The words mutuality and
cooperation have positive connotations politically, whereas divisive and
exclusive do not. To be sure, mutual cooperation has the drawback of
relegating competitiveness, which can foster greater efficiency and effectiveness.
In the policy domain of defense, however, wherein nuclear weapons live,
competition between weaponized polities can be dangerous and thus not worth any
improvements from competing. The Cold War in the twentieth century attests to
the superiority of mutuality and cooperation at the international
theatre wherein polities act as sovereign militarized entities. Within a
federal Union, however, relying on the mutual cooperation between states is, I
contend, woefully deficient and inadequate. In fact, relying on states to assume
the burden of defense can lead to the violent break up of a Union, as was
dramatically demonstrated in what some Americans have called the War between
the States (1861-1865), but is more accurately called the war between the
U.S.A. and the C.S.A.(the Confederate States of America). Two political unions
of very different balances of power between the respective federal and state
levels of governance. It is precisely with this historical example in mind that
the comments made by E.U. (Commission) President Von der Leyen at the Munich
Security Conference in February, 2026 should be analyzed. Relying in going
forward from that time on the E.U. states to build up their respective military
forces, or militias in American-speak, under the assumption that those states
would mutually cooperate military is a very risky strategy for the E.U. at a
time in which its cousin across the Atlantic Ocean was pulling back from Europe
in terms of military protection.
Von der Leyen’s notion that
the E.U. could rely on its states in defense (as well as foreign policy) must
contend with reservations previously made by Mark Rutte, NATO’s Secretary
General, on Europe being able to defend itself without American cover at least
in the medium term. Specifically, Rutte had opined just a month earlier, “if
anyone thinks here, again, that the European Union, or Europe as a whole, can
defend itself without the US, keep on dreaming. You can’t. We can’t. We need
each other.”[1]
Still the aggressor in Ukraine, Russia’s Putin was still a reality check on
European “deams” of self-sufficiency in defense. Even so, Von der Leyen limited
the E.U.’s enhanced defense-capabilities to reliance on its member-states. “I
believe the time has come to bring Europe’s mutual defence clause to life,” she
said. “Mutual defence is not optional . . . it is an obligation.”[2]
She was referring to Article 42.7 of the E.U.’s basic law, which “states that ‘if
an E.U. [state] is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other
E.U. [states] have an obligation to aid and assist it by all means in their power.’”[3]
This article is similar to Article 5 of the NATO international alliance. Besides
ignoring the qualitatively and quantitively closer integration of states in a
federal Union, copying the article of an international alliance leaves open the
greater possibility—one that was foreseen by the American Founders on that Union
being in part to prevent internecine wars between the states—that E.U. states could
utilize their bolstered militaries to fight each other rather than just
cooperate in a mutual action to push Russia out of Ukraine. In other words, Von
der Leyen’s decision to rely on Article 42.7 rather than propose a federal army
capable of united action beyond mutual cooperation (and to aid in the
cooperation of the state militias) ignores the qualitative difference between a
federal Union of states (i.e., European integration) and an international
alliance. Besides the greater likely of conflicts between states in a Union,
the E.U.’s foreign policy competency could lead to offensive rather than merely
defensive united action, as for example could have been waged in Ukraine to
push the Russian troops out in the first months of that invasion. In other
words, the fact that governmental sovereignty in the E.U. is divided, albeit too
unevenly, between the E.U. and the state governments means that relying on
mutual cooperation between the states for military action is insufficient and
even arguably contradictory. The latter treats the E.U. as it were like the U.S.’s
Articles of Confederation, under which the 13 states were sovereign countries.
Even without the dual-sovereignty that the E.U. federation enjoys, General
Washington was (barely) able to hold together a continental army rather than rely
on the mutual cooperation of the armies of the 13 American countries in that
Union. How much more should the E.U. have a federal army, as per the
dual-sovereignty-feature of its federal system! Lest it be countered that the
E.U. states were still sovereign in 2026, the voting method of qualified-majority
itself represents a transfer of sovereignty to the federal level, as a state could
(and has) found itself on the losing side of those votes.
Finally, there is the danger in relying on the states to develop their own nuclear-weapons capability rather than assigning control of those weapons to the federal level institutions, including the European Council, which represents the state governments at the federal level directly. As Rutte said about European sufficiency in defense, “You’d have to build up your own nuclear capability” because “you would lose the ultimate guarantor of our freedom, which is the U.S. nuclear umbrella. So, hey, good luck!”[4]
I would simply, add, good luck with Vickor Orbán of the E.U. state of Hungary
having nuclear weapons as leverage against other states and even the ECJ and
the Commission as they try to punish the Hungarian government for violating
E.U. law. Moreover, good luck trying to minimize the chance that any E.U. state
might use its strengthened military might to invade another state, with no
federal army to push back the aggressor. Especially in the context of years of
the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Von der Leyen’s misjudgment in stopping at
Article 42.7 is startling, especially as her speech came shortly after Mario
Draghi’s speech urging more federal competencies in the E.U. to strengthen the
federal system from being too dominated by its states at the expense of united
action that goes beyond even mutual cooperation.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
