government coffers by expanding entitlement programs. That by 2025 several E.U. states had deficits and debts greater than the limits prescribed by the Stability and Growth Pact and those governments faced no real accountability from the E.U.’s federal government adds support to the argument that democracy may be at odds with sustained and balanced fiscal policy unless, as the U.S.’s Thomas Jefferson and John Adams agreed, the citizenry who vote (i.e., the electorate) are educated and virtuous.  

In terms of business, enterprises in LDC’s tend to be smaller than those in developed countries (and NICs). Smaller organizations are less competitive in trade because they cannot realize the benefits of economies of scale. Such organizations also have less job-specialization and job variety. Bandiera even referred to the labor of such companies as a “disassociated group of self-employed.” Additionally, the CEOs of those enterprises tend to be managers more so than leaders, meaning that those CEOs spend more of their time oriented to functions inside the organizations and less time oriented to external stakeholders and even society as a whole. Visionary leadership is something that the head of a small business in a developing country cannot afford.

Even in business schools in developed countries, the business field of business environment has a place similar to that of Pluto in the solar system. Situating the field of business ethics within business environment is logically and conceptually dubious—but not to worry; few “scholars” of business ethics have actually studied philosophy, of which ethics is a subfield. One business ethics “scholar” at MIT told me in 2024 that ethics is actually situated in sociology rather than philosophy. Being in the humanities, I only smiled and wished her well. Rather than copy the business systems of developed countries, perhaps LDCs should grow their own varieties. The question is perhaps whether the governments should first not only invest in infrastructure, but also underwrite small-business loans to a sufficient portion of poor households before enticing foreign direct-investment. After all, forests develop in stages.

Affluence and Democracy in China: A Complicated Relationship

The Financial Times reported in 2013 that there was “no great clamour in China for western democracy.”[1] The assumption in the West that prosperity in China will someday inevitably usher in democracy may unduly privilege Western political values in an exogenous context. The newspaper suggested that prosperity can be the source of rising pressure for political change rather than an antidote to it. In other words, the power shift between the state and individual that is unleashed by rising incomes does not necessary privilege the individual. Time and again, China’s leaders have refused to shift power to the individual at the expense of the state; social harmony, and power, are just too important. To be sure, cronyism and corruption, while endemic in China, are not esteemed cultural values, and the rising middle-class may demand that the state clamp down on the unfairness of government officials “wetting their beaks.” This would be particularly problematic if the growing upper-middle-class demand more transparency in government and more rule-of-law to instill fairness over the personal aggrandizement of government officials. However, President Xi, at least publically, would hardly object, as he set out to come down hard on corruption even in the state. At the very least, the matter of increasing wealth and democracy in China can only be complex, yet we can come to some conclusions based on Chinese history and the Chinese view of democracy being Western.

The relationship between economic development and political democracy in China is more complex than is typically presumed in the West. Put another way, the rest of the world is not made in the West’s image. That the newly affluent in China (except for in Hong Kong) would not necessarily demand democracy would strike most Westerners as bizarre. Why would not enhanced choice given the greater buying-power translate into choice in politics too? It is very possible that the Chinese newly rich would want a breed of change in government that does not reflect Western democracy. Certainly the extant ruling elite would favor such a force over one that is pro-democracy.Rather than a change of system, rising incomes may fuel a power struggle between different power-centers—one being the old and the other(s) being the new. This sort of thing happened in the Salem witch trials in seventeenth-century New England. Newly-propertied women were literally burned-to-death by city officials who favored the established landed gentry. The religious subterfuge belied the more earthly battle between old and new centers of power based at least in part on economic change.
Similarly, contending centers of power held within the Communist Party widen to include the rich and professional classes (i.e., upper and upper-middle). With the exception of the two short-lived republics attempted at the end of the Qing dynasty in the early twentieth century, China has no history of democracy, so it would not be likely that the ruling party expands to include a democratic faction.

