Wall Street Snuffed Out President Clinton's Goal of Homeownership for the Poor

It is one thing for the head of a government (or a government’s executive arm) to set a praiseworthy goal that is in the public interest, and quite another thing to rely on the financial sector to implement it. Finance has its own means tied to its own goals, with plenty of greed in the mix. Governmental officials may tend to minimize the potential damage from ego-laden greed to the goals of public policy. Such policy ideally strives for the good of the whole, whereas the goals of a private sector of a part. This could account, at least in part, for the financial crisis of 2008 and the continuing bear market in housing in much of the U.S.

According to The Wall Street Journal, housing prices had fallen for 57 consecutive months by May 2011.[1] Even though the recession had officially ended in June 2009, the real estate market still had yet to hit bottom.[2] Since the housing peak in 2006, home values nationally were down 29.5 percent, according to Zillow.com. Compared to the same time in 2010, prices were down 8.2 percent in the U.S. markets. In that year, house price depreciation had slowed or stabilized because of tax credits of up to $8000 that expired during that summer. Accordingly, negative equity became even more prevalent in the first quarter of 2011, when 28.4 percent of all single-family homes with mortgages were "underwater."[3] Monthly declines for February and March were "really staggering," according to Stan Humphries, Zillow's chef economist. He claimed that the declines reflected "the true underlying demand," which was "being completely overwhelmed by supply."[4] Fannie and Freddie sold more than 94,000 foreclosed houses in the quarter; this represents 23% more than in the previous quarter.[5] The increase in supply from the foreclosures was at relatively low prices, hence the impact on the market was particularly depressing.

A declining housing price translates into lost wealth for the homeowner. When home values decline, the values of mortgages often do not go down as well. Homeowners lose some of their equity, or the stake they have in their home. When equity becomes negative—that is to say, when the value of a mortgage exceeds the value of the property—homeowners become especially vulnerable to default and foreclosure. “Falling home prices can create a vicious cycle. When a property falls into foreclosure, it tends to depress the values of properties around it, making those homes more likely to experience a similar fate. [In 2010], nearly 2.9 million homes received a foreclosure filing, and more than 2.8 million homes got one in 2009.” based on the data provider RealtyTrac.[6] More foreclosures further reduced the value of residential mortgage-based securities, which in turn reduced the asset-values and returns of companies and individuals investing in the CDOs (collateralized debt obligations) worldwide. This investment asset essentially has mortgage-borrowers pay the holders of the respective CDOs, whose value is thus based on the value of the underlying mortgages.

Problematically, the holders of the CDOs, not the originator of the mortgage, assumed the risk that the mortgage borrowers might stop their mortgage payments. The mortgage servicers had sold their mortgages to an investment bank such as Lehman Brothers, which in turn would pass the then-securitized mortgage-based bonds on to investors such as Deutsche Bank and the two major banks of Iceland. Neither companies such as New Century (or Countrywide) nor investment banks like Lehman would face any risk unless they happened to be holding a significant number of the risky mortgages (or real estate) when the merry-go-round finally stopped in 2008.

Countrywide was bought up by Bank of America (by Ken Lewis, CEO at the time) and Lehman Brothers went bankrupt. Both Lewis and Dick Fuld (of Lehman) could be said to be empire-builders—meaning expansion at virtually any expense and even as an end itself. Pure ego plus greed. New Century and Lehman both assumed that they would never get caught with their pants down holding toxic mortgages. They were both wrong—oh so wrong. To be so wrong and yet blame the consumers is, at the very least, bad form.

Unfortunately, the housing market was “plagued by scandal” in the first quarter of 2011.[7] Homeowners and investors filed “numerous lawsuits alleging that big banks misplaced or even faked crucial mortgage documents.” After it was “revealed that companies that processed foreclosures signed thousands of documents daily without even reading them, potentially violating the law, some of the biggest banks temporarily halted their foreclosure proceedings” in the fall of 2010.[8] I suspect, however, that the failure of the underwriters (and compliance folks) is a red herring; most of the sub-prime residential mortgages required no documents proving income or even a job, and many of those mortgage applications contained lies known or even encouraged by the brokers. Not unexpectedly, the brokers and borrowers have differed on whether the latter should be expected to have resisted the, “It’s ok, really. Trust me,” from the “professionals.” In any case, the (in many cases) first-time homeowners were used, and the greed of the mortgage producers was ultimately behind it.

