To leverage the combined power,
or united front, that is possible in Europe, the European Union was established
in the waning years of the twentieth century. Roughly thirty years later, the power
of the state governments at the federal level still compromised the leverage,
especially in foreign affairs and defense. Even in sanctioning trading partners,
even qualified majority voting in the Council of the E.U. can be said to have
negatively impacted the ability of the E.U. Commission, the executive branch, to
leverage the political muscle of the E.U. against other countries. State-level
political agendas could essentially hold any possible leverage hostage. It may
be worth thinking about why a qualified majority vote in the Council of the
E.U., which represents the state governments, rather than in the E.U.’s
parliament, which represents E.U. citizens, was necessary for trade sanctions
to be applied to duty-free imports from Israel. That state-level political or
economic interests could possibility trump applying economic leverage to stop
Israel’s genocide and holocaust in Gaza, as well as Israel’s military attacks
on other countries in the Middle East can be an indication that the state
governments have too much power at the federal level. For if the E.U. is only an
aggregation of states, without the whole being more than the sum of the parts,
then the whole sans the aggregate cannot very well enact leverage on
foreign actors abroad, even those whose behavior has been nothing short of
atrocious.
On September 17, 2025, the
European Commission released its proposal to sanction Israel “for its ongoing
military assault in Gaza, as well as deepening occupation of the West Bank,
which Brussels says breach the EU-Israel Association Agreement.”[1]
Regarding that treaty, I contend that the E.U.’s state governments should not
have any say on the consequences for Israel because the treaty is between the
E.U. and Israel. As trade is an exclusive competency of the E.U., only
federal institutions, which include the European Commission, the European
Parliament, and the European Court of Justice, rightly have sufficient
jurisdiction (i.e., competence) to terminate the Agreement due to the violation
or sanction Israel economically (as the Agreement is economic in nature).
Moreover, developing the habit
of distinguishing distinctly federal governmental (i.e., executive,
legislative, and judicial) institutions from other E.U. bodies that represent the
states would not be a bad idea for the European political elite, many of whom
have been in fear of even using the term federal because of what that
might provoke in Euroskeptic states such as Hungary. That fear, I submit, is likely
overblown, and it subtly undercuts the E.U. itself, especially in it being a
whole beyond a mere aggregation of states.
The E.U. Commission, subject to judicial review by the ECJ, determined that Israel had violated the Agreement. The decision to act against Israel was based on “’the rapidly deteriorating humanitarian situation in Gaza following the military intervention of Israel, the blockade of humanitarian aid, the intensifying of military operations,’ including the ongoing ground offensive, according to the European Commission.”[2] Such a credible finding against Israel does not justify state governments intervening through their access at the federal level through the European Council or the Council of the E.U. on suspicion that the E.U. president and her commissioners were acting out of prejudice against Israel. This in turn is clear from the fact that the proposed sanctions also apply to ten members of Hamas, in addition to two Israeli ministers, Security Minister Gvir and Finance Minister Smotrich “for their role inciting violence in the West Bank.”[3] The Agreement, of course, only holds for Israel, rather than Hamas, so that the proposed sanctions extend to Hamas demonstrates that the Commission was “bending over backwards” to be fair in such a one-sided war that it is not really a war, but, rather, a genocide and even a holocaust of cruelty wherein death is not deemed as “punishment” enough according to the utterly fallacious theory of collective justice.
E.U. President Von der Leyen said the week before the announcement of the proposed sanctions, “The horrific events taking place in Gaza on a daily basis must stop. There needs to be an immediate ceasefire, unrestrained access for all humanitarian aid, and the release of all hostages held by Hamas.”[4] She continued, “We propose to suspend trade concessions with Israel, sanction extremist ministers and violent settlers, and put bilateral support to Israel on hold . . .”[5] I submit that it would be difficult for the justices at the ECJ to find bias in her rationale or remedy, or, moreover, with her legitimacy in taking such a decision for the E.U. as a united front even though some state governments were at odds with her decision.
The whole is more than the sum of the parts, and yet only if one of the two largest states in opposition vote in favor of the sanctions would they pass. The E.U.’s foreign minister, Kaja Kallas, was pessimistic, noting at the time, “The political lines are very much in the place where they have been so far.”[6] But that is at the state level; things might have already changed in the European Parliament, whose representatives not only represent European voters, but also have the interests of the E.U. itself, including its treaties with other countries, in mind.
That the bias woven into the federal-level fabric of
the E.U. in favor of the state governments over E.U. citizens could inhibit the
E.U. from taking even an economic stand against a genocidal government indicates
that the state governments have too much power at the federal—and it is federal—level
of the European Union, such that reform in the Union’s basic or constitutional
law is warranted. If such is the case, care should be taken so too much power
be taken away from the state governments such that they could not even defend
their retained sovereignty from undue encroachment by the feds. Americans could
afford to take a lesson on that, for a one-size-fits-all public policy becoming
monopolistic at the expense of differences between states, whether American or
European, does not bode well in any empire-scale union.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