Because the two brief republics occurred just after the Qing dynasty fell, and, moreover, because the history of China contains cycle after cycle of dynasties rising and falling, real change that includes a democratic system would most likely be possible only after the fall of the Communist Party dynasty. Considering that the Qing dynasty went from 1644 to 1910, I wouldn't look for this kind of change any time soon. Yet within the current dynasty, more pockets of limited democracy, perhaps similar to Hong Kong's, may be established, or, more to the point, allowed by the power in the status quo.

1. Philip Stephens, “Political Cracks Imperil China’s Power,” The Financial Times, January 24, 2013.

East Asia and Latin America: Economy & State

In the fall of 2011, the economic troubles in the developed countries were starting to hit fast-growing developing economies like China, Brazil and Indonesia. The governments of the developing countries were “girding themselves,” according to the Wall Street Journal, “to offset any economic and financial damage.” China’s government, for example, increased the investment of its sovereign wealth fund in Chinese banks. In September, China’s exports to the E.U. grew at 10 percent, compared with 22% in August. China’s increase in imports was also weaker, which did not bode well for emerging markets in Latin America and elsewhere that supply commodities for China’s construction industry.  Yet IMF projections depicted an interesting distinction between the projected increase of real GNP in Latin America and the developing Asian economies. The projections for 2011 were 4.7% and 7.9 percent, respectively. For 2012, the projections were 4.0% and 7.7 percent, again respectively. What can explain this pattern wherein Asian newly industrialized economies (NICs) were expected to fare better?

Economists might point to the regions having different mixes of industries as behind the difference in projected growth—some industries more affected by the global downturn than others. Economists might also point out that domestic markets are more mature, and thus resistant to external shock, in the Asian NICs. Political economists would likely bring up the strong/weak state variable, hence bringing in the element of government to explain the difference in the projected economic growth rates.

In their democratic incarnations, Latin American governments have been less resistant to popular pressure for increased government spending on consumption. This has come at the expense of government investment such as infrastructure projects attractive to foreign direct investment. In other words, the governments of the Asian NICs have had a stronger state in the sense that the governments have been better able to resist the demand by people for increased entitlement spending at the expense of investment oriented to industrializing. Such investment can include education/training and transportation networks. Managers at a corporation looking for a country in which to locate a factory, for instance, are apt to size up the local and regional transportation infrastructure with an eye to being able to bring in supplies in a timely manner and send off products—both to the domestic market and other markets. Also, the government of a poor country hoping to develop economically via attracting foreign direct investment invests in training facilities and attempts to reduce corruption, as foreign companies appreciate locally-trained labor and not having to pay bribes to government officials in return for being able to conduct business. Officials of strong states are less capricious, and thus less corrupt.

Asian NICs were able to industrialize in the last two decades of the twentieth century more so than Latin American countries in part because of a strong state—meaning more resistant to spending tax revenue away on immediate consumption at the expense of infrastructure investment. This “state” variable was salient in the scholarship of international political economy when the Asian tigers were pulling away from the Latin American economies in the 1980s.

Lest it be presumed that a strong state is necessarily better simply because it can be useful in industrializing a “LDC” (low developed country) into a NIC through foreign direct investment, it is also possible that a government that is more resistant to popular pressure can also be more resistant to democracy. If republics are susceptible to profligacy in spending on consumption while dictatorships can resist such pressure and attract foreign direct investment, then a sad tradeoff could exist between liberty and wealth. Of course, as many dictatorships have shown, the wealth garnered from licensing commodity extraction (e.g., oil drilling) can be quite concentrated domestically. The tradeoff may not reach the people.

Perhaps ideally, the state is weak, or pliant, at election time, when governmental sovereignty bows to popular sovereignty. As the government turns to governing, the state hardens up in resisting the passions of the masses for immediate gratification. The resistance entailed in governing can be oriented to a people’s best interests rather than to oppressing the masses. The IMF projections may indicate that the Asian NICs came out of the twentieth century better constituted than the Latin American countries in this regard.

Source:

Alex Frangos and Patrick McGroarty, “Troubles of West Take Toll on Emerging Economies,” The Wall Street Journal, October 14, 2011. 

