CNN’s Hosts: Hidden Agendas

Hitting record-low ratings among total viewers and in the 25-54 age demographic, CNN had its overall lowest-rated month in April 2012 since August 2001. In May 2012, the network hit a 20-year low for total viewers during primetime viewing.[1] Something had gone seriously wrong. Perhaps the easiest move when a company takes a nose-dive is to fire the top. Accordingly, Time Warner executives were thinking of replacing the president of CNN Worldwide.[2] While taking off the top might make sense in government because the entire administration is apt to change, business firms tend to be more entrenched even when under new management.

In the case of CNN, the culprit may have been bad hiring decisions. If so, the solution would lie in replacing the staff who made the hires as well as the “personalities” hired. In an age of “media personalities” wherein opinion typically accompanies journalistic interviewing, it is only natural to hire people who have strong personalities. It is far less common to witness interviewees going after hosts in terms of their personalities. In May 2012, Donald Trump laid into Wolf Blitzer during an interview. The real-estate magnet told the journalist that the introduction was inappropriate, but then added a personal insult in remarking, but “that’s okay, because I’ve gotten to know you over the years.”[3] It would appear that Trump and others “in the loop” having had years of experience with Blitzer had come to the conclusion that he could not be trusted. The general public—meaning the viewers—could only surmise on the accusation, knowing only the “on-screen” media personality.

Years before Trump’s revelation, I had already glimpsed a bit of the man behind the curtain when Blitzer wished everyone “a happy holiday and happy New Year.” The meaning of this statement struck me as suggestive of a Jewish prejudice against Christmas, as if the U.S. holiday were only the religious holiday celebrated by Christians. I also saw footage of Blitzer at a Hollywood event as he was desperately trying to get interviewed by a journalist.

My sense that CNN “stars” might be too self-absorbed got a shot in the arm when Piers Morgan admitted on-camera while covering Queen Elizabeth II’s sixty years on the state’s throne that he really wanted to be king. That was too much even for one of Morgan’s co-host, who said in exasperation, “Oh, Piers!” Strangely, he had previously said that he was glad to be a subject (of the Queen).  Might it be that pride in being a subject is really a subterfuge for a desire to be king? Piers’ imagining of himself as king of the island (an interesting fantasy, given that he had been implicated in the Murdoch hacking scandal) was revealing. Two days before, his coverage had been reduced to drawing attention to the rain—a constant refrain during the parade of boats. He even pointed out that there was water on his seat (as if any of the viewers cared). Moreover, he was careful to stress everything that was distinctively British, while generalizing everything American across fifty republics (Britain is one republic). My instinctive reaction was to ask, well then why don’t you stay over there? 

I was not at all surprised to learn of CNN’s low ratings. I suspected that even if viewers had not been aware of it, they had probably reacted in reaction to the arrogance of the major hosts. People were voting with their remote controls even if they couldn’t put their finger on what was behind their decisions. Rather than limit the change to the top brass at CNN, Time Warner executives would have been wiser to demand that the major “stars” of CNN be replaced en masse. Owning a subsidiary does not mean that oversight is limited to the subsidiary’s executive suite, at least if the parent company is being capably run.

1. Rebecca Shapiro, “CNN Considering Leadership Change in Wake of Ratings Woes: Report,” The Huffington Post, June 8, 2012.

2. Ibid.

3. The Atlantic Wire, “Donald Trump Blasts Wolf Blitzer, CNN During Combative Live Interview,” May 29, 2012.

Pressuring E.U. States: The Debt Crisis as Leverage

By mid 2012, the verdict was in on the German-led recipe for restoring states overwhelmed by public- or private-sector debt: Austerity is counter-productive in reducing government deficits. On June 6, 2012, the media reported: “Prolonged austerity is making it harder, not easier, for governments like Greece to become self-reliant again.”[1] Salaries and pensions in the private and the public sectors in the state had been cut by up to 50 percent, leaving Greece 495 million euros short of its revenue targets in the four months ending the previous April, according to the Greek Finance Ministry.[2] With less cash, consumers had to reduce spending, leading thousands of taxpaying businesses to fail. Income expected from a higher, 23 percent value-added tax required by the bailout agreement fell short by around 800 million euros in the first four months of 2012. That is partly because cash-short businesses that were once law-abiding started hiding money to stay afloat, tax officials said.

The complete essay is at Essays on Two Federal Empires.

1. Liz Alderman, “Greece Warns of Going Broke as Tax Proceeds Dry Up,” The New York Times, June 6, 2012.

2. Ibid.

The Wisconsin Recall Election: A Predictor of the U.S. Presidential Election?

According to Paul Abowd of the Center for Public Integrity in 2012, the election to fill the governor’s office in the wake of Scott Walker’s recall “has become a referendum on the future of public sector unions.”[1] That the union of teaching-assistant students at the University of Wisconsin in Madison refused to endorse Barrett precisely because he was not making collective bargaining rights a salient part of his campaign would suggest that Abowd had it wrong. Moreover, it is a mistake to read the election results in Wisconsin as a harbinger of things to come in the U.S. presidential election five months later in November 2012.

During his campaign, Barrett downplayed the public-sector union issue because he figured he already had his base, which had detested Walker for more than a year. Barrett was going for the independents who saw the recall petition as sour-grapes by a vocal interest group (the student union validating this judgment). Most tellingly, the teaching-assistant student-union had even refused to endorse the unions’ own favorite for Democratic nominee, Kathleen Falk, who had lost to Barrett in the primary by twenty points. Falk had promised not to sign any legislation until a bill restoring the public-sector unions' collective-bargaining rights is presented. You cannot get much more pro-union than that, and yet even THAT was not good enough for the graduate students at the University of Wisconsin in Madison. At the very least, it would appear that the graduate school's admissions committees at the university in Madison could have been doing better in their decisions, at least in regard to assessing maturity and judgment. 

