Friday, May 22, 2020

The E.U. Says No to Hungarian Asylum Detention Camps: A Test for E.U. Federalism

On May 11, 2020, the European Court of Justice (ECJ), the E.U.’s highest court, ruled against the state of Hungary on its detention camp near the Serbian border. The state had denied the asylum requests because the immigrants had come through Serbia, and the latter refused to allow them to reverse course. The immigrants were thus stuck, essentially detained in “prison-like conditions.”[1] The high court ruled that the “conditions prevailing in the Roszke transit zone amount to a deprivation of liberty.”[2] ECJ Advocate General Priit Pikamae had argued that the “unlawful detention” was due to the “high degree of restriction of the freedom of movement.”[3] The state of Hungary had argued that the immigrants could have stayed in Servia, as it was a safe-country of transit, and thus were not eligible for asylum in Hungary. Unlike Hungary, Serbia was not an E.U. state, which may be why the asylum-seekers did not want to remain in Serbia. Hence being a border state added to Hungary’s woes. Therefore, the E.U. had some responsibility to alleviate the pressure on Hungary. Yet the Union did not do so, showing its weakness, and yet the state government bowed to the ECJ’s ruling. To the extent that the E.U. relies on such self-subordination in the want of federal help, the E.U. could be said to be on borrowed time during which basic adjustments to the federal system could be made.

As a border-state of the E.U., Hungary doubtless felt that it could be overwhelmed by asylum-seekers from the Middle East. This set the state’s particular interest at odds with the common interest of the Union because Hungary and other border states would bear the disproportionate weight of the waves of asylum-seekers in the late 2010s. Even though the state’s prime minister, Viktor Orban, was a Euroskeptic, or state rights proponent, and thus especially oriented to his state’s interests, he bowed to the federal court’s ruling, and thus authority. “The Hungarian government disagrees with the ruling, we consider it a risk with regard to European security, but as an EU member state, we will adhere to all court rulings,” Gergely Gulyas, a government spokesman, said at the time.[4]  Even though the E.U. had not come in to solve the intractable problem of the camps, the Euroskeptic state would act according to the ruling of the federal supreme court. This may mean that the E.U.’s federal system had strength at the state level in spite of weakness in united action for the whole—that is, more strength than the Union deserved.

Generally speaking, a federal system is internally vulnerable, and thus weak, to the extent that it must rely on the voluntary subordination of the state governments who must nevertheless suffer from insufficient federal power to redress Union-related state problems. To be sure, a federal system is weak if the states recognize federal authority only when it suits them. Hence the U.S. federal government acted against the state of South Carolina in 1832 after it passed a law invalidating any federal law in the state that goes against the state’s interest. Yet if state governments suffer enough adverse federal judicial decisions without federal help with problems that are acute at the state level (especially if acute because the state is in the federal system), then at some point secessions may result in the dissolution of the federal system.

In the E.U., the federal level was at the time still too hamstrung by overarching state power to be able to act sufficiently even to help particular states on problems stemming from the states’ respective roles or situs in the Union. For example, any state government could veto the proposed law to help the most economically distressed states financially in the midst of the coronavirus pandemic. The power of the states generally is made worse by the strangle-hold that the most powerful states had over the federal level (think Germany and France). Money would not be allocated for the E.U. to deal with the asylum-seekers in Hungary’s detention camps if the most dominant state governments did not agree that the common interest in doing so was worth it to those states. To the extent that the most powerful states could effectively use federal institutions in line those states’ own interests even at the expense of common problems, other states, such as Hungary, would naturally be Euroskeptic. For such a state to recognize an ECJ ruling averse to the state’s interests anyway is surely laudable, even if it buys the Union added time to redress the problem of the imbalance of power between the federal and state levels.


[1] Deutsche Welle, “Hungary Illegally Held Asylum-Seekers, ECJ Rules,” DW.com, May 14, 2020 (accessed May 22, 2020).
[2] Ibid.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Deutsche Welle, “Hungary to Close Transit Zone Camps for Asylum-Seekers,” DW.com, May 21, 2020 (accessed May 22, 2020).

Wednesday, May 20, 2020

An E.U. Economic Recovery Fund: A Federal Problem

On May 18, 2020, with the E.U. Commission having been no match for the states’ own interests in their own health and economic crises, the governors of France and Germany announced that they would support a recovery fund to help the states most in need. The €500 billion fund of grants (not loans) would be raised on the capital markets and guaranteed by the state governments. It would be part of the federal budget.[1] I submit that the imbalance in that federal system is evident; here again, the power of the state governments relative to the federal Commission shows the weakness of the latter.

Not coincidentally, the governors’ joint announcement fit nicely with the proposal yet to be unveiled by the European Commission. Because the fund would be part of the federal budget, a federal institution (i.e., the Commission) should arguably have made its announcement prior to that of the two state executives. That the state-level took the lead on a federal program suggests that the federal level was itself relatively weak. It is telling that had the Commission gone first, the state governments would likely have ignored the proposal.

Yet to rely on the largest states to act de facto as the federal level makes the Union vulnerable to the common interests being subject to the particular interests of the most powerful states. It is no accident that the Commission would use “the argument that the fund is an exercise in common self-interest.”[2] The other states would rightly have been suspicious had France and Germany used that argument. So we have the pertinent argument to be made by the Commission only in retrospect. This in itself may point to how important the common interest actually has been in a Union whose legitimacy is based precisely on common interest.

To be viable in the long-term, a federal system must maintain a balance of power between the federal and state levels. Too much federal power and the system consolidates; too much state power and the risk is dissolution of the federal system. Short of dissolution, a state-heavy federal system pays too much heed to the particular interests of states and can even be dominated by the most powerful state (or states). Throughout its entire history as of 2020, the E.U. suffered from this imbalance. The want of federal power to provide a check on excessive state power over federal institutions and the Union itself was evident, for example, as rich Northern states were able to thwart federal efforts to mitigate the austerity of heavily indebted states such as Greece and Spain after the financial crisis of 2008.

Efforts to minimize redistribution within a federal system, moreover, reflect a minimal notion of the common interest. While such a view is consistent with a confederation in which all of the sovereignty resides with the states, the minimal approach can stifle a federal government’s use of its portion (or competencies) of sovereignty, which in turn should match the common interests with which the federation is tasked. Having a federal currency, for instance, implies the need for monetary and even fiscal policy for stabilization purposes. Hence the Commission was set to argue that the Eurozone itself could be destabilized if an uneven economic recovery were to occur after the coronavirus pandemic. Hence the need for the redistributive recovery fund. To have established the common currency and yet insist on a minimal notion of common interest is self-contradictory because having such a currency expands the common interest. In other words, to give federal governmental institutions competencies geared to protecting or furthering the common interest and then narrowing it to bind the federal use of the competencies essentially ties the federal level in knots. While this strategy may be in the immediate interests of the states (especially the most powerful) in holding back any possible federal encroachment, the federal system itself suffers from the want of federal power, given its competencies.


