Showing posts with label market bubbles. Show all posts
Showing posts with label market bubbles. Show all posts

Monday, February 11, 2019

Is Modest Growth vs. Full Employment a False Dichotomy?

As Summer slid into Autumn in 2012, the Chinese government was giving no hint of any ensuing economic stimulus program. This was more than slightly unnerving for some, as a recent manufacturing survey had slumped more than expected, to 49.2 in August. A score of 50 separated expansion from contraction. A similar survey, by HSBC, came in at 47.6, down from 49.3 the previous month. Bloomberg suggested that China might face a recession in the third quarter. So why no stimulus announcement?  Was the Chinese government really just one giant tease? I submit that the false dichotomy of moderate economic growth and full employment was in play. In short, the Chinese government did not want to over-heat even a stagnant economy even though the assumption was that full employment would thus not be realizable.

Wang Tao, an economist at UBS, explained the “very reactionary, cautious approach” as being motivated by the desire to avoid repeating the “excesses of last time.”[1] The stimulus policy in the wake of the 2008 global downturn had sparked inflation and caused a housing bubble in China. According to The New York Times, China was avoiding “measures that could reignite another investment binge of the sort that sent prices for property and other assets soaring in 2009 and 2010.”[2] A repeat of any such binge could not be good, for it can spark the sort of irrational excitement that have a life of its own.
In short, too much stimulus in an economy can cause inflation and put people’s homes at risk of foreclosure once the housing bubble bursts, whereas a lack of stimulus means that a moderate growth rate is likely, rather one that could give rise to full employment. Is there no way out of this trade-off? 
Keeping fiscal or monetary stimulus within projections of a moderate growth can occur with more government spending targeted to a combination of giving private employers a financial incentive to hire more people and increasing the number of people hired by state enterprises. In principle with the Full Employment Act of the U.S. in 1946, a government can see that anyone who wants a job has one, while still maintaining a moderate stimulus. A modest growth-rate can co-exist with full employment. 

1, Bettina Wassener, “As Growth Flags, China Shies From Stimulus,” The New York Times, September 3, 2012. 
2. Ibid.

