On Leveraging the U.S. Debt-Ceiling: How the Market Mechanism Handles Trust

On May 9 2011, U.S. House Speaker Boehner insisted “on trillions of dollars in spending cuts, and no tax increases, as the price for rounding up enough votes to allow more borrowing and prevent the country from defaulting on its debt,” according to the Huffington Post. The Ohio Republican had “said failure to increase the borrowing limit [in the summer of 2011] would trigger a financial disaster for the United States and the world.” On May 12^th in Congressional testimony, Ben Bernanke, chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank, cautioned against using raising the debt ceiling as leverage for getting a particular partisan policy-prescription on federal spending enacted into law. Richmond Fed President Jeffrey Lacker had told Reuters, “I do share the chairman’s concern that going up to the edge and playing chicken on the debt ceiling is not a wise strategy.”

Meanwhile, GOP U.S. Senators and House Representatives had been hearing from constituents warning them not to raise the debt ceiling.  “Enough is enough!” such citizens were saying. This pressure was geared to getting the U.S. Government to live closer to its means rather than resorting to its power to increase the debt it can issue without limit. Even so, U.S. Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid said on May 10^th that tax increases may be needed, along with spending cuts, to help rein in the deficit. Moreover, he warned against ultimatums. “We shouldn’t be drawing lines in the sand,” he said according to The Wall Street Journal. This was not stopping Sen. Bob Corker, who was urging an automatic spending cap of 20.6% of GNP (when the fiscal 2011 figure was estimated at 24.3%) as a condition of passing an increase in the federal debt limit.

Given the existence of contending policy prescriptions, using default for leverage on one side is faulty. Aside from the implicit presumption that one side of the debate has a monopoly on truth, playing with fire where the viability of the financial system itself could hang in the balance does not evince much statesmanship and it could imperil the operation of the market mechanism itself.

Trust is vital in the very nature of a market. If trust is up for grabs, the increased volatility can freeze the market mechanism itself. Rather than simply increasing a price to account for the added risk, a market mechanism can simply close down even if trust is questioned. The reason is that the mechanism reflects human nature itself. Trust does not behave along a continuum as does risk/reward. Rather, people trust someone or something only to a point at which an implicit “all or none” mental calculation or feeling occurs. Beyond that point, the picture itself is fundamentally different. A shift in risk/return does not come into play because fear is choking off any action. In other words, human beings in fear or lack of trust freeze up rather than slow down. The market mechanism’s interval of risk/return tradeoffs reflecting in adjusting price is inconsistent with this feature of human nature as manifested even in a market mechanism. There is thus a fundamental flaw in the mechanism where it diverges from how human nature reacts to fear as lack of trust.

According to Alan Greenberg, former Chair and CEO of Bear Stearns, “Without reciprocal trust between the parties to any securities transaction, the money stops. Doubt fills the vacuum, and credit and liquidity are the chief casualties. Bad news . . . has an alarming capacity to become contagious and self-perpetuating. No problem is an isolated problem” (Greenberg, p. 3). Money simply stopping trumps price adjusting to reflect the increased risk from less trust because trust in human terms does not function as intervals of degrees. Accordingly, market theory itself, specifically in its risk/return tradeoff running the gambit, contains a flaw with respect to increased levels of volatility due to “trust issues.”

In using the debt ceiling as a bargaining chip for political leverage, the Republican lawmakers in the U.S. Government were risking the flaw being triggered. In other words, those politicians were implicitly assuming that the market would simply adjust to the added risk rather than shut down. Besides the problem in the lack of statesmanship—a political problem—the market mechanism itself contains a fundamental flaw in need of being addressed. Specifically, higher risk that kicks in even just close to the lack-of-trust-threshold can freeze the mechanism itself due to how human nature handles trust as a more of an “all or none” than “matter of degrees” phenomenon even as we wrongly suppose the market handles trust along an interval of prices. Unfortunately, we love the beauty of the latter even after having realized in September of 2008 that it does not hold.

Sources:

Alan C. Greenberg, The Rise and Fall of Bear Stearns (NY: Simon & Schuster, 2010).

Janet Hock and Carol E. Lee, “Democrats Oppose Spending Cap Plan,” The Wall Street Journal, May 11, 2011, p. A4.

The Huffington Post, “John Boehner, GOP Seek Leverage in Talks Over Raising Debt Ceiling,” May 12, 2011.

Strategic Thinking beyond the Business Plan

“When smart people came up with ideas for well-conceived business opportunities, we said go for it. As always, organizational charts, management consultants, and business plans played virtually no role in any of this. My own strategic thinking I did mostly while showering or shaving.”