I count it as a good thing that Barrett’s position on restoring the Wisconsin government workers’ bargaining right was less “my way or the highway” than was Falk’s position because Barrett was evincing a more mature or seasoned approach to governance. In contrast, the teaching-assistants’ union can be read as evincing the self-defeating and immature rigidity of “my way or the highway.” The contending camps in Wisconsin’s Democratic Party reflected this difference of political culture between Milwaukee and Madison. Hence, the dynamic cannot be assumed to operate at the U.S. level.

Furthermore, Mitchell, a young fireman whose involvement in his union probably won him the Democratic nomination for Vice (or lieutenant) Governor (as an after-thought by most voters), was at the time both too young and inexperienced in terms of public office to occupy the second-highest office in the land, not to mention the highest. At an outdoor rally in a street-alcove after a motley march that took place in downtown Madison the day after the primary, Mitchell easily stood out in video of the event because he was the only person in the warm weather wearing a grey suit. His political inexperience really stood out as he could be seen walking through the crowd, insisting on shaking hands with people even as they were trying to listen to the speakers. Perhaps most tellingly, he bumped into at least one person who preferred to keep listening to the speaker rather than turn around to shake hands. I suspect that Mitchell was trying to be a "professional" politician in a very atypical (and thus inappropriate) context (i.e., the recall). This itself essentially disqualified him from the office he was seeking, especially because it was possible that had he won along with Walker, the young fireman could have found himself assuming the office of governor.

The quality of the Democrats’ choice for vice governor mattered particularly because Walker was being investigated at the time by U.S. and Wisconsin law-enforcement agencies for corruption while he had been chief executive of the County of Milwaukee. In Illinois, Quinn had become the head of state and chief executive of the government when "Blago" was impeached and removed from office for trying to sell Barak Obama's vacated U.S. Senate seat. Were Mitchell to have won even as Bartlett lost, the novice could have found himself eventually taking over for Walker. It is not at all advisable to have a political novice in the highest office in the land. I suspect that this factor weighed on independent voters.

It would be perfectly understandable, therefore, for Wisconsinites in favor of Barrett to have skipped the lieutenant governor race based on principle (i.e., putting the interest of the public good over partisanship), even if that could have resulted in the governor and lieutenant governor being of different parties. Because the lieutenant governor office has some important powers when the governor is not in Wisconsin, such a scenario would certainly not be optimal for Barrett supporters. Therefore, I believe the Democrats in Wisconsin dropped the ball in voting in the primary for a nominee for lieutenant governor. To be sure, they made a good choice in picking Barrett’s mature approach to restoring union rights over Falk’s “my way of the highway” mentality on the "single issue" of a union's bargaining rights. The refusal of at least one union in Madison to back Barrett further compromised the Democrats’ strength in defeating Walker.  These are idiosyncratic elements in the Wisconsin “recall election” that don’t project onto the U.S. as a whole. 

Most obviously, going into the recall election, the sitting governor of Wisconsin was a Republican whereas the sitting U.S. president was a Democrat. Also, whereas Mitchell was a political novice at the time (being plucked out of a fire department union), Obama’s VP was an experienced former U.S. Senator and VP. In terms of the parties, Barrett was not associated with Obama's weaknesses (e.g., Obamacare), and Walker did not have Romney's problems with conservatives. Indeed, some Obama supporters crossed over to vote for Walker--a fact that Obama no doubt had foreseen as he was staying away from campaigning for Barrett.

Moreover, the United States is not a state with a very large back yard. Given the heterogeneous political, economic, religious and social cultures of the republics in the U.S., it is not a good idea to simply project the results in Wisconsin on the U.S. as a whole. Furthermore, there are issues that are only relevant at the U.S. level, such as foreign policy. I must conclude that the U.S.-based media was being much too simplistic in regarding the Wisconsin race as an indicator of the “upcoming” U.S. elections. Lest all politics is local, the results of a U.S.-wide election can be viewed as a quilt of various majorities rather than as one huge aggregate. Yet reductionism to U.S.-level politics seems a preoccupation or obsession, at least for the major American media companies, as if the American republics existed only in so far as they contribute to U.S. races. I suspect that the culprit is American business more generally, as large corporations have found it cheaper to have one set rather than fifty sets of government regulations. Reducing American politics to the U.S. stage serves this purpose.

1. Amanda Terkel, “Wisconsin Recall: Election Law Quirk Could Throw Governance Into Disarray,” The Huffington Post, June 3, 2012. See Paul Abowd, “CPI: Wisconsin Recall Battle Is State’s Most Expensive Election,”MSNBC.com, June 3, 2012. 

European Central Bank to E.U. Leaders: Vision Is Needed

Mario Draghi, president of the European Central Bank, warned a committee of the E.U.'s parliament at the end of May 2012 that the structure undergirding the euro in the E.U. had become "unsustainable." He criticized political officials for having kicked the can down the road by enacting half-measures or else delaying decisions, thus making the debt crisis even worse than it otherwise would have been. "The next step is for our leaders to clarify what is the vision for a certain number of years from now."[1] Similarly, Olli Rehm, vice president of the E.U. Commission (the E.U.'s executive branch), said that ways must be found to avoid a disintegration of the common currency.

The full essay is in Essays on the E.U. Political Economy, available in print and as an ebook at Amazon.

1. Jack Ewing, "A Terse Warming for Euro States: Do Something New," The New York Times, May 31, 2012.

No State Left Behind: American Education Eclipsing Federalism

Facing a federal requirement that every student be proficient in math and English by 2014, the member-states in the U.S. rushed to apply for waivers in 2011 and 2012. In 2010, 38 percent of the schools had failed to meet their goals for annual progress toward the 2014 goal. The U.S. Secretary of Education thought that figure could soar to 80 percent. When a school fails to meet such goals, the No Child Left Behind law requires “a series of interventions by the district and the state that can culminate in a state takeover. With so many schools failing, “that threatened to create an impossible burden on states and districts,” according to Chester Finn, director of an institute that studies education.[1] The waivers did not come without strings, however. The Obama administration pushed the governments to measure teacher performance, and put increased emphasis on low-performing groups as well as on the lowest-performing schools.