A U.S. Visa Fast-Track For Rich Investors

The New York Times reported in December 2011 that affluent foreigners had been rushing to take advantage of a U.S. immigration program. The foreign applicants must invest at least $500,000 in construction projects within the United States. The number of applicants had nearly doubled since the end of 2008 to more than 3,800 in the 2011 fiscal year. The intent of the program is to spur economic development at a time of high unemployment. Yet the program has also been characterized as a cash-for-visas scheme. Besides the question of whether the program’s rules have been stretched in New York City to qualify projects in prosperous areas for special concessions, an ethical question can be raised concerning who should get a visa.
Obviously, the program’s designers must have known that only wealthy people could qualify. A public-interest ethical argument could be made that they deserve a green card because they contribute to economic development out of which jobs for Americans can ensue. Indeed, to the extent that the additional investment results in more economic activity, the visitors making the investment in 2011 could have been helping to forestall a double-dip recession. This was a distinct possibility at the time, given the E.U. debt crisis.
The ethical issue is in the exclusion of people who are not wealthy. The principle of fairness would seem to mandate that just as many non-rich foreigners be granted green cards above the ordinary limit. However, this would seem to be rather artificial—a sort of tit for tat—as in “we’ll accept your tax cut if you accept ours.” Moreover, in the context of high unemployment, any such increase in visas should not add to the supply of labor.
John Rawls suggested that in designing such a system as applying for a green card, a veil of ignorance as to whether one will be rich or poor should be utilized. Rawls’ thinking was that if the designers cannot know whether they or their friends will be rich or poor, then the proposed system design will be fair (i.e., there would be the chance that one’s friends are poor foreigners unable to get a green card). While fair in itself, this ethical device may not adequately take into account the public interest that could be satisfied by only one segment (e.g., the rich). Should the U.S. renounce the possibility of more economic development, particularly at a time of high unemployment, just because poor and middle-class foreigners cannot participate?
Related to the matter of income and wealth, it can be asked from both the public interest and ethical standpoints whether capital investment is more valuable economically than highly skilled and educated foreigners. To be sure, the latter ought not crowd out citizens and existing residents who have comparable skills and knowledge, and it is presumably possible to further train and educate existing citizens and residents.
For example, the very same issue of the New York Times containing the story of the green cards for foreign investors reported that M.I.T. was announcing an expanded program that would still allow anyone anywhere to take M.I.T. courses online free of charge, but would add online labs, self-assessments and student-to-student discussion. Also, for a small charge, a certificate can be obtained. At the time, the university’s free OpenCourseWare included nearly 2,100 courses and had been used by more than 100 million people. Rafael Reif, the provost, gave the following as the operating assumption: “There are many people who would love to augment their education by having access to M.I.T. content, people who are very capable to earn a certificate from M.I.T.” To be sure, a certificate would not be a degree, but in terms of non-professional jobs the former may be sufficient. “The most important thing is that it’ll be a certificate that will clearly state that a body sanctioned by M.I.T. says you have gained mastery,” Reif added. The notion that cost (and debt) ought not be an obstacle to a natural drive to learn more, whether in terms of skills or knowledge, is foreign in the United States (and increasingly in Europe as well).
Yet from the standpoint of economic development as well as jobs, viewing education as an investment rather than as a purchased product would likely pay substantial dividends. Where such an approach to vocational training and higher education falls short for citizens and residents, welcoming the best and the brightest from abroad—even training and educating them at online programs such as M.I.T’s—may be an investment policy even more beneficial than that of attracting additional capital investment in construction projects.

Sources:

Tamar Lewin, “M.I.T. Plans to Expand Its Free Online Courses,” The New York Times, December 19, 2011.

Patrick McGeehan and Kirk Semple, “Rules Stretched as Green Cards Go to Investors,” The New York Times, December 19, 2011. 