[1] Katya Adler, “Politics and PR: Behind the Scenes of Franco-German Recovery Fund,” BBC.com, May 18, 2020.
[2] Ibid.

Sunday, May 10, 2020

The European Union at Risk: The German High Court Undercut the European Court of Justice on the Role of the European Central Bank

If a dispute between an E.U. state and the European Central Bank (ECB) on one of its programmes could come to challenge the European Court of Justice (ECJ) itself and the very sustainability of the E.U.’s federal system, then that system itself could be said to be severely impaired, and thus facing a high risk of being destroyed.  Yet in the Judgment of the Second Senate of May 5, 2020, the constitutional court of Germany did exactly that in throwing out an earlier ruling of the E.U.’s supreme court (ECJ) on the legality under E.U. law of an ECB programme.[1]

The primary objective of the  European System of Central Banks, which includes the European Central Bank and those of the States using the euro currency, to be the maintenance of price stability. In 2015, the ESCB “adopted a programme for the purchase of government bonds on secondary markets . . . , with the aim of returning inflation rates to levels below, but close to, 2%.”[2] According to the European Court of Justice, the E.U.’s supreme court within the federal judiciary (CJEU), the ECB’s rationale was that the large-scale purchase of government bonds—90% of which by the state banks—would facilitate “access to the financing that is conducive to boosting economic activity, by promoting a reduction in real interest rates and encouraging commercial banks to provide more credit.”[3] With the supply of goods and services fixed in the short-term, the increased lending by banks due to the lower interest rates would mean more euros relative to the E.U. goods and services, and thus an increase in inflation. However, the ECB’s stated purpose for the program was primarily to boost economic activity by means of lowering interest rates. Yet price stability was the ECB’s objective, hence not to be a byproduct of the pursuit of another objective.

(Source: Trading Economics)

To be sure, the central bank’s mission was an inflation rate to levels below, but close to 2 percent, and the inflation rate in the “euro area” was .24% in 2015, with a period of deflation.[4] By 2019, the inflation rate stood at 1.76 percent, which was within the ECB’s objective. The programme had worked. Whether it should of worked—whether money supply should be increased to increase inflation—is debatable, for deflation and inflation should arguably be determined by relationship of GDP to the money supply. Otherwise, a pro-inflation mandate would mean that prices would continue to increase rather than reflect the market relationship of money and GDP. After a sustained period of inflation, balance would dictate a corrective period of deflation.

Answering questions submitted by the state of Germany’s top court, the European Court of Justice issued a press release in 2018 stating that the “purpose of the PSPP programme is to encourage a return of inflation rates to levels below, but close to, 2% over the medium term.”[5] Yet, as stated above, the ECB’s own stated reason for its programme was to boost economic activity (by decreasing interest rates). The ECJ states that “a monetary policy [i.e., decreasing interest rates to increase inflation] cannot be treated as equivalent to an economic [i.e., fiscal] policy [e.g. for boosting economic activity] for the sole reason that it may have indirect effects that can also be sought in the context of economic policy.”[6] In plain English, increasing or decreasing money supply is not an equivalent option to fiscal policy in boosting economic activity just because this is an indirect effect of the monetary policy. Therefore, even if boosting economic activity were an indirect effect, or byproduct, of the ECB’s primary intent to increase inflation, the ECB could not justify its programme on the basis of its indirect fiscal effect. Yet the ECB’s stated objective of the programme was to boost economic activity! The E.U. should have used a fiscal rather than a monetary policy if the primary aim, as the ECB stated, was to boost economic activity. The groups in Germany that had instigated the German court’s questions to the ECJ had a good argument that the ECB had been acting beyond its mandate in this narrow sense. However, that the ECB had achieved its inflation target by means of the programme suggests that the central bank could be viewed as having acted within its mandate. The question is perhaps whether the ECB pursued its program even after the inflation target had been achieved. That the rate in 2018 was still below 2% suggests that this was not the case. The problem, therefore, was that the ECB stated boosting economic activity as its primary objective, with lower interest rates serving only as a means.

Unfortunately, the constitutional court of the state of Germany took its objection too far. Even though groups that had brought constitutional objections to the Bundesverfassungsgericht (the German constitutional court) had claimed that because the PSPP programme exceeded the ECB’s mandate, the E.U. failed “to observe the division of competencies” between the E.U. and its states, the German court violated the supremacy of the ECJ, the federal supreme court of the E.U., over the state courts by directing the state’s central bank not to comply with the ECB’s programme by buying back German bonds. Such a long sentence, by the way, is in keeping with German, though my words do not reach such a length.

The Nullification Crisis in U.S. history can provide us with a context. In November, 1832, the South Carolina Government passed a law declaring the U.S. tariffs laws of 1828 and 1832 null and void in South Carolina. The underlying problem was “the constitutional theory that upheld the right of states to nullify federal acts within their boundaries.”[7] Had the member states still been sovereign, as they had been from 1776 to 1789 (including under the Articles of Confederation), the doctrine would have had a solid basis (i.e., the full sovereignty of the new republics within the U.S.). However, once the U.S. itself (i.e., the federal level) had been delegated some governmental sovereignty, the doctrine would have eviscerated that sovereignty. States would have been able to pick which federal law to recognize, hence any federal law could easily have been vitiated or compromised. The states would have been able to trample on the federal sovereignty with impunity and the federal system itself would have lost coherence, and thus the ability to function viably.

On May 5, 2020, the constitutional court of the state of Germany ruled against the legality of the ECB’s programme within the state, much as South Carolina’s legislature had voted against the legality of the tariff laws. It was a direct challenge to the E.U.’s central bank and supreme court (ECJ). Were the ECJ to let the state court’s ruling stand, other states would surely follow in opting out of whatever federal laws they do not like. The Government of Germany had been against the bond buy-backs in the euro area because of the shared losses. In short, the powerful northern state didn’t want to pay for the losses of poorer southern states through the programme. Likewise, the matter of shared state debt had been a hot topic during the Washington administration in the 1790s in the United States. There too, the state governments who had incurred less debt in fighting the Revolutionary War did not want the higher debts of other states to be pooled through the federal government.

The resistance in Germany since the European debt crisis during and after the financial crisis of 2008 to covering the massive debts of Greece, Spain, and Italy found a footing in the German court even though the ruling meant the possible vitiation (i.e. end) of the E.U’s competencies (i.e., governmental sovereignty), and thus of the federal system itself.  “Given the influence Germany wields as the largest [State in the euro area of the E.U.], the [ECB] can’t afford to ignore the [German] court’s decision, in part because it would be all but impossible for” the programme to continue without the participation of Germany’s central bank.[8] Moreover, other state governments (and courts), such as in Poland and the Czech Republic, would likely follow in challenging the E.U. unilaterally.

