In March, 2025 after the U.S. had
direct talks with Russia on ending Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the E.U.
stepped up its game in helping Ukraine militarily. This was also in the context
of a trade war between the E.U. and U.S., which did not make transatlantic
relations any better. The E.U.’s increasing emphasis on military aid to Ukraine
and the related publicity inadvertently showcased how federalism could be applied
to defense and foreign policy differently that it has in the U.S., wherein the
member states are excluded, since the Articles of Confederation, when the
member states were sovereign within the U.S. confederation. Although both manifestations
of early-modern federalism have their respective benefits and risks, I contend
that the E.U.’s application of federalism to the two governmental domains of
power is more in the spirit of (dual-sovereignty) federalism, even though serious
vulnerabilities can be identified.
Kaja
Kallas, the E.U.’s foreign minister, “pitched an ambitious plan to mobilize up
to to €40 billion in fresh military support for Ukraine, which, if achieved,
would represent a twofold increase from the defence assistance the European
Union provided” in 2024.[1]
Whether premised on the assumption that Russia would not agree to a truce or
that Ukraine would need additional leverage in negotiations, “the Kallas initiative”
put the E.U.’s defense and foreign policy in the spotlight globally. Lest it be
assumed by assuming an exact likeness to the U.S. federal system that the E.U.’s
defense and foreign policy areas were exclusive competencies (i.e., domains of
enumerated power) at the federal level, the E.U.’s state governments, including
their respective foreign ministers, played a significant role in the actual
provision to Ukraine of artillery ammunition, missiles, drones, and even fighter
jets. This arrangement, which includes overall federal coordination and
significant funding, resembles the directive, which is a federal law that requires
the state governments enact legislation to implement the content of the federal
law. That Kallas, the federal foreign minister, took “into account” non-lethal
provisions, including “training and equipment for Ukrainian brigades, . . . to
ensure the participation of neutral” state governments shows just how much of a
role the E.U. states had at the time in defense and foreign policy.[2]
Marco Rubio, Kallas’
counterpart in the U.S., would not have even consulted with state governments
in coming up with an initiative regarding Ukraine. That approach, wherein foreign
policy and defense are completely federalized, does not reflect modern (i.e.,
dual-sovereignty) federalism, whereas the shared competencies of the E.U. do.
This is not to say that every enumerated power or federal competency should be
shared. In fact, that the principle of unanimity applied to foreign policy and
defense in the E.U. represents a serious vulnerability. Essentially, the
requirement that every state government consent treats modern (dual-sovereignty)
federalism as if it were confederalism, where the states hold all governmental
sovereignty. Similarly, David Cameron, a prime minister of the ex-E.U. state of
Britain, confused the two in stating that the E.U. is just another
international network.” Given this category mistake, the E.U. was better off
after Britain seceded from the union. Even the linguistic subterfuge of “Brexit,”
as well as Kallas’ strange job title as “high representative” rather than
foreign minister, attests to the vulnerability inherent in obfuscating (early)
modern federalism with confederalism.
In short, involving the state
governments in foreign policy and defense federal policy and legislation applies
federalism more so than does consolidating those two domains at the federal
level, and yet giving each state government a veto not only renders the federal
system vulnerable to being exploited and paralyzed from within, but also treats
a federal system in which two systems of government each have some amount of sovereignty
like a confederation in which the states retain sovereignty.
The U.S. could improve how it
manifests federalism by having the heads of the state governments represent
them in the U.S. Senate, just as the heads of the state governments in the E.U.
sit in the European Council. Additionally, the U.S. member states could play
more of a role in the implementation of foreign policies and defense, such as
in receiving money from the Pentagon to send machinery from the states’
respective militaries (called militias) to countries that are to be supported
militarily. The federal level could then act as a check on corruption in the implementation.
To be sure, giving the state governments veto-power would carry the
check-and-balance feature of federalism too far. So both the E.U. and U.S.
could stand to improve their respective federal systems towards ever perfect
union—neither one being a trading “bloc” or confederation.
1. Jorge Liboreiro, “Kallas Pitches Plan to ‘Potentially’ Mobilize €40 Billion in MilitaryAid for Ukraine,” Euronews, March 14, 2025.
2. Ibid.
