Both the filibuster in the
U.S. Senate and the veto in the European Council reflect the act that the respective
states were sovereign and retain a portion of that governmental sovereignty
that has not been delegated to the respective Unions. But whereas the American
filibuster is compatible with a federal system based on dual-sovereignty
(states and union), the European veto is not; rather, each state having a veto is
at home in a confederation, which is characterized by the states retaining
their sovereignty rather than having given up some in becoming a state. In April
2026 shortly after Viktor Orbán had lost his bid for re-election in the E.U. state
of Hungary, the E.U.’s foreign minister argued publicly that the states’ veto
in the European Council (and the Council of Ministers) runs contrary to the
democratic principle of majority rule. The prerogative of retained and residual
governmental sovereignty was essentially being pitted against a fundamental principle
of democracy.
Kaja Kallas, the E.U.’s
foreign minister, castigated the requirement of unanimity in the European
Council (in competencies, or enumerated powers, in which qualified majority
voting does not apply) because the votes of 26 state governments can be hijacked
by a single holdout. Her assumption is that majority-rule rather than the rule
by one (holdout) is fundamental to democracy, whether direct or representative.
Referring to the vetoes that had been exercised by the then-outgoing governor
of the E.U. state of Hungary, Viktor Orbán, Kallas pointed out that the Council
doing what only one state wants, “not what the 26 [others] want . . . is not
really democracy.”[1] In
fact, one-state rule can be thought of as autocratic rather than democratic. If
so, then it follows that the remainder of sovereignty retained by the states as
veto power is antithetical to democracy. Although both principles are valid
in a federal system characterized by dual-sovereignty rather than all sovereignty
being retained by the states, I contend that a sufficient recognition of the
retained sovereignty of the states lies in the voting method by qualified
majority, and furthermore, that such a method is not in conflict with democracy
because even a super-majority is majority rule.
To be sure, the E.U.’s basic (constitutional,
or government framework) law provides “a legal pathway to move from unanimity
to qualified majority voting. However, . . . such a shift itself requires unanimous
consent.”[2]
Such a blatant “Catch 22” suggests that the state governments were exploiting a
conflict of interest in devising and approving the pathway as if they were
states in a confederation, which, unlike modern federalism, according to
Kenneth Wheare’s Federal Government, involves no transfer of limited
sovereignty (i.e., enumerated powers) to the federal level. That the hamstringing
non-qualified-majority-vote policy and legislation at the federal level could easily
have been foreseen indicates a proclivity to put the interests of their own
states, and the states altogether, above federal initiatives for the good of
the whole, which is more than merely the sum of the parts. In fact, the veto
itself may imply that the whole is merely such a sum.
Qualified-majority voting
enables sufficient unity at the level of the whole and enables the federal
level to exercise its exclusive and shared competencies, or powers. Kallas said,
“we need to be united and able to take decisions.”[3]
So unity should not be so total that decisions cannot be taken and implemented
at the federal level, which consists not only of the European Council (and the
Council of Ministers), but also the Commission, Parliament, and supreme court (i.e.,
the ECJ), which are not so beholden to state-level interests that can differ
from the interests of the whole, as represented by the Union.
The counter-argument made by
Charles Michel (interestingly at the time of Kallas’s interview) in favor of keeping
the veto in the Council that he had chaired from 2019 to 2024 is spurious. Firstly,
he undercut his argument against the pressing need to shelve the veto mechanism
by predicting that the European Council would be not be more unified on Ukraine
following Orbán’s departure because other governors “share elements of his political
stance, including on Ukraine.”[4]
Slovakia, for instance, could easily step into Orbán’s shoes. This prediction makes
Kallas’ point even more urgent!
Michel went on to claim that “the ‘European Dream’ depends on collective agreement among all 27 member states.”[5] Such would be the case were the E.U. a confederation of sovereign states, such as the Articles of Confederation were as the treaty made by the sovereign countries forming the U.S. until 1789, but the E.U.’s federal level enjoys exclusive and a shared-portion of competencies, or enumerated powers, and such sovereignty does not depend on unanimity at the state level because the states are not fully sovereign. The political-type category mistake in which a modern federal system of dual sovereignty is supposed to be a confederation was ultimately responsible for why Britain seceded from the Union; as prime minister, David Cameron mischaracterized the E.U. as but one of the “networks” of which Britain had joined. It is no wonder that a significant number of the Brits chaffed at even the limited governmental sovereignty that the E.U. itself enjoyed at the expense of full state sovereignty.
Michel’s “European dream” involves
yet another problematic claim. “If you stop trying to involve every [state],”
he said, “you risk weakening the EU’s weight on the international stage.”[6]
This statement incorrectly assumes that any state on the losing end of a
qualified-majority vote in the Council is not involved in the process, and that
the E.U.’s very credibility on the world stage is not undercut when one state
hinders federal action in foreign and defense affairs. Even as Russia continued
to invade Ukraine for over four years, that the E.U. could not support Ukraine
militarily made the Europeans look weak and unprincipled on such an obvious
case of unprovoked military invasion.
Moreover, I dispute Michel’s
utopian fantasy that 27 governors of states with differing interests, both
economic and geopolitical, will nonetheless be unanimous enough on specific
federal policy and legislative proposals for the principle of unanimity to be viable
(i.e., workable enough) for the E.U. to exercise its own competencies that are
subject to unanimity. Put another way, for the states to have delegated a
significant amount of governmental sovereignty to the E.U. and yet selfishly,
as per state-specific interests, to hold onto unanimity on many important
matters being considered in the federal-level councils constitutes wanting to
have one’s cake and eat it too. Such a capricious mentality does not deserve
credibility on the world’s stage.
To be sure, Michel warned
against governors misusing (to excess) the veto-power of their respective states
in the Council, noting that the veto should only be used as it was intended to
be used, “only when vital [state] interests are at stake.”[7]
Given that the authority has been up to the governors themselves whether to use
their power, however, an expansionist wielding of the vetoes should have been
anticipated at Lisbon. Besides over-valuing even petty interests, as if they
should outweigh the interests of the whole (Union), governors could easily
invent such interests in solidarity with a foreign foe of the E.U. and thus
undercut the Union itself on the world stage. I am referring here to Orbán’s relationship
with Russia’s President Putin—Orbán even went to Moscow, undercutting President
Von der Leyen’s policy against Putin’s militaristic aggression unprovoked in
Ukraine.
The Von der Leyen
administration was wise in looking outward to the credibility of the E.U. and
its long-term functioning as a federal rather than state-centric system of
governance, whereas Michel was entrenched in a status quo premised on fallacious
arguments and even a category mistake. Ironically, for the need to expunge the
veto-power from the federal-level councils after the departure of Orbán
to still be felt as pressing, Michel’s prediction of no increase in
cohesion among the governors was significant. Unfortunately, as an impetus to
even needed political reform, the abstraction of a prediction pales in comparison
to the actual use of vetoes, such as Orbán’s veto of the loan to Ukraine.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Angela Skujins, “European Council Should “Think Carefully” before Removing Unanmity, Says Michel,” Euronews.com, 24 April, 2026.
5. Ibid.; italics added for emphasis.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