The German chancellorin (prime minister), Angela Merkel, had been urging a stronger E.U. after the secession of euro-skeptic (anti-federalist) Britain, yet her state’s interest in staving off shared debt through the ECB resulted in her state’s high court throwing an arrow directly at the core of the E.U.’s federal system (of dual or divided sovereignty). “At a time of growing tension in the EU over German reluctance to embrace ambitious plans to resuscitate southern European economies hit hardest by the coronavirus by issuing mutualized debt, known colloquially as corona bonds,” the German court’s ruling added fuel to the argument that the E.U. itself was being compromised by the power of its largest state in pursuing its own interests at the expense of the common good, or general welfare, in the Union as a whole.[9] Abstractly stated, no part should have sufficient power over the whole that the latter’s power is eviscerated because it is a mere reflection of  the interests of the part operating at the expense of the whole.

(Source: Politico)

As for the ruling of the Bundesverfassungsgericht (the German constitutional court), Justice Andreas Vosskuhle said that the ECJ had approved the programme that “was obviously not covered” by the ECB’s mandate.”[10] The ruling did not apply to the corona bonds during the pandemic in 2020. Nor was the ECB’s purchasing of state debt (i.e. quantitative easing) during the financial crisis. Even though the court did not find enough evidence to rule that the programme amounted to monetary financing (i.e., the ECB funding state budgets), the court did decide that the ECB had overstepped its inflation-objective mission.[11] The German government had been against pooling money through the ECB to fund the government budgets by pooling the debt of the more indebted states going back to the financial crisis of 2008. Regarding the programme at issue here, the German court’s claim that the ECB had overstepped its mandate does not succeed because the programme did not push inflation above 2% in trying to boost economic activity. In other words, the ECB had not over-shot its inflation target, even if the bank erroneously was primarily oriented to increase GNP. Inflation was so low in 2015 that an inflation rationale was justified. 
 
The impact of the Bundesverfassungsgericht’s ruling went beyond the ECB itself. The viability of the ECJ and the federal system itself was suddenly under threat. Dismissing a 2018 ECJ decision to allow bond buy-backs, the state court “ordered the ECB to provide Germany with adequate justification for the program within the next three months. Should it fail to do so, the Bundesbank [the state’s central bank] would no longer be permitted to participate in the program.”[12] The ECB was at the time “an independent EU institution [that] does not have to take orders from the German court, and the government in Berlin.”[13] In reply, the ECB told the German court that the ECJ had already determined the legality of [the programme]. In dismissing the ECJ’s earlier conclusions, the German court, by a 7-1 majority, declared the reasoning by the ECJ to be “not comprehensible” and “objectively arbitrary” and the decision itself to be untra vires (i.e., beyond the court’s authority).[14] Yet the German court presumed itself to have the authority to overrule the federal supreme court!

Even were the ECJ to deliver a bad ruling, or one injurious to a particular state’s policy, the ECJ would be protected by the precedent of its superiority over state supreme courts. The ECJ had ruled in Costa v ENEL (1964) that the states had transferred sovereign rights to the ECJ on E.U. law and furthermore that such law could not be overridden by state law. The ECB being a federal institution, the matter of whether the programme breached the central bank’s mandate was within the purview of the federal supreme court, the ECJ, rather than any state court. In stating that the gravity of the question at hand merited going up against the ECJ ruling and the ECJ itself, the German court had, I contend, lost perspective. Buying back bonds through a federal program, unlike something infringing on basic human rights, for example, does not have sufficient weight to justify imperiling the federal system itself. It is ironic that just months after the state of Britain seceded in part out of dislike for the extant governmental sovereignty of the E.U. in relation to that of the state governments, the German state court threw a bomb from within.



1. BVerfG, Judgment of the Second Senate of 05 May 2020 – 2 BvR 859/15-, paras. (1-237).
2. Court of Justice of the European Union, Press Release No 192/18, December 11, 2018.
3. Ibid.
4. Statistica.com (accessed May 10, 2020).
5. Court of Justice of the European Union, Press Release No 192/18.
6. Ibid.
7.  The Nullification Crisis, Britannica.com (accessed May 10, 2020).
8. Matthew Karnitschnig, “German Court Lays Down Law in Defiance of European Union,” Politico, May 5, 2020 (accessed May 10, 2020).
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.

Saturday, May 2, 2020

An Aggressive Culture Applied to a Pandemic

If a local culture does not value education, such that the public education system is weak, and furthermore engages in and enables aggressive behavior, even self-protective statements and efforts can provoke aggressive responses based on ignorance. In such a culture, authorities may be particularly unlikely to stem such aggression, and they may even be inclined to engage in active or passive aggression against victims rather than enforce laws and rules. For existence, police called on a noise complaint at an apartment complex may willfully or unwittingly turn on the complainer not due to lack of noise, but, rather, out of ignorance as to what constitutes a residential disturbance, fear of confronting people who are disturbing others, a desire to inhibit future calls or simply due the aggressor’s bidding by blaming the victim for complaining. Besides indicating a corrupt, sordid police culture, that of the locality itself would likely be compromised. During a pandemic, such pathology might be especially transparent because it is clear when people and authorities are not only not enforcing laws and organizational policies geared to protecting both employees and customers, but also acting against public health by turning on the victims. The case of Arizona and, more particularly, the Phoenix police department, is particularly revealing.
On March 30, 2020, the chief executive of Arizona issued an executive order in response to the coronavirus pandemic. With enumerated exceptions, people in Arizona were to stay in their places of domicile. Essential activities constitute the first exception in the order. Obtaining food (i.e., groceries) is first on the list of such activities. Interestingly, outside exercise, including walking, and “constitutionally protected activities such as speech and religion” are also listed.[1] The order requires that when “individuals ar using shared or outdoor spaces when outside their residence or property for Essential Activities, they shall to the extent possible maintain physical distancing of at least six feet from any other person, consistent with guidance from the CDC.”[2] The word shall here means must. The executive order is stronger than mere guidance. Even so, even local police in Phoenix took physical distancing to be nothing stronger than CDC guidelines. Even though the executive order states that “(n)o person shall be required to provide documentation or proof of their activities to justify their activities under this order,” the order was enforceable against infractions. Even so, the police in Phoenix were not necessarily grasping this point.