While the waivers can easily be seen as an effort to put the Obama administration’s own priorities on legislation from a prior administration, the Secretary of Education, Arne Duncan, claimed that his aim was to get out of a bad law that could overwhelm states that don’t measure up. “Our goal with this waiver process, frankly, has always been to get out of the way of states and districts,” he said.[2] If this were so, however, he would not insist on negotiating for better terms in granting the waivers. Beyond this extent of intervention, that of the No Child Left Behind law requiring “interventions by the district and the state” with failing schools interlards the U.S. Government in a domain that is constitutionally reserved to the states. Absent the enumerated (i.e., listed) powers of the federal government, the fifty republics are sovereign states. While the Congress can spend in the general welfare of the political and monetary union, strings beyond the general purpose trigger a breach of the constitutional design, which should give the republics enough power to act as a check on the other system of government—that of the union itself. That is, specifying down to district intervention meddles inordinately in a state’s system of government to implement federal law.

In terms of education, the role of the U.S. Government should be oriented to regulating the interstate aspects, such as making sure that students are not deprived of equal protection (e.g., not discriminated against) and that out-of-state students are not gauged at the university level. Any spending should come attached to a general purpose (which I believe must be within an enumerated power, especially if there are any strings attached), rather than with requirements for implementation (or penalty). Should a republic not spend the money in line with the purpose (especially if that purpose lies within one of the sovereign domains of the member states), the federal government could sue to get the money back. If this seems to restrict Congressional power unduly, it may be that the federal power had gone so far beyond what is consistent with a federal system that what seems drastic is merely what is necessary to get back in line with it. In terms of failing schools, the underlying problem may be that Americans (i.e., including parents of school children) do not value self-discipline (i.e., at the expense of instant gratification) or education itself enough. Imposing federal requirements and penalties are doomed to fail against such societal disvalues. In other words, we are trashing federalism for nothing.

1. Richard Perez-Pena, “Waivers for 8 More States from ‘No Child Left Behind,” The New York Times, May 30, 2012.

2. Ibid.

Eurobonds for Stimulus Spending

Meeting on May 23, 2012, the E.U.’s European Council failed to come up with a plan to offset the recessionary aspect of Greece’s budget cuts. The pressure was on; the OECD had just warned that the E.U. go back into recession. Interest rates on state debt-namely that of Spain—had reached an unsustainable level the week before due to concern regarding banks based in the state. Besides the debt and banking vulnerabilities at the state level, the E.U. itself was struggling with its political weakness, which can be attributed to the states’ rights (or euro-skeptic) ideology that was not exactly going away in the context of the debt-contagion that had prompted the establishment of a permanent E.U. bailout fund for states in over their heads on debt. In this context, the European Council was at the intersection of debt, banking and political problems.

The full essay is at Essays on the E.U. Political Economy, available in print and as an ebook at Amazon.

Facebook’s IPO: Morgan Stanley’s Conflict of Interest

Morgan Stanley’s underwriting of Facebook’s IPO has been thought by some of the bank’s rivals to be incompetently managed.  According to the New York Times, “(r)ival bankers and big investors have complained that Morgan Stanley botched the I.P.O., setting the price too high and selling too many shares to the public.”[1] Interestingly, the incompetence is positively correlated with unethical policy decisions at the bank. Even as the bankers as underwriters were eager to sell lots of shares, they may have given some of their institutional customers—albeit only the most preferred, as per the bank’s other services—some privileged information. If this charge is true, the conflict of interest at the bank should be closely examined by Congress and any relevant regulators.

The full essay is at Institutional Conflicts of Interest, available in print and as an ebook at Amazon.

1. Evelyn Rusli and Michael De La Merced, “Facebook I.P.O. Raises Regulatory Concerns,” The New York Times, May 22, 2012.

Wealth and Happiness American-Style

The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development released an up-dated version of its Better Life Index in May 2012. The U.S. ranked first in income, with average household wealth at $102,000, as well as in housing (Americans spending about 20% of their disposable income on it—the OECD average being 22%).[1] These figures for the U.S. could have been pushed upward by the fact that at the time, the very rich were richer than their counterparts in other countries, for the gap between rich and poor was relatively high in the U.S. For example, 30 million Americans were without health insurance and a record number of Americans were receiving a governmental subsidy for food. Rather than assume that the middle and lower economic segments in the U.S. were better off than their counterparts in other regions of the world, I suspect that the statistics reflect the higher relative pay of American executives and professionals (lawyers, physicians and CPAs). The typical CEO in the E.U., for example, made less than his or her counterpart in the U.S.  This caused trouble in the Chrysler-Daimler merger because the Chrysler executives enjoyed higher compensation even though Daimler was in charge.

Interestingly, the rank of the U.S. in life satisfaction was above average, with 76 percent of people reporting having more positive than negative experiences in an average day (the average in the OECD index being 72%). In other words, the gap between the rich and poor does not appear to have gotten in the way of life-satisfaction. Although economic reductionism is particularly salient in the U.S., such satisfaction does not reduce to dollars and cents. Even in economic terms, the large gap between the rich and poor includes geographic distance. For example, court-orders have had to be used to force some cities and towns to allow subsidized (low-income) housing. Meanwhile, it is not uncommon, particularly in Florida, for people with money to live in gated communities. With the rich out of sight, the poor are less likely to be aware of the economic inequality, which could otherwise put a damper on their life-satisfaction.

As a final observation, my reference to Florida suggests that the OECD should not generalize all of the American states into one figure. For example, life-satisfaction is likely to be higher in Hawaii than in Alabama or Michigan for climatic or economic reasons (or in North Dakota during the winter even considering the economic boom). Housing in New Hampshire is, in general, better than in Mississippi. Income in Connecticut is higher on average than in Arkansas. For states, whether in the U.S. or E.U., to be in a union is not to say that they are identical and thus readily grouped together. In other words, a general statistic in housing or income has less real meaning when applied over such a large area. It is like saying that the average temperature in the U.S. in 2011 was 56 degrees (I don’t know the real figure). It is unlikely that figure applies in any state—certainly not in Florida, Hawaii, Alaska, or Maine. The figure has no real meaning, other than relative to other such figures over time (e.g., to assess global warming). For the OECD to compare the U.S. as a whole to E.U. states such as Denmark, Belgium and Spain suggests that the organization is content to engage in category mistakes. If the figures are relevant on the state level, the OECD should be consistent rather than selectively over-generalize.