—Alan C. Greenberg, former Chairman and CEO of Bear Stearns

Similarly, when I write an essay, I inevitably pass on first constructing a formal outline and go instead off of what I have worked out in ratiocinating while exercising, in transit, or showering. Freeing the mind up to search for and try out connections between ideas, and working a theory over and over—like kneeding dough or forming a clay pot on a wheel—are inconsistent with too much structure.

The human mind needs its own space to solve abstract or applied problems needing considerable thought. Subjecting the processes of theory-construction and problem-solving (“critical thinking”) to too much structure is simply not in line with the nature of the mind itself. Human reasoning, it turns out, is not a linear process that necessarily fits within the confines of a business plan or consulting diagnostic tool. Particularly if creativity and innovation are to be encouraged, mechanistic structure must succumb to organic process.

For example, I did a consulting project as part of an organizational design senior seminar that I took in college. The professor had developed a structured organizational audit—a diagnostic tool geared to detecting discrepancies between an organization chart and actual communication. As he had developed the instrument, we were naturally to rely on it in making our recommendations to the clients. I used the tool on a computer retail store and proffered recommendations from it. Because the business was family-owned and operated, I could see that the communications were in part a function of the family dynamics, which the professor’s organizational audit failed to pick up. So I asked some additional questions and made some supplemental recommendations, which the business owner/manager found quite useful—unlike those that came from the audit.

Even though the professor graded me lower for adding the recommendations, the client went so far as to call him to urge that an A be given to me for the project. From what the client told me later, the professor was perhaps too attached to his “organizational audit” tool (which he used in his own consulting practice). My orientation as a novice consultant was neither to my grade nor to the tool; rather, I wanted to help the owner/manager by proffering him insight that he could use to solve his problem. Although I cannot be sure at this point, I might have come up with my final recommendation to him on the way to a class, during a run, or even while shaving.

So I can totally understand Alan Greenberg’s aversion to organization charts, business plans and “professional” consultants. A true consultant comes from a perspective of expertise that clients do not have. For example, a consultant could be an academic or a nearly-retired practioner. In either case, the advice should be viewed as supplemental to the client’s focal situs “on the ground”—that is, consulting advice is something for a client to digest and possibly integrate with his or her larger considerations outside the range of the consultant.

Being geared to helping a client, a consultant should be able to let go of his or her “black bag” if the tools therein fall short in diagnosing the organizational dysfunction, or “illness.” I suspect that one's “gut” can come into play, effectively transcending the mechanistic tools, only if the consultant cares, because only then is he or she intrinsically oriented to the client’s situation rather than the consultant’s own bag of tricks as ends in themselves. In the end, consulting is interpersonal—helping others who are suffering from a problem. Such problems typically involving human beings, it should be no surprise if a consultant should approach them from more than one level.

Therefore, both strategic and consulting thinking ought to be accommodated in the sense of giving them some organic free range. Treating business plans, organizational charts, and diagnostic tools as ends in themselves, as if they were rational beings (i.e., Kant's kingdom of ends), is ultimately self-defeating, if not suffocating. Just as managing can sometimes be informed by simply wandering around, so too the strategic mind needs some room to roam.  

Source:

Alan C. Greenberg, The Rise and Fall of Bear Stearns (NY: Simon & Schuster, 2010)

The Financial Crisis of 2008: On the Role of Negligence Breaching Fiduciary Obligation

Roger Lowenstein laments that “New York Times columnist Joe Nocera lamented that ‘Wall Street bigwigs whose firms took unconscionable risks … aren't even on Justice's radar screen.’ A news story in the Times about a mortgage executive who was convicted of criminal fraud observed, ‘The Justice Dept. has yet to bring charges against an executive who ran a major Wall Street firm leading up to the disaster.’ In the same dispassionate tone, National Public Radio's All Things Considered chimed in, ‘Some of the most publicly reviled figures in the mortgage mess won't face any public accounting.’ New York magazine saw fit to print the estimable opinion of Bernie Madoff, who observed that the dearth of criminal convictions is ‘unbelievable.’ Rolling Stone, which has been beating this drum the longest and with the heaviest hand, reductively asked, ‘Why isn't Wall Street in jail?’”

Lowenstein interprets these sentiments as implying “that the financial crisis was caused by fraud; that people who take big risks should be subject to a criminal investigation; that executives of large financial firms should be criminal suspects after a crash; that public revulsion indicates likely culpability; that it is inconceivable (to Madoff, anyway) that people could lose so much money absent a conspiracy; and that Wall Street bears collective guilt for which a large part of it should be incarcerated.”