  
For example, while I was shopping at an Albertsons (Safeway) grocery store in Phoenix on May 1, 2020, when the executive order was still in full effect, a man approached me very closely from behind while I was at the front of a one-way aisle. Even though the “cash register has emerged as the most dangerous place” in a grocery store, “according to public health and worker safety experts,” the most dangerous place for customers may be the aisles when confronted with a customer who not only refuses to keep a distance, but also becomes physically and verbally abusive as a result.[3]
The customer who I encountered was confrontational and aggressive from the outset. He refused to step back, causing me to back up past the product I had been selecting. I asked him to step back so I could get the product, but he told me I would have to go down the aisle and come around again. We were at logger-heads. The aisle was too narrow for him to pass me. Indeed, passing me so closely would have violated the store requirement that six feet be maintained where possible (e.g., excepting the cashier area). While I was calling for a store employee or manager to come (none did), the other customer rammed into my cart, causing it to block the narrow aisle. Both he and his wife (far behind him) were hurling insults to me even though he had violated the store requirement. Even as I was walking to the store manager’s office, the customer’s wife felt the need to insult me. It is such aggression on top of fault that I submit is particularly toxic, as well as prevalent in the local culture there.

A police supervisor claimed he couldn't tell tell from either my video or the store's who slammed into whom. Why would a police manager lie? I had called to complain about his subordinate, but the supervisor managed to dissimulate and deflect (indicative of the culture).

Adding insult to injury, when the police arrived—seven or eight of them!—after I had agreed to the manager’s suggestion that I report the aggression to them, four of the police were positionally or vocally hostile and even confrontational with me even in approaching me. Put another way, when the caller is the victim, he or she does not need three police standing in a hostile pose behind the police employee conversing with the victim. Such distrust applied to a victim is consistent with blaming the victim.
Even though the store manager told me later that she had told the police that the store requirement on physical distancing was not a suggestion, the policewoman told me that the manager had told her otherwise. I showed the police employee a large sign indicating that maintaining six feet of distance was a store requirement and told her that a store policy is not a suggestion, then she was once again antagonistic, threatening me by asking me if I understand that I could be charged with assault because my cart blocked the aisle after the other customer repeatedly slammed into the cart. 



I don't know why law enforcement would even venture an opinion on a store policy (and getting that wrong) when it is clear that law enforcement enforces laws. The police employee even got the law wrong. She erroneously claimed that the governor’s executive order only gave a guideline for physical distancing, so it was unenforceable. Strangely, she even told me that the police cannot enforce a store policy, or suggestion as she viewed a policy to be. “A store policy is not a law,” the police employee told a man with three degrees in business. Perhaps because she was irked at me for knowing more, she even told me that I had committed an assault against the customer who had rammed my cart because my cart was blocking the aisle. Incredible!
Was there no limit to the lengths that the local police would go to blame the victim? Later, when I spoke with the policewoman’s supervisor, who had also been at the store but had not bothered to speak with me, I was stunned when he claimed that he couldn’t tell from the store’s video (and presumably mine, as the police woman had shown my video to him in the store) who was slamming whose cart. After the police herd had left the store, the store manager and I examined very closely the store video, and we agreed that the other customer had rammed my cart—not vice versa. Yet later, the police supervisor claimed that nothing of the sort was on the tape (including my own!) and that the store manager had agreed with him. “It is on tape,” I told the supervisor by phone. “You’re wrong,” he said, “maybe your conduct was disorderly.” He was threatening to charge me with disorderly conduct!
In short, the local police seem to have been getting away with turning the tables on victims, especially if a police employee (or supervisor!) is annoyed when a victim tries to support his or her claim even with audio-video by returning to the matter of the actual aggression. Even when I called in a complaint against loud, heavy-bass music near my apartment, the policeman who responded felt the need to focus on me rather than the ordinance-violator. “She says that you taping her music from inside your apartment is harassment.” Even getting some evidence away from the culprit’s apartment outside would not constitute harassment. In fact, for a police department to discourage evidence and then refuse to intercede for lack of evidence (i.e, he said, she said) suggests (just a suggestion!) a dysfunctional police culture (as well as incompetent employees). For a police department to take such a counter-claim seriously and even use an accusation-tone with the victim of the disturbing loud noise may suggest (just a suggestion!) that the police employees are habituated to blaming the victim or even viewing every call as a dispute rather than a complaint.
In my conversations with the policewoman at Safeways and her supervisor later by phone, neither person wanted to talk about the aggression against me. They were both accusatory throughout. Even though I had both the store requirement and that in the governor’s executive order backing me up (as well as even my video of the incident), the strategy of the police was to undermine me at every point—too keep the focus on me—even accusing me of physical assault and disorderly conduct. The store manager had suggested that I let her call the police, and I concluded after the police herd had left that I could no longer trust the police to even focus on aggressors. Such passive aggression, moreover, is a glaring indication of a dysfunctional department culture.



[1] Executive Order 2020-18, State of Arizona, March 30, 2020.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Nathaniel Meyersohn, “This Is the Most Dangerous Place in the Grocery Store,” CNNbusiness, May 1, 2020 (accessed same day).

Friday, April 24, 2020

Do Police Departments Unwittingly Attract an Aggressive Mentality?

Might the personality type most excited by inflicting pain on others be drawn to “serve” on a police force?  Might force itself be an allurement to such a personality? Moreover, might organizations populated by the personality be inclined to set up defenses against being held accountable either internally or by other organizations? At the very least, deference ought to go to the victims rather than the “officers.”
The New York City police department and the district attorney’s office set investigations in motion after video surfaced of Anthony Bologna of the police department using pepper spray against protesters of Wall Street greed and the lack of accountability there. Even as the department’s own investigation was yet to commence, the chief publically questioned whether the video offered enough context to evaluate the inspector’s actions. To the chief, merely protesting in a way that blocked traffic justifies the use of pepper spray without warning. The inspector’s union boss claimed the motive had been to restore order—though the video shows that the victims were not disorderly or resisting arrest. Indeed, the police did not attempt to arrest those sprayed. It is not difficult to see where the police investigation of its own will go.
Beyond the hypocrisy involved in those sworn to protect actually attacking and the anti-Americanism involved in trying to curtail a protest, it might reasonably be asked whether Bologna was acting on his own, or whether Wall Street money was ultimately behind the aggression. In the protest’s first four days, the mega media companies scarcely covered the protest; Bologna’s unprovoked aggression came after the news networks could no longer viably ignore the movement. So was the case simply that of American banks using the police state to keep a movement from spreading to their detriment? Were there actual accountability on Bologna, might the bird sing, affording us some transparency concerning any such hidden relationships?
Even if no such conspiracy existed, there is obviously a need for stronger instruments of accountability that could be imposed externally on police departments and their employees. In the wake of Bologna’s attacks, the media reported that such incidents are not uncommon. Indeed, I have witnessed them. While in Pittsburgh, for example, I witnessed how the police treated black teenagers who were simply walking along the sidewalks in the university area of town (Oakland). It was evident to me at the time (as a bystander leaving a restaurant) that the police employees believed they did not face any meaningful accountability. So I was not surprised to see video surface of Anthony Bologna’s sadism on full display in New York.
Thomas Hobbes writes that in the state of nature, and even in society, each person has the right to protect his or her person, as per the right of self-preservation. A sovereign cannot take this inalienable right away. When Bologna acted outside of the law, and thus outside of the social contract, his victims had the right to defend themselves, even in using pepper spray against the attacker. In other words, Bologna could and should have been treated as a criminal attacker by his victims and bystanders. Perhaps in the future protestors ought to carry pepper spray in case any criminals show up and attempt any aggressive attacks. It could be that the offending attackers are imprisoned while the self-preserving protestors are exonerated. Then maybe police departments will recognize that accountability applied to their own employees is in the departments’ interest. Legitimate force goes only so far before it lapses into criminality, and we all have an obligation as citizens to thwart crime as it is happening by whomever. If police employees do not want other citizens to be put in the position of making this judgment, then perhaps those employees might want to reassess their attitude and habits. In the meantime, citizens need to be on guard against criminals even and especially where they are least expected and perhaps most commonly found.


