Ethics applied to human resource management is typically
thought to boil down to treating subordinates well. Kant’s categorical
imperative, treat other rational beings not just as means, but also as ends in
themselves, applies to this sense of ethical HR management. Specifically, human
beings are not only cogs in a machine; they have lives outside of work that
should not be expected to reduce to serving the interests of the employer.
Another side of HR management also exists, however, that concerns the handling
of unethical employees. Such handling can be ethical or unethical.
Front-line employees who deal with customers whether in
person or at a call center are especially subject to customer complaints. The
choices that such employees make on how to deal with customer complaints
regarding themselves can be ethical or unethical. For instance, an employee who
resists a customer’s request to speak to the employee’s supervisor acts
unethically by exploiting the conflict of interest. The conflict lies in the employee
putting his or her own vocational interest above the interests of the customer
and even the company. Gate-keeping refers to an employee’s efforts in getting
the customer to say why he or she wants to speak with a manager so if the
reason reflects badly on the employee, he or she can lie about a supervisor
being available or insist that the customer speak only to the employee about
the issue. Such an employee is operating at a primitive level—that of
self-preservation—rather than as a duty-bound agent of a principal (e.g., a
company).
I contend that a company’s management that does not have
adequate safeguards against such an exploitation of a conflict of interest
operates unethically with respect to its human resources. Should a customer
inform a supervisor of a specific employee who is exploiting the conflict of
interest and yet the supervisor does not set negative consequences for the
employee and notify middle-management
that the company’s safeguards against such exploitation are not sufficient acts
unethically too. Safeguards are possible beyond relying on individual customer
complaints. The latter strategy is flawed because the complaints that actually
reach a supervisor are reduced in conditions in which employees can get away
with exploiting the conflict of interest. Put another way, a company is
unethical in relying on individual complaints to willow out problematic
employees as a safeguard because it is hampered by the exploitation itself.
Interestingly, whereas exploitation of employees
is a common refrain, an employee’s exploitation of customers is less commonly
known.
Stronger safeguards are ethical where their efficacy cannot
be compromised by an employee’s exploitation of customers. Concerning phone
calls, for example, the greeting could include the following: “At any time
while speaking with a representative of the company, you can press 5 should you
like to report a problem you are having with the representative.” The call
could go to a designated manager who acts as a safeguard. In a store, a
designated desk could be identified as the place where customers can go if they
have had a problem with an employee. Unlike a typically customer-service desk,
the person taking the complaints should hold a rank higher than that of the
entry-level employees. Unfortunately, entry-level employees may tend to cover
for each other, and thus extend the conflict of interest rather than curtail
it.
Internal audit departments could definitely add assessing
weak as well as presumably strong safeguards. Calls to respective
customer-service departments could be made, and verification could be applied
not only to those calls, but also on real complaints. Problems may be difficult
to detect. As a case in point, the customer service process used by the
regional transit authority in Phoenix, Arizona begins with an employee in Metro
Valley’s customer-service department. Complaints on bus drivers are sent to
their respective supervisors, yet they are known to cover for their respective
drivers rather than provide accountability. Also, drivers circumventing company
policies, including those regarding the coronavirus pandemic, has also been a
major problem. Bad driving, such as braking too hard, and, relatedly, driving
fast to accrue enough time to take smoking breaks, have also been endemic and
beyond the reach the process of accountability. Aggravating the matter of
accountability, the driver-supervisors work for the sub-contracted
bus-operating companies; at least one of which dismissed videos of bad braking
in 2018. In short, the customer-service department’s process of handling
complaints and feedback is grossly inadequate, given the behavior of enough
drivers and their supervisors. An audit would ideally uncover the corruption
and come up with a process that takes the problematic drivers and supervisors
(i.e., the dysfunctional culture) into account. Accountability is indeed
difficult in such organizations in which employees regularly flaunt company
policies and the immediate supervisors enable such behavior by refusing to
enforce the policies even where unsafe driving and passenger health are
concerned.