1. “OECD LaunchesUpdated Version of Your Better Life Index,” OECD. 

See also MSNBC, “US Ranks No. 1 in Wealth, Not in Happiness.” 

"Real Change" Belied: Lobbyists in Obama's White House

Visitor logs for January 17, 2012 show that the lobbying industry that Obama had vowed to constrain was nonetheless a regular presence at 1600 Pennsylvania Ave.[1] That's the address of the White House. Even though the president barred recent lobbyists from joining his administration or even serving on its advisory boards and forbid federal employees from accepting free admission to receptions and conferences sponsored by lobbying groups, records suggest that lobbyists with personal connections to the White House enjoyed the easiest access. The principle of fairness (not to mention consistency) seems to have been sacrificed for political (and campaign finance) expediency.

Lobbyist Marshal Matz, for example, who served as an unpaid adviser to Obama’s 2008 campaign, gained access to the White House roughly two dozen times through May 2012.[2] He brought along the general council for the Biotechnology Industry Organization, the chief executive of cereal maker General Mills and pro bono clients, including advocates for farmers in Africa. It seems that the “Wall Street needs reform” president was rather pro-business behind the gates.

Another such lobbyist with close ties to the White House was former New York congressman Tom Downey, who at the time was married to Carol Browner. Until 2010, she was Obama’s energy czar. Downey was the head of Downey McGrath Group, a lobbying firm whose clients include Time Warner Cable and Herbalife, which sells nutrition and dieting products. As of January 2012, he had been to the White House complex for meetings and events 31 times. On Dec. 10, 2010, Downey held a meeting with economic adviser Lawrence H. Summers and just happened to bring along Bill Cheney, the head of the Credit Union National Association and one of Downey McGrath’s clients. John Magill, the top lobbyist for the association, said that the group was pushing to lift the cap on the percentage of assets its members can lend out.[3]

“A lot of folks,” Obama said in April 2012, “see the amounts of money that are being spent and the special interests that dominate and the lobbyists that always have access, and they say to themselves, maybe I don’t count.”[3] That is also the inevitable reaction from the White House visitor log. Even members of Congress may conclude that they don't count.

According to U.S. Sen. Ron Wyden (D-Oregon), for example, the U.S. Trade Representative was sharing draft negotiation documents on the Trans-Pacific trade deal with the governments of other countries and American corporate executives who serve on advisory boards, no such access was being provided to the majority of Congress or most nonprofit groups. "The majority of Congress is being kept in the dark as to the substance of the TPP negotiations, while representatives of U.S. corporations--like Halliburton, Chevron, PhRMA, Comcast and the Motion Picture Association of America--are being consulted and made privy to details of the agreement," Wyden said[4]. A subsidiarity of Halliburton had been accused by the U.S. military of charging it $1.6 billion for fake services. The Motion Picture Association had former U.S. Senator Chris Dodd (D-Conn.) as its head. 

Furthermore, ABC News had reported in 2011 that employees of Comcast had "contributed more money to President Obama's reelection bid than employees from any other organization, according to [an] analysis of the Federal Election Commission data by the Center for Responsive Politics."[5]  It appears that the Obama administration was being quite responsive to Comcast in enabling the company to "buy" the access to the trade negotiations. In fact, Obama attended "an intimate fundraiser at the home of Comcast executive vice president David Cohen in Philadelphia in June [2011] and a private 'social reception' at the Martha's Vineyard estate of Comcast CEO Brian Roberts [in August 2011]. Cohen put together more than $500,000 in contributions to the Obama campaign and the DNC for the 2012 election. Nonetheless, the president’s press secretary—speaking as if tone-deaf—said, “Our goal has been to reduce the influence of special interests in Washington — which we’ve done more than any Administration in history.”[6] 

It seems to me that the Obama administration's mutual back-scratching with big business can explain why Obama caved on the "public option" in his health-insurance reform law--essentially handing the existing private insurance companies tens of millions of new customers financed by the U.S. Government without any competition from a public insurer. The close ties can also explain why Obama backed off from his statements that Wall Street banks too big to fail should be broken up preemptively (rather than merely having the government get involved to help out on the liquidation after a bank has gone bankrupt as is the case in the resulting law). Even though the positive correlation of campaign contributions and favorable access and legislation (and trade negotiations) does not in itself prove the existence of a quid pro quo, the fingerprints are all over the darkened windows of Obama's White House. Rather than attacking capitalism, Obama was wallowing in it even as he occasionally threw red meat to his anti-corporate base to get it out to the polls. 

Moreover, both the matter of White House access and access to trade deal negotiation point to the partisan nature of the office of the U.S. Presidency. With regard to the White House access, the Post reports that “Republican lobbyists coming to visit are rare, while Democratic lobbyists are common, whether they are representing corporate clients or liberal causes.” This suggests that the presidency itself may be more partisan than is consistent with representing the United States itself (i.e., the figure-head role of the office).

In general terms, it would be naïve to suppose that powerful figures in Washington, D.C. could somehow be immune from lobbyists when the clients have so much money (i.e., economic power). In other words, concentrated wealth must needs eventuate in pressure on public policy. To restrict lobbyist access at the White House would thus only plug a hole that is a symptom. While doing so might assuage our frustration at such blatant favoritism bought with campaign (or SuperPac) donations, it is that money and the related mammoth size and power of modern corporations that must ultimately be challenged for there to be any change in substance. However, we should not be so naïve as to expect that barring lobbyists from the People’s House or even outlawing corporate political campaign contributions would reduce the influence. Where there are deep pockets of concentrated private wealth, the public weale must needs be so oriented. 

1. T. W. Farnam, “White House Visitor Logs Provide Window into Lobbying Industry, The Washington Post, May 21, 2012.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. Zach Carter, "Trans-Pacific Partnership: Key Senate Democrat Joins Bipartisan Trade Revolt Against Obama," The Huffington Post, May 23, 2012.