China’s Increasing International Role: A Historical Departure

Historically, China was isolationist. The Opium Wars in the mid-19^th century is a good illustration of why. From this context, China’s announcements of a series of international trade and finance initiatives by which China would assume a larger leadership role internationally are stunning. Doubtless the enhanced role is in line with China’s geopolitical and economic interests. After all, political realism is hardly a dead theory in the 21^st century. Even so, the impact of the reversal on the culture is significant, and thus worthy of study. Specifically, the traditional mistrust of foreigners is likely to diminish. As it does, the Chinese will be more likely to consider and even advocate for economic and political principles, such as liberty and rights, that are valued elsewhere in the world but not so much in China. The result could be increased political instability. In short, the initiatives timed to coincide with the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting in November 2014 could eventually weaken the Chinese government’s grip on power.

The full essay is at “China’s Increasing International Role”

Ebola in Liberia: The Government’s Fault?

With the Ebola virus “spreading like wildfire” in Liberia, “devouring everything in its path,” Brownie Samukai, the state’s defense minister, went on to tell the U.N. Security Council on September 9, 2014 that “Liberia is facing a serious threat to its national existence.”[1] With more than half of the epidemic’s deaths in that state—1,224 out of at least 2,2296 in West Africa as of September 6, 2014—and new cases “increasing exponentially,” the World Health Organization (WHO) declared that “the demands of the Ebola outbreak have completely outstripped the government’s and partners’ capacity  to respond.”[2] Meanwhile, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) reported that the illness had severely handicapped the mining, agriculture, and service sectors of the state’s economy.[3] Quite understandably, pleas for the government to do more peeled like frightened bells across the state. “The patients are hungry, they are starving. No food, no water,” a terrified woman told journalists. “The government needs to do more. Let Ellen Johnson Sirleaf do more!”[4] Even if valid, such blame is hypocritical to the extent that the people themselves had been refusing to do what is necessary to stop such a virus from spreading.

Concerning the validity of woman’s charge that the government was not doing nearly enough, Samukai pointed out that the “already weak health infrastructure” was overwhelmed.[5] That is to say, the government had to deal with an already-insufficient healthcare system. Why insufficient? Two theories of development give different answers. According to dependencia, or dependency theory, the infrastructure of a colony is oriented to getting commodities out to the colonizer rather than to developing an internal, web-like system. Roads of a coastal colony, for example, are prioritized that go from the interior to the coast, where ships can pick up the goods and transport them to the core economy (e.g., Europe). The colonists and even their successors cannot be blamed for the lack of internally-oriented infrastructure, yet at some point after a sufficient amount of time as a sovereign state the lack of any progress is surely blameworthy.

The modernization theory says that what holds a developing country back is not its colonial infrastructure, but, rather, things like tradition and ignorance that a people stubbornly cling to even when offered a better way. Superstition, for example, may keep people from working on certain days while tradition has it that a person should stop working as soon as he or she has enough for subsistence living. This inverse of the Protestant work ethic can keep capital from accumulating to the point that reinvestment can broaden an agrarian economy to include manufacturing industries. Rigidly sticking with the custom that puts child labor above education, a people can keep its young from becoming professionals, business entrepreneurs, and managers. Quite understandably, executives of foreign corporations are hesitant to start operations where such a base labor pool exists and reinforces itself.

Taken together dependencia and modernization theory can account for the weak health infrastructure in Liberia and other former colonies in Africa. Health-care of the natives had not been a priority of the colonizers. Additionally, education and investment, as well as even foreign direct investment, may be lacking even though they would contribute much to building a sound healthcare system.

Applied to the Ebola outbreak, we can look beyond the government and healthcare infrastructure to apply modernization theory to the people themselves. The funeral custom, for example, of touching the body the deceased friend or relative is great for the virus, which spreads by touch rather than air. Even so, the African who have this tradition stubbornly and/or ignorantly held to it even as the epidemic was spreading. Additionally, villagers took to hiding sick residents rather than allowing visiting healthcare workers to take the infected people to makeshift treating facilities out of fear that people go to die at such places; meanwhile, the villagers themselves could become infected. In some cases, villagers even attacked the visitors, stubbornly ignoring their pleas.