Sunday, January 6, 2019

Wall Street Snuffed Out President Clinton's Goal of Homeownership for the Poor

It is one thing for the head of a government (or a government’s executive arm) to set a praiseworthy goal that is in the public interest, and quite another thing to rely on the financial sector to implement it. Finance has its own means tied to its own goals, with plenty of greed in the mix. Governmental officials may tend to minimize the potential damage from ego-laden greed to the goals of public policy. Such policy ideally strives for the good of the whole, whereas the goals of a private sector of a part. This could account, at least in part, for the financial crisis of 2008 and the continuing bear market in housing in much of the U.S.
According to The Wall Street Journal, housing prices had fallen for 57 consecutive months by May 2011.[1] Even though the recession had officially ended in June 2009, the real estate market still had yet to hit bottom.[2] Since the housing peak in 2006, home values nationally were down 29.5 percent, according to Zillow.com. Compared to the same time in 2010, prices were down 8.2 percent in the U.S. markets. In that year, house price depreciation had slowed or stabilized because of tax credits of up to $8000 that expired during that summer. Accordingly, negative equity became even more prevalent in the first quarter of 2011, when 28.4 percent of all single-family homes with mortgages were "underwater."[3] Monthly declines for February and March were "really staggering," according to Stan Humphries, Zillow's chef economist. He claimed that the declines reflected "the true underlying demand," which was "being completely overwhelmed by supply."[4] Fannie and Freddie sold more than 94,000 foreclosed houses in the quarter; this represents 23% more than in the previous quarter.[5] The increase in supply from the foreclosures was at relatively low prices, hence the impact on the market was particularly depressing.
A declining housing price translates into lost wealth for the homeowner. When home values decline, the values of mortgages often do not go down as well. Homeowners lose some of their equity, or the stake they have in their home. When equity becomes negative—that is to say, when the value of a mortgage exceeds the value of the property—homeowners become especially vulnerable to default and foreclosure. “Falling home prices can create a vicious cycle. When a property falls into foreclosure, it tends to depress the values of properties around it, making those homes more likely to experience a similar fate. [In 2010], nearly 2.9 million homes received a foreclosure filing, and more than 2.8 million homes got one in 2009.” based on the data provider RealtyTrac.[6] More foreclosures further reduced the value of residential mortgage-based securities, which in turn reduced the asset-values and returns of companies and individuals investing in the CDOs (collateralized debt obligations) worldwide. This investment asset essentially has mortgage-borrowers pay the holders of the respective CDOs, whose value is thus based on the value of the underlying mortgages.
Problematically, the holders of the CDOs, not the originator of the mortgage, assumed the risk that the mortgage borrowers might stop their mortgage payments. The mortgage servicers had sold their mortgages to an investment bank such as Lehman Brothers, which in turn would pass the then-securitized mortgage-based bonds on to investors such as Deutsche Bank and the two major banks of Iceland. Neither companies such as New Century (or Countrywide) nor investment banks like Lehman would face any risk unless they happened to be holding a significant number of the risky mortgages (or real estate) when the merry-go-round finally stopped in 2008.
Countrywide was bought up by Bank of America (by Ken Lewis, CEO at the time) and Lehman Brothers went bankrupt. Both Lewis and Dick Fuld (of Lehman) could be said to be empire-builders—meaning expansion at virtually any expense and even as an end itself. Pure ego plus greed. New Century and Lehman both assumed that they would never get caught with their pants down holding toxic mortgages. They were both wrong—oh so wrong. To be so wrong and yet blame the consumers is, at the very least, bad form.
Unfortunately, the housing market was “plagued by scandal” in the first quarter of 2011.[7] Homeowners and investors filed “numerous lawsuits alleging that big banks misplaced or even faked crucial mortgage documents.” After it was “revealed that companies that processed foreclosures signed thousands of documents daily without even reading them, potentially violating the law, some of the biggest banks temporarily halted their foreclosure proceedings” in the fall of 2010.[8] I suspect, however, that the failure of the underwriters (and compliance folks) is a red herring; most of the sub-prime residential mortgages required no documents proving income or even a job, and many of those mortgage applications contained lies known or even encouraged by the brokers. Not unexpectedly, the brokers and borrowers have differed on whether the latter should be expected to have resisted the, “It’s ok, really. Trust me,” from the “professionals.” In any case, the (in many cases) first-time homeowners were used, and the greed of the mortgage producers was ultimately behind it.
The claim, for example, made by some mortgage brokers and Wall Street securitization arrangers that the borrowers should have somehow known better than to sign low- or no-document subprime mortgages with steep ARM resets of up to double-digit interest rates is more than just disingenuous; the brokers had assured the potential homeowners that the inevitable increase in home equity appreciation from the rising housing market would give them the 20 percent equity stake that was necessary at the time to refinance into a fixed mortgages at a decent, constant interest rate. The brokers did not care whether the borrowers enabling the double commissions could make the higher ARM (adjustable rate mortgage) payments in case they might kick in. One might even say that the system was rigged by the mortgage-producing companies such as Countrywide at the expense of first-time mortgage-borrowers. Preying on the newbies, in other words, could characterize the system’s basis. Of course, such preying is unethical, for it puts others in harm’s way unless the prey should have known better, which I dispute. In short, it was not a fair fight when the harm came as even AAA-rated subprime (i.e., risky) mortgage-based CDOs ruptured in the financial crisis of 2008. 
In conclusion, although Clinton’s goal of putting poor people in their own homes had been laudable, constructing ARM mortgages with resets that low income people could not afford and relying on a rising market to obviate them was a recipe for years of a bear housing market. In other words, the system that the financial world established blocked Clinton’s goal from being sustainable, and thus achieved. Of course, Wall Street was not in the game to do Clinton’s bidding; finance had its own goals, which went on through two terms of George W. Bush in the White House. In retrospect, Clinton should have used government regulation to establish a viable system in sync with the goal rather than allow his henchmen—most notable Alan Greenspan at the Federal Reserve, Robert Rubin, Secretary of the Treasury, and Larry Summers also of the Treasury, to push Congress to keep the CDOs unregulated. In other words, Clinton, in trying to position himself in the political middle, followed Carter in adopting a deregulatory position even as it ultimately rendered his laudable goal unattainable and even reckless.



1. Nick Timiraaos and Dawn Wotapka, "Home Market Takes a Tumble," The Wall Street Journal, May 9, 2011, pp. A1-A2.

2. William Alden, “Home Prices Fall Again in Biggest Drop since 2008,” The Huffington Post, May 9, 2011.


3. Ibid.


4. Nick Timiraaos and Dawn Wotapka, "Home Market Takes a Tumble," The Wall Street Journal, May 9, 2011, pp. A1-A2.


5. Ibid.


6. William Alden, “Home Prices Fall Again in Biggest Drop since 2008,” The Huffington Post, May 9, 2011.


7. Ibid.


8.Ibid.

