In September 2012, the E.U. state of Greece was in the process of working out a 11.5 euro austerity plan that would involve forced retirements in public sector and pension cuts so the E.U. would approve another installment of the bailout to the state. One resident remarked at the time, “Mark my words. In the coming months, there will be a revolution, and this government will fall.”[1] This sounds a bit like “buyer’s remorse” concerning the election the previous June in which the anti-bailout/austerity party barely lost. What about all the Greeks who voted for Samaras, the pro-bailout/austerity leader? It cannot be assumed that they, too, had buyer's remorse even as the additional cuts went into effect. Even if the electorate shifted in the direction of anti-austerity as the forced retirements and pension cuts occurred, the ingrediants of representative democracy includes terms of office to protect the elected officials by giving time for their policies to work. Representative democracy does not reduce to the momentary passion of the masses. According to Plato, mob rule is the bad form of democracy.
What if conditions significantly deteriorate and the representatives elected to office refuse to change course? Does this justify truncating the term? The German-led “austerity-only” approach to the Greek debt crisis clearly exacerbated the Greek fiscal condition. Austerity cuts resulting in further contractions of the economy meant more unemployment payouts by the Greek government even as it had to cut spending. Had Samaras' voters anticipated this? Is this question even relevant? The failure to anticipate how a policy once enacted will affect the economy does not nullify the votes cast or justify depriving the office holder of his or her the full term.
What if conditions significantly deteriorate and the representatives elected to office refuse to change course? Does this justify truncating the term? The German-led “austerity-only” approach to the Greek debt crisis clearly exacerbated the Greek fiscal condition. Austerity cuts resulting in further contractions of the economy meant more unemployment payouts by the Greek government even as it had to cut spending. Had Samaras' voters anticipated this? Is this question even relevant? The failure to anticipate how a policy once enacted will affect the economy does not nullify the votes cast or justify depriving the office holder of his or her the full term.
Terms of office enable elected representatives to do the right thing even when the masses at the moment are exerting tremendous pressure on the representatives to do what is politically expedient but not in the people's best interest. This can be distinguished from stubborn office-holders who rigidly hold to their ideology at the expense of the people's best interest. Because the term-of-office protects both good and bad office holders, rather than rewarding the courageous representatives and penalizing the office-holders who use their term be able to go too far, the term element of representative democracy is not enough.
In 2012, Samaras needed some time to do what might not match the momentary passions of the mob as retirements and pension cuts were being inflicted. Had the additional cuts triggered a meltdown in the state's economy with Samaras holding firm on the state budget cuts, a snap election could have been necessary not only to stop the meltdown, but also to prevent a revolution.
Is it a good idea that representative democracies have terms of elected office? The answer can only be vague or indeterminate. In parliamentary systems, a legislative vote of no confidence can of course trigger an election. The term is truncated. Ideally, this is not due to office-holders withstanding political pressures that would put political expedience above the best interests of the state and its people. The problem is that we cannot be sure.
See related: Skip Worden, Essays on the E.U. Political Economy: Federalism and the Debt Crisis.
In 2012, Samaras needed some time to do what might not match the momentary passions of the mob as retirements and pension cuts were being inflicted. Had the additional cuts triggered a meltdown in the state's economy with Samaras holding firm on the state budget cuts, a snap election could have been necessary not only to stop the meltdown, but also to prevent a revolution.
Is it a good idea that representative democracies have terms of elected office? The answer can only be vague or indeterminate. In parliamentary systems, a legislative vote of no confidence can of course trigger an election. The term is truncated. Ideally, this is not due to office-holders withstanding political pressures that would put political expedience above the best interests of the state and its people. The problem is that we cannot be sure.
See related: Skip Worden, Essays on the E.U. Political Economy: Federalism and the Debt Crisis.
1. Liz Alderman, “Greek Government and Public at Odds Over New Cuts,” The New York Times, September 6, 2012.
