Tuesday, January 3, 2012

On the U.S. Presidency's Campaign “Season”

The overextension, or hypertrophy, of one part of a governmental system—whether a level, branch or even a particular office—can be seen in the overemphasis alone of the process by which it is filled. Whether obsessed over or merely elongated, the selection process can come to take on a life of its own. Indeed, it could even eclipse governing. If, in referring to a particular office that has a four year term, one expects a window of only a year or perhaps two for governing before the selection process revs up again, then there is reason to suspect that the office has too much power in the system of government. Of course, it could also be that the selection process is simply flawed, but why then would so many people either tacitly approve it or even maintain that it is necessary.

In the context of the Iowa caucuses, which formally kick off the nomination process for the U.S. presidency—after at least six months of media-complicit campaigning and debates during which candidates rise and fall without a single vote being cast—the vested interests in Iowa defend the value, even necessity, of what is essentially, Me first! Listen to me, watch me! What is mentioned in the media as an aside, if at all, is the small fact that Iowa’s delegates to the parties’ nominating conventions are selected months later at a state convention. The selection of delegates is not a reflection of the popular vote. One would not suspect this from all the attention given to the “results” on caucus night. In actuality, the value of the results is basically in giving the first snapshot of what some voters in one small, unrepresentative state feel about the various candidates. While preferable to having pundits misinterpret polls in order to grab headlines by elevating some candidates while effectively marginalizing or even pushing others out well before any votes are cast, the Iowa caucuses are a straw poll of sorts, whose value is largely perceptual. Considering that the Iowa straw poll, which occurs about six months before the caucuses, can be far off the mark as a predictor of their results—much less of who is actually nominated by the two major parties (e.g., 2011-2012)—we might want to reassess the value of the caucuses even as little polls.

I contend that the overemphasis of the “first in the nation” caucuses, far beyond their significance even to the parties’ eventual nominating conventions in Iowa, stems from the overemphasis of the office of the U.S. presidency itself. Whether the power of that office had grown too much through roughly the last three-quarters of the twentieth century or the media and the people have built up too much “personality hype” surrounding the office, to obsess over its selection process from even midway through the four year term is at the very least excessive. Most significantly, the sheer length of the campaign “season” can compromise or even thwart the governing. In other words, we are treating a means with at least one end. We do not select a president so he (or she) can turn around and start campaigning for re-election. Perhaps we should not even allow presidential second-terms, though we would still have the multi-year campaign “season.”

In short, I contend that the way in which the two major American political parties nominate their respective candidates for the office of the U.S. president is deeply flawed, if not broken. Moreover, the entire campaign “season” is entirely too long, and growing longer—at least as of 2012. Similarly, the commercial Christmas, or “Happy Holiday” season was also being pushed further back into November and even October with our tacit approval (or at least not confronting offending retailers). Another national holiday, Thanksgiving, which is on the third Thursday in November, has come to be eclipsed or slighted in a way that is similar to how governance comes to be relegated or even ignored as the cameras turn to the “upcoming” campaign. After months of daily coverage even before the Iowa caucuses, the media proclaim that the campaign season is about to begin. How, one might wonder, can a journalist make such a statement with a straight face? You have been covering the race every day for at least six months, maybe longer! About to begin?  Haven’t you been paying attention to even what you have been doing? Nobody can be that stupid. One can reasonably wonder, therefore, whether it is in the interest of some power behind the scenes that the presidential campaign be turned into a business in its own right, or for some other purpose to be served that would be put at risk were the fiction uncovered and the system fixed.

Of course, as I allude to above, all of the attention paid to the presidential campaigning could be due to the increased power of the office itself. In his book on the presidency, Arthur Schlesinger refers the inordinate power of the office as “the imperial presidency.” The presidency, which includes the role of commander in chief, gained power from World War II to the Vietnam War in part due to what can be termed the “cycle of influence” involving the increasingly powerful military-industrial complex. In general terms, the increasing amount of money being “donated” to successive presidential campaigns suggests that at least some wealthy donors view the office as being sufficiently powerful to warrant the higher investment in influence.

One should not expect a candidate for president to campaign on reducing the powers of the presidency. At the very least, such a platform would suffer from a rather obvious conflict of interest. According to the International Herald Tribune’s 2012 New Year’s edition, even the “limited government” Republican candidates for president held “expansive views about the scope of the executive powers they would wield if elected—including the ability to authorize the targeted killing of U.S. citizens they deem threats and to launch military attacks without congressional permission.” Most of the candidates saw “the commander in chief as having the authority to lawfully take extraordinary actions if he decides doing so is necessary to protect national security.”[1] This view would turn out to be convenient should any of those candidates become president.