Source:

Al Baker and Joseph Goldstein, “Officer’s Pepper-Spraying of Protesters Is Under Investigation,” New York Times, September 29, 2011. 

Putin’s Pals: Billionaire Junkies

Arkady Rotenberg, a former judo coach, became a billionaire industrialist by selling pipe to the state-owned gas monopoly, Gazprom. Meanwhile, owning a minority state in a small bank in St. Petersburg that won control of another of Gazprom subsidiaries, Yuri Kovalchuk gained a net worth of $1.5 billion. Gennady Timchenko, “once the little-known sales manager of a local oil refinery,” went on to become one of the richest men in the world by co-owning “a commodity trading company that moves about $70 billion of crude oil a year, much of it through major contracts with Rosneft, the Russian national oil company.” What these billionaires shared besides getting rich was a certain connection—namely to Vladimir Putin.

                           Vladimir Putin arrives for a campaign rally in Moscow.  Agence France-Presse/Getty Images

The New York Times stated that “these relationships are evidence of deeply entrenched corruption.” Critics view the billionaires as examples of what was essentially government-sanctioned theft connected to Russia’s abundant natural resources. “The basic point is that these guys have benefited and made their fortunes through deals which involved state-controlled companies, which were operating under the direct control of government and the president,” said Vladimir Milov, a former deputy energy minister who turned into an opposition leader. For his part, Putin denied any role in enriching his friends into billionaires. He also denied involvement in their project to build him a “palace” on the Black Sea—a “sprawling resort complex” costing as much as $1 billion. Even so, Sergei Kolesnikov, one of Putin’s former associates from St. Petersburg, fled Russia with a trove of documents that support the contention that Putin was connected to the resort being built for him. Kolesnikov has also described other business dealings in which money had been funneled, often as loans, to businesses controlled by Putin’s friends or relatives.
According to the New York Times, the dealings between Putin and his acquaintances would likely come under even more scrutiny with the growth of the opposition and its increased pressure for governmental reforms. At the same time—just before the Russian presidential election in March 2012—the Western media was reporting that Putin was almost certain to win the election even in spite of the huge protests. Even though this could simply mean that conservatives across Russia greatly outnumber the protesters, I suspect that the election of a man amid such documented corruption says something more generally about the strength of accountability in a democracy.
Meanwhile in the U.S., The Huffington Post was running a headline saying that people who invest in SuperPacs for Mitt Romney could see their “investments” in him pay off handsomely. As the story went, a campaign contribution buys the ability to get the office-holder’s ear (or that of an aide). The examples of new wealth in Russia conveniently connected to Putin suggests that much more was involved in the return on investment. Neither Putin nor Romney seemed hurt by the (at the very least) unseemly mix of contributors or connections already having benefitted or expecting huge “dividends.” In Romney’s case, his close ties with Wall Street both personally and in business as well as political contributions did not seem to bother many people even though Wall Street had been culpable in the financial crisis of 2008. It is enough, it seems, to be a pretty boy with connections in the establishment; the lack of ideological substance, or vision, in a candidate-fixated electoral culture enables such candidates. Their support becomes a self-fulfilling prophesy, with well-connected backers in it with the expectation of a huge economic payoff.
The real culprit, I’m afraid, is neither Putin nor Romney. Rather, it may go back to the premise of John Adams and Thomas Jefferson that a viable republic depends on an educated and virtuous self-governing citizenry—that is to say, an electorate that is not easily manipulated or hoodwinked. How Putin could be poised to win even on the first round in spite of the corruption, and how the Republican Party establishment (rather than the rank and file) could manage the primaries with the Wall Street candidate being favored so soon after 2008 suggests to me that democracy is either weak or deeply flawed—conveniently tilted to the establishment rather than the people. Yet it could also be that too many voters, both Russian and American, vote as though the three blind men in the opening of James Bond’s Dr. No. I suspect the tilting toward the “men on top” dovetails with an enabling electorate, and this in turn provides a default wherein corruption is the norm. In other words, the corrupt are too ensconced—too comfortable as they know they are beyond being touched.
Beyond giving business ethics a bad name, the Putin billionaires, the Romney contributors from Wall Street reflect badly on democracy because they take advantage of its lapses in accountability. Ultimately, We the People could do much better were we to get off our sofas, turn off the remotes, and vote the bastards out and put in people who would go after the connections and bad businesses that have been enabled for far too long. This would undoubtedly take more than one election cycle of replacements before those in power get the message that maintaining the status quo is no longer sufficient. Yet even as I write these lines, I can feel the weight of the status quo bearing down on me. I can sense the herd-like mentality of the vast majority of the voters in any country continuing to chew the cud even if they do happen to hear bits and pieces on how established connections enrich themselves and even attack other people with impunity.

Source:
Andrew Kramer and David Herszenhorn, “Midas Touch in St. Petersburg: Friends of Putin GlowBrightly,” The New York Times, March 2, 2012.

Monday, April 20, 2020

Major Cracks in Human Resources and Management in the American Grocery Industry Made Transparent during the Coronavirus Pandemic

For a certain personality-type, character, or mentality, it is easy to blame other people while remaining silent on one’s own mistakes (and mentality). This approach can be particularly harmful during a pandemic, for one’s own mistakes could be passing on the infectious illness. Such mistakes include refusing to maintain a physical distance from other people in public places and retail stores. As noxious as the blaming is, a more significant anthropological point may be that as a social and habitual animal, the human being may not be mentally advanced enough to keep a distance from other such animals even for self-preservation. I don’t think the instinctual urge for socializing exhausts the explanation, for the failure (and even refusal) to respect others enough to keep at a distance even when they ask surely involves weakness that manifests psychologically beyond merely having a bad attitude. Not even the artificial organizational-management systems our species has established are a match for the toxicity of a weakness that is even just passively aggressive toward other people. I contend that American management is susceptible to an even more severe weakness; one that foists organizational power as a club even on customers. 

