The E.U. as Peace-Maker: Bringing in Serbia and Kosovo

Serbia and Kosovo reached an agreement on April 19, 2013 bearing on how much autonomy Kosovo would allow Serb cities in return Serbia’s recognition of Kosovo’s remaining authority in the cities.[1] Kosovo had seceded from Serbia in 2008, and the ensuing conflict kept both states from joining the European Union. As it turned out, the prospect of accession gave both Serbia and Kosovo enough incentive to reach an agreement. Indeed, only a few days after the agreement had been reached, the governments of Serbia and Kosovo approved it. Such swiftness indicates how strong of an incentive accession can be for belligerent republics in Europe. The E.U.’s deployment of this “carrot” is fully in line with the main objective of the European Union: to prevent war in Europe. According to the New York Times, the accord is thus “an important victory” for the E.U.[2] An even further victory in line with the E.U.'s most important purposes would be to internalize both Serbia and Kosovo so any future interstate conflicts could be peacibly resolved. 

In the wake of World War II, the European Coal and Steel Cooperative was formed in order to keep an eye on Germany’s use of iron, should the Germans seek to re-militarize. The EEC was also formed to obviate war in Europe, and the E.U. inherited this central aim. Accordingly, it is fitting and proper that, as Kosovo’s deputy minister of foreign affairs, Petrit Selimi put it, “The incentive of joining the E.U. played a huge role in clinching an agreement.”[3] The E.U. thus played a role in forging greater peace in Europe. In fact, the negotiations took place in Brussels, according to Catherine Ashton, the E.U.’s secretary of state. “It is very important,” she told reporters, “that now what we are seeing is a step away from the past and, for both [Kosovo and Serbia], a step closer to Europe.”[4] Days after the agreement was signed, the European Commission recommended to the European Council  that talks start on Serbia’s accession. Belgrade had “taken very significant steps and sustainable improvement in relations with Kosovo,” the Commission announced. The Commission also noted that as Kosovo had met all its “short-term priorities,” talks toward a Stabilization and Association Agreement, a precursor to Kosovo gaining statehood, should commence.
Bringing both Serbia and Kosovo into the Union would represent a more permanent means of forestalling war in Europe. As this depends too on how much power the E.U. has in reconciling conflicts between the states, giving the federal government sufficient competencies in this regard would also represent a step toward sustained peace in Europe. While the prospect of accession has been shown to be enough of an incentive for a meaningful agreement to be reached, better still is the incorporation of trouble spots into the European Union, where more pressure can be brought to bear on any bellicose states such that any nascent conflicts between them can be peaceably resolved. Indeed, the E.U.’s competency, or enumerated power, to remove state obstacles to a common market is in part geared to forestalling potential conflict between discriminating states. This is also a reason behind the interstate commerce clause in the American system.
Lest a fixation on any of the contemporary crises hitting the E.U. inculcates a pessimism that is destructive to the Union and thus ruinous to its more basic purposes, it should be helpful to keep an eye raised to one of those fundamental aims of the project. Given the two major wars in Europe during the first half of the twentieth century, it is wise to keep perspective regarding the role of the E.U., both directly and indirectly, in obviating war.

1. Dan Bilefsky, “Serbia and Kosovo Reach Agreement on Power-Sharing,” The New York Times, April 20, 2013.
2. Ibid.
3. Vanessa Mock and Gordon Fairclough, “Serbia Ready for EU Accession Talks,” The Wall Street Journal, April 22, 2013.
4. Ibid.

The British Pound Reacts to Secession

When the E.U. state of Britain held a vote in 2016 on whether to secede from the union, the British currency plummeted. On the day of the December 2019 statewide election in the U.K., that currency initially jumped and held on the day after as official results confirmed that the conservatives had won a majority and thus would be able to see the secession through. I submit that uncertainty itself was a major factor in both swings, and that the market put too much emphasis on the matter of uncertainty at the expense of the substantive economic effects of secession.

According to The New York Times, the British pound plummeted after the referendum vote in 2016 due to “agitation over the economic and financial disruption that seemed to lie ahead.”[1] Such disruption would be an interim matter, rather than ongoing, because a new equilibrium would doubtless take hold. The agitation was thus about change, and more specifically about the uncertainty that is in any change. Alternatively, the drop in the currency could have been to analysts having determined that the British economy would not be as strong after the change. In other words, the drop could have been prompted by analyses of the new equilibrium more so than the uncertainty during the change. I submit that such a rationale would have been better, for it would have reflected economic fundamentals rather than merely an aversion to change.

The state’s general election in December 2019 took place after a long period of governmental stalemate on the matter of secession. Prime Minister Boris Johnson had secured an agreement with federal officials on a secession plan, but his own state legislature balked. The achievement of an outright majority in the House of Commons in the election meant that Johnson’s plan could finally be passed. The high probability of secession taking place at the end of the next month (and with a trade deal) removed the uncertainty concerning even whether the state would secede. According to Lee Hardman at MUFG, the election outcome “gives you more clarity over the direction of Brexit.”[2] Clarity, rather than how the state’s economy would be post-secession, involves a decrease of uncertainty.

To be sure, the governmental stalemate and the related uncertainty had been difficult on British businesses. Some even moved their headquarters to other states. That Johnson would be able to push his secession deal through his legislature means that the market could anticipate even less uncertainty. So it makes sense that the decrease in uncertainty would be a factor in the currency markets. Even so, what about how the state’s economy would be like after the transition? That the UK would secede with a deal suggested that the state’s economy would not only suffer less uncertainty, but also be stronger, with continuing trade with the E.U.’s states. How would the UK economy look? This, I submit, is what the currency markets could (and should) have reflected to a significant degree relative to the matter of uncertainty and transition.

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1. Amie Tsang and Matt Phillips, “Brexit Once Meant a Weaker British Pound, But Not Anymore,” The New York Times, December 12, 2019.

2. Ibid.