The military rise of the U.S. around the world since World War II—even fighting two wars at once in the first decade of the twenty-first century!—has made the American presidency more powerful in absolute terms as well as relative to the other offices, branches and even levels of government in the United States. This trend is particularly dangerous because it is difficult to hold a president accountable. Making reference to the preceding “decade of disputes over the scope and limits of presidential authority,” which itself could have been a reaction to its increase, the Tribune points out that “executive branch actions are often secret and courts rarely have jurisdiction to review them.”[2] We are lucky there have not been more “slicky Dick” Nixons occupying the White House. So the conventional wisdom is that the candidates must be thoroughly vetted, even if by the pundits and press instead of being willowed down by the voters closer to the election (i.e., within the same year!). Fear can be a powerful motivator in “staying the course” in the status quo.

The sheer duration of the presidential election cycle, plus the seemingly consequential Iowa caucuses being its first snapshot by some of the electorate, is said to be valuable, even necessary. This claim is a galaxy away from my perspective that the selection process is fundamentally flawed as well as broken. How is it that European campaign season—admittedly on the state level but the states play a larger role at the E.U. level than their American counterparts do at the U.S. level—is only a few months? Do the Americans make better decisions on account of the longer duration and related additional attention? Typically, any possible “constitutional moment” wherein the general public focuses on a major matter of governance or policy during the campaign is quickly eclipsed by the report that someone called someone else a bad name. As if by instinct, we feel we need to hear what the other guy said in reply, so we are hooked, like addicts, totally unaware of the opportunity costs both in terms of substantive public debate and in our own lives, which I submit should not be lived vicariously through a soap opera of bad actors willing to go on and on if it will get them the power they crave. So, finally, it can be asked whether they are worth all of the time we give them. Maybe if the office were not so powerful, or if structural changes were made to how a person is selected as president, we might get a break from the seemingly unending series of reports on the campaigns.

We do not even know that the U.S. Constitution mandates the Electoral College as a way to check excess democracy ironically by making use of elected representatives. The state legislatures were to appoint the electors who would then vote by state to elect the president. Even though the U.S. House was to be the repository of popular election in the U.S. Government and the Electoral College was meant to check excess democracy (e.g., the impact of momentary passions) for our own good, American citizens living long before the twenty-first century made the electors in each state subject to whichever candidate wins the popular vote in the state. In other words, the system is not only out of control; it was never designed to function as a multi-year electoral “season.” Even so, it goes on as if nothing were wrong—even as if the status quo were being worshipped, in effect. At the very least, to be comfortable with a broken status quo indicates that something is wrong societally—with us.  To admit that it is broken but be resigned to it is almost to deserve it. It is as though the United States is so big, as an empire of fifty republics comparable to European states, that only the sheer mass of its inertia can fuel its momentum. No other force, even from within, dares challenge the powerful vested interests who insist not only that the system is working, but that it must! We in turn do not question, really. We are so accustomed to going along with the status quo, as if its mere operation meant it is viable, that we hardly even notice.

On a clear, sunny day in early 2012, a century after the Titanic sank, few if any Americans were viewing the presidential contest then going on as fundamentally broken; the attention was on the personalities running. It is as if American society itself were unconsciously flirting with an iceberg ahead, sipping tea oblivious to the danger—or stranger still, looking straight at the mass of ice ahead while pausing to rearrange the deck chairs as if to get the best view. No need to report the sight or figure out a change of course. As the Iowa caucuses demonstrate, it is important to be first—sitting in front. This is ironic in lands so filled with Churches (even in the campaigns). Being able to secure one’s place means the system is working—serving the good of the whole, the public good.

See related essay: “Picking a President by Polls”


1. Charlie Savage, “Limited Government But Far-Ranging Presidency,” International Herald Tribune, December 31, 2011-January 1, 2012.  
2. Ibid.

Sunday, January 1, 2012

On the Plight of the Euro

Relative to the U.S. dollar, the euro of the E.U. was not in as dire shape in 2011 as was typically presumed. As the euro celebrated its ten-year anniversary on January 1, 2012 at $1.29, a ten-year perspective could assuage the irrational exaggeration of fear over the currency’s impending demise. Besides the human propensity to develop tunnel vision—looking only right straight ahead—we tend to over-dramatize some things (while ignoring other things).


The full essay is at "Essays on the E.U. Political Economy," available at Amazon.