Lowenstein argues that “(t)hese assumptions do violence to our system of justice and hinder our understanding of the crisis. The claim that it was ‘caused by financial fraud’ is debatable, but the weight of the evidence is strongly against it. The financial crisis was accompanied by fraud, on the part of mortgage applicants as well as banks. It was caused, more nearly, by a speculative bubble in mortgages, in which bankers, applicants, investors, and regulators were all blind to risk. More broadly, the crash was the result of a tendency in our financial culture, especially after a period of buoyancy, to push leverage and risk-taking to the extreme.”

Lowenstein also ticks off a loose monetary policy (i.e., extremely low interest rates), unaccountability at Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, weak financial regulation, and an overconfidence in “risk management” methods in arguing that we should not be reductionist in ascribing the crisis to fraud alone or even primarily.  

Analysis:

Lowenstein is undoubtedly on firm ground in labeling the crisis a “multi-causal” affair. In a general sense, the positive feedback loop wherein everyone benefitted from a rising housing market turned to a negative feedback loop once that market decided to take a hard landing. However, even though he makes a good point that criminal fraud was probably not pervasive on Wall Street, he downplays the litigation that is still possible in going after senior managers at Wall Street banks for negligently breaching their fiduciary obligations to stockholders—the negligence being in the sheer recklessness (which I suspect is a function of individual personalities).

For example, Richard Fuld essentially ignored his risk committee at Lehman Brothers as he added leverage up to forty times value in order to continue buying CDO’s and commercial real estate by the bucketful—his ultimate objective most likely being to bring the bank up to the big league (e.g., with banks such as Goldman Sachs). Would not such recklessness based on egotism constitute fiduciary negligence? It is as though Fuld were under the illusion that the stockholders’ wealth in the bank was his own because of how much of the stock he himself held.

As another example, even Alan Greenberg over at Bear Stearns may have been negligent in not alerting the board as Jim Cayne, the CEO at the time, became “more aloof and full of himself” even as two of the bank’s hedge funds were going down in July 2007 (Greenberg, p. 145). Incredibly, Cayne was playing in a card-game tournament in Nashville for over a week as the executive committee labored daily over whether to liquidate the two hedge funds at the bank that were losing money from their mortgage-related securities and the ensuing redemption calls from nervous investors. Virtually everyone in the senior management of Bear Stearns should have informed the board of Cayne's conduct (i.e., his priorities, which evinced immaturity befitting the man's pot-smoking at the tournaments and even at work). If the directors would have failed to act (e.g., being too cozy with Cayne), the board too should be held by stockholders as woefully negligent.

Furthermore, being on the risk committee, Greenberg may have been negligent in deferring to Warren Spector on the risk issuing from the fixed-income area (e.g., mortgage-backed securities). Claiming that Spector was “imperious” in that area is no excuse for Greenberg failing to exercise diligence given the amount of business the bank was doing in CDOs. Greenberg recounts that “multiple variables contributed to an extremely complex dynamic, yielding consequences that I hadn’t previously encountered” (Greenberg, p. 156). However, he admits to have told Warren a few years earlier to unload CDO’s within 90 days because of the risk involved. Greenberg simply gave up in pushing back from the financial pressure of the large profits being made. Accordingly, he gave up on due diligence on the risk committee and should be held accountable by Stearns stockholders. 

Incidentally, I admire Greenberg for his straightforward recounting of the events leading up to the collapse of his bank, even though I do not buy his account of his role on the risk committee. Perhaps the lesson is that even an ethically solid and competent person is fallable, and may even inadvertantly fall into a negligent pattern of complacency in the midst of momentary profit. The depth of the causes leading to the financial crisis may be evinced, moreover, in that a person such as Greenberg became unintentionally complicit. As Greenberg himself observes, Jamie Diamond at Morgan had urged his bank out of the mortgage-related securities business altogether as far back as 2006 as the housing market was peaking. From this vantage-point, Greenberg himself must surely know in hindsight that he had fellen short.

Whereas Lowenstein claims that one of the causes of the crisis was that risk management methods were followed, I contend that they were relegated or ignored even by the risk averse because the standards stood in the way of large profits. To be sure, Greenberg and others on risk committees relied on the AAA ratings from Moody’s and S & P (though Greenberg had been sufficiently worried to urge quick sales of the bonds). Even so, it should have been prime facie evident that a mortgage-based bond is not a Treasury bond. Furthermore, the rating agencies’ managements should not be held blameless, as they did the bidding of Bear Stearns and Lehman in exchange for lucrative fees;  there was undoubtedly fraud or at least negligence in this conflict of interest.  