In mid-April, 2020, in the midst of the coronavirus pandemic, “some worker experts, union leaders and small grocery store owners” were claiming that it had “become too dangerous to let customers browse aisles, coming into close range with workers.”[1] The president of the United Food and Commercial Workers’ union pointed to “careless customers” as “probably the biggest threat” to the workers.[2] According to that union, “85% of its grocery store member workers reported that customers” were not literally going even a bit out of their way to maintain a physical distance from other shoppers and employees.[3] With supermarkets struggling to convince customers to wear masks, the union's president also said that he was urging grocery stores to make masks mandatory not only for employees, but also customers. "Everyone must wear masks," he insisted. [4] Too many customers were endangering lives. Wearing a surgical or handmade mask could not prevent the virus from being inhaled; rather, such a mask prevents the mask wearer from sneezing or coughing near another person, increasing the likelihood of infecting him or her (infection could also result from breathing regardless of whether masks are being worn). In other words, wearing a mask protects other people, so not wearing one does not indicate a weakened motive of self-preservation, but, rather, a lack of consideration and even empathy for other people. It is quite selfish, as is walking or standing by another person. 

From my own experience in several Albertsons, Kroger, Target, and Sprouts stores in Phoenix, Arizona, I saw the vast majority of customers—perhaps all of them—fitting within the union’s statistic on the lack of physical distancing. 

This customer headed directly toward me. I asked him to maintain a distance and reminded him that the aisle is one-way due to the pandemic. He showed disgust, but turned around. Disgust at me, rather than recognition that he was in the wrong. Presumptuousness on top of not being responsible. 

                                                    

                                                            



In fact, I encountered a few customers who verbally lashed out at me for asking them to keep a distance due to the pandemic as they were about to closely approach me and thus blatantly dismiss the two-carts-apart policy of the stores. In one case, the Albertsons  (Safeway) store manager was very near and yet in spite of having witnessed the violation, he refused to chastise the customer not only for violating the store’s policy of “social” distancing, but also being verbally aggressive toward me. “I think we should just let it go,” the manager told me as I looked at him in utter astonishment.


At another Safeway store, a customer headed directly at me and refused to back up, even to let me back to the products where I had been. Then he assaulted me by slamming my cart until it blocked the aisle. The sordid Phoenix police, whom I asked be called, turned it on me. I had assaulted the customer by blocking the aisle! The contrarian attitude of the seven or eight police who responded to my initiated call was as obvious as their confrontational postures toward the victim--me!

In fact, I had not seen one employee or manager of a grocery store bother to enforce the policy of “social” distancing since the U.S. Center of Disease Control issued guidelines and the Arizona government issued an order to maintain a physical distance of six feet from other people unless necessary. With regard to the masks, and I submit on the distancing too, stores generally were "reluctant to antagonize customers by turning them away."[5] According to a Wegman's spokesperson, the chain wanted to minimize "the likelihood of conflicts in our stores" and would "not put our people in the position of having to deny entry to our stores," even in states where masks in public settings are required.[6] In other words, the company's management was not even willing to conform to government orders. I saw the same refusal at Albertsons, Kroger, and Sprouts stores in Arizona. In Los Angeles in neighboring California, customers had to wear masks or coverings in stores, but Kroger (Ralphs) was not enforcing the government order. In fact, a store manager reprimanded an employee for having asked a customer to wear a mask. "I was told that it was none of my business and that I was not the mask police," the employee later reported.[7] She was being quite reasonable in wanting to protect herself. 

At the time, New Jersey, Maryland, New York, Pennsylvania, Connecticut, Hawaii, Miami (Florida) Austin (Texas), Washington, D.C. and some others had orders mandating that grocery shoppers wear face coverings or masks in the stores, yet no penalties go to noncomplying customers or stores. Only a handful of smaller grocers in the U.S. were requiring customers to wear masks. The medium and large companies, however, were putting expediency on revenue before the safety of two major stakeholders: the employees and customers. 

Such stakeholder management is unethical because it prioritizes company gain even at a time when the business was good before the very lives of others. Yes, even employees can be thought of as others to a company's management that is oriented to the company's profits and executive bonuses. Utilitarianism is violated because the greatest good is not provided to the greatest number (of people). Even were a major chain to risk going out of business by enforcing physical distance and mask-wearing on customers, the industry was too important during the pandemic not to get money from the U.S. Government. So the executives' mindset was one of selfish enrichment over consideration and even empathy for others who could suffer greatly and even die as a result. Hume's theory of moral sentiment has it that the sentiment of moral disapprobation that people would naturally feel looking at the sordid refusals to enforce even government orders is the moral judgment against the companies. Kant would point out that the executives (and store managers) were not treating those put at risk as not just means, but also as ends in themselves (for they are rational beings worthy of intrinsic value). 

To be sure, I had seen plenty of employees and even store managers violating their own company's policy on physical distancing both between themselves and as inflicted on customers through callious disregard. Such behavior is also unethical.

For example, a store manager of a Sprouts store, whose nitch was supposedly still healthy foods, stood just behind an employee who could not wait a few seconds until I would emerge from the narrow hallway from the bathrooms to enter without passing me at close range. “He tried,” the manager said when I asked the manager why he was not enforcing his store policy (and CDC guideline) on his own employees. As I pivoted to exit the store, I glanced around to see another employee come up right behind me to grab something, with of course her manager looking on. 

The next week, while I was waiting outside far to the left of the entry to the same store, I asked an oncoming employee to keep a distance as she passed by. She did not alter her course. She even hurled insults at me, including, “Maybe you should bring a ruler.” She then said to a customer, who also thought my request had been unreasonable, “There is something wrong with customers who ask me to keep a distance. I get thirty customers everyday asking me to keep a distance.” One implication is that she had not been maintaining physical distance much at all in the store, which implies that the store manager was not enforcing the policy on his employees. This inference is consistent with my observations by then of employees at several Kroger (Frys) and Albertsons (Safeway) grocery stores in Phoenix, Arizona. 


This Kroger (Frys) store manager was not even maintaining a distance from an employee even in just talking. How could it be expected that the manager was enforcing the policy on his employees given that he was not enforcing it on himself?

This Albertsons (Safeway) department head and employee walked close by me twice without a thought between them on the risk they were posing to a customer. 

This Kroger (Frys) employee, who worked at the self-check-out stations (and thus close to customers), lied to me that she had tried to keep a distance from me in an aisle. Walking on the other side of the pillar at the end of the aisle would have counted as trying. 

The Albertsons (Safeway) employee on the left had been even closer to the other employee's face in passing close by before stopping to talk. Two-cart-lengths distance was the store policy and Arizona's guideline.

