Prospects for Civil War in an E.U. State: The Case of Slovakia

As the E.U. was heading toward legislative elections in 2024, the shooting of Slovenia’s prime minister could have served as a wake-up call concerning the silent benefits of having a union that is political, and thus governmental, rather than merely an economic “bloc.” Were civil war likely in Slovakia, given the aggressive political division there, being a semi-sovereign state rather than a fully independent country meant that explicit and implicit buffers existed that could stave off such war. Considering that an assassination had been the trigger for World War I, having a federal system that could quell aggression within a state is no small benefit.

In 2004, Slovakia became an E.U. state, which means that some of its governmental sovereignty went to a federal level. Slovakia’s velvet reputation for having split peacefully from the Czech Republic in the dissolution of Czechoslovakia in 1993 may have masked the ensuing stark political reality under Prime Minister Vladimir Merciar, when Slovakia “found itself at a crossroads, stuck between becoming an autocratic regime with close ties to organized crime or a state based on the rule of law.”[1] In 1995, the country’s secret service kidnapped the president’s son. In 2004, Robert Fico’s political career as a “social democrat fighting corruption and unbridled neoliberalism” was just beginning.[2] Yet after becoming prime minister for the first time in 2006, he was accused “of graft and involvement in the Penta Gorilla affair, Slovakia’s biggest post-communist corruption scandal.”[3] In his second stint as prime minister, he and his government “mainly focused on influencing the judiciary, . . . stopping corruption trials and silencing independent media.”[4] He spoke against the E.U. and Ukraine in the midst of the Russian invasion. With all of the press that Viktor Orban of Hungary was receiving for taking the same positions, it was easy to miss Fico’s stances in the E.U.

Together, Fico and Orban can be viewed as a minority stance in E.U. foreign policy in favor of Russia. With such policy requiring unanimity at the federal level, this minority had the potential of hamstringing any foreign policy at the federal level regarding Russia’s aggression. E.U. states would be free to work at cross purposes, and the power of a united front would be missed. This is an argument for applying qualified majority voting to E.U. foreign policy. Such a stance is more evident than another benefit that the E.U. provides to the states—a benefit highlighted by Slovakia.

The shooting of Fico in May, 2024 stemmed from a climate of hateful political polarization in the state. In the wake of the shooting, some fear of a resulting civil war was voiced in the media. Even though the European Steel and Coal Cooperative had been formed to stave off war between states (most notably involving Germany), the less obvious benefit of the E.U. in being able to step in to stave off war within a state has received little attention. The potential benefit for Europe as a whole resonates with the suggestion made by France’s Macron that the defense capability of the E.U. itself be strengthened. For it to be any good, its deployment would have to be decided by qualified majority vote rather than unanimity. Otherwise, Hungary could use its veto to enable Fico’s party to put away its opposition militarily.

A related benefit of the E.U. with respect to Slovakia does not depend on any additional governmental sovereignty being shifted to the federal level. The fact that some sovereignty had already been delegated to the E.U. by its states means that the likelihood of a civil war in a state is buffered, and thus reduced, simply by being in a federal union that has a legislature, executive branch, and a supreme court. Any one of these governmental branches could take action against Slovakia were civil war to break out. Financial levers alone could do the trick, but so too could informal conversations in the European Council, in which the states themselves, through their respective governors, are the members. As nervous as the E.U. officials are about a war just outside the E.U. is, the prospect of war within the E.U. would surely be galvanizing.

Furthermore, within Slovenia, simply viewing itself as a state rather than a sovereign country could work against forces that would otherwise provoke a civil war. In other words, being a state in a political and economic union is itself a moderating force with respect to political polarization getting out of control. In the early U.S., Shay’s Rebellion in Massachusetts and the Whiskey Rebellion in Pennsylvania were doubtless on the minds of the delegates at the Constitutional Convention in making sure that the U.S. president would be able to call the armies of the then-sovereign states into action to put down rebellions in the future semi-sovereign states. So, there is precedent for the E.U. calling on state militias to quell any rebellions in any of its semi-sovereign states, and even for bolstering a federal military force. As E.U. citizens and residents headed to the polls in 2024, it would be a shame were they to take the E.U. for granted. Going even further, it would be a shame were they to miss an opportunity to voice support for an ever more perfect, and thus strengthened rather than hamstrung, union.