Whereas fraud may have been limited largely to salesmen at mortgage brokerage firms and the rating agencies, breaches in fiduciary obligation were, I suspect, running rampant on Wall Street. In other words, money being easy and regulation being light (or non-existent in the case of the CDOs) did not give the banks’ managements a pass on their fiduciary obligation to exercise a duty of care over stockholder’s equity in the banks. Whereas cheap leverage and lack of oversight are context, recklessness with others’ wealth may constitute the principal cause—the lack of concern for risk being part of it.

Generally speaking, boards allowed senior managements—as evinced in the persons of Dick Fuld and Jim Cayne—far too much rope with which to hang themselves. It is astounding to me that people like Fuld and Cayne were able to get anywhere near the authority of a CEO. Their glaring immaturity and incompetence may point to a systemic problem in corporate governance going far beyond what even institutional stockholders realize. It would seem that the boards of Lehman and Stearns were either asleep or in somebody’s pocket (which involves at the very lease a stark conflict of interest). Although holding the managers accountable for their recklessness leading up to the financial crisis of 2008 would be a step in the right direction, stockholder interest warrants systemic reforms to corporate governance itself such that “upper” managements are given much shorter leashes (and stature).  

Sources:

Roger Lowenstein, “Why No Wall St. Bigwig Has Been Prosecuted,” MSNBC.com, May 16, 2011.

Alan Greenberg, The Rise and Fall of Bear Stearns (NY: Simon and Schuster, 2010).

The Electoral College: A Check on Excess Democracy

As a delegate in the U.S. constitutional convention, Governeur Morris stated on July 19, 1787 that the proposed National Executive (i.e. the U.S. President) should be “a firm guardian of the people and of the public interest.” (1)  Given this role, Morris maintained that it “cannot be possible that a man shall have sufficiently distinguished himself to merit this high trust without having his character proclaimed by fame throughout the Empire.” (2)   In other words, presiding requires a requisite credibility or stature that may be difficult to find in a territory on the scale of an empire.

The E.U. has obviated this problem by having presidencies of particular E.U. governmental bodies the a state government serving in the E.U. Presidency, a figure-head “office” based on a six-month rotation. The U.S., on the other hand, put all of their eggs in one basket in terms of having one president with substantial power in being commander in chief and having a legislative veto as well as a “bully pulpit.” Considerable emphasis is thus placed on the office’s selection process.

In the constitutional convention, Morris believed that the people at large “would be as likely as any that could be devised to produce [a President] of distinguished Character.” (3) Morris was assuming that at least one candidate can be found whose character has been proclaimed by fame throughout the Empire. Differing from Morris, Gerry argued on July 19 in the convention that the “people are uninformed, and would be misled by a few designing men. He urged the expediency of an appointment of the Executive by Electors to be chosen by the State Executives.” (4)  In other words, suitable candidates could exist, but the people would not be sufficiently aware of their characters to discern the wheat from the chaff.

Electors selected by the governors and presidents of the States would be of lesser number and thus able to come to know the candidates and thus avoid electing a lemon. However, Williamson, also on July 19, “had no great confidence in the Electors to be chosen for the special purpose. . . . They would be liable to undue influence.” (5) Even so, the convention voted that the President would be appointed by electors to be chosen by the State legislatures.

Williamson turned out to be right; the political parties have had tight influence on the States’ electors. The electors would also prove to be excessively subject to the influence of the  citizens who vote for them, rather than being a check on the passions and ignorance of the wider public.  In other words, the selection process has come to enervate an intended check on the democracy of the moment (e.g., the flavor of the month).  Presidential elections have become virtual popularity contests.  The matter of finding someone with sufficient maturity and credibility to preside over the common good has been lost.  Accordingly, the presidents have been highly partisan—even going against their campaign promises for political expediency. My point is that we can look beyond the individual presidents and find that the selection process itself is perhaps biased against producing good governance.

It seems to me that a better alternative would be to have the governors of the States meet together to select the U.S. President. The governors are apt to know the candidates (or can meet them), and could assess them from the standpoint of presiding and executing law. Lest this alternative be thought to slight representative democracy, it could be pointed out that governors are popularly elected and thus accountable to the people.

In actuality, the alternative is both rooted in democracy and capable of providing a check on some of its drawbacks (e.g., popularity contests). Perhaps having the governors select the office would prompt voters to take their governor races more seriously. Additionally, this alternative might provide a needed check on the encroachment of the Federal Government onto the domains of the States (i.e., beyond the enumerated powers in the US Constitution), since the State governments lost their involvement in the U.S. Government in 1913 when U.S. Senators were no longer appointed by the State governments.

In short, the move would strength democracy as well as federalism. This is merely one alternative; doubtless other good ones exist as well.  My main point is that such alternatives should be dug up and debated using the American media and our representatives as conduits. We ignore the bias in the selection process at our own peril. Slighting the problem is itself indicative of the danger in the current process.

