Friday, April 5, 2019

On the Unitary and Imperial American Presidency

In December 2009, Abdullah II, King of Jordon, dismissed the prime minister and replaced him with a palace aide and loyalist, dissolved Parliament, and postponed legislative elections for a year.   For all the defects of a representative democratic system, it is far superior to autocratic rule, especially by a dictator.   It is natural for people to resist preemption. “The nature of humans is they want democracy,” said Ali Dalain, an independent member of the Parliament that was dissolved. “One person cannot solve all problems and cannot make everyone happy, so people must share in determining their fate.”[1] These quotes are revealing from the standpoint of the unitary and imperial American presidency. 
   
Regarding “one person cannot solve all problems,” the American theory of the unitary executive and, moreover, the imperial presidency can be challenged. The unitary executive means that one person as president is better than a presidential council, for example. In a council, it may be difficult to reach a final decision, which is a drawback especially in times of emergency. Hence, the president's role as commander in chief has been tied to the unitary executive model. However, the emergency card has, I submit, been overplayed. A better reason is that a final say may be needed on contending military plans, but a council's majority could be taken. Most importantly, one person can be wrong, even in military matters. Would President George W. Bush have been able to link Iraq to the attack on September 11, 2001 and thus invade the country and occupy it for years had a presidential council have had to sign off? To be sure, only Congress can declare war, for it is a conflict of interest for the commander in chief to do so. Yet the fact that such commanders have been able to unilaterally begin military engagements means that the problem of one person being wrong should be taken seriously.  

The imperial presidency refers to the increase in presidential power in the twentieth century in the U.S. This has been at the expense not only of Congress, but also the state governments, given the federal power of preemption. In proposing laws, the president depends theoretically on Congressional leaders to steer the legislation through the lawmaking machinery. Should the Congress pass an alternative, the president can veto it, yet this does not mean the president's own proposal becomes law. So, constitutionally, the relationship seems balanced, and ample opportunity for voices exists. Even so, the president has an edge on Congress in that the latter goes on recesses whereas the West Wing is always working (though the same could be said of congressional staffs). So more to the point, the president is nearly always in the spotlight--relative even to individual senators--and thus can mold public opinion. 

Given the increased power of the presidency, it can be argued that too much power has come to be in the hands of one person. Human nature may not handle wielding so much power very well. The Stanford experiments in the 1960's on the abuse of power testify to the problem. Whereas the presidency may have a figure head without running into this problem, spreading out the power may fit better with how humans are constituted, especially those humans who suffer from ailments such as malignant narcissism. A presidential council could put a check on such a person, especially if he tends to lose control of his urges of the moment at the risk of the reputation, at least, of the presidency and the U.S.  

Disassociating the presidency from "one person" could also disspell any associated hero worship that has held on from ancient king-worship.  This tendency is evinced not just when a president is sworn in, but also when he gives the State of the Union address. Contributing to the problem, the media obsesses on his every move, including what he is doing on vacation.  

1. Michael Slackman, "Jordan's King Remakes His Government," The New York Times, December 22, 2009. 

Should Health Care Be a Right?

In the Spring of 2019, President Trump promised that a Republican alternative to "Obamacare" would soon be unveiled; the majority leader of the U.S. Senate, Mitch McConnell, quickly informed the president that the prospects of such legislation passing the Democratic-controlled U.S. House were zilch. This virtually guaranteed that health care would be play a salient role in the upcoming 2020 presidential race. The underlying question, I submit, has been whether health care ought to be a right, which the government would be obligated to ensure. Such a right would obviously not be one of those that hold government back (e.g., the right to liberty). Whether a right ensured by government or holding government back, the nature of a right is such that it is to be respected by others, whether individuals, organizations, or the state. Such respect, being an obligation, constrains those others. Hence, health care as a right has been controversial in the U.S. 
The Senior US Senator from Illinois, Dick Durbin, said the following just before one of the votes in December, 2009 on the Affordable Care Act, the health-care insurance reform legislation initiated by President Obama: “Thirty million Americans who currently don’t have health insurance  have the peace of mind of knowing that they have health insurance,” Mr. Durbin said. He added, “This is a real debate over whether or not health care is going to be a right or a privilege in America.”[1] By using the word, privilege, Sen. Durbin was implying that having access to health care on the sole basis of whether a person has money is unfair. 
If being wealthy is a good indication of being worthy of survival, then it may be assumed that health care for all, whether through private, non-profit, or government insurance, would undermine survival of the fittest. This in turn takes fit to mean strong or good. Were the humans in the financial sector before the financial crisis of 2008 strong or good? Does not fraud point to an underlying weakness? When Dick Fuld was CEO of Lehman Brothers before it collapsed, was he a strong leader or a pitiful man whose ambition got the best of him? 
In "survival of the fittest," fit has to do with fitting in with a changed environment. Such fitness, or fit, is on nature's terms rather than necessarily according to our notions of strong and good. For instance, a young drug dealer in a large city may have twelve "baby mamas." This means that the man had impregnated twelve women, who had been attracted to him on some basis that they valued. The sheer number of offspring suggests that the man was successful in reproducing himself; he thus fit well in his environment on this nauralistic basis. If survival of the fittest lies the availability of health care, should that man be covered while a poor religious man who has contributed to society without earning much money or having children should not? 

