On the Ideological Illogic of European Federalism

Europe may have contributed immensely to philosophy but logic seems to have been in short supply at times, as Europe ties itself in ideological knots in service of nationalism itself, as if that ideology had not given rise to two world wars in the twentieth century. I am not referring to the incendiary, irrational fear of the word, federalism, being applied to the European Union, but, rather, to the role of nationalist ideology in distorting the application of comparative institutional politics by journalists.

Take, for example, the following paragraph from Euronews: “Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni hosted three-way transatlantic talks in Rome on Sunday, which European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen highlighted as a possible ‘new beginning in international relations between the two blocs.”[1] Scant reasoning is needed to conclude that the two blocs being referred to are the E.U. and U.S., and that the Italian prime minister represents the third party, Italy.

The logic begins to fray, however, because the E.U. state of Italy is not separate from the E.U., so the talks were not actually three-way. To treat a state in a union of states as equivalent to that or any other like union is to commit a category mistake. Politically, the other E.U. states might get jealous were the E.U. state of Italy to be reckoned both as a state of the E.U. and as a third party in the talks, as if an umpire between the two “blocs.”

Typically, European journalists refer to only the E.U. as a “bloc” in order to differentiate that union from the other empire-scale union across the proverbial pond. To refer to both unions as blocs defeats that purpose. In actuality, neither union is a bloc because neither union is temporary nor oriented around one issue, or pillar. Furthermore, the federal, yes, federal governmental institutions of both unions are more than merely a playground for intergovernmental relations among state governments. In other words, both the E.U. and the U.S. have the sort of federal system wherein governmental sovereignty is split between the federal and state systems. In Federal Government, Ken Wheare uses “systems” instead of levels to make the point that where sovereignty is divided up, one locus is not “above” the other. In fact, the system of state governments can act as a check on over-reaches at the federal level, and vice versa.

Therefore, the E.U.-U.S. talks were actually bilateral between two empire-scale federal unions comprised of federal and state governmental institutions. The same powers need not be federalized in both unions for the latter to evince what Wheare calls modern federalism to distinguish it from confederalism, wherein the states hold all governmental sovereignty. Nor need there be a balance of power between that of the “feds” and the states, although I contend that balance is important in both loci being able to serve as a check on the other. Neither the E.U. nor the U.S. has, at least as of 2025, achieved balance, and it may not be an altogether stable property of federalism. This does not relegate either union to being a “bloc,” and the E.U. ambassador to the U.S. agreed with me on this point when we met on May 1, 2025, when we met at Yale, whose European Studies Council takes the E.U. as being more substantial than does the counterpart at Harvard. The E.U. is neither mainly intergovernmental relations nor an alliance.

So in Rome on May 18, 2025, Meloni was simply playing host to the Vice President of the U.S. and the President of the E.U., both unions (not blocs) having distinct roles in foreign policy. The governor of Italy was not present to negotiate on behalf of the E.U. on tariffs pertaining to the U.S.; in regard to them, von der Leyen and Vance had their work cut out for them in dealing with both tariff and non-tariff barriers to E.U.-U.S. trade.

If the E.U. were a bloc, then the U.S. would be one too, but actually both claims would be counter-productive at a time when strength at the respective federal levels was needed. This is not to imply that any two empire-scale modern-federal unions are or even should be identical for them the be classifiable in the same political genus: modern federalism as distinct as a political “species” from confederalism, and also from instances of modern federalism at the “kingdom” (i.e., member-state) rather than empire-level. The inter-state heterogeneity in an empire-scale polity is a leap, or step, rather than degree, more than that which exists within a state, and this difference gives modern federalism at the empire-scale distinct properties, and in fact federalism itself is geared to such heterogeneity. This is not to say that regional differences do not exist at the state, or “kingdom” level, and a federal system can be useful there as well. Hence, California, for example, could benefit by adopting a federal system for itself. New York and Illinois could benefit too, as could the former E.U. state of Britain, which, like Switzerland, is (early modern) kingdom-level too. Hence UK-US or EU-UK is misleading in a way that E.U.-U.S. is not, even if nationalism goes down hard.