1. James Madison, Notes in the Federal Convention of 1787. New York: Norton, 1987, p. 324.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid., p. 327.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid., pp. 328-29.

Malignant Narcissism in the Porn Industry: A Case of Flaccid Industry Self-Regulation

In early February, 2011, the Los Angeles city council voted unanimously to draft an ordinance that would require condoms to be used on the set of every pornographic movie made within city limits. “We can’t keep our heads in the sand any longer,” City Councilman Bill Rosendahl said. “These people should be using condoms. Period.” According to The New York Times, the "city law would be the first to impose safety standards specifically on the pornographic film industry, which has largely been allowed to police itself." Until the late 1990s, the industry went unregulated. On the heels of lawsuits filed against production companies by several actresses who had contracted H.I.V., the industry created the Adult Industry Medical Healthcare Foundation in 1998. The nonprofit clinic was financed by contributions from production companies and offered STD tests for the talent. Producers agreed not to hire performers who had not been tested within thirty days. Even though the county health department accused the industry's self-regulation of failing to protect the talent and their sexual partners, the production companies claimed that the system worked well. “This has been working for years,” said Steven Hirsch, founder of Vivid Entertainment. “If we saw people getting sick, we would go to mandatory condoms.” However, STDs remained rampant among pornographic film performers. Rates of chlamydia and gonorrhea are seven times higher than those in the general population.  Taking Steven Hirsch's own statement, it could be argued that waiting until an actor looks sick to require him to wear a condom is a bit like waiting until the horse has left the barn. “Testing just acts as a fig leaf for producers, who suggest that it is a reasonable substitute for condoms, which it is not,” said Michael Weinstein, president of the AIDS Healthcare Foundation.

As with most business ethics cases, this case pits the public good against the financial interests of particular firms and employees. The self-regulatory testing system often left the talent weighing financial needs against their own safety (and one could add the public health). “At first, I would ask about condoms, and they told me I’d never be able to find work,” one actress said. “You do worry about the risk, but any girl desperate for money, like I was, is still going to do it.” It is also not in the financial interest of the production companies to make condom use mandatory. “I tried many years ago to get everybody to go to condoms,” said Jim South, a longtime talent agent for sex-film performers. “Quite a few companies did, but sales fell severely. The switch would be very difficult.”

Ethically, both the talent and the companies have been risking harm to others (and in the case of the talent, themselves as well) in order to gain financially.  It is essentially egoism at the expense of others' well-being. To the extent that AIDs is still fatal, the trade off is between killing someone (and oneself, in the case of the talent not wanting to wear condoms) and losing money. I have written a novel in which I juxapose frauduent sub-prime mortgage banker with gay college students who carelessly risk others' health (and lives) by having unprotected sex, moving from guy to guy in "hook-ups."  The harm in being kicked out of one's home onto the street may seem qualitatively different than the harm in being infected by a possibly fatal disease.  However, I contend that the callous disregard for others among the two kinds of violators renders the two as the same "type." Moreover, I submit that this "type" is increasingly salient in the make up of modern society.  In other words, modern culture, at least in the West, is increasingly taking on their attitude. In terms of M. Scott Peck's theory in People of the Lie, the self-centeredness at the expense of others is malignant narcissism.  Peck theorizes that such narcissism is actually a protective or defensive shield around a feeling of emptiness at one's core.  The evil, Peck argues, is the emptiness rather than the defense mechanisms of selfishness and lack of empathy.  The increasingly "bubble" quality of modern society, wherein people drive in their own cars, listen to their own music, and even watch movies alone on their laptops, may perpetuate the "me vs. everyone else," which in turn reinforces the attitude of malignant narcissism.

Beyond the ethical dimension, that industry self-regulation allowed for others to be harmed in the sex film industry and perhaps has even killed talent or their partners indicates a justification for government regulation. The New York Times reports that enforcement has been a problem, and that the threat of loss of the industry might undercut the regulator's power to enforce a new law. "Even if the law is enacted, city regulators may face similar problems of enforcement that have dogged state occupational safety and health officials. And some filmmakers have grumbled about moving their operations, which bring in as much as $13 billion annually, to other states." An industry can "capture" a regulatory agency not only because the latter depends on the former for information, but also because of the industry's power. This power can be exercised through government officials, even legislators and governors, who have influence over agencies. 