Tuesday, October 18, 2016

A Housing Bubble in China: A Rationale for Government Intervention

As of October, 2016, China was in the midst of a dizzying housing bubble. A month before, “economists at the Bank of China warned in a report that worsening asset price bubbles were adding to a frothy market that could result in trouble.”[1] Shanghai’s average housing price was up nearly one-third from a year before; prices in major cities like Beijing and Guangzhou were not far behind.[2] The recognition of the bubble—which does not come easily—should have triggered counter-cyclical measures by the Chinese government.

For example, the government could have increased the minimum requirements for down-payments and even increased tax on purchases of additional properties to counter the impact of speculators. Rumors alone of these measures was enough in 2016 for many couples to file for divorce “so that one partner could still be treated as an independent buyer” so as to be able to buy additional properties as investments.[3] That people would go to such an extreme based on rumors points to how carried-away market bubbles can get. For this reason, increasing the minimal down-payment and associated taxes even on a couple’s purchase of one property may not be excessive.

Adding to the difficulty in curtailing the boom was the “growing amount of American-style debt.”[4] Long-term household loans (mostly mortgages) doubled as a share of total official bank lending in 2016 through mid-October. In August, the loans accounted for about 40 percent of all new loans, contrasted with just 20 percent at the start of the year. The value of new home-loans as a percentage of all housing sales surged to a record high. Underground lenders were also feeding the boom. Unfortunately, the loans facilitated the role of speculators in the market, whom I submit play a crucial role in any market-bubble.

Unfortunately, the loans stemmed from the lending oriented to keeping the Chinese economy growing. As long as the government wanted to use leverage as a fiscal stimulus for the economy, clamping down on bubble-facilitating, long-term loans could only be difficult at best. Hence the need for tightened government-regulations making the loans less easy to get, especially but not limited to additional properties. One challenge for regulators in such a context is to enable the poor to become homeowners even as unnecessary home-buying is stymied until the bubble has been shrunk.  In other words, regulators should have distinguished home-ownership as a basic human right (and in this sense not a commodity) from home-ownership as an investment—and these two in turn from overall economic growth.



1. Neil Gough and Carolyn Zhang, “In China, Property Frenzy, Fake Divorces and a Bloating Bubble,” The New York Times, October 16, 2016.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.

Thursday, April 12, 2012

Facebook Devours Instagram: Buying a Product

Reporters can easily get carried away in characterizing mergers and acquisitions in business.Regarding eBay buying PayPal in 2002 for $1.5 billion, Google purchasing YouTube in 2006 for $1.65 billion, and Facebook acquiring Instagram in 2012 for $1 billion, expanding in the technology sector can be viewed as buying technology as a product rather than acquiring another company. Accordingly, the fact that Instagram had not earned any revenue is irrelevant. 

The full essay is at "Taking the Face Off Facebook."

Tuesday, March 22, 2011

On the Irrational Exuberance of a Market's Bubble: The Tech Industry

I contend that the degree of uncertainty related to the expectation of future profits in the social media companies means that that industry ought to be treated by investors as if it were in a bubble, even if it turns out that the expectations were spot on. That is to say, investors should buy in lightly, and supported by a diversified portfolio. So perhaps the question of whether the industry is in a bubble is not as vital as the media may suppose; the extent of uncertainty, which was clearly evident for instance in LinkedIn's trading at 540 times its prior year's profit, is itself a factor not to take lightly. So call it bubble or not, the difference between known and expected revenues is itself worthy of consideration, and when that difference is significant, the wise and prudent investor naturally treads lightly, even if it seems that others may make out like bandits.

On March 17, 2011, USA Today observed, “Tech and Internet stocks turned into bad words after the dot-com bust in 2000. But the get-rich-quick feelings toward tech are back. . . . Given the near-hysteria about promising but largely unproven companies, investment [practitioners] warn that things could start getting out of hand.” So why did the government not step in and stop it from going so far and then crashing?  This is easier said than done. Beyond the difficulties in having regulators intercede to stop transactions that may be necessary to avert a party from bankruptcy, the sheer ambiguity in ascertaining whether a bubble does in fact exist can have a paralyzing effect. "It's a boom, not a bubble, when you hear the sound of dynamite profits," according to Bing Gordon, a partner at a venture-capital firm and a board member of social-gaming company Zynga, which was valued at $9 billion in March of 2011.

However, a big boom can explode in a giant bust; Gordon’s distinction doesn’t carry much water. Neither does that of Geoff Yang, a founding partner of Redpoint Ventures. "There is effervescence, but no bubble." Effervescence can manifest, however, as an attribute of the sort of irrational exuberance that characterizes bubbles. That the market mechanism not only does not temper, but may even magnify the volatility from, this all-too-human psychology, whether in pushing a “boom” or “bubble,” is the real problem. Government regulation will not be able to effectively pull up this root until its nature is uncovered. In the meantime, we are left with the problem of discerning whether a bubble can even be identified as it is expanding. Consider, for example, Facebook in 2010.

