The political debates
concerning the accession of candidate states such as Texas, California, Alaska
and even Hawaii into the U.S. were long past when the issue of enlargement became
salient for the E.U. due to Russia’s unilateral, unprovoked invasion of
Ukraine. In the American case, surely no one was arguing that the U.S. without being
enlarged would cease to be credible, yet in 2025, a government official of the
candidate state of Montenegro said as much of the European Union. Even if Filip
Ivanovic was merely using rhetoric during an interview on October 4, 2025, even
that should at least make sense. Making matters worse, his comments can be
interpreted as ultimatums for the E.U. even though nothing binds the E.U. to
annexing any future state. In fact, given the veto-power of state officials at
the federal level in the E.U., enlargement should arguably come only after
internal reform of the E.U.’s basic law concerning the power of the states at
the federal level.
During the interview with
Euronews, the deputy prime-minister of the candidate state said, “If enlargement
does not happen . . . then the very concept of the European Union loses its
credibility: It’s not European, and it’s not a union anymore.”[1]
I demur. That E.U. territory did not at the time extend to the entire continent
of Europe does not mean that the E.U. was not European. No one would seriously
contend that any of the E.U. states were not European, so it follows that the
E.U. itself, consisting of those states and a federal system, was not European.
As for the E.U. not being a union unless it enlarged under the pressure of
Putin’s militaristic aggression in Ukraine, the E.U.’s own constitutional or
basic law at the time put any such claim to rest as ludicrous. It was the
deputy prime-minister’s credibility that was actually on the line from his statement.
At the time, nine possible states were officially designated by the Commission as candidates for statehood, with Montenegro being “the most advanced in implementing the constitutional, judicial and economic reforms” that are required.[2] But Montenegro being at an advanced stage does not mean that the E.U. was therefore duty-bound to annex the territory of the state as being within the Union. Even so, Ivanovic said the government of Montenegro “cannot accept” the refusal of the E.U. to extend statehood to Montenegro because the other possible states “would understand that whatever they do is in vain.”[3] Whether the government of Montenegro could or could not accept a negative decision should be irrelevant to the E.U. as it decides on whether, and by how much, and when to enlarge its territory by extending offers of statehood. Asking for something and then stating that unless it is given, the decision will be unacceptable is not the way to ask for something if the expectation is that the request will be granted.
Viktor Orban of the E.U. state of Hungary had been using the state’s veto in the European Council on proposals concerning enlargement and foreign policy. As a result of Orban’s siding with Putin rather than with the majority of other states in the Union, the Union was being back from within in being able to adequately help Ukraine to resist Russia’s invasion even though Putin’s militarism was not justified even by historical arguments because might does not itself make right. Enlarging the Union such that even more states would be able to wield a veto to styme the Union would be recipe for paralysis at the federal level, and so this consideration alone is credible in deciding when it would be best to admit new states. It is not as though taking account of the risk of being held up by a single state forestalling action on the federal level before taking up the matter of enlargement would lack in credibility. Rather, moderating the power of the individual veto, similar to how the U.S. Senate has moderated the power of the filibuster (which is based on the fact that the states retain some governmental sovereignty just as the E.U. states do), would be prudent as requisite to enlarging. Whether or not this strategy was acceptable to Montenegro is irrelevant.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