5. Devin Dwyer, "Comcast Employees Top Donors to Obama Campaign Accounts," ABC News, August 25, 2011.
6. Ibid.

Unions and States at a G-8 Meeting

At the G-8 summit at Camp David in May 2012, E.U. and U.S. leaders met with the leaders of four E.U. states (Italy, Germany, France and Britain). As this picture illustrates, the qualitative differences between looking after a union of states and a state can show up unintentionally in informal seating arrangements. In the context of the European debt crisis—in particular, whether to give one state (i.e., Greece) stimulus cash or just insist on the austerity programs already agreed to—the governors of the E.U. states have particular agendas (given the financial interests of the respective states) whereas the federal officials are oriented to the good of the whole (i.e., the E.U.). President Obama of the U.S. was by the time of the summit used to taking such a perspective over and above the interests of particular U.S. states. Such a commonality of federal, empire-level interests as distinct from the relatively particularized interests of E.U. (and U.S.) states could be reflected in the seating arrangement in the picture taken by the White House, wherein Obama, Barroso (sitting next to Obama), and Van Rompuy (in the sweater) seem to be facing the four governors. The seating arrangement could just as easily have been a circle. It probably was, originally, and I suspect that the federal v. states distinction operated unconsciously on the participants such that the three federal officials came to be as though a line facing the four governors of E.U. states.

The complete essay is at Essays on Two Federal Empires, available at Amazon.

The United States as Religious and Secular Societies

E pluribus unum, or “Out of many, one,” is a motto for the United States—the American States that are united. The many can refer, I suppose, to the sheer number of inhabitants stretching across a continent and beyond. The word could also refer to the diversity of people living even in a large American city. Finally, the word could refer to the Union consists of many different socio-political societies, or republics—again possibly referring to the number of states or the fact that they differ so from one another.  It is the last interpretation that I want to explore here, for it alone gets at the fact that the U.S., like the E.U. and China, are at the empire-level (or scale) in twentieth-century (rather than medieval) terms (i.e., scaling).

Yellow: most "religious."  Blue: least "religious" (as per regular attendance). Notice the "river" of yellow running through the (political) "red states" in the middle of the map. Even so, "yellow" is doubtless not homogenous.

The complete essay is at Essays on Two Federal Empires, available at Amazon.

A Conflict-of-Interest in Lobbying: The Case of JPMorgan

At the JP Morgan stockholder meeting on May 15, 2012, as the FBI was opening an investigation into the bank’s $2 (or $3 )billion loss on credit derivatives, Chair/CEO Jamie Dimon gave what the Huffington Post calls “a spirited defense of the bank’s efforts to lobby against stiffer financial regulation.” He argued that the bank’s interest is the same as the stockholders—namely, to make the financial system strong and sound. What he omitted was the part about the bank’s interest including its own profit, even if systemic risk of the system is increased as a result. In general, any business looks primary after its own interests, and only then to the general interests of the system.

The full essay is at "JPMorgan: An Unethical Monstrosity," available at Amazon. 

California Fiscal Policy: The Crowding-Out Effect

In the U.S. Constitutional Convention of 1787, some delegates expressed the concern that giving the General (federal) Government the authority to tax income would eventually result in a “crowding out” of the ability of state governments to raise revenue. Over two hundred years later, in 2012, California had cut its budget by 20 percent over the previous three years and was still faced with a $16 billion deficit.[1] Unlike Greece, California cannot avail itself of bailout funds from the federal level. Additionally, the Federal Reserve, like the European Central Bank, is barred by statute from bailing out a state government. Even as the U.S. Government places certain requirements on California’s budget that make it more difficult for the Government of California to make cuts, it could not avail itself of the bailout (TARP) that had benefitted Wall Street banks and the Michigan auto industry.

The complete essay is at Essays on Two Federal Empires, available at Amazon.

1. “California Governor Calls for Higher Taxes, 4-day State Workweek to Fill $16 Billion Gap,” NBC News, May 14, 2012. 

Tsipras against Austerity: Merkel Bends on Stimulus

Under pressure to join a unity government in Greece with the New Democracy and Socialist parties, Tsipras of a “radical left” Syriza party was holding firm as of May 13, 2012. Even as the resulting prospect of new elections and a possible reneging on the agreement by Greece, there is something to admire in Tsipras’ position.

Greek president Karolos Papoulias meeting with leaders of the three main parties (Tsipras on right) AP

The full essay is in Essays on the E.U. Political Economy, available in print and as an ebook at Amazon.

Anti-Austerity in Greek Government

The Socialists and then the New Democracy Party told Greeks that sacrifices were necessary to avert default on the state’s debt. This position came at a high political cost on May 6, 2012, when both parties lost seats in the state’s legislative election. “The established parties collapsed — they had too much pressure from Berlin and Brussels and the I.M.F.,” said Nikos Xydakis, an newspaper editor and a political commentator, referring to Greece’s foreign lenders.[1] In other words, the leaders of the two mainstream Greek parties sold out their compatriots, having caved in to ultimatums from Merkel operating at the E.U. level. “In a meeting with President Karolos Papoulias, the leader of the leftist party, Alexis Tsipras, ridiculed the leaders of the two main parties whose coalition lost its majority in the parliamentary elections.”[2] Tsipras added that his party would not be forming a government with either party. The New Democracy Party had been unable to form a government in the wake of the election, so it was then Tsipras’ turn to try.

Alexis Tsipras  and Greek President Papoulias   NYT/Kostas Tsironis

The full essay is in Essays on the E.U. Political Economy, available in print and as an ebook at Amazon.

1.. Rachel Donadio and Niki Kitsantonis, “Greek Leftists Rule Out Coalition with Incumbents,” The New York Times, May 8, 2012.
2. Ibid.

Fuld’s Arrogance at Lehman: Systemic Risk

Documents released in May 2012 regarding Dick Fuld at Lehman Brothers prove that he was aware of the high risk involved in holding so much real estate (and related security derivatives). This means definitively that “the ‘forces-out-of- our-control’ argument we hear from Wall Street leaders is [self-serving] bunk. It is the ill-advised behavior of one banker after another, day in and day out, that leads to the sort of devastating financial crisis we are only now emerging from.”[1]

The full essay is in Essays on the Financial Crisis, available in print and as an ebook at Amazon.