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1, Keno Verseck, “Robert Fico Shooting Highlights Slovakia’s Deep Polarization,” Deutsche Welle, May 17, 2024.
2, Ibid.
3, Ibid.
4, Ibid.

Slovak Resistance to Expanding the E.U. Bailout in 2011

Richard Sulik, Parliament Speaker of the Slovakian legislature, argued that the only real solution to the debt crisis in the E.U. was rigorous enforcement of the E.U. regulations on budget deficits and public debt. He had been particularly angered by his state, the second poorest in the E.U., having to bail-out a richer state that had consistently violated the E.U. regulations. Additional debt, he insisted, was not a way out for the PIGS. Slovakia, after all, had to adhere to strict limits on everything from budget deficits to inflation rates in order to be able to adopt the euro. “Now when I see what is being allowed for Greece and Italy, it really makes me angry,” Sulik admitted. “We have to pay because of this double standard. It’s a real injustice.” Indeed it was. Bailing out Greece so the state would not default effectively rewarded that state government for profligate spending and tax avoidance in violation of the E.U. regulations.  

Solely from the standpoint of debt, adding more was not a viable way out, according to Sulik. “The more we let [states] violate the rules, the worse things will get,” he said. So he opposed expanding the bailout. Undoubtedly putting a chill in the halls of banks in rich states such as France and Germany, he bluntly stated, “Greece has to go into bankruptcy.” This would demonstrate that the E.U. was not an agency of the big banks holding questionable semi-sovereign state debt.

At the very least, having a state government official resist the interests of the big banks and their politicians in the “core” states was in the interest of a fuller debate within the E.U. as a whole on how to deal with “bad” states. In fact, potentially at least, a state like Slovakia could serve as a check on plutocracy gaining a foothold in the E.U. According to Sulik, it simply was not fair to ask poor Slovaks to bailout the big banks and richer states—even apart from the latter’s violation of the E.U. regulations. In short, the E.U. should not have been run in the interest of French and German banks. At the same time, giving each state government a veto would have been a recipe for E.U. impotence at the federal level.

If the bailout had to be expanded to obviate a financial collapse of the E.U., then having one hold-out could have been a very expensive price to pay to avoid giving the E.U. additional competencies in fiscal matters. Were a qualified majority needed to augment E.U. competencies, Sulik's argument could still win the day--but his points would have to be sufficiently persuasive among the poorer states. If the banks' interest must be satisfied in order to avoid financial collapse, enough of the neutral states could turn from Sulik, who might otherwise be able to prevent the E.U. from avoiding catastrophe.

Source:

Gordon Fairclough, “Slovak Official’s Delay of Rescue Fund Vote Poses Problem for Euro Zone,” Wall Street Journal, September 6, 2011. 

The Visible Hand: Markets Forging a Stronger E.U.

Joschka Fischer, a former foreign minister of the state of Germany, said the agreement under which 17 state governments accept more oversight and control of their budgets by the European Union “was a big step, which was pushed on the Europeans by the markets.”[1] Such pressure was necessary, given the conflict of interest bearing on state officials working at the federal level on a deal that would add a new competency to the E.U. “(I)n the end,” Fischer added, “the markets have limited the options of the political leaders, especially of Merkel, and pushed her into giving more support for the euro.”[2] Giving more support for the euro meant giving more power to the E.U. at the expense of the state-level where Merkel has most of her power. From this vantage point (i.e., the power that state officials have at the E.U. level), it is amazing that the E.U. has been able to acquire any additional competencies.

The full essay is at "Essays on the E.U. Political Economy," available at Amazon.

1. Steven Erlanger and Liz Alderman, “Chronic Pain for the Euro,” The New York Times, December 12, 2011; Landon Thomas, “A Stark Step Away From Europe,” The New York Times, December 11, 2011. 

2. Ibid.