See also "Congressional Cuts to Foodstamps: Violating a Human Right?"

1. David Herszenhorn and Robert Pear, "Parties Stay United as Health Bill Clears Steps in Senate," The New York Times, December 22, 2009.

Sunday, March 31, 2019

Undermining the Dodd-Frank Act: An Incessant Desire for Profit

In the Dodd-Frank financial reform Act of 2010, financial firms in the U.S. are required to set aside higher reserves to cover losses on trades of securities, including those that “swap” the risk of default of a given security, such as bonds based on subprime mortgages. Almost immediately, the Wall Street bankers set about minimizing the new hindrance.  
Traders in the banks set about getting around the “margin requirements” by treating the “swaps” as futures, which do not require the higher reserves in Dodd-Frank. Whereas a futures contract for corn to sell at a certain price limits residual risk, swapping the risk of the default of an investment puts a party on the line for the entire investment. Moreover, unlike futures contracts, swaps have significant systemic risk because claims can all be made at once, overwhelming the parties assuming the liability in the swaps (e.g. AIG in September 2008). 
Managers at Wall Street firms have tended to not only minimize safeguards even though they protect the banks (from themselves), but also discount or even dismiss such high-risk, low-probability outcomes as come with risk to a bank as well as the entire financial system (i.e., systemic risk). Meanwhile, less money held in reserve means more money available to be lent or put into high-risk investments such subprime mortgages or bonds based bundles of such high-risk mortgages. 
Accordingly, the gradual trajectory already as of the beginning of 2013 was toward yet another systemic collapse of the financial system should enough housing markets take a down turn. “As the market gravitates to the cheaper platform—and it’s cheaper because it’s unsafe—that creates risk for everyone,” said James Cawley, CEO of trade execution firm Javelin Capital Markets.[1]  Put another way, market participants were operating according to the greatest profit, the greater risk notwithstanding. “In a distress scenario, you basically have what you had from AIG in 2008,” Cawley said; “Then someone has to step in, and we all know who that someone is: the U.S. taxpayer.”[2] So the question at the time was perhaps whether the SEC had the taxpayer’s back or was reflective of, or enabling a cozy revolving door between the federal government and Wall Street firms.
To be sure, the Volcker Rule, part of the Dodd-Frank Act, would, unless weakened, bar banks from short-term proprietary trading (i.e., on their own accounts, except for market-making), and from taking ownership states in private equity funds and hedge funds. U.S. Senator John Hatch speaking at Jack Lew’s confirmation hearing in early 2013 raised the question of whether Lew would act as U.S. Secretary of State to constrain banks’ risky proprietary trading, given that he had headed units at Citigroup that were involved in just such practices that would violate the Volcker Rule. 
Jack Lew at his confirmation hearing for U.S. Treasury Secretary. Lew had been the chief operating officer at units at Citibank.     NPR
Lew had been the COO of Alternative Investments at Citi. MAT and Falcon investment funds were sold as low-risk even though those funds were actually hedge funds with high risk.  As COO, Lew refused to offer the misled customers full refunds.  At least fourteen arbitration panels subsequently gave the customers the full refunds they had sought. Although he had not been involved in selling the funds, he did manage units that engaged in risky proprietary trading. The public would be justified in wondering if they too would be left on the hook as taxpayers rather than protected should Lew favor Wall Street's incessant desire for profit over the government's role to place that desire in check for the good of the system/whole.
After Lew, during President Trump's first term, the Federal Reserve Bank voted unanimously in late May, 2018 to weaken the Volcker Rule. The move was consistent with the president's desire to deregulate Wall Street. The flip side of the move that would enhance Wall Street profits was that the government would be doing less to protect the financial system as a whole even though the systemic risk of the largest five banks had increased with their growth. As Senator Dick Durbin had said after the financial crisis when people were looking to Congress to protect even the banks from themselves, “Congress is owned by the banking lobby.” So looking to the legislative branch should the executive be in sync with Wall Street's financial interests may not play well. Even after semi-stringent regulatory constraints have been passed, Wall Street can still have the edge in circumventing or mollifying the speed-bumps even though they are in the bank's own long-term interest, which can come to roust even in the short term as in 2008.

See Essays on the Financial Crisis, available at Amazon.

1. Eleazar Melendez, “Wall Street Setting Itself Up For Next Derivatives Crisis, Market Participants Warn,” The Huffington Post, February 14, 2013.
2. Ibid.