1. William Cohan, “Lehman Docs Show Wall Street Arrogance Led to Financial Collapse,” The Huffington Post, May 7, 2012.

Merkel’s Fiscal Box in the E.U. Debt Crisis

Germany was ruling out any substantive shift in its approach to Europe's debt crisis despite a rising chorus of opposition to Berlin's austerity policies that reached a crescendo in the elections in Greece and France on May 6, 2012. On the following day, Merkel “rejected the notion that Europe was on the brink of a major policy shift after Socialist Francois Hollande defeated her fellow conservative Nicolas Sarkozy and Greek voters punished ruling parties who slashed spending to secure a foreign bailout. . . . Merkel herself made clear that, while there was scope to discuss tactics, the overall strategy EU leaders committed to by agreeing a compact on fiscal consolidation was ‘not negotiable.’”[1] That seems a bit presumptuous, considering that the “fiscal pact” had yet to be ratified in enough of the states to go into effect.

The full essay is in Essays on the E.U. Political Economy, available in print and as an ebook at Amazon.

1. Noah Barkin and Stephen Brown, “Germany Austerity Policies: Berlin Unmoved by Votes in France, Germany,” The Huffington Post, May 7, 2012.

Europeans Vote against Austerity in 2012

On May 6, 2012, elections took place in six E.U. states. The most significant in terms of the debt crisis were those of France and Greece. In France, Francois Hollande narrowly beat Nicolas Sarkozy. Sarkozy “is the latest of a string of European incumbents, from both the left and the right, to lose in a larger popular revolt against budget-cutting and tax increased during a time of recession and high unemployment.”[1] Hollande said “he intends to give ‘a new direction to Europe,’ demanding that a European Union [amendment] limiting debt be expanded to include measures to produce economic growth.”[2] After midnight, Hollande spoke against austerity to a crowd gathered at the Bastille. To be sure, an anti-Sarkozy-arrogance vote doubtlessly benefitted Hollande. This makes it difficult to treat this (or any other) election as a mandate policywise. Even so, the center of gravity on austerity at the E.U. level had shifted, given the important role of state officials there.

                 François Hollande addressed supporters in Tulle, France.      Philippe Desmazes/Agence France-Presse

Meanwhile, voters in Greece were shifting the political landscape in that state, “bolstering the far left and neo-Nazi right in a wave of protest against the dominant political parties that they blame for the country’s economic collapse.”[3] In other words, the two main parties that had agreed to the austerity/bailout agreement lost ground to other parties—essentially splintering the vote. An exit poll “indicated that center-right New Democracy party was in first place with 19 to 20.5 percent of the vote, much less than the 34 percent it won in 2009. But in a major shift, the Socialists, who dominated for decades, won 44 percent of the vote in 2009 and were in power when Greece asked for foreign aid in 2010, appeared to have 13 to 14 percent of the vote, putting them behind the Coalition of the Radical Left, called Syriza, which opposes Greece’s agreement with its foreign lenders. Syriza appeared to be drawing 15.5 to 17 percent of the vote.”[4] New Democracy and the Socialist Party had agreed to the austerity, and they paid a price at the polls.

The shifts in both states undoubtedly provided federal officials (including state officials active at the federal level) with a message: more and more E.U. citizens were opposing the austerity-only approach. Lest it be concluded that Hollande and the Greek legislature trigger a change of E.U. policy, incumbents including Angela Merkel were still a force to be reckoned with. Generally speaking, actual political change occurs in graduate steps rather than all at once after an election. The status quo is never entirely defeated by a few replacements; it takes several elections for a sea-change to gain the upper hand in governmental channels.

Even so, May 6, 2012 suggests that the forces of such change were gaining.  Even if it would take more elections for the austerity-emphasis to be changed, it was already clear that a majority of the people were willing to vote as if they were opposed to the approach.  In relying so much on austerity in their agreement with Greece, state leaders making policy at the E.U. level had gone beyond the center of gravity. In a representative democracy, doing what is right or in the people’s best interest at the expense of popular anger or disapproval has value. However, this leash does not extend very long and it must be tailored to the amount of time until the next election. This is both a disadvantage and advantage of representative democracy: officials cannot get too far from their basis in the popular center of gravity, even if a crisis warrants a long-term solution that is generally unpopular at the grass-roots level.

1. Steve Erlanger and Nicola Clark, “Hollande Ousts Sarkozy in French Presidential Election,” The New York Times, May 6, 2012. 
2. Ibid.
3. Rachel Donadio and Nici Kitsantonis, “Greek Voters Punish 2 Main Parties for Economic Collapse,” The New York Times, May 6, 2012. 
4. Ibid.

Subsidiarity: Federalism Over Catholic Social Ethics?

In the E.U., the principle of subsidiarity functions in theory like the Tenth Amendment does in the U.S.—again in theory. In both cases, public authority on a given domain or policy-area is preferentially to be exercised at the state rather than federal level. The principle, while not federalism per se, can be an element of it. Taking subsidiarity to be “really federalism” turns the latter into an alliance—giving the states potentially so much power that the government of the federation or union itself cannot act as a check on the state governments.

The complete essay is at Essays on Two Federal Empires.

Wal-Mart: Political Contributions as Bribery

In September 2005, “a senior Wal-Mart lawyer received an alarming e-mail from a former executive at the company’s largest foreign subsidiary, Wal-Mart de Mexico. In the e-mail and follow-up conversations, the former executive described how Wal-Mart de Mexico had orchestrated a campaign of bribery to win market dominance. In its rush to build stores, he said, the company had paid bribes to obtain permits in virtually every corner of the country. . . . Wal-Mart dispatched investigators to Mexico City, and within days they unearthed evidence of widespread bribery. They found a paper trail of hundreds of suspect payments totaling more than $24 million. They also found documents showing that Wal-Mart de Mexico’s top executives not only knew about the payments, but had taken steps to conceal them from Wal-Mart’s headquarters in Bentonville, Ark. In a confidential report to his superiors, Wal-Mart’s lead investigator, a former F.B.I. special agent, summed up their initial findings this way: ‘There is reasonable suspicion to believe that Mexican and USA laws have been violated.’”[1]

 Critics protesting a new Wal-Mart store after the bribery scandal    John Moore/Getty

The full essay is in The full essay is in Cases of Unethical Business: A Malignant Mentality of Mendacity, available in print and as an ebook at Amazon.com.