Thursday, December 15, 2011

Leadership in Europe: A Recipe for Reducing Legal Uncertainty

Concerning the legal environment of business, the lawyers who teach as full-time instructors in American business schools affirm that managers would rather have a challenging environment that they know than one that is characterized by headlines such as, “Legal Uncertainty Imperils EU Agreement.” At the E.U.’s parliament, which represents the E.U.’s citizens, the president of the European Council, Herman Van Rompuy, said in the wake of the agreement, “An intergovernmental treaty was not my first preference, nor that of . . . most of the member states . . . It will not be easy, also legally speaking. I count on everybody to be constructive, bearing in mind what is at stake.”[1] Investors were “largely dismissive” of the Council meeting  at which the extra-E.U. agreement on strengthening the enforcement mechanism of state deficit and debt limits had been reached at the end of the previous week. Alan Brown, chief investment officer at Schroders Investment Management, which had at the time almost $300 billion under management, said of the results of the Council meeting, “Yes, it was what I expected, and yes, I was disappointed.”[2] Schroders was backing up this view with a modest bet against the euro. Relatedly, Barclays was forecasting the currency to fall from $1.30 on December 13, 2011 to $1.25 by June 2012. Besides the pessimism on the “intergovernmental treaty” as well as a possible increase of funds from the $500 billion cap on the agenda at a Council meeting in March 2012, the sheer uncertainty described by Van Rompuy lowers the value of the announced agreement and the outlook concerning the viability of the euro as well as the E.U. itself.

Federalismus in Action: Jose Barosso of the E.U. Commission and Angela Merkel of Germany / NYT

The full essay is at "Essays on the E.U. Political Economy," available at Amazon.


1. Steven Erlanger and Stephen Castle, “Europe United, Minus One: A Firm German Imprint on an E.U. Transformed,” International Herald Tribune, December 10-11, 2011. 
2. Matina Stevis, Frances Robinson, and Marcin Sobczyk, “Legal Uncertainty Imperils EU Agreement,” The Wall Street Journal, December 14, 2011; Tom Lauricella, “Euro at 11-Month Low,” The Wall Street Journal, December 14, 2011.

Monday, December 12, 2011

Unanimity as Outmoded in the E.U."

In the U.S., states can get waivers from having to comply with regulations, depending on the particular law; federal legislation is not passed as if only between some of the several states. It is pretty much a one-size-fits-all notion of federal law, with opt-outs possible typically only on particular regulatory requirements. One such publicized waiver enables states to be exempted from the health-insurance mandate if they can show they have achieved the aim (universal healthcare) by another means. Massachusetts, for example, had a pre-existing program of universal health-care.

In Europe, David Cameron vetoed the European Council proposing an amendment to the E.U.’s basic law that would have strengthened the enforcement mechanism constraining state governments that exceed deficit and debt limits established by the E.U. His message was on behalf of state rights. So it was very smart indeed that the Europeans came up with a way to avoid the downside of unanimity while recognizing that some of the states jealously guard the sovereignty they have retained.  Hitherto, the veto mechanism that any state can use to block laws in important areas like taxation has crippled or at least hampered the E.U. institutions in meeting even the responsibilities entailed in the E.U.’s current competencies. Besides gradually increasing the percentage of the E.U.’s competencies (domains of authority) subject to qualified majority voting rather than unanimity, it turns out that groups of at least nine states can go ahead with legislation if a proposal is stalled or vetoed by a state. Crucially, the vetoing state need not be subject to the legislation. Valuing this is a distinctive European trait in the annals of modern federalism. Adding competencies to the E.U. government need not require every state, including most notably euroskeptic, veto-prone states like Britain, to give up more sovereignty.

The Visible Hand: Markets Forging a Stronger E.U.

Joschka Fischer, a former foreign minister of the state of Germany, said the agreement under which 17 state governments accept more oversight and control of their budgets by the European Union “was a big step, which was pushed on the Europeans by the markets.”[1] Such pressure was necessary, given the conflict of interest bearing on state officials working at the federal level on a deal that would add a new competency to the E.U. “(I)n the end,” Fischer added, “the markets have limited the options of the political leaders, especially of Merkel, and pushed her into giving more support for the euro.”[2] Giving more support for the euro meant giving more power to the E.U. at the expense of the state-level where Merkel has most of her power. From this vantage point (i.e., the power that state officials have at the E.U. level), it is amazing that the E.U. has been able to acquire any additional competencies.


The full essay is at "Essays on the E.U. Political Economy," available at Amazon.


1. Steven Erlanger and Liz Alderman, “Chronic Pain for the Euro,” The New York Times, December 12, 2011; Landon Thomas, “A Stark Step Away From Europe,” The New York Times, December 11, 2011. 
2. Ibid.