In 2010, Facebook had about $2 billion in revenue according to USA TodayMSNBC puts the company’s profit for that year at $600 million. Facebook was being valued at $75 billion, based on private transactions from the SharesPost market. If an accurate valuation, USA Today claimed that “this would make the social-media upstart more valuable than Disney.” It would also mean that Facebook had a price-earnings ratio (P/E) of 125.  This essentially means that higher future profits were expected.  The average P/E ratio for the technology sector was about 25, making 125 extraordinarily high.  This could be taken as being indicative of irrational exuberance,  as one typically compares a company’s number with the average of its sector.

However, the technology sector was quite broad at the time, and one would expect companies on the forefront like Google, Yahoo and Facebook to have much higher numbers than other companies in the sector. Even a very high P/E ratio for such companies relative to a sector’s average does not necessary point to there being a bubble. However, even lesser-known companies, such as Color (a photo-sharing and social-networking start-up) was being valued at around $100 million by venture firms even though the company had an untested product in a crowded market. According to The Economist, competition among angel investors has helped drive up valuations of social-media start-ups by more than 50% from May 2010 to May 2011.

Furthermore, in March of 2011 USA Today claimed, “Even big companies are said to be drinking the Internet Kool-Aid. There is speculation that Google and Facebook have considered bidding as much as $10 billion for online microblogging service Twitter.”  In December of 2010 according to USA Today, “The New York Times reported that Twitter was valued at $3.7 billion after a funding round. In March of the following year, it was pegged at about $7.2 billion, according to SharesPost.” The sheer variance between these figures indicates high risk, but this did not seem to bother those drinking the kool-aid. Such psychology is a red-flag that a bubble is likely in the works. It is like a tornado watch: conditions are right for one to form.

The risk can be seen by uncovering fallacies in the way the private tech companies are valued. According to USA Today, “Until companies finally go public and the stocks actively trade on major exchanges, the small and relatively thin trading on private markets sets the price. . . .  Private marketplaces, including SecondMarket and SharesPost, allow owners of shares of private companies such as Digg, Facebook, Zynga and Twitter to sell to high-net-worth individuals and institutions. Typically, the sellers are employees at these firms looking to cash in on shares they've received. And the buyers are sophisticated investors who understand they could lose their entire investment. These online services provide a way for employees to sell their shares now rather than waiting for an IPO that may never occur. However, with the great power that such marketplaces offer comes confusion. Many of the valuations put on companies are overinflated based on limited sales of shares occurring on the relatively small markets. . . . Before long, estimates for the value of popular Internet companies can soar.” In short, one should not generalize from a highly particularized market to project a total market value because there are unique dynamics going on in that market that would not apply were the firm listed on the NYSE.

Crucially, the generalization is in the direction of overstating; hence, it can camouflage irrational exuberance while feeding it. Therefore, risk is increased by how private companies are restrictively “traded” even as the risk is cloaked—making it even more dangerous. “Given such huge risks, the level of the public's infatuation with shares of privately held Internet companies is again taking on a feel of a mania, Gary Freedman, securities lawyer, said, according to USA TodayHe noted that several ingredients that inflate bubbles were all present, including a broad acceptance of the companies' products.  Intensifying the distortion, according to him, was the fact that there was very little financial information on these private companies. "It's the same mania," he claimed. "Markets are cyclical. It's really no different than looking at the Internet bust and the housing market." Lest one conclude from this a slam-dunk case, USA Today pointed out that the not all of the practitioners were on board.  That is to say, there was serious difference on whether there was any bubble at all.

USA Today represented the other side as follows: “proponents of the next breed of Internet companies say the valuations aren't absurd this time because the companies have fundamentals behind them. ‘We're talking about real companies with real revenue and real profit,’ says Jeremy Smith of SecondMarket. A major shift in technology is bound to create companies with massive market values, the proponents say. The emergence of social media (more than 500 million accounts on Facebook alone), combined with mobile phone use (4.5 billion), is disrupting all of technology, so giant winners are to be expected, say venture-capitalists such as Cohler and Yang. ‘I think this boom is going to last awhile,’ Ted Schlein, a managing partner at KPCB, averred. ‘The trend lines are unlike anything we've seen in history,’ He says the enormous size of the social and mobile Internet market — tens of billions of people — dwarfs the markets for the fledgling Internet (billions) and personal computers (hundreds of millions), putting companies such as Facebook, Twitter and Zynga in prime position to strike it rich in IPOs. ‘This is just the beginning of a big market run,’ says Tim Draper, founder of a venture-capital firm.” John O'Farrell, a partner with Andreessen Horowitz, a venture capital firm that owns stakes in Facebook, Twitter, Zynga and Groupon agreed. “These are serious businesses with huge global market opportunities ahead of them. To an uninformed person, the valuations may look like a bubble, but we believe they will in fact prove to be very low valuations.”