1. David Barstow, “Vast Mexico Bribery Case Hushed Up by Wal-Mart After Top-Level Struggle,” The New York Times, April 21, 2012.

Obama Caved to the Agribusiness Lobby

Faced with political pressure from Republicans and farming groups, the White House decided in April 2012 not to go ahead with rules that would have prevented children from “operating heavy machinery, handling tobacco crops, working in grain silos or performing other jobs considered potentially dangerous.”[1] The Labor Department issued a statement indicating it was withdrawing the rules due to concern from the public over how they could affect family farms. “The Obama administration is firmly committed to promoting family farmers and respecting the rural way of life, especially the role that parents and other family members play in passing those traditions down through the generations,” the department announced.[2] I contend that this rationale was a ruse intended to cover up the true source of the political pressure. Family farms were actually exempted from the proposed rules.

"Although family farms were actually exempted from the proposed rules, many opponents cast them as an assault on family farms and rural traditions, saying the White House wanted to keep children from doing even small chores. In fact, the rules would only have affected minors who were formally employed and on farm payrolls.”[3] To get at why Republicans would have stressed the family farm ruse, it is necessary to go to the funding—for motivation tends to follow it.

From 1996 through at least 2012, agribusiness has given much more to Republicans than to Democrats.[4] The disproportionate giving gave Republican lawmakers a financial (and political) incentive to protect agricultural corporations from regulations they do not want. Because the family farm has a much better reputation in society, it makes political sense that Republicans (and even the farm groups) would claim to be protecting the family farm when the real intent is to keep agribusiness free of unwanted regulations. What is surprising is not the subterfuge; rather, the surprise lies with the Democrat in the White House who caved into the agribusiness interest in spite of where that sector was directing its political contributions. Given the political maxim that perception can become reality, it is likely that the family farm subterfuge worked and Obama felt he had to acquiesce to it or be viewed as against the rural family in the midst of his re-election campaign.

See Related Essay: “Oil and Gas Companies: Citizens Buying Government”

1. Dave Jamieson, “Child Labor Farm Rules Scrapped by White House under Political Pressure,” The Huffington Post, April 27, 2012.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Dan Froomkin, "Corporate Campaign Contributions Show Some Industries Giving Up Appearance of Bipartisanship,”  The Huffington Post, April 26, 2012.

The E.U.: The Growth Union

In relying only on austerity and cheap bailout loans, the German-led strategy has proffered a false sense of European integration in the E.U. Even as expanding the bailout funds to roughly 800 billion euros and strengthening the E.U.’s means of enforcing limits on state deficits and debt are along the line of continued incremental shifts of governmental sovereignty from the state governments to that of the E.U., the related austerity (and recession) sparked a populist backlash in several states. At the state level (and this level has a major role at the E.U. level—unlike in the U.S.), the state-rights (i.e., anti-E.U.) parties have been the beneficiaries even if they could not gain outright majorities. The National Front in the state of France is an obvious example, as it captured 18% of the vote in the run up to the general election in 2012.  Other things equal, such a spike translates into brakes on further European integration in the medium term.

Different takes on the E.U. and austerity: Sarkozy, Hollande, and Le Pen of France    NYT

The full essay is in Essays on the E.U. Political Economy, available in print and as an ebook at Amazon.

Oil and Gas Companies: Citizens Buying Government

“Corporate campaign contributions have historically been split among incumbents of both political parties, with a decided advantage for whichever controls Congress and the White House.”[1] From 2008 to 2012, however, “companies in some major industries that [saw] a threat from federal regulations—most notably the energy sector—[appeared] to have deepened bonds with the Republican Party, with which they share increasingly indistinguishable goals.”[2] One implication is that the party would block regulations to protect the regulated even at the expense of the public safety.

For example, the disproportionate donations by the oil and gas industry to the Republican Party could explain why Republicans in Congress argued for deregulation of deepwater oil drilling even in the wake of the BP Deepwater Horizon explosion and oil leak in the Gulf of Mexico. Financial contributions can explain why the obvious reaction for greater regulation was ignored by those members of Congress. In other words, financial incentive can create blindspots or lapses that are seemingly inexplicable.

Besides the compromised public safety, the financial largess of an industry going predominantly to one party can distort the political “playing board” such that the competition between parties (and between incumbents and challengers) is compromised or distorted. In other words, baleful effects on democracy itself may be part of the mix.

Lastly, the “right” of companies to make political contributions, as if they were “corporate citizens,” can be challenged on the basis that a company is an association rather than a citizen. Lloyd Avram, a spokesman for Chevron, claimed in a written statement that "Chevron exercises its fundamental right and responsibility to participate in the political process. We make political contributions where permitted by law and, consistent with Company policy, to support political candidates, political organizations and ballot measures committed to economic development, free enterprise and good government." Rather than being a fundamental right and responsibility for a company to participate in the political process, it may be an overreach.

On one level, the “fundamental right and responsibility” evinces anthropomorphism: the projecting of human qualities onto non-human entities. Humans exercise their rights of citizenship. It does not necessarily follow that what holds for human beings also applies to our associations themselves. Even though a company consists of people, the entity itself is an organization with its distinct interests. It is not necessarily so that those interests have the rights and responsibilities enjoyed by citizens. To the extent that the interests between a company and its members do not diverge, the citizens in the company have a multiplied influence that other citizens do not have. The principle of fairness is thus relevant too.