The claim, for example, made by some mortgage brokers and Wall Street securitization arrangers that the borrowers should have somehow known better than to sign low- or no-document subprime mortgages with steep ARM resets of up to double-digit interest rates is more than just disingenuous; the brokers had assured the potential homeowners that the inevitable increase in home equity appreciation from the rising housing market would give them the 20 percent equity stake that was necessary at the time to refinance into a fixed mortgages at a decent, constant interest rate. The brokers did not care whether the borrowers enabling the double commissions could make the higher ARM (adjustable rate mortgage) payments in case they might kick in. One might even say that the system was rigged by the mortgage-producing companies such as Countrywide at the expense of first-time mortgage-borrowers. Preying on the newbies, in other words, could characterize the system’s basis. Of course, such preying is unethical, for it puts others in harm’s way unless the prey should have known better, which I dispute. In short, it was not a fair fight when the harm came as even AAA-rated subprime (i.e., risky) mortgage-based CDOs ruptured in the financial crisis of 2008. 

In conclusion, although Clinton’s goal of putting poor people in their own homes had been laudable, constructing ARM mortgages with resets that low income people could not afford and relying on a rising market to obviate them was a recipe for years of a bear housing market. In other words, the system that the financial world established blocked Clinton’s goal from being sustainable, and thus achieved. Of course, Wall Street was not in the game to do Clinton’s bidding; finance had its own goals, which went on through two terms of George W. Bush in the White House. In retrospect, Clinton should have used government regulation to establish a viable system in sync with the goal rather than allow his henchmen—most notable Alan Greenspan at the Federal Reserve, Robert Rubin, Secretary of the Treasury, and Larry Summers also of the Treasury, to push Congress to keep the CDOs unregulated. In other words, Clinton, in trying to position himself in the political middle, followed Carter in adopting a deregulatory position even as it ultimately rendered his laudable goal unattainable and even reckless.

See Essays on the Financial Crisis and On the Arrogance of False Entitlement, both available at Amazon. 

---

1. Nick Timiraaos and Dawn Wotapka, "Home Market Takes a Tumble," The Wall Street Journal, May 9, 2011, pp. A1-A2.

2. William Alden, “Home Prices Fall Again in Biggest Drop since 2008,” The Huffington Post, May 9, 2011.

3. Ibid.

4. Nick Timiraaos and Dawn Wotapka, "Home Market Takes a Tumble," The Wall Street Journal, May 9, 2011, pp. A1-A2.

5. Ibid.

6. William Alden, “Home Prices Fall Again in Biggest Drop since 2008,” The Huffington Post, May 9, 2011.

7. Ibid.

8.Ibid.

Fannie and Freddie: A Lavish Corporate Lifestyle after the Financial Crisis

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac spent more than $640,000 to send 100 employees to a mortgage-industry conference in Chicago in the fall of 2011. According to a letter from the Federal Housing Finance Agency, which oversees Fannie and Freddie, the spending included nearly $342,000 for travel, food, hotel and meeting-room space. Incredibly, $74,000 was spent on four invitation-only dinners for mortgage-lending companies that are regular customers of Fannie and Freddie. Because Fannie and Freddie at the time dominated the U.S. mortgage market, "purchasing and guaranteeing about 70% of new loans from mortgage lenders,” who in turn thus had few alternative potential buyers, managers at Fannie and Freddie still felt the need to wine and dine their customers under the subterfuge of valuing “face-to-face meetings with customers as a way to understand their needs,” according to the Wall Street Journal. Apparently the folks at Fannie and Freddie were not familiar with customer surveys or even the telephone. Instead, Freddie spokesman Doug Duvall bragged, “[We were able to meet] with our lender customers in a cost-efficient way. In just two days we held approximately 200 meetings.” Undoubtedly some of those “meetings” were held at the dinners, each of which cost the taxpayers $18, 500.

The $640,000 spent on the conference can be racked up to the lack of competitive pressure facing a government-owned organization that is close enough to the private sector to want to enjoy perks that are no doubt common on Wall Street. In other words, while it might be less bothersome to us to see stockholders’ money spend on corporate luxuries, it is not clear that Adam Smith would feel very comfortable amid modern corporate capitalism (and he did include a role for government in his economic theory).

The particularly sad thing about the lavish spending by managers at Fannie and Freddie is that those agencies had been firmly opposed to refinancing the mortgages of borrowers “under water” since the collapse of the housing bubble. Over 3 million foreclosures had taken place in the three years since September 2008. The luxury amid harm bespeaks such inequity that even underlying societal values may be at issue—namely, I should be able to eat, drink and be merry while people I don’t know lose their homes. Beyond the ethical problems with this attitude, it evinces a pathology—that of malignant narcissism and perhaps even sociopathy. It is interesting (i.e., convenient) that no terms could be given up on even the questionable (i.e., the producers’ role) mortgages, while plenty of money was available to be spent on lavish dinners ostensibly for guaranteed customers. The managers at Fannie and Freddie could not very well say that they could not afford to relax some of the overly-stringent terms of the ARMs in the sub-primes (and Alts). In fact, given the roles of policy makers and mortgage producers in enabling the housing bubble with questionable mortgages, a moral obligation exists for the government (and the related agencies) to act so as to obviate the foreclosures (which would have obviated the need for TARP for the banks, as the toxic assets were based on the bad mortgages in default). Had the managers at Fannie and Freddie recognized this point rather than stood on sanctity of contract, the Obama administration might have found a way to compensate the two agencies for doing so—perhaps even throwing their managers a lavish dinner at the White House.