Not once did I see an employee even move to the other side of an aisle in passing a customer. Not once did I see an employee bother to move out of the way to give a customer some distance. “I’m trying,” one employee told me even though she had not even bothered to move from the center of an aisle when she passed me. I, however, was hugging the other side. I held back from replying, “You’re not trying enough.” I don’t think she was trying at all. She was lying. In general, I had the sense that employees thought it was rude for customers to ask that the store policy be followed. At the very least, employees didn’t want to follow the policy, and their managers were not enforcing it. Even cashiers managed to evade the clear plastic screen between them and the customers checking out. I was speechless when a cashier moved her head around the plastic to hear me better at close range. Apparently she didn't think there was a pandemic going around. Perhaps her store manager had believed that scant training was sufficient for the employees. 

  
The upper sign asks customers not to talk to employees around the edges of the plastic that covers most of the desk area.


The plastic screens at Kroger (Frys) grocery check-out stations are too narrow because the plastic does not cover the area where customers pay even though the distance from the cashier is close. Also, the area at which customers spend considerable time unloading carts and waiting is also too close to the cashier to be unprotected by the plastic. 

This video demonstrates that the plastic screens at check-out are insufficiently narrow because they do not cover the area between the cashier and customer during the payment phase. Even though I told the cashier that she was too close to me, she did not back off while I was paying. Instead, she chastized me for pushing a wrong button on the keypad. "We could be infecting eachother right now," I said. "I know," she replied. 

Even so, as I was taking a photo of the sign ironically just behind her station, the cashier backed away from the next customer as she paid. The cashier was staring at me to present the illusion that she was following the guideline of "social" distancing. I wish she had been less social with me.

Therefore, it would be one-sided to conclude that employees needed more protection from customers because customers also needed protection even though managers and even employees themselves in some cases felt free to inflict on customers asking for such protection. Even more so than refusing to enforce policies and even government orders, aggressively blaming the victim is not a viable long-term strategy for retaining good customers and minimizing the number of bad employees. 

The thought of Friedrich Nietzsche, a nineteenth-century European moral philosopher, anthropologist, and philologist, is useful in providing a deeper explanation. He would say that both the employees and customers were behaving like herd animals too weak to master their base instinctual urges, including selfishness, greed, and the desire to aggressively lash out at other people. Selfishness out of weakness is not necessarily in line with furthering self-preservation; ignoring the physical-distancing policies and guidelines ran contrary to the egoist urge of self-preservation. 

The industry needed ethical leaders willing to go beyond what is convenient and expedient for the companies. Even the head of at least one major labor union sought to blame customers while looking the other way on the sordid lack of regard that at least some members were displaying for customers. Only a child would say, "I won't step out of my way in the least," and then, if caught, lie, "I tried" as the lack of effort had somehow not been noticeable. 

Nor were any of the store managers in the stores that I surveyed leaders, for they were not strong enough to enforce the health guideline and store policy even on employees. Nietzsche would explain those managers as herd animals with an extended urge to dominate without the requisite strength.[8] The indictment, therefore, exposed during the coronavirus pandemic in the United States, is that retail-level managers may not be strong enough to manage stores. Generalizing so from my unscientific sample can of course only be taken as a rough-draft yet to be verified. That I saw the same pattern in every store gives me confidence that I am correct, but here I am on more solid ground in relating my observations to Nietzsche's psychological-anthropological theory. 

According to that theory, the herd animals who cannot resist their urges to dominate even without being strong enough compensate through aggression, including intending to be cruel. In contrast, a strong conqueror does not intend to be cruel, but is instead oriented to overcoming both external and internal obstacles.
 
So I was not completely surprised when an assistant manager with an employee of a Kroger (Frys) store in Phoenix, Arizona stalked me around the store because I had photographed the store manager talking at close distance with one of his employees, an employee who had refused to keep a distance from me, and a customer who had mindlessly come up to me like a herd animal moving on to the next clump of grass. These people, even the manager, violated the store policy (and CDC and state guidelines) on maintaining a physical distance from other people. Neither man was wearing a mask. Had they been more clever, they might have combined their two infractions by walking up to me and sneezing or coughing. 

The (assistant) manager not only felt the need to be confrontational and insulting toward me in a way that indicated that he really wanted to attack a customer, but also missed an opportunity to hear from a customer with proof that the store's employees were serially violating the store's policy on physical distancing--even violating a governmental guideline or order on "social distancing." In other words, the head of a large union was wrong in blaming only the customers! 

A self-confident, strong assistant manager (which may be an oxymoron) in the store would have asked me at the time why I had taken pictures instead of accusing me even though he still didn't know for sure and the management had not posted signs prohibiting photography. I would have explained that I had photographed only some infractions in which I was being but in harm's way, and that the company stood to benefit. Several days later, I had chance, impromptu  meeting in the parking lot of an Albertsons (Safeway) store with a woman who works with the county's Environmental Services department. I learned that her department had no clue that the stores were not enforcing the government guidelines on physical distancing. Referring to my earlier experience at Krogers (Frys), she said my photography was justified. "You were collecting evidence!" I had also been holding my phone up as a possible deterrent (i.e., another customer or employee approaching very near would presumably not want to be photographed). 

And yet, the (asst) manager had been accusatory, and in this sense confrontational as if he had already made up his mind that I was guilty. He and his young sidekick employee were in a hunting mode, so I did not feel comfortable bringing my earlier complaints to them. 
The two men left me, or so I first thought, but the sidekick was keeping an eye on me. Both men waited to pounce on me just after I had paid for the groceries. The assistant manager walked fast to me in an aggressive manner and shouted insults at me as if he were a policeman. "I heard from a customer and employee!" he said in a loud, threatening voice without bothering to even consider that the complainers might have been retaliating against me for getting evidence of their wrong-doing. Instead, he was an extension of their self-righteous fury. 

He even shouted at me to leave the store even though I was already outside! That he was motivated to make the demand even when I was walking away, outside the building, suggested to me that he was motivated to lash out at me for its own sake--for the pleasure that comes from even positional power. Tellingly, even though I was pushing the cart into the parking lot, the manager threatened me, "You need to leave or I'm calling the police!" There was at the time a local law against calling the police for frivolous reasons. "But he was already leaving," the police would have told him. 

Because I was obviously leaving, Nietzsche would say that the man (and his sidekick) was weak which is to say, sick. A strong person would have let the matter go when I was paying for the food and leaving the store rather than act out of resentment and an urge to subdue. A strong manager makes a point and then moves on; a weak manager cannot let go--cannot master--his or her pressing institual urges. Such mastery is the richest source of the pleasure than comes from power--far richer than acting out against a customer already leaving the store. 

The (asst) manager's young sidekick had not kept at a physical distance from me twice when we were inside of the store. That he violated the store policy even as he was questioning me as if he were a detective demonstrates weakness primping itself into dominating inspite of itself. In fact, the seccond time he had come close, I positioned my cart between him and myself (two cart-lengths was the policy, as per the recurring announcement that he presumably had heard often enough). He was stunned that I would protect myself, such was his feeling of entitlement. 


Major cracks in Kroger's human resources and store management occasion smaller cracks in customer's "loyalty" cards.