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1. “Italian PM Meloni Hosts EU-US Talks on Trade, Ukraine and Defence,” Euronews.com, May 18, 2025.

Strength in Numbers: The European Union in Foreign Policy

One of the chief benefits of having an empire-scale union of states is the sway, or influence, abroad that comes with strength of numbers. Dwarfing the foreign-policy of a state government, and even of an informal bloc of a few states plus others outside the union, an empire-scale united-policy enacted to influence other countries can make the delegation of the additional governmental sovereignty to the federal level worth losing some state power abroad. I contend that this lesson can be gained by examining the European-Russian relation during the month of May in 2025.

On May 14, 2025, the E.U. “agreed to impose a new round of sanctions against Russia, threatening to slap on another one if the country continues to refuse the 30-day unconditional ceasefire proposed by the White House and the ‘Coalition of the Willing’.”[1] The White House refers to the U.S., another empire-scale union of states, but the “coalition” is a more nebulous construction; it consisted of three E.U. states plus Britain, which had seceded from the E.U. and was thus separate. One of those states, Germany, threatened Russia with immediate sanctions only to see Putin continue his military invasion of Ukraine. When a person’s “line in the sand” is so easily and quickly crossed, that person should re-evaluate one’s own vantage-point for what it is. Even a small bloc of states plus a former state is not sufficient to stop a Russian bear in its tracks. It is no accident, therefore, that the E.U. lost little time in announcing its own sanctions against Russia. The lesson is that the state leaders should have put the E.U. commission in the driver’s seat in the first place, rather than demonstrate the need for collective action that the E.U. could provide.

Macron of the E.U. state of France said on May 12, 2025 that an “unconditional ceasefire is not preceded by negotiations” but he could do little to back up that statement, given that Putin had just dismissed an immediate unconditional ceasefire without paying any price.[2] That an informal coalition, or bloc, had “previously demanded a full ceasefire a precondition to starting negotiations” meant nothing to Putin.[3] Continuing to make military progress on the ground in Ukraine, he had no incentive to respond to the bloc, but to the extent that Russia could suffer from sanctions from the E.U., Putin would have more reason to take an ultimatum seriously.

That the governors of three E.U. states chose to exercise their retained power in foreign policy rather than go through the Commission points to a vulnerability of the European Union from foreign policy being a shared competency while the state governments hold most of the governmental sovereignty in the union. It is very tempting to a state leader to grab media attention by taking the lead in a foreign policy that the E.U. could do with more power internationally.

There is also the conflict of interest in a bottom-heavy federal system wherein state leaders resist delegating enough authority to the federal level so it can function effectively, especially with regard to international relations. The E.U. had a foreign minister at the time, and a federal president, and yet three state leaders decided to spearhead a push for Russia to agree to an immediate ceasefire anyway. Their approach was doomed from the start because Russia could easily dismiss the threats from a few states even though the U.S. was on board on an immediate ceasefire.

So, it is problematic that once the E.U. effectively took over from the bloc of a few states, the need for the state level institutions to take a lesson and be willing to give the E.U. more authority to make and enforce foreign policy, as by applying qualified-majority voting to such policy, was not grasped in the public media and discourse. Lest there be any doubt concerning the power of a small bloc of (large) E.U. states, Dmitry Medvedev wrote on social media: “Macron, Metz, Starmer and Tusk were supposed to discuss peace in Kyiv. Instead, they are blurting out threats against Russia . . . You think that’s smart, eh? Shove these peace plans up your pangender arses.”[4] Ouch!  I submit that the E.U. announcing additional sanctions would not be taken as the blurting out of threats was taken, in part because of the much greater power of the E.U. vis á vis Russia. Macron, Metz, and Tusk looked like the three musketeers, with Starmer as a former fourth, relative to the E.U.’s institutions.

Unfortunately, the state level of governance had held back those institutions from being able to leverage the “power in numbers” in foreign policy that could otherwise be realized by the Commission with oversight by the Parliament and the European Court of Justice, and with a check by the involvement of the states at the federal level. Too much of a check by the latter, including taking the lead and ignoring the shared competency of the Commission, was detracting not only from a more perfect union, but one that could have enough sway internationally to operate as a real check on Russia as well as Israel.