Source:

Alan Zebel, “Fannie, Freddie Spend $640,000 on Conference,” The Wall Street Journal, December 1, 2011. 

Fuld’s Arrogance at Lehman: Systemic Risk

Documents released in May 2012 regarding Dick Fuld at Lehman Brothers prove that he was aware of the high risk involved in holding so much real estate (and related security derivatives). This means definitively that “the ‘forces-out-of- our-control’ argument we hear from Wall Street leaders is [self-serving] bunk. It is the ill-advised behavior of one banker after another, day in and day out, that leads to the sort of devastating financial crisis we are only now emerging from.”[1]

The full essay is in Essays on the Financial Crisis, available in print and as an ebook at Amazon.

1. William Cohan, “Lehman Docs Show Wall Street Arrogance Led to Financial Collapse,” The Huffington Post, May 7, 2012.

Foreclosing on Freddie and Fannie

Three years after the financial crisis of 2008, nearly half of the people in Arizona with mortgages owed more than their homes were worth; those people were “underwater.” Only three homeowners had been approved for debt reduction since the debt-reduction program in Arizona began in September 2010. “It is extremely difficult for the principal reduction program to be successful” when Fannie and Freddie opt out, according to Shaun Rieve of the Arizona Department of Housing.[1] Even though Arizona would pay up to half of the principal reduction, up to $50,000 of a $100,000 principal reduction, the two housing entities that were taken over by the U.S. Government have been obstructing taxpayers from re-emerging from “underwater.”

The full essay is at "Essays on the Financial Crisis."

1. Shaila Dewan, “Freddie and Fannie Reject Debt Relief,” The New York Times, October 6, 2011. 

Nietzsche on Bank of America

The positive correlation between incompetence and unethical conduct at companies is striking, for, theoretically at least, a person can be talented or smart and of questionable character. Of course, it could be that cutting corners is a survival strategy of people who are not competent. However, shirking seems to reflect a sordid character, which, like personality, is relatively constant throughout one’s life—though character flaws could manifest more when times are tough (as in when incompetence has eventuated in a dire balance sheet). One might investigate, moreover, whether a firm’s culture can become more tolerant of unethical conduct when the finances are going south—or do unethical cultures tend to be like fixtures in organizations irrespective of financial condition?

The full essay has been incorporated into On the Arrogance of False Entitlement: A Nietzschean Critique of Business Ethics and Management, available at Amazon.

Refinancing Mortgages: Only for the Rich?

According to the U.S. Government, prices of homes with government-backed mortgages fell 5.9% in the second quarter of 2011 from a year earlier. This was the biggest decline since 2009, which was on the heels of the credit crisis of late 2008. In 2011, more than one in five homeowners with mortgages owed more than their homes are worth. That translates to at least 10.9 million families, almost none of whom could refinance. While the Treasury Department and Federal Reserve were able to pump hundreds of billions of dollars into American banks, federal programs to assist homeowners had been regarded as ineffective.. [1] Out of the $45.6 billion in TARP funds (the total being $800 billion) set aside to help struggling homeowners, only $22.9 billion had been spent by August 2011. Fewer than 1.7 million loans had been modified under federal programs as of 2011. Just over 760,000 permanent mortgage modifications had been initiated under the government programs while at least 5.5 million mortgages were in delinquency or foreclosure. Andrea Risotto, a spokesperson at Treasury, said that the unused portion of the TARP funds for homeowners would be used to reduce the deficit.[2]

So it is perhaps not a surprise that even though mortgage interest rates were around 4%, the Obama administration was hedging in 2011 on whether to direct Fannie and Freddie to allow the existing mortgages guaranteed by those agencies to be refinanced. David Wessel observed that whereas taxpayers bore all the downsides of nationalizing the two housing guarantors, the two firms and their regulators consistently resisted helping taxpayers over their heads on their mortgages.[3]

Even though the mortgage servicers and banks had been at the very least complicit in the liar’s loans of many of the sub-prime mortgages, the Obama administration was not sure even as late as mid 2011 whether homeowners behind in their payments should be able to refinance. According to the New York Times, despite “record low interest rates, many homeowners have been unable to refinance their loans either because they owe more than their houses are now worth or because their credit is tarnished.” Yet it was “unclear . . . whether people who are delinquent on their mortgages would be eligible or whether lenders would administer it.”[4] So it would appear that only homeowners who don’t need the refinancing will be able to get it.