Nietzsche urges the strong to keep a distance, a pathos of distance, from the weak. If you go to a hospital, you risk getting infected by the sick. So don't hang out in hospitals. Unfortunately, I did not practice enough social distancing from the weak yet aggressive birds of prey at a Kroger Frys store in Phoenix even though the pandemic there had rendered the weakness suddenly blatantly transparent. It is tempting to engage with the birds of prey, but it is a trap, for they lure stronger people in, perhaps out of resentment for the inner weakness that the weak sense, in order not to conquer but instead to inflict. Such invisible birds of prey are infectious in that even the healthy can be beguiled into going down to the birds' acrimonious level. Nietzsche's writing style, which I am reflecting in this paragraph, certainly does not mince words; both the herd animals and those from within who dominate the herd and beguile the strong to dominate them too are sick.  

Physical distancing can thus be distinguished from social distancing; the former is advisable during an infectious pandemic and both kinds of distancing are recommended for a person who is confronted by weak, confrontational (and even aggressive) retail employees and managers. 

To be sure, not all retail employees and managers are weak, but that restless birds of prey survive in retail stores reflects badly on retail companies, including their internal accountability. Put another way, without empirical studies in the stores, it is not possible to know the percentage of workers and managers who have been infected or are innately sick--the weak cannot be but weak, and the strong cannot be other than strong. Yet the severity of the sickness suggests that the company or even the industry is unduly susceptible to the weakness and its being able to even beguile the strong into being dominated in fear. Put another way, the behavior can violate customer service so deeply that the presence of a kind of brain sickness can be inferred. 
The sheer extreme to which the Kroger (asst) store manager and his young sidekick allowed themselves to go in verbally attacking me as I walking toward the main door and even outside of the store, without instead asking why I had used my phone to record the lack of physical distancing in the store by customers, employees, and even a manager, demonstrated to me at least that something was wrong with the two men. They wanted to go beyond insults to be cruel in their aggressive walking after me, scolding me, and threatening me. 

The young sidekick's bizarre behavior was also a red flag concerning his underlying sickness (and mentality). Outside of the store, as I was heading into the parking area, he loudly threatened me, "Taking pictures on private property is Very illegal!" Then he immediately (and fakely) repeatedly thanked me for shopping there! Did he then think he had exercised good customer service? 

He obviously thought he knew the law, as did his boss, even though the company had posted no signs prohibiting photography and I had not used my phone-camera after the two men had initially accosted me in the store (they lied that a customer had complained, hiding that an employee had also complained). Also, as the employee of the county's Environmental Services department later told me, I was not breaking any law recording evidence. Of course, the sidekick would doubtlessly have declared that such taping is illegal! Perhaps I should have called his bluff. In hindsight, I wish I had taped the (asst) manager and his sidekick shouting at me from the check-out area to the parking area. Evidence! Perhaps it was out of fear of this that the manager threatened that he would call the police even though I was leaving anyway. At the time, I didn't want to trigger the aggressive birds beaming down from their perches. In actuality, the customers should be on perches!

It is interesting that an employee and customer who were violating the store policy (and government guidelines) on physical distancing  decided to retaliate against me by reporting on me rather than cease their problematic, and perhaps even dangerous, inconsiderate conduct. I held my phone up in part to dissuade them from continuing to proceed so closely to me (I also asked them, but they refused), but to no avail. They were oblivious to what they were doing, but not to what I was doing. I submit that they felt resentment--ressentiment--rather than remorse; they lashed out, rather than offered even just an apology.  They would thus be likely to continue their risky behavior. 

I contend that the mentality was by 2020 so ingrained in Arizona that the government's guidelines on physical distancing were insufficient, given the people there. Even an order would have had to be enforced by law enforcement, especially as the stores were not willing to enforce even their own policies on wearing masks because doing so could compromise earnings. 

The mentality was so prevalent among the general public (notably in the middle and lower economic classes) in at least Tucson and the Phoenix metropolitan area that aggressiveness toward strangers was very apparent to people new to Arizona. "The people here are mean as rattlesnakes," one person told me. The people native to Arizona have blamed people coming in from other U.S. states, but even such convenient deflection is actually part of the culture in the state where cacti prick. In fact, culture-shock in moving to a major city in Arizona includes adjusting to the obvious "police state" mentality, wherein security guards and the police easily partake of the excess aggression. Overly, and I suspect intentionally visible security guards even standing next to an off-duty police employee were not uncommon at Albertsons (Frys) stores in Phoenix. As this was not the case at other grocery chains there, I submit that desire to intimidate customers is a revealing part of Albertsons' corporate culture in Arizona. That is, the company's culture there reflected the societal culture.  


A security guard stands in a confrontational stance at an Albertsons (Frys) store in Phoenix, Arizona. 

The (assistant) manager and his sidekick were clearly at home in such a societal and corporate culture. At the store level at least, it was permissible to intimidate customers by an excessive show of even police force on a routine basis and verbally and physically harass customers. It is not the sort of company culture that would be conducive to managers and employees mastering their sordid instinctual urge of aggression. The instinct to be considerate towards other people, on the other hand, would not receive its due respect. 

In being so motivated to be unnecessarily aggressive toward me because an employee had complained, the (asst) manager was enabling the employee's sick game. Two birds of a feather fly together, Nietzsche would say. The healthy cannot be blamed for cutting up their store cards in order to maintain a pathos of distance from the sick. Strength can only be frustrated by weakness. This is the epitomy of the sickness that Nietzsche describes in his texts.  

So in proclaiming the law as if he could not be wrong about it and assuming that customers should know that the company prohibits photography without being told or seeing any signs posted, the sidekick not only demonstrated his ignorance, but also lashed out at me. At the very least, this anadote strongly suggests that retail is susceptible to weakness wanting to dominate even the people to be served. In fact, the managerial role itself may be susceptible as control is so salient.[9]

In the Kroger store, two birds of prey flied too close to me, literally circling me and hovering within the store and pursuing me as if I were their prey outside, as they smelled an opportunity to eke out a bit of pleasure from inflicting repressed ire (sourced in self-resentment, which is deeper than the resentment against the strong) on a customer. Customers conveniently look weaker to faint, greedy eyes from the birds' soiled perches. I regret not having photographed the birds so you too could be astonished at the severity of the sickness of the weak, but I promise the manager and his sidekick were nothing to look at. 


[1] Nathaniel Meyersohn, “Experts Say It May Be Time for Grocery Stores to Ban Customers from Coming Inside,” CNN.com, April 19, 2020 (accessed same day).
[2] Ibid.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Nathaniel Meyersohn, "Stores Want Shoppers to Wear Masks. But Some Customers Refuse," CNN.com, April 23, 2020.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Ibid.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Skip Worden, On the Arrogance of False Entitlement: A Nietzschean Critique of Business Ethics and Management.
[9] Ibid.