In the end, it is the lack of value that talent and the production companies put on human life (especially that of others, but also that of the talent themselves) that is telling in this case study. Sex itself is oriented to an instant of sheer pleasure that a peson can enjoy in him or herself. It is therefore not surprising that people in an industry involving sex are oriented to their own interests at the expense of others. Whether through industry self-regulation or government regulation, it is difficult to get around, or change, an attitude. This is the intractable problem that this case puts before us. One might ask whether the malignant narcissism is simply human nature or an instance of decadence therein.  Weakness may be difficult enough to treat; whether human nature itself can be changed so as to mitigate the squalid effects of malignant narcissism may be a question for the psychological, biological and medical sciences as the twenty-first century progresses.

Source: http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/10/health/policy/10porn.html?_r=1&ref=todayspaper

The U.S. Senate: What Is It Really?

Part I

In 1928, the Senate stopped the bill that would have given WWI vets their bonus then rather than in 1946.  Mass protests for weeks by thousands of vets on the U.S. Capitol may have swayed the U.S. House, but the Senate was undaunted: passage of the bill would be economically disasterous .   Such a scenerio is exactly what the delegates in the U.S. constitutional convention in 1787 would have predicted.  They designed the House to reflect the passions of the people, and the Senate as a check on such passion where it is intemperate.   Looking back at Shays’ Rebellion in Massachusetts, the delegates feared excess democracy.  No supporter of the Senate, Madison nonetheless points out that “a numerous body of Representatives were liable to err also, from fickleness and passion. A necessary fence against this danger would be to select a portion of enlightened citizens, whose limited number, and firmness might seasonably interpose against impetuous councils” (Madison’s Notes, p. 194).

However, the delegates also designed the U.S. Senate “to represent the wealth of the Country” (Pinkney, in Madison’s Notes, p. 198).  Col. Mason claimed that “one important object in constituting the Senate was to secure the rights of property” (Madison’s Notes, p. 200).  Does being wealthy make one temporate or enlightened?   Madison observes that “wisdom & virtue” are among the objects of the proposed Senate (Madison’s Notes, p. 195).  Does being wealthy mean that one is apt to stand up for virtue?  Does wisdom come from having inherited or earned wealth?

As if these two purposes etched in the design of the U.S. Senate are not sufficiently disjoined, the delegates also intended that the Senate represent the State governments so as to proffer them a means of defending their turf against encroachment by the U.S. Government.  Senators were selected by State governments before the ratification of the 17th Amendment in 1913.  It was debated in the convention whether popular election would give the senators a sufficient incentive to protect their respective State governments.  The delegates concluded that it would be insufficient, and history has proved them right–as the governments of the States have steadily lost power to the expansive U.S. Government.

So, the U.S. Senate was designed as a check on the excess democracy possible in the U.S. House, to protect the interests of property, and to represent the State governments and protect the balance of power so crucial to the viability of federalism.   It is not clear to me that these three functions are mutually-supporting or even compatible.  I don’t see evidence in Madison’s Notes of Debates in the Federal Convention of any consideration of the assumed compatibility.

Just as any human institution is apt to subtly morph if it endures for a sufficient time, the U.S. Senate has changed through the centuries.  As a result of the 17th Amendment wherein U.S. Senators are now popularly elected (by State), the U.S. Senate is more democratic–hence more like the House.  The six year senatorial term is a buffer, to be sure. However, re-election is never too far off to be absent from a given Senator’s political and legislative calculation.   Hence we are unwittingly leaving ourselves vulnerable to our own excesses.  Are we assuming that our passionate, spur-of-the-moment, collective impulse cannot be reckless and ultimately not in our own best interest?

I have already pointed to the implications for the State governments, and we have seen their eclipse through the last century.   What about the protection of property?  How does this mix with the more-democratic “structural tendency” in the Senate?   Are Senators more oriented to the upper-class voters while soothing the rest as if we too are being represented?  In other words, is there a sort of duplicity built-in to this combination?

In my opinion, the U.S. Senate can represent the State governments while simultaneously serving as a check on the intemporate excesses possible in the U.S. House.  Property is sufficiently represented in the U.S. Government as a whole, given the small number of elected and appointed officials relative to the entire population.   I would look to the commensurate European Council in the E.U.   The Council not only represents the State governments, the chief executives of the States (or their ministers when specialized topics are decided) sit on the Council.   It is a viable check on the European Parliament, which is commensurate with the U.S. House (i.e., elected representatives by the people of the EU).   We could do better by emulating the European Council.

Accordingly, I recommend that the governors sit in the Senate (which would meet periodically…with the governors’ respective staffs doing the leg work), with the relevant members of the States’ cabinets meeting on specialized topics.   This might seem confusing, but it works in Europe.  Essentially, officials in the respective State governments would meet in a common council.  50, not 100 members.  The latter number is too numerous for a council.   Because governors are elected, democracy would not be shirked even as the Senate would be a viable check on the excesses in the House (because the governors acting in a council are “two degrees” from the voters while the U.S. Reps are only one).   To be sure, the Senate would not be meeting every day, but meeting periodically to decide the major points.