Put another way, as the Trump administration was warming up to Russia and Israel, the world could ill-afford to have the Europeans resorting to informal blocs of a few E.U. states due to institutional clutching of power at the state level and a lack of leadership there for the good of the whole (E.U.) over state politicians’ self-interest for power and stardom. The breakdown of the international order, with the UN being politically impotent to stop Russia or Israel in their excessive aggression, means that Europeans could ill-afford continuing to allow their state officials to styme action at the E.U. level on the world stage.

Euroskeptics have feared the advent of a huge “federal state” without realizing that hamstringing E.U. institutions on competencies that are shared with the states only hurts the European Union itself. In other words, compromising a federal system because it is wrongly assumed that for such a system to exist (and thus that the E.U.’s system has not been federal from the start), there must be a massive state at the top, leaves Europe vulnerable to a real massive state—that of Russia.

This is not to say that Europe must also have a massive state; ironically, that the E.U. has a federal system enables there not to be a massive state covering the E.U.’s territory, for dual-sovereignty can and should be balanced such that neither the federal nor the state level dominates the whole federal system. In his book, Federal Government, Ken Wheare denies that such a balance is necessary to an ongoing and stable federal system of checks and balances. I disagree. Under his theory, the federal level of the E.U. could gain so much authority that the state governments are utterly dominated and still the federal system would work. I disagree. Whereas the U.S. federalism could be better balanced by having the states empowered to act as a check on the federal institutions, E.U. federalism could be better balanced by having the federal level gain additional competencies, with the states benefitting from the resulting collective action while still having enough sovereignty to check the federal institutions. Whereas the U.S. could benefit by increasing the formal involvement of the state governments in foreign policy in Washington, the E.U. could benefit by increasing the formal involvement of the E.U.’s president and foreign minister in crafting and enforcing foreign policy to defend Europe from aggressive powers abroad, whether they are empires in themselves or sovereign states.

It is telling that a year before Macron returned to his state capital of Paris empty-handed (just as Merz headed back to Berlin empty-handed) after Putin had dismissed the state-level demand for a ceasefire in Ukraine, Macron had given a major speech on the need for Europe to defend itself. “In the next decade,” he had said, “the risk is immense that [Europe] will be weakened, even relegated.”[5] The clear conclusion for us in contrasting those two events is that the state governments should formally allow the E.U. to take the lead in foreign policy rather than have state leaders attempt to “steal the thunder” by charging out in front as if by instinct with the federal officials tasked with foreign policy only able to look on. Yes, Virginia, the E.U. does indeed have a federal system, but this does not mean that transferring more governmental sovereignty on foreign policy (and defense) to the federal level would necessarily turn Europe into a federal state as Euroskeptics fear; the sort of federal consolidation that has occurred over centuries in the U.S. can be avoided even as Europeans lend greater balance to the E.U.’s federal system.

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1. Jorge Liboreiro, “EU Agrees New Sanctions on Russia and Threatens More If Putin Refuses Ceasefire,” Euronews.com, 14 May 2025.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Shaun Walker, “Vladimir Putin Rejects Ceasefire Ultimatum Proposed by European Leaders,” The Guardian, May 10, 2025.
5. Clea Caulcutt, “Macron Warns Europe ‘Can Die’ in Alarmist Speech on Protectionism, Geopolitical Threats,” Politico.com, April 25, 2024.

Nationalism at Eurovision: A Lack of Vision

The inherent retentiveness of conservatism benefits a society because it need not “reinvent the wheel” in “starting from scratch,” as resort can be made to customs that have been efficacious. Unfortunately, conservatism can easily be in denial as to the need for adaptation to changes whether in geopolitical institutions or in culture. The advent of the European Union as a federal system of dual-sovereignty has been easy fodder for conservatism’s proclivity of denial with regard to very new things. Eurovision, too, was an invention beyond even the European Union, and thus also of the post-World-War-II history of integration meant in part as a check on the full-blown nationalism that had twice decimated Europe in the twentieth century. So it is problematic that the EBU, the organization behind the Eurovision Song Contest, has made so many category mistakes involving Europe in favor of nationalism.