Scared villagers in Liberia stand far away from the healthcare worker, even as they risk getting the virus by rubbing up against each other--ignoring the worker's pleas. (Image Source: The Washington Post)

Simply maintaining a distance from other people, rather than continuing to touch them, would have done a lot to smite the Ebola. Especially sordid is the assumption that the healthcare workers and government officials don’t know what they are talking about, especially if the person also assumes that he or she cannot be wrong—such as in knowing that touching a dead body brings with it benefits that can keep the person healthy or safe. Ignorance that cannot be wrong, backed up by tradition, can indeed be a silent killer, the odor of which can only be pleasing to the Ebola virus. Blaming the government rings hollow from such a putrid drum, even if officials could be doing a better job in mopping up the mess.

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[1] Abby Ohlheiser, “Ebola Is ‘Devouring Everything in Its Path.’ Could It Lead to Liberia’s Collapse?” The Washington Post, September 11, 2014.

[2] WTO, “Ebola Situation in Liberia: Non-Conventional Interventions Needed,” September 8, 2014; Elahe Izadi, “Ebola Death Toll Rises to 2,296 as Liberia Struggles to Keep Up,” The Washington Post, September 9, 2014.

[3] Anna Yukhananov, “IMF Says Ebola Hits Economic Growth in West Africa,” Reuters, September 11, 2014.

[4] Abby Ohlheiser, “Ebola.”

[5] Ibid.

Wealth and Happiness American-Style

The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development released an up-dated version of its Better Life Index in May 2012. The U.S. ranked first in income, with average household wealth at $102,000, as well as in housing (Americans spending about 20% of their disposable income on it—the OECD average being 22%).[1] These figures for the U.S. could have been pushed upward by the fact that at the time, the very rich were richer than their counterparts in other countries, for the gap between rich and poor was relatively high in the U.S. For example, 30 million Americans were without health insurance and a record number of Americans were receiving a governmental subsidy for food. Rather than assume that the middle and lower economic segments in the U.S. were better off than their counterparts in other regions of the world, I suspect that the statistics reflect the higher relative pay of American executives and professionals (lawyers, physicians and CPAs). The typical CEO in the E.U., for example, made less than his or her counterpart in the U.S.  This caused trouble in the Chrysler-Daimler merger because the Chrysler executives enjoyed higher compensation even though Daimler was in charge.

Interestingly, the rank of the U.S. in life satisfaction was above average, with 76 percent of people reporting having more positive than negative experiences in an average day (the average in the OECD index being 72%). In other words, the gap between the rich and poor does not appear to have gotten in the way of life-satisfaction. Although economic reductionism is particularly salient in the U.S., such satisfaction does not reduce to dollars and cents. Even in economic terms, the large gap between the rich and poor includes geographic distance. For example, court-orders have had to be used to force some cities and towns to allow subsidized (low-income) housing. Meanwhile, it is not uncommon, particularly in Florida, for people with money to live in gated communities. With the rich out of sight, the poor are less likely to be aware of the economic inequality, which could otherwise put a damper on their life-satisfaction.

As a final observation, my reference to Florida suggests that the OECD should not generalize all of the American states into one figure. For example, life-satisfaction is likely to be higher in Hawaii than in Alabama or Michigan for climatic or economic reasons (or in North Dakota during the winter even considering the economic boom). Housing in New Hampshire is, in general, better than in Mississippi. Income in Connecticut is higher on average than in Arkansas. For states, whether in the U.S. or E.U., to be in a union is not to say that they are identical and thus readily grouped together. In other words, a general statistic in housing or income has less real meaning when applied over such a large area. It is like saying that the average temperature in the U.S. in 2011 was 56 degrees (I don’t know the real figure). It is unlikely that figure applies in any state—certainly not in Florida, Hawaii, Alaska, or Maine. The figure has no real meaning, other than relative to other such figures over time (e.g., to assess global warming). For the OECD to compare the U.S. as a whole to E.U. states such as Denmark, Belgium and Spain suggests that the organization is content to engage in category mistakes. If the figures are relevant on the state level, the OECD should be consistent rather than selectively over-generalize.

1. “OECD LaunchesUpdated Version of Your Better Life Index,” OECD. 

See also MSNBC, “US Ranks No. 1 in Wealth, Not in Happiness.”