As if having elected
representatives and political parties in the European Parliament were not
enough evidence that the E.U. has been a political union all along, the distinctly
political role of the E.U. with regard to Ukraine amid the Russian
invasion renders the E.U. political not merely institutionally in regard to representative
democracy, which is a political rather than an economic system. Also, that the
European Commission has exclusive competency on trade does not eclipse the
union’s distinctly political activity. That the E.U. agreed to move forward
informally with Ukraine’s accession request even though the state of Hungary
was formally vetoing the accession demonstrates a political function or role of
the European Union.
In December, 2025, the E.U. announced
that it had “drawn up an action plan” for Ukraine to meet accession standards “despite
official talks being blocked by Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán.”[1]
To be sure, for one state to wield its veto at the federal level when all of
the other states are opposed is arguably a case of an abuse of the informal
consensus model; after all, it was not as though Ukraine’s accession would
threaten the vital interests of the state of Hungary. That veto-power of the
states in the European Council and the Council of Ministers on E.U.
competencies (i.e., enumerated powers) is itself a misplaced harbinger of a
confederal system of government, wherein the states retain all governmental
sovereignty, rather than modern federalism, wherein competencies, or
governmental sovereignty, are divided between federal and state governmental
institutions. So the Commission was entirely justified in working informally to
find a political means by which the government of Ukraine could get
itself up to the anti-corruption, pro-democratic standards of the E.U. (even
though Bulgaria’s government collapsed that December due to mass protests
against corruption in that government/administration).
The E.U.’s ten-point plan for
Ukraine to follow in order to be assessed at a later date, perhaps after Orbán’s
upcoming election, is inherently political (rather than economic) because the Commission
framed the accession as “essential” to providing Ukraine “with future security
guarantees.”[2] The
Union’s Enlargement Commissioner, Marta Kos, said at the time of the
announcement that Ukraine’s accession is “the political arm of the
European security guarantee for Ukraine” and would be “central to make any
peace settlement sustainable.”[3]
The E.U.’s executive branch was thus acting in a political capacity.
Thus the E.U. is a political union even at its distinctly federal level (i.e.,
apart from any institutional involvement of the state governments at the
federal level).
Put another way, because the
E.U. executive branch used it 10-point plan to “bypass Hungary’s political veto
on the official opening of accession negotiations,” the E.U. itself was carrying
out a distinctly political function. It is difficult to argue that the E.U. was
not a political union at the time, yet operated politically even apart from any
formal involvement of the state governments at the federal level. Yet ideological
denial was still strong enough for many E.U. citizens to deny not only that the
E.U. is a political union, but that also that it has a federal system even
though having states is sufficient for the E.U. to have a federal
system. Underneath the antiquated state-veto lies the Euroskeptic and
anti-American political ideologies that have been holding the E.U. back not
only from being able to enlarge, but also to adequately aid Ukraine militarily
through years of it being invaded by Russia.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid. Italics added.