The full essay is at "Nationalism at Eurovision."

Political and Economic Elites

I submit that in virtually every political party, a distinction can be made between the “rank and file” and the political elite. Kamala Harris may have lost to Donald Trump in the 2024 U.S. federal-presidential race in part because Harris had not spoken out enough on economic issues amid soaring inflation on groceries and rents to gain traction with Democratic and Independent voters who had had enough of the “woke” ideological agenda, which includes, for example, moral pressure and even demands that people announce their “pronouns” before speaking. Although President Biden had initiated some anti-trust judicial action, the industry-oligopoly of meat producers, for example, was left untouched. So too were the mega-grocery-store chains. Kroger was later found to have spiked egg and milk prices above the increased costs with impunity, yet Harris did not suggest that the Sherman or Clayton anti-trust acts should be taken out of the garage for spin on the American judicial highways that connect the rank-and-file party-members to party elites mainly in New England, New York, and California. I contend that U.S. Senator Bernie Sander’s anti-oligopoly speeches in conservative Congressional districts gained such numbers in 2025 precisely because the Democratic Party’s elite had lost touch with the party’s “rank and file” voters on economic issues.[1]

In early May, 2025, Faiz Shakir, a top advisor to Sanders, castigated elected Democrats who want “to talk down to” voters as if ordinary people are “just too dumb to understand the general notions of powerful elites running” the show, presumably both in politics and business.[2] I don’t think it is lost on many Democratic voters that Democratic office-holders taking campaign donations from oligopolistic companies have been less than willing to urge the U.S. Department of Justice to prosecute large companies on the basis of restraint of trade. Virtually no elected official in government who takes a significant amount of “corporate cash” would be willing to propose a law strengthening anti-trust law such that governments in the U.S. would have a duty to restore monopolistic and oligopolistic industries to market-competition even if the existing firms are not colluding on price or other matters.

For example, since its early days, Facebook (then Meta) has actively bought out budding potential competitors. Social media became an oligopolistic industry in part because of that strategy. Whether or not Meta has engaged in restraint of trade, the U.S. Department of Justice could be given the legal mandate to break up the large American social-media companies in order to bring about a competitive industry. A monopolistic or oligopolistic industry cannot be counted upon to metamorphosize itself naturally into a competitive market; rather, the reverse tends to occur. Hence the need for government to act to perpetuate competition in industries.

This is not to say that Democratic and Independent voters would or should accept Sanders’ platforms of “Medicare for All” and free college-tuition at public colleges and universities. Rather, his “relentless focus on economic policy” could have improved his party’s chances to retain the federal presidency by countering “swing voters’ belief [that] Democrats are too close to feckless institutions and too obsessed with culture war issues.”[3] U.S. Senator Chris Murphy, also a Democrat, observed about six months after the 2024 election, “We viewed people like Bernie as an outlier threat to the institutional Democratic Party, when in fact what he was talking about and is still talking about is the crossover message. And it pulls Trump voters back into the Democratic coalition.”[4] Both the Hilary-Clinton-dominated party elite in 2016, which was rather unfair to Sanders, and the Kamala-Harris presumptive-nominee fiat in 2024 demonstrate the lack of willingness of the party’s elite to select its nominees for president by competitive (and fair, open) contests. This lack of political competition mirrors the lack of economic competition that has continued to plague many American industries at the expense of consumers.