The Senate representing the State governments would distinguish the Senate from being a replica of the House.  Do we really need two Houses?   Strictly speaking, proportional representation applies where citizens are being represented.  In contrast, in an intergovernmental council each government is a member–a person, as it were–regardless of how much each weights (e.g., different populations, territorial size, or wealth).  The European Council deviates from the “intergovernmental council” model because the number of votes assigned to the governments is influenced by its population.  I don’t see why the Senate would no longer be an intergovernmental council just because the votes are proportional; the key would be that governments would be voting, so the one vote per government could be relaxed.  Because proportional represention is the rule in the U.S. House, the big States can protect themselves.  So I don’t view the one vote per government in the Senate as problematic in terms of the Congress as a whole.  In general terms, the more we can distinguish the two bodies of the Congress, the more we enrich our system of government by taking advantage of the unique contributions from different forms of polity.   If there is a downside to proportional representation,  a Senate not partaking of that method would automatically be a check (and vice versa, of course).

Part II

The US Senate is “absurd.” So said Katie Connolly of MSNBC in 2010.  She was referring to Sen Shelby (R-AL) being able to singlehandedly place a hold on all pending nominations.  Citing a congressional scholar, Johathan Chait noted that a blanket hold has never been used before. Connolly argued that Shelb was doing it “because he wants a European corporation to build some planes in his state.”  Such a reason would be ubiquitous if not squalid enough in either body of the US Congress, so it is certainly plausable.  One might recall the money Sen. Ben Nelson got for Nebraska by agreeing to the health care reform bill.  In needing all 60 votes from the democrats and two independents, that bill gave us all a reminder of what an international body is like where each member has a veto.  In singlehandedly blocking all pending nominations before the US Senate, Sen Shelby was drawing on this theory as well.  While it is easy to trounce on each Senator (or each state) having a veto, I would argue that it is far less sordid than Shelby’s reason (i.e., more pork).  Because every state in the Union is semi-sovereign (and enjoys residual sovereignty as per the tenth amendment), there is constitutional support for any state represented in the US Senate having a veto on any legislation or appointment.  Because the veto is based on governmental sovereignty (i.e., the US Senate being in this respect an international body—unlike the US House), Alabama can use its veto even for reasons we might find disgusting.

So if each Senator (who represents his or her state as a political body even though he or she is elected by the citizens of his or her state) having a veto makes the US Senate “absurd” (and I join with those who are frustrated by it), we might want to consider the consequences that would be involved in depriving the political members of the Union of their vetos in the General Government (ie., Washington).  We could expect an acceleration in the consolidation of power in the General Government at the expense of the state governments—resulting in one size fits all in a heterogenous empire-scale Union (i.e., empire).  Any state government objecting to Washington taking over yet another domain of power would be powerless to stop that train without breaks running down the tracks toward a central state.  Meanwhile, that train would be able to pass more legislation through the US Senate, further accelerating its speed.

Some time back, I asked Sandra Day O’Connor of the US Supreme Court why she wasn’t objecting to the US Government going beyond its enumerated powers.  She replied to the small group that Congress was acting like a state legislature.  Disgust was palpable in her voice.  In a sense of futility, she added that it takes five on the US Supreme Court to have a majority decision (meaning that a majority would not go along with her on the enumerated powers matter).   You might be wondering what is wrong with Congress acting like a state legislature. The problem is that the US is in scale (and its make-up) commensurate with an empire by today’s standards.  In other words, most of our states are equivalent to countries.  You just can’t (or shouldn’t) run a combination of countries as though it were one country.  For one thing, a combo is inherently diverse.  Also, its center is further from the people.  It means less democracy or republican principles of representation because there are far fewer US Reps and Senators than state Reps and Senators.  Also, the US Government is designed as an empire-level polity.  Whereas the states’ Senates represent citizens (just as the states’ assemblies do), the US Senate (unlike the US House) represents political entities (the states) rather than US citizens.  In other words, both US citizens and US states are members of the US.  The US Government isn’t fashioned like a state government because the Union is a combination of such states (whereas a state is not a combo of republics in turn).