Indeed, LinkedIn’s IPO on May 19, 2011 shot up immediately, more than doubling from the company’s initial pricing at $45. The IPO began at $83 and was over $100 (up around 140%) at noon. That's 540 times the company's 2010 net income! That valuation of an internet company was the largest since Google’s IPO in 2004. According to the Associated Press on the day of the IPO, “Renaissance Capital, an IPO research and investment firm, said LinkedIn's 84 percent increase at the market opening Thursday was the biggest for a U.S. IPO since the 2009 debut of OpenTable Inc., a restaurant reservations website. IPO analyst Scott Sweet, the founder of IPO Boutique, credits the increase to LinkedIn selling a relatively small number of shares, 7.8 million. [However,] (t)he demand reflects investors' belief that Internet services that connect people with common interests will be able to make more money as the Web's audience steadily expands.” This seems to be the question regarding any social media bubble; namely, will the internet audience continue to expand such that anticipated revenue increases from advertising and premium packages will beBusiness Insider

To be sure, the emergence of social media had been a huge phenomenon in defining or characterizing daily life in the first decade of the twenty-first century. Anything so big would tend to attract a lot of money. Even so, the P/E ratios were at nosebleed territory.  Facebook’s ratio of 125, for example, harkened back to the dot.coms in the 1990s. Like a jet that steeply climbs after take-off and then eventually levels off, the social media companies could not be expected to continue their climb forever; they were bound to level off at some point, and then the extended boom would be truncated or even turned to a bust if the market gets stung by the high P/E ratios.

The question seems to be whether too much stock is placed on the expectation of future profit. For example, in June 2011, Groupon filed to go public in an IPO that could value the company at as much as $20 billion, according to The Wall Street Journal. The company was only two and a half years old at the time, with a loss of $413.4 million in 2010 and another $113.9 million in the first quarter of 2011. With revenues during the quarter of $644.7 million, the company's management could make the argument that it was investing for future expansion and profitability. Even so, it could be argued that it is the extent of expectation that renders the company's valuation part of a bubble.

In fact, a bubble can be defined as an expectation of an “extended boom.” The “bubble” lies in the difference between the expectation and the reality that even such a boom is apt to end. The more things change, the more they stay the same. The next bubble is always said to be something different—something new—even as it is easy to relate it back to the last one. Identifying a bubble in progress with some degree of consensus does not seem to be likely. Were such identification even probable, what would government regulators do to let the air out of the balloon? Limit how high LinkedIn’s price could soar on the morning of its IPO? Prohibit LBOs if the price seems too high?

If Facebook, itself iffy with a P/E ratio of 125, wants to buy Twitter for $10 billion even though the latter had been valued at just over $3 billion a few months before, would blocking the purchase lessen the bubble? Were Twitter in trouble in spite of its growing presumed market value, would its bankruptcy take the air out of the bubble only to provoke a recession?  The aim of the regulators would have to be to release air from the balloon without triggering a recession (which is the downside of a bubble anyway). If anything is clear, it is that much more knowledge is needed for the market to be managed, let alone designed, so bubbles are identified and depressed before doing so could do harm to an economy as a whole. In the meantime, we can expect bubbles to top up because markets are susceptible to the human psychology of irrational exuberance. Such a condition is not surprising; what is astonishing is the human propensity to engage in denial while being completely blind to it even as it is in progress.


Sources:

Jon Swartz and Matt Krantz, "Is a New Tech Bubble Starting to Grow?" USA Today, March 16, 2011.
Nicholas Carlson, "Facebook 2010 Profit? Try $600 Million," MSNBC.com,
Michael Liedtke, "LinkedIn IPO Price Jumps Up Value to Over $4 Billion," The Huffington Post, May 17, 2011.
The Associated Press, "LinkedIn Shares More Than Double in NYSE Debut," CNBC.com, May 19, 2011.
The Economist, "Another Digital Gold Rush," May 14, 2011, pp. 85-87.
Anupreeta Das and Geoffrey A. Fowler, "Groupon to Gauge Limits of IPO Mania,The Wall Street Journal, June 3, 2011, p. A1.