Lest the attention on price-spikes from President Trump’s tariffs monopolize the public discourse on prices that American consumers must pay to have even staple products, another, more widespread, reason for higher prices may be right under their proverbial noses and yet many Americans, both as voters and consumers, may continue to be oblivious to the bad odor of greed that has fueled collusion not only within industries, but also between business and government. An anti-elite populism preached by Democratic candidates and office-holders who refuse corporate donations could really make a difference in setting the Democratic Party apart from not only Trump’s Republican Party, but also the status quo itself, whose gravitas can be likened to that of the Earth in its magnitude and relentlessness. Elites may have such a foothold in American politics and business that many party-members and consumers may be left with only a vague instinctual sense that “the gig is rigged.” For the powers that are able to frame the contours of debates on issues, including on which issues will be debated publicly, do so with a keen eye on retaining and even gaining power and wealth. Hence making the contours explicit, and uncovering the underlying vested interests, is vital to restoring bottom-up democracy and competitive markets in the United States. Faith in American democracy may boil down to the precipitate of ordinary people resisting entrenched, powerful interests even in their own political parties.

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1. An oligopoly is an industry in which a few companies dominate. An oligopoly is between a monopoly and a competitive market. Prices on products can be higher than necessary, the surplus revenue going to profits. Sellers are price-takers rather than price-setters in a competitive market, whereas companies in an oligopolistic industry have sufficient market-power to set prices because consumers have few choices.

2. Igor Bobic, “Bernie Sanders: Resisting Trump Is ‘Not Good Enough’,” The Huffington Post, May 6, 2025.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

E.U. Statehood for Canada: Not So Fast

Even as the federal president of the U.S., Donald Trump, campaigned in 2024 in part on Canada becoming a member of the U.S., statehood in the E.U. was being discussed in 2025 on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean. Besides being perhaps a knee-jerk political reaction against Trump, the prospect of Canada becoming an E.U. state faced a few major hurdles—one of which being the E.U.’s Basic (aka constitutional) Law. Accordingly, working instead toward a closer trading relationship was a more realistic route.

Firstly, that U.S. President Trump had “taunted and provoked Canadians with talk” of statehood for Canada in the U.S. and even that 46% of Canadians in a February, 2025 poll favored accession in the E.U. instead of the U.S. are not sufficient rationales for Canada to become an E.U. state.[1] One reason for representative rather than direct democracy is that having a term of office protects elected representatives from having to capitulate politically to momentary passions held by the most impassioned in a population. Because Trump’s invitation to Canada to join the other states in the U.S. would likely go unheeded, and, moreover, Trump’s term in office would presumably end at some point, the Canadian interest in accession in the E.U. would likely dissipate rather than continue to build. I submit that such a momentous political change should not be made on the basis of a momentary political context.

Secondly, the Canada is “the most European of non-European countries,” given the “French and British roots” as evinced in Quebec and Newfoundland, for example, is not a sufficient reason, as the same could be said of Australia regarding its British roots.[2] In fact, that Quebec and Newfoundland are so culturally different is an argument that Canada could split up and be more than one state in the E.U. or U.S., since inter-state differences are supposed to be greater than intra-state differences in a federal system.

Thirdly, during a briefing in March, 2025, “a Commission spokeswoman pointed to Article 49 of the Treaty of the European Union which stipulates that ‘any European State’ can apply to become a state—“in other words, ONLY European states” can become E.U. states.[3] Canada lacks the geographical proximity to the E.U. necessary to satisfy Article 49. So whereas Cyprus is technically in Asia, the proximity to the E.U.—not just being culturally European—renders that state different than Canada with respect to the Article. 

Ironically, Hawaii as a member state of the U.S. is not only not in North America, but is arguably more Asian than American culturally. Not even Alaska, which is in North America, is contiguous with “the lower 48.” Europeans who like to point out the cultural differences between E.U. states while assuming that the other union, which stretches across a continent and then some, is culturally homogenous miss not only the tremendous differences between a member-state like Mississippi and that of Massachusetts, but also the distinctive culture and location of Hawaii! So, I’m not sure that Europeans are the best judges of how European Canadian culture is. Certainement, French speakers in the E.U. have strong opinions on the way the language is spoken in Quebec.

In a parliamentary question to the E.U.’s executive branch in 2025, Rep. Streit, a member of the Reform party, argued that Canadian statehood would “expand [the E.U.’s] single market, create sales opportunities, facilitate the exchange of goods and services, and be better able to withstand threats of tariffs and global security risks.”[4] A good trade agreement with Canada would satisfy all but the last benefit, and NATO could handle the last one without risking stretching the E.U. too thin, especially given the staying power of the principle of unanimity in the European Council.