Monday, December 5, 2011

The Democracy Deficit in Nominating Presidential Candidates

“Newt Gingrich is up, Herman Cain is out, and the attacks are getting sharper as the GOP primary campaign enters the final month.”[1] The final month, that is, before “Iowa launches the contests that will choose the challenger to President Obama.” This has the ring of before time began, or before the beginning. That anything is decided before the beginning may seem metaphysically impossible even if it applies politically. One might demur, claiming that anything without a foundation ought not to be able to exist, let alone to stand. Can Americans borrow anything from the E.U.'s presidents that might improve how the U.S. president is selected?

The full essay is at Essays on Two Federal Empires, which is available at Amazon. 


1. Susan Page, “Gingrich Rises in GOP Field; Cain Out,” USA Today, December 5, 2011.

Sunday, December 4, 2011

A Dilemma for the E.U.: A Convention or an Amendment?

In November 2011, European leaders began to talk about amendments to the E.U. that would “change the fundamental structure of the union.”[1] Complicating the talks was ambiguity concerning the nature of the E.U. itself at the time. Foremost among the changes being discussed was the idea of a form of centralized oversight of the budgets of the state governments, with “sanctions for the profligate.”[2] The existing E.U., while more than the American Articles of Confederation, was at the time found to be insufficient in keeping the debt crisis from spreading from state to state and engulfing the union itself and its currency. “The survival of the euro zone is in play,” one senior European official said, “So far it’s been too little, too late.”[3] In this respect, the pressure for “ever closer union” was like that facing the Americans in the mid-1780s. Because the nature of the union was itself an issue, a convention composed of delegates—not state officials—directly elected by the people for the purpose might seem best suited. However, I contend that while rethinking the E.U. was not without merit at the time, the specificity of the planned amendment argues against the idea.


1. Steven Erlanger, "Leaders Struggle for a Deal to Keep Euro Intact," The New York Times, December 4, 2011.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.

Tuesday, November 29, 2011

An American President Meets the E.U.: Corrective Exigencies of a Debt Crisis

 Political protocol can take some time to catch up to changed political realities. For over two hundred years, it has been assumed that U.S. presidents have met with their counterparts in E.U. states such as Britain, France, and Germany. During the European debt crisis, “in numerous private conversations and increasingly forceful public statements, [American] policy makers are urging their European counterparts to take big steps and move fast to reassure markets.”[1] It was undoubtedly assumed that the counterparts were at the state level in the E.U., rather than in E.U. governmental institutions. So how are we to situate Barak Obama’s meeting on November 27, 2011 with José Manuel Barroso, president of the European Commission; Herman Van Rompuy, president of the European Council; and Catherine Ashton, the European foreign policy chief? 


 Doug Mills/NYT

1. Anne Lowrey, "Obama Meets Leaders of the European Union," The New York Times, November 28, 2011. 

Friday, November 25, 2011

Monti and Papadernos in the E.U.: Leadership in Technical Expertise or Democratic Deficit?

“The moment of truth has come.”[1] This was said by the head of state of the E.U.’s third largest state, Italy, in a televised address just after Berlusconi had resigned as the prime minister. Although the statement could be interpreted as referring to the need to reign in the Italian profligate system of public-sector patronage (which includes private contractors), Giorgio Napolitano could also have been referring to the credibility of his state at the E.U. level. “We need to restore confidence with investors and European institutions,” he continued before turning to the more tangible point that the state would need to refinance nearly 200 billion euros in government bonds before May, 2012.[2]


 Monti and Barroso (Thys/Agence France-Presse/Getty)


The full essay is at "Essays on the E.U. Political Economy," available at Amazon.

1. Alessandra Galloni and Christopher Emsden, “Italy’s Monti to Form New Government,” The Wall Street Journal, November 14, 2011.
2. Stephen Castle and Liz Alderman, “Under a New Prime Minister, Italy’s Star May Rise at the European Union,” The New York Times, November 23, 2011.

Monday, November 21, 2011

The African Customs Unions and the E.U.: On Currencies

The East African Community (EAC) is Africa’s “most advanced regional trade bloc,” according to The Wall Street Journal. As of the journal’s report in late 2011, the EAC was already a customs union that guaranteed the movement of goods and the right to work across Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and Tanzania. The parliaments were working at the time on synchronizing immigration and tariff laws. “We want to develop this corridor vigorously and collectively,” Mugo Kibati, director of a Kenyan government program, said. The journal notes, however, that the EAC and other trading blocs in Africa, such as the Southern African Development Community, were “backing away from one prominent aspect of Europe’s economic union: a common currency.” Aside from any vague similarities that the fiscal differences between Greece and Germany may have to those between Zimbabwe and South Africa, the currency question itself is out of place for a NAFTA-like trade agreement.


The full essay is at "Essays on the E.U. Political Economy," available at Amazon.


1. Patrick McGroarty, “Africa’s Goal: EuropeWithout the Currency,” The Wall Street Journal, November 21, 2011.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.