In policing its borders as late as 2016, the E.U. suffered
the same plight as the U.S. did under its Articles of Confederation—only whereas
in the case of the U.S. the States retained all of their governmental sovereignty
under the Articles, some governmental sovereignty in the E.U. was already
lodged at the federal level. I contend that this perplexing disjunction between
extant federal competencies and state rights in the E.U. is not sustainable.
On October 6, 2016 when the E.U. opened its Boarder and Coast
Guard Agency to police the E.U.’s borders given the refugee crisis stemming
from Syria’s civil war, the state governments were not required to provide
guards and equipment. Those governments had “proved slow in delivering on their
pledges to the agency’s predecessor, Frontex.”[1]
Accordingly, E.U. Migration Commissioner, Dimitris Avramopoulos, warned, “Everyone
must join in and implement it as soon as possible. We have no time to lose.”[2]
He was not the first federal official to face such a frustration. Similarly,
Alexander Hamilton had had so much difficulty getting the U.S. States to send their
quotas of men and equipment to General Washington’s Continental Army that he
would later push for a large transfer of governmental sovereignty to the
federal level of the U.S. Fortunately, that level had few enumerated powers
under the Articles of Confederation, whereas the E.U. Commission has a
substantial number of competencies in 2016.
Therefore, having to rely on voluntary contributions from
the state governments really does not fit in the case of the E.U.’s
border-control and coast guard agency. Even just getting to the goal of 1,500
border-guard officers could be difficult if state officials decide to hold
their government’s quota hostage for some other political purpose, for example.
Moreover, that a state could fall short and yet get the benefit of
border-control agents sent from other states gives such a state an incentive to
fall short. Exactly the opposite should be the incentive.
The underlying problem is structural in nature: the federal
level of the E.U. had at the time sufficient competencies (i.e., enumerated
powers) that the extent of remaining state sovereignty was too much for the
federal system itself to function viably. Put another way, state and federal
officials, and the European electorate, had stood by in desiring both more
federal competencies and substantial state sovereignty—proverbially wanting their
cake and eating it too.
[1] Valentina
Pop, “EU Launches Effort to Police Its Borders,” The Wall Street Journal, October 7, 2016.
[2]
Ibid.