Neither the U.S. or the E.U. evinces regional governance in the sense of covering a global region, as if a stepping stone on the way to a world government. Furthermore, both unions faced significant internal political strains in 2024, and enlarging either union rather than being focused on addressing internal pressures could be foolish rather than prudent. For instance, before adding more Eastern European states, the E.U. could be strengthened on the federal level by applying qualified majority rule to more E.U. competencies in the European Council and the ministerial Council of the E.U., and giving the E.U.’s Parliament more authority so it could be a check on state governments exploiting conflicts of interest through the councils.

Fourthly, allowing Canada to apply to become an E.U. state would open the door to Israel doing the same, which would embroil the E.U. in Middle East politics. That “Israel’s security cabinet . . . approved a plan to expand its military offensive” in Gaza after more than month of blocking humanitarian aid such as food and medical supplies from entering the enclave and in spite of rulings against Israel by the International Criminal Court and the U.N.’s International Court of Justice may suggest that negotiating with Israel in the European Council and the council of ministers could result in stalemate rather than decisions.[5] In other words, if you think Viktor Orbán is stubborn, try Ben Netanyahu. Given the staying power of the principle of unanimity, flexibility on the state level is a highly valuable commodity at the federal level, given the extent of state power there. Even giving Turkey the go-ahead would have introduced a Middle Eastern culture into the E.U. at the councils, and E.U. decision-making would have been much more difficult because of exogenous values would have to be recognized and respected even if they conflict with European culture. Moreover, no limit would exist as to how large the E.U. could become. At some point, diseconomies of scale could take a toll on the federal level in being able to realize benefits from collective action as distinct from merely aggregated benefits from states acting unilaterally, such as in foreign policy and defense.

Lastly, the British monarch is, at least as of 2025, the head of state of Canada. Even though the lack of geographical proximity renders that royal role difficult, that the United Kingdom had seceded from the E.U. renders Canadian accession both awkward and difficult. Although the royal role does not render Canada subservient to the British government, the question of Canada's loyalty to the E.U. could conceivably be raised by federal and state officials in the union because of the head of state is an official role in Canada. Perhaps the loyalist Canadians could push for Canada’s provinces, except for Quebec, to be made equivalent to Wales, Northern Ireland, and Scotland as regions in the United Kingdom instead of Canada becoming a state in the European Union. Does not having the king or queen as head of state mean that Canada is essentially within the monarch's kingdom, even if not subject to the British government? Of course, neither Canadian provinces becoming regional governments in a European kingdom nor Canada becoming a state in an empire-scale union is very realistic, given the sheer gravitas of the status quo. Radical political change is seen as momentous not only for its platforms being very different, but also because such change is rare. Nevertheless, in analyzing possibilities for significant change in how various scales (and scale-types) of polities are related, the prerequisite of relating stepwise regions, kingdoms, and empire-scale polities around the world is best done without category-mistakes foisted by political ideology (e.g., nationalism).[6]

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1. Stefan Grobe, “Meet the MEP Who Wants to Bring Canada into the European Union,” Euronews.com, 5 May 2025.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. David Gritten, “Israel Security Cabinet Approves Plan to ‘Capture’ Gaza, Official Says,” BBC.com, 5 May 2025.

6. See Skip Wroden, British Colonies Forge an American Empire: A Basis for Trans-Atlantic Comparisons (Seattle: Amazon, 2017).

On the 2025 Political Convention of the European People’s Party

Competition within a pollical party and recognition that a political party is indeed a political party are essential or at least advantageous to any political party in a democratic system. Moreover, a republic, even if it contains smaller republics but is not just them in aggregate, deserves to be recognized as such rather than implicitly relegated by erroneous nomenclature that is designed to appease skeptics so they won’t rise up to resist the federal republic itself. “Let the chips fall where they may” is, I believe, an expression from gambling. Another expression comes from playing cards: Call a spade a spade. These two expressions evince truth and power, whereas hiding behind false notions is sheer weakness. Much of my writing on the European Union is oriented to strengthening it, as well as to gleam lessons for both the E.U. and U.S. by comparing and contrasting them as federal empire-scale unions of states.