In short, giving corporations the fundamental rights and responsibilities of (human) citizens opens the political system up to significant risks. In being able to buy a political party thereby made hegemonic, large concentrations of private capital can effectively protect their interests in staving off regulation at the expense of the public interest. In effect, one faction is able to buy a government. Beyond the conflict of interest in having the regulated be in a position to use its public agents to obviate unwanted regulation and the democracy deficit in the polity as a whole, the attribution of the rights and responsibilities of citizenship on companies evinces a fallacy or category mistake caused, most likely, by the usual suspect of corporate political contributions. Unlike corporations, (human) citizens don't buy themselves citizenship. The concept naturally applies to human beings rather than to our associations. That we have freedom of association does not somehow turn our associations into citizens themselves.

1. Dan Froomkin, “Corporate Campaign Contributions Show Some Industries Giving Up Appearance of Bipartisanship,” The Huffington Post, April 26, 2012. 
2. Ibid.

Spanked by Stockholders: Citigroup

In April 2012, Citigroup’s shareholders voted against the bank’s proposed $15 million compensation for the CEO, Vikram Pandit. This was the first time a majority on a stockholder vote—in this case, 55 percent—united in opposition to what was considered “outsized compensation at a financial giant.”[1] Shortly thereafter, a major stockholder sued Citigroup for breach of fiduciary duty (owed to the stockholders) for excessive executive compensation. Nevertheless, the prognosis is not so bad for the “top brass” on Wall Street; they need not worry unless the votes were to become binding and managements were barred from voting proxies.

For one thing, the vote, taken as required by the Dodd Frank Financial Reform Act of 2010, was non-binding. “After the vote, Richard D. Parsons, who is retiring as Citigroup chairman, said that he takes the vote seriously and Citi's board will carefully consider it.”[2] It is odd, to say the least, that the agents of the owners would just “carefully consider” a majority vote of stockholders. Anything less than binding contradicts principal-agent theory. Lest it be argued that the business judgment rule ought to trump property rights, the question of the total compensation for the “top five” positions at the bank does not hinge on technical expertise in management. Moreover, it could be argued that in a economic system based on private property, that the property rights trump even the expertise of hired managers.

Secondly, the problem for stockholders voting no may have had more to do with the relationship to performance than that the pay level itself was too high. “The company has been flatlining,” said Mike McCauley, a senior officer at the Florida State Board of Administration, which voted its 6.4 million shares against the plan. “The plan put forth reveals a disconnect between pay and performance,” he continued. Calpers, the California state pension fund, also voted against the plan. The issue for Calpers “was whether pay was linked to performance and whether those targets were spelled out and sustainable over the long term,” said Anne Simpson, director of corporate governance for Calpers, which owns 9.7 million Citigroup shares. “Citi was found wanting on both,” she said. “If you reward them for focusing on high-risk, short-term profits, that's what you get, and that's how the financial crisis caught fire.”[3] In other words, the issue was not necessarily excessive pay on Wall Street; rather, the perceived culprit was a reckless design of compensation incentives resulting in excessive risk.

Therefore, I do not relate the negative vote at Citigroup to the wealth-inequality protests in the Occupy Wall Street movement. That American CEOs continued to make far more proportionately than workers than was the case in Europe was besides the point. The majority of Citigroup’s shareholders were trying to make sure that Citigroup would not go the way of Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers.

1. Jessica Greenberg and Nelson Schwartz, “Shareholders in Citigroup Reject Executive Pay Plan,” The New York Times, April 18, 2012.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

U.S. President Obama on Executive Power

In February 2011, U.S. President Barak Obama directed the U.S. Justice Department to stop defending the Defense of Marriage Act, which bars federal recognition of gay marriages, against constitutional challenges. “Previously, the administration had urged lawmakers to repeal it, but had defended their right to enact it. In the following months, the administration increased efforts to curb greenhouse gas emissions through environmental regulations, gave states waivers from federal mandates if they agreed to education overhauls, and refocused deportation policy in a way that in effect granted relief to some illegal immigrants brought to the country as children. Each step substituted for a faltered legislative proposal.”[1] While not defying Congressional statutes, the use of executive power to thwart defending a statute violates the enforcement function of the executive branch. The other matters—enacting environmental regulations, granting relief to some illegal immigrants, and issuing state waivers presumably were under broader statutes that permit administrative action by the executive branch. The danger, however, is that the enforcement branch or arm could become a legislative branch or arm of the U.S. Government.

The irony is that Barak Obama had criticized George W. Bush’s use of signing statements. The New York Times points out that the institutional incentives of the presidency had come to affect even Obama. This is an extremely significant point, for it suggests that “elections have consequences” is buffered by the institutional trappings of the particular office.

For example, as the E.U. was struggling to manage the debt of some large states by pressing for austerity budget cuts at the state level, it was feared that state office-holders would be elected who had promised to leave the euro and reject the austerity. From the example of Obama on executive power, we can say that such fear was over-stated.  A Euroskeptic once in office is subject to pressure from other states as well as from E.U. officials. The consequent backtracking is typically viewed as political fear. I contend that it is merely a natural reaction to the incentives of a given office and institutional placement (i.e., as a state in the E.U.).

Rather than being hypocrites,  office-holders who said one thing on the campaign trail but then modified their position once in office can be said to be shifting from campaigning to governing—the latter being subject to the institutional incentives of the office. The breadth of campaign proposals is almost necessarily to be wider than the actual conduct of office-holders because the “mandates” of an office have a converging effect because the office itself does not change.

Obama could have campaigned as an anti-executive candidate, but once he was sworn in he became an executive and thus had to function as one. His anti-executive campaign promises would translate at best on the margins of his governing decisions.  Hence, “real change” on the campaign trail is one thing, but change by office-holders is notoriously incremental by nature of the continuance of the respective offices. In other words, the status quo is the clear favorite where a government of offices has already been established. For “real change,” governmental change must also be included, and that cannot come from extant offices.

Generally speaking, what we take as change—what we expect in this regard from our elected office-holders—is only a very moderated sense of change. Put another way, we expect too much out of existing offices. If we want “real change” in terms of policy, we must also look at structural change of the government.

1. Charlie Savage, “Shift onExecutive Power Lets Obama Bypass Rivals,” The New York Times, April 22, 2012.