Showing posts with label production. Show all posts
Showing posts with label production. Show all posts

Saturday, January 11, 2025

GDP Per Capita in the E.U. and U.S.: Changing Perceptions

Historically speaking, the E.U. and U.S. are relatively large in territorial expanse and population, so it is only to be expected that significant economic (and cultural) differences exist from state to state in the respective unions of states. In Europe, some medieval kingdoms have relegated to being but regions in E.U. states. Holland, for instance, is a region in The Netherlands, which in turn is a E.U. state. The same can be said of Bavaria (and England, were the United Kingdom still a E.U. state). To compare the economic inequality in such a region with the inequality in the E.U. (or U.S.) over all would be deeply misleading. For example, rural/urban economic patterns that pertain to an economy containing one major city do not translate into the multiple rural/urban patterns that exist in a modern (empire-scale) union of states. In short, scale matters, especially in how we make use of mathematical averages.  Comparing GDP per capita is a case in point; states should be compared with states.

Although recent studies had suggested that upward mobility was higher in the E.U. than in the U.S., the GDP per capita in the latter was significantly more in the latter than the former. To be sure, the gap is less “when adjusted for purchasing power parity (PPP)—which accounts for cost-of-living differences.”[1] Also, comparing the E.U. and the U.S. misses out on the significant differences between states in each of the empire-scale unions; such differences in turn can be used to compare individual states in one union with individual states in the other.

It is difficult to believe that in “the third quarter of 2024, Mississippi’s GDP per capita was €49,780, just €1,524 less than Germany’s at €51,304.”[2] That the industrial base in the latter state greatly exceeded Mississippi’s industry makes the respective numbers all the more perplexing. Because the E.U. average GDP per capita was €40,060 as compared to the U.S. average of €80,023, a person might begin to wonder whether a false economic-equivalence has pervaded both the American and European general perspectives. Certainly geographically, Americans may be surprised how much smaller Europe is than North America (and, accordingly, the E.U. in relation to the U.S.).  The GDP per capita comparisons may thus be like superimposing geographic maps at the expense of previously-held perspectives and assumptions of equivalence.

This is not to say that every E.U. state was poorer than every U.S. state; Luxembourg’s €125,043 is more than New York’s €107,485.[3] Nevertheless, it is significant that the figures for Germany, France, Italy, and Spain are less than those of West Virginia, Arkansas, Alabama, and South Carolina—each of these being below the U.S. average. It would not be at all surprising to read that these figures are incorrect, but, then again, the generally-held false geographical equivalence that Americans and Europeans naturally hold concerning the E.U. relative to the U.S. may, as a phenomenon of a false assumption of equivalence, exist economically too.

Were I to attempt an explanation—not being an economist—I would want to look at whether the relatively higher tax rates in the E.U. discourage economic activity. I would also want to investigate the extent to which the shorter work-week in Europe may also be a factor in the relatively lower GDP per capita. Furthermore, the relatively generous social policies in many E.U. states may also discourage the long-term unemployed from filling job openings, thus reducing factory efficiency and output and lowering per capita averages. Lastly, I would want to know just how much the different PPPs decrease the gaps of GDP per capita. I suspect, however, that all of these possible factors operate only on the margins, rather than explaining the entirety of the differences, given the magnitudes of the differences. It may simply be that hoch Kultur and the higher population (urban) density in the E.U. carries with it the false assumption that the E.U. must be as economically productive per person as in the U.S.



1. Servet Yanatma, “How Do America’s Poorest States Compare to Europe’s Largest Economies,” Euronews.com, January 6, 2025.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.

Sunday, January 3, 2016

On the Key Role of Energy in the Industrial Revolution

Reading from Peter Stearns' "The Industrial Revolution in World History," I'm intrigued with the twin elements of fossil fuels to power the machinery and organizational management to organize the production process, including the continued use of human energy/labor. I suppose Descartes' "mind-body" dualism is getting in the way of my understanding of the industrial revolution from the standpoint of the leap of energy and the related increase in complexity. 

Stearns contends that "the industrial revolution constituted one of those rare occasions in world history when the human species altered its framework of existence." This is a huge statement! Stearns suggests that "the only previous development comparable in terms of sheer magnitude was the Neolithic revolution--the conversion of hunting and gathering to agriculture as the basic form of production for survival." As a result of the industrial revolution, human beings use 100 times the energy necessary for survival. Such energy is necessary to maintain and establish increasingly complex technological devices and organizational/communications systems or networks. 

I get how the energy harnessed from coal represents a leap in the industrial revolution, but the boost in energy from "industrial-style organization [,which] involved more conscious management of workers toward a faster as well as a more fully coordinated work pace" does not seem to me to be the same kind of energy as is unleashed in a chemical reaction (e.g., burning coal).

Sterns emphasizes the "contrast with the more relaxed work styles characteristic of much preindustrial labor, including a good bit of slave labor." I can understand that workers working more means more energy (as I understand that term in physics), but the managerial coordination of work does not seem like "real energy" to me. I realize I'm wrong about this, but that energy just seems different to me--less real. Likewise, stuff like "redefined work discipline and specialization," [which] along with growth in the size of the work unit, defined the organizational core of the industrial revolution," seems to me like concentrating mental energy rather than more energy. Of course, increasing the size of a factory means more energy in a factory. But mental energy, as is involved in managerial coordination and increased self-discipline, seems different to me--more like the "energy" that is involved in thinking. 

I do realize that the brain's activity is indeed a draw on the body's total energy (including holding the brain up), but I suppose I have a bit of the Cartesian mind/body dualism going on here. My reading here of the industrial revolution is that it rivals the Neolithic revolution (hunter/gatherer to agriculture) in that the source of the energy changed from animals and humans to fossil fuels, which have a lot of stored energy from the sun. It is the tapping of that stored energy--being able to use much more of the sun's energy--that I believe is the key change in the industrial revolution; so when I look at the energy used in thinking, including managerial coordination and the self-discipline of labor, I don't see the especially great energy required since it is largely mental. In other words, I lean on coal (and then oil) as the energy-signature of the industrial revolution.