Why has the E.U. been
sidelined amid the military tensions in the Middle East? The answer lies with the
E.U.’s federal system, rather than the size of its economy or of its population.
The E.U. certainly could have more geopolitical sway abroad were it not for a vulnerability
being exploited within its own federal system. The vulnerability stems from a
refusal by some state officials to recognize and respect the qualitative and
quantitative differences between the federal and the state levels of the E.U. Specifically,
when the governor (i.e., chief executive and/or head of state) of a state operates
as if a federal-level official, especially that of a federal
president, the authority of the actual federal president is undercut, hence
weakening that person’s ability to convince the heads of foreign governments to
include the E.U. president or foreign minister in multilateral negotiations centered
on the Middle East, for example. Even unconsciously, foreign leaders may say to
themselves, why should we respect the president of the E.U. if she is so
easily upstaged by the leader of an E.U. state who is acting as if he were
president of the European Commission? To speak with one voice, and to be able to
speak for the E.U. rather than just one state thereof, an E.U. official
must be the speaker. Macron of the E.U. state of France cannot speak for the
E.U., but Von der Leyen could, provided her space is respected by the
governors of the states. This is not to say that this is the only reason why
the E.U. has been sidelined from negotiations on Middle East warfare; rather,
my contention is that this reason is typically overlooked due to the
Euroskeptic ideological delusion that the E.U. does not have a federal system
of government even though since 1993, governmental sovereignty has indeed been
split between the states and the Union. Perhaps the underlying question here is
whether continuing to clutch at the anti-federalist ideology is worth the E.U.
continuing to be weakened unnecessarily from within, and thus sidelined
from international negotiations that do not center on Europe. Making such blind-spots
transparent is indeed a valuable occupation, even if it can be infuriating to people whose interests and ideology are served best if societies look the
other way.
In June, 2025, Claude
Moniquet, a European formerly in the field of intelligence, told a journalist
that the E.U. had been left “sitting on the sidelines” as Israel pummeled Gaza
and commenced a bombing in Iran.[1]
“Europeans have been pretty much excluded from all major diplomatic manoeuvres
around the war in Gaza or the war in Lebanon,” he added.[2]
So even though the president of the E.U.’s executive branch, Ursula Von der
Leyen, wrote on 13 June 2025, “Diplomatic efforts are crucial to preventing
further escalation,” after having spoke with Israel’s president, Isaac Herzog,
words are just words if they are from the sidelines rather than after having
been dealt a hand of cards at the power-table.[3]
I submit that the irrelevance of Von der Leyen’s words is partly due to Emmanuel
Macron of the E.U. state of France having “stolen the thunder” by putting himself
up as speaking for the E.U. on Gaza.
For instance, during a
three-hour televised interview in early May, 2025, Macron said that Europe should
consider sanctioning Israel over the humanitarian situation in Gaza, where “hundreds
of thousands” were thought to be “facing starvation.”[4]
Even though he was understandably frustrated by the lack of sanctions at the
federal level, the president of France had no place to speak for Europe, as
he was not an E.U. official at the time. To be sure, the thorny problem of the
principle of unanimity in the European Council and the Council of Ministers on
foreign-policy matters was a factor in the E.U.’s internal-weakness at the
federal level, but Macron’s proper orientation was to contend that France
should consider sanctioning Israel, if this had not already been done. Indeed,
Macron said publicly on 30 May 2025 that France could harden its
position on Israel. “The humanitarian blockade is creating a situation that is
untenable on the ground,” he said.[5]
Yet two weeks later, Macron
was visiting Greenland to represent Europe’s—not just France’s—objection to U.S.
President Trump’s desire to make Greenland a U.S. territory. “The situation in
Greenland is clearly a wakeup call for all Europeans,” he said as if he were president
of the E.U. rather than the governor of an E.U. state.[6]
This manner of situating the French president may seem harsh, but I submit that
I have properly stated his role from the vantage point of the E.U. and
particularly in terms of its federal system, wherein states are both
qualitatively and quantitatively distinct from the federal level officials and
governmental branches. Von der Leyen could have spoken for E.U. citizens rather
than merely residents of the state of France were she to have visited
Greenland, but Macron relegated such an opportunity for the E.U., and thus the
collective clout that it potentially could have that a state could not. There
is a cost, in other words, in a state official refusing to apply self-control
when going into the spotlight is tempting. Were the U.S. president to try to
invade Greenland, the E.U. president would have more economic clout than France
could have with which to pressure Trump to cease and desist in his imperial
designs.
Admittedly, involving state
officials in foreign policy is arguably one way in which the E.U.’s federal
system is a better case of federalism than the top-heavy American counterpart,
but such involvement requires also giving E.U. officials, especially its (executive
branch) president and foreign minister, enough authority with which to block
state leaders from stealing the show on the societal stage. Although the U.S.
had taken the doctrine of federal preemption of state action too far, some
preemption would be justified in the E.U., especially as the governors do have
a formal role even at the federal level in the European Council and through
their ministers in the Council of Ministers on foreign policy. The proclivity
to go beyond those federal institutions conflicts with the roles of the E.U.
president and foreign minister in being able to lead the E.U. on foreign policy.
A similar case of state overreach occurred when the prime minister of Italy
sought to manipulate representatives in the European Parliament, which
represents E.U. citizens rather than states. Likewise, a governor of one of the republics
in the U.S. can justifiably pressure a U.S. senator representing that governor’s
state at the federal level, but the House representatives even in districts
located in that state serve the U.S. citizens in those districts rather than
the state government.
In short, political
overreaching should be guarded against for a federal system to function
optimally, such that benefits internationally from collective action at the
federal level can be realized while the cultural and ideological interstate
differences can be accommodated by there being policy domains retained by the
state governments. Stealing the limelight of someone else is not conducive to a
federal system being able to work both internally and as a political unit to
the outside world. Put bluntly, if France’s Macron wants so to be president of
the E.U., let him go through the process of candidacy at the end of Von der
Leyen’s second term rather than usurp her role before then.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Gavin Blackburn, “Macron on ‘Crusade against Jewish State,’ Israel Says Following Criticism of Gaza War,” Euronews.com, 30 May 2025.
5. Reuters, “France May Toughen Stance on Israel If It Continues Blocking Gaza Aid, Macron Says,” Reuters.com, May 30, 2025.
6. Emma De Ruiter, “Macron Reaffirms Support for Greenland during Visit Ahead of G7 Summit,” Euronews.com, 15 June, 2025.