The priorities showing through both with TARP and the refinancing ideas being floated in 2011 may have reflected the anti-borrower bias Countrywide and other mortgage originators, whose meagerly educated sales force and managers believed that the struggling sub-prime borrowers were lazy and dishonest idiots who do not deserve a break from the “sacred contracts” (even if constructed as a liar’s loan—meaning a lender lying about the borrower’s income to secure a double commission).[5] 

In other words, the imbalance concerning the treatment of the banks and the borrowers by the U.S. Government is consistent with the bankers’ selective attention to culpability. Most likely, the sub-prime crisis had multiple contributing sources. Were the government’s responses to reflect this, both the financial institutions and the borrowers would be given some leeway so as to obviate a collapse of the entire economy. Both the major banks and the struggling homeowners would be attended to because the crisis was larger than any one of them. For the government’s priorities to reflect one of them suggests disproportionate influence, which ultimately is detrimental to the republic itself.

1. Shaila Dewan and Louise Story, “U.S. May Back Refinance Plan for Mortgages,” the New York Times, August 25, 2011. 
2. Ibid.
4. Ibid.

5. David Wessel, “Tracking Missteps Behind World’s Economic Slump,” Wall Street Journal, August 25, 2011. 
3. Ibid.

On the Arrogance of Power: Greenspan, Rubin, and Summers in the Clinton Administration

Over two years after the financial crisis of 2008, a commentator on Fox News said that the banks should not stop the foreclosure process because that would not be good for the free market. He said that people who cannot afford their houses should lose them. Another commentator remarked that there was still too much government in the financial sector. This, according to the commentator, is “the problem.” It is particularly striking that Alan Greenspan’s stark admission to a U.S. House committee in 2008 that the deregulated laissez faire market paradigm contains a fundamental flaw was lost on the two commentators. In May 2011, House Speaker Boehner charged that business is over-regulated. This comment too is remarkable given Greenspan’s realization. If a people disowns its own lessons, history is destined to repeat itself.

The full essay is at Essays on the Financial Crisis.

Wall St. Bonuses and TARP: A Tale of Two Cities

Wall Street profits totaled $21.4 billion during the first three quarters of 2010. The prior year's record of $61.4 billion was fueled by the bailout financed by American taxpayers. Wall Street paid out $20.3 billion in bonuses on the 2009 profits. According to New York City Comptroller John Liu, "The astounding recovery of financial firm profitability in 2009 has been followed by a mixed year in 2010, yet total compensation in the industry is expected to be up modestly once year-end bonuses are paid." Goldman Sachs’ CEO Lloyd C. Blankfein and his top subordinate executives collected about $111.3 million in stock in January 2011. It was a delayed payoff from 2009 and the bank’s record-setting 2007 bonuses, according to a Bloomberg News report. Within a year after the bonuses had been approved, Goldman Sachs took $10 billion from the U.S. Treasury, converted to a bank and was borrowing as much as $35.4 billion a day from Federal Reserve emergency programs, Bloomberg reported. In 2010, the bank paid $550 million to settle U.S. regulators’ fraud charges related to a mortgage-security company sold in 2007.

The full essay is at "Bonuses and TARP."

TARP and Foreclosures: A Matter of Misplaced Priorities

Neil Kashkari wrote up the U.S. Treasury department’s Break the Glass Bank Recapitalization Plan in April, 2008—months before the financial crisis—as a “just in case.” It was essentially the TARP program.  Karshkari states in his plan that governmental purchases of toxic mortgage-based assets would do “nothing to help homeowners without [there being] a complimentary program.” He notes that should there be a crisis, “there would be enormous political pressure” for relief going to homeowners in trouble.  Considering the noted downside to his plan, he may have viewed any such pressure from “the masses” as a problem to be ignored rather than even assuaged.  He also admits in his plan that it would provide “no guarantee banks [would] resume lending.”  It is odd that his was made explicit yet not dealt with.  He does gloss an alternative option (C) that would involve refinancing the troubled mortgages, though he assumes a (needlessly cumbersome) case by case basis and that the servicers would determine which loans to put into the program.  The culprits could opt out to insist on the higher payments. In other words, Kashkari was assuming that the government shouldn’t or couldn’t force the banks to take write-downs.  As a former Goldman Sachs man himself (like his boss at the time, Henry Paulson), Kashkari probably didn’t want to propose anything that the bankers wouldn’t view as being in their interest.

The full essay is at "Essays on the Financial Crisis."