Anna Hazare: A Modern Incarnation of Gandhi?

On August 21, 2011 in New Delhi, India, tens of thousands marched in support of Anna Hazare, then in the sixth day of his hunger strike in support of the Jan Lokpal anti-corruption bill. He told the crowd, “Even if the prime minister comes, I will not withdraw my hunger strike until the [bill] is passed in the Parliament. I can die but I will not bend.”[1] What a unique and intriguing statement! To be sure, the man's “professed unwillingness to compromise,” as well as his “occasionally belligerent tone, . . . attracted criticism.”[2] Even so, he inspired mainly hope, particularly from the young. His main constituency, however, was the middle class, who felt alienated and unfairly treated. Hazare self-consciously embraced the model of Gandhi. That model, including the principled unbending, is no stranger in India, yet I am surprised that it took until 2011 for a societal figure so Gandhi-like to emerge and galvanize a mass protest using Gandhi’s methods. Of course, the likeness between the two men could be overstated. How much like Gandhi was Hazare and his political action? For example, would Gandhi have stopped eating simply out of preference for one of two bills before the Parliament? Putting a stop to widespread violence is arguably much more significant than reducing corruption. Also, the demand that conduct be changed is more direct than that a law be enacted unless to abolish an unjust one. 

                              

The uncompromising rectitude plays out differently in the two cases  Gandhi's underlying moral concern made his unwillingness to compromise laudable. Such stubbornness can fall on its face in a legislative context in which political compromise is inherent to the process. In appealing directly to the people for their malicious behavior to stop, Gandhi sidestepped the incrementalism of legislative politics. 

For a refusal to compromise to be a virtue, some pretty convincing principles must be at stake and a clear distinction must be drawn. In other words, a serious moral wrong must be involved. Typically, such a wrong involves great human suffering. Wide-scale  corruption, especially if it involves extortion of the poor and middle class incurs human suffering, but arguably not that which is involved in widespread societal violence that even results in death. In subjecting himself to death, Hazare may thus have been acting disproportionately. Taking up the mantle of Gandhi's method is perhaps not as simple as it may appear. 

1. Jim Yardley, “Thousands Back Antigraft Hunger Strike in New Delhi,” New York Times (August 22, 2011). 
2. Ibid.

Anti-Corruption and Federalism in India

At the end of 2011, India’s coalition government adjourned the upper chamber of the federal legislature without passing legislation that would have created an independent anticorruption agency. India was a the time rife with governmental corruption. A college wants its foreign students protected from crime? A payment is made to local police employees, who pocket the money for themselves. Someone wants a government contract? Well, that goes without saying.

The lower house having passed the legislation, the inaction of the upper chamber was particularly frustrating, particularly to the supporters of Hazare, whose hunger strike  during the summer had led to a promise by the government that the legislation would be introduced. It would have been impractical, and even anti-democratic, for the government to have sidestepped the legislative process simply because a demonstrator of Hazare’s stature was undergoing a hunger-strike. Even heroes should not be lionized too much. Lest it be thought that the federal parliament’s inaction would provoke Hazare to renew hunger-strike, he had actually attempted during the week leading up to the anticipated vote to rally public support against the government’s bill—calling it too weak—by undergoing a hunger-strike, but the large crowds of the summer did not materialize so he called off his hunger-strike “prematurely,” according to the New York Times, “blaming poor health.” It is odd that a person who risks his or her life in a hunger-strike would call it off on account of poor health. “I’m risking death, but I don’t want to get too sick” belies the claim to authenticity and thus undermines the credibility of the movement itself. Ironically, Hazare’s lobbying against the government’s bill may have contributed to the eventual inaction, so the inaction does not necessary constitute a failure for Hazare.

Furthermore, concerns other than corruption legitimately contributed to the inaction. Specifically, the New York Times reports that “(m)uch of the argument centered on an often-technical discussion about India’s federalist structure and whether the provision concerning the creation of state-level anticorruption agencies was unconstitutional.” As the example of the United States suggests, the encroachment of a general government of a federal system on the state governments can compromise the sovereignty retained by the latter, and thus the “checks and balances” feature of federalism between the two government systems (i.e., that of the states and that of the general government). In the case of the anti-corruption bill, whether the federalist arguments were a smokescreen or not, it is significant and highly valuable that federalism was raised as a factor explicitly. In the U.S., the factor is not typically raised even where it is relevant and even vital; typically, the federalism being affected is simply compromised.

Therefore, both with regard to Hazare’s anti-corruption crusade and federalism, the inaction of the upper federal legislative chamber is complex. Ideally, corruption should be rooted out systemically while federalism should be fortified rather than enervated. Both objectives can be achieved—meaning that federalism need not be compromised in riding the society of corruption.

Source:

Jim Yardley, “Bill to Create Anticorruption Agency Stalls in India,” The New York Times, December 30, 2011.