So we ought to be very careful about kneejerk reactions to fix the “absurd” US Senate.  To be sure, holding up appointments to get pork is squalid even by a pig’s standards, but turning the US Senate into a state senate would drastically alter what the US are.   Even though we use “the US” as a singular noun, the entity itself and its government were formed and designed with it as a plural noun (the states) in mind.  The US constitutional convention delegates invented modern federalism to suit this new genus of an empire: the Union.  The EU has since come into being along similar principles because it is of the same genus.  To treat either the US or EU as though it were commensurate with one of its states would be to treat something other than what it is.  That can only lead to a downfall.   So perhaps rather than change the US Senate to fit our understanding, we might alter our understanding to fit what the US are. This would entail taking the pressure off of the US Senate by returning most of the domestic legislation to the state governments (where there is more democracy).  Consider the coherence in having the US Senate  mainly involved in foreign policy (and regulating between the states) and having a filibuster (which is close to the principle of international organization).  That is, the state governments meet in the US Senate technically on an international basis. Moreover, the U.S. Constitution forms a hybrid between or composed of international and national governance.  This unique situs fits with the empire-scale of the United States, especially as they have expanded to fifty. 

Treating the US Senate as a state legislature…legislating on everything from healthcare to education…is a gross departure from this coherence.  It is indeed absurd—only we have the arrows reversed.  It is our use of the US Senate that is absurd—not the Senate’s principles (even though they can be abused, such as by Nebraska and Alabama). Treating the US Senate (and the Union) as other than what it is can only lead to the fall of our empire…our Union of States. To be sure, every empire that rises must fall.  So why write?  I’m merely trying to stay the fall a bit, but the outcome is certain.  In the meantime, let’s not help it along.  This will take more humility and much less presumptuousness in what we think we know about our system of public governance.  With more humility, perhaps more of us will be content to get involved in our state governments.  As it is, we overlook them and advocate changing the US Senate into our own image of what it should be, presuming the extant Senate is "absurd" (perhaps it is sheer hubris to make such a summary judgement?).

Source: http://blog.newsweek.com/blogs/thegaggle/archive/2010/02/05/need-more-evidence-the-senate-is-absurd-look-no-further.aspx

On the Virtue of a Constitutional Moment: Reassessing the American System of Government

A constitutional moment engaging the citizenry is urgently needed with respect to the system of government in the United States. In short, the citizenry should decide, as a people, whether to revert back to a federal system or to make the political consolidation that has ensued official. If the latter, Alexander Hamilton's suggestion that the states be districts of the US Government, whose energy he thought could not directly extend to the outer reaches of the empire (i.e., into the wilderness of states distant from the seat of the U.S. Government). This was Hamilton's view in the U.S. Constitutional Convention; his writings eventually published in The Federalist Papers were meant to sell the proposed constitution rather than to give his own proposal. His own view may have come to pass, though through incremental Congressional encroachment on the turf of the governments of the several states and concurring U.S. Supreme Court assuaging (or enabling) doctrines.  I submit that this process of change over many years has eventuated in a gap between the system of governance as it is and as it is to be constitutionally.  Whereas some people argue that we must revert back to the constitution following a "strict" construction, I believe we the people, as a people, should commence a constitutional moment of heightened attention and debate concerning whether we want centralized consolidation (i.e., no states), decentralized consolidation (i.e., states as districts), or federalism (which entails dual sovereignty and a balance of power between the general government and the governments of the states).  I believe the latter is the best suited for an inherently diverse empire-scale political union, but that the people reach a decision is the imporant point now.  For otherwise, we will continue to live a lie--to claim to be a federal system while actually being consolidated: essentially flying with miscalibrated instruments. 

Actually making a decision on the type of political system is better than having the system inadvertantly change as a byproduct of whatever issue is being legislated at the moment. If the latter habit continues, I suspect that the United States will continue along the trend of consolidation at the expense of the State governments, with Congress, the U.S. President, and the U.S. Supreme Court gaining more and more power without sufficient checks on their abuse of power.  Progressives could look back on Congress and the U.S. Supreme Court allowing President George W. Bush to essentially declare war on Iraq and command the forces, while conservatives could look back on "Obamacare" applying to every state. Being concerned about the government of the Union having too much power is or ought to be an American proclivity. So too, the need for a decision on what type of political system the United States should have bears on every citizen, regardless of party.  This is what a constitutional moment is, after all; the people itself rising to discuss the system of government itself without being distracted by partisan issues of the day. To be sure, such a moment requires self-discipline among the people and responsibility in the media, so to keep on topic.

I find myself wondering why I even make the arguments.  It would take so much energy and agreement just to get to a constitutional moment wherein the citizenry as a whole become engaged in revisiting the governance system itself.  We are so easily distracted, and do we, as a citizenry, really care whether our government is federal or consolidated?   It might be that most of the citizenry is ready to say good bye to federalism.  If so, then so be it.  Let’s at least make a decision.  If we as a people are incapable of making such a decision, it might be asked whether we are capable of democracy itself. It would be ironic if we were preaching democracy to the Middle East while not embracing popular sovereignty here at home.