Rubber-stamping closed-room decisions is hardly uncommon at conventions of political parties. The E.U.’s European People’s Party is no exception. At the annual convention in 2025, the party’s leadership appeared “quite monarchic” in spite of the fact that the E.U. was “the world’s second largest democracy,” and that President Von der Leyen had been touting the value being placed on democracy.[1] At the convention, Manfred Weber was re-elected by 502 of 563 votes “while his loyal ally Dolors Montserrat was elected unopposed to the position of secretary general with 91% of the votes cast.”[2] The lack of intra-party competition could be expected to have an impact politically on the E.U. itelf, as the “ascendant” EPP included E.U. Commission President Von der Leyen, 13 commissioners, and 188 representatives in the Parliament.[3]

With the E.U. being a few years over 30 years old, the EPP in the E.U. could be likened to the Congress Party in India during the twentieth century. To be sure, the latter party eventually lost its dominance, and the EPP could be expected to lose its early foothold too. Beforehand, however, a democracy deficit can exist not only when one party dominates at the federal level of an empire-scale polity of polities, but also when such a party is monocratic at the party level.

In other words, a multiplier effect can be in the mix when dominance is salient within a party that in turn is dominate in a government, and an executive branch, a legislative chamber elected by citizens, and a supreme court do indeed constitute a government even if denial has a firm foothold in the public square. In fact, for the media to mislabel a political party’s convention as a congress, which is actually an international meeting of sovereign countries, and a union such as the E.U. as a bloc undermines the credibility of a party and union. Both a democracy-deficit and enervating ideological (i.e., Euroskeptic) misnomers imperil a federal system, especially if the states hold most (but not all!) of the governmental sovereignty. 

For the Commission to be able to enforce even its exclusive competencies (i.e., enumerated powers), it is important that that executive branch be representative rather than oligarchic and known to be something more than of a bloc, which is a temporary grouping for one purpose. The E.U. was not intended to be temporary or of just one pillar. Indeed, the third pillar belies any claim that the E.U. is merely an economic international organization. International organizations such as NATO and the UN have no governmental sovereignty of their own, and do not have legislative chambers whose representatives are directly elected by citizens. International organizations do not even have citizens! A little intellectual honesty can go a long way.

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1. Jeremy Fleming-Jones, “The EU’s Biggest Political Party Met in Valencia—What We Learned,” Euronews.com, 30 April 2025.

2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.

Bottom-Heavy Federalism: The E.U. Stability and Growth Pact

With Russia still in Ukraine in 2025, the E.U. faced pressure to enact more laws and regulations at the federal, yes, federal level to reap the benefits of collective, coordinated action. Although the fear that Russia might invade one or more of the eastern E.U. states was probably unrealistic, given that Russia was still mired in Ukraine, the crisis of an invasion so close to the E.U. could legitimately serve as a “wake-up call” for the federal and state officials in the E.U. to get their federal system of dual sovereignty in order. The ability of state governments to successfully evade the state deficit and debt limits in the federal Stability and Growth Pact and the flipside of the Commission’s weakness can be read as indicative that more work is needed to get to a viable federal system. The states have been able to weaken the limitations successively over years, including by leveraging the fear of invasion by Russia as a call for more defense spending at the state rather than at the federal level.

By 1 May 2025, several E.U. states had notified the European Council of their intent “to make use of an exemption allowing them to go over budgetary limits in order to boost military spending. The Commission, the E.U.’s executive branch, had proposed earlier that year that E.U. state governments “could use an emergency clause to spend up to 1.5% of their GDP on defence investments over the next four years without breaching rules on public deficits and debt” at the state level.[i] The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) mandates that any state’s government budget deficit be kept below 3% of GDP and government debt below 60% of GDP. The regulations are based on Articles 121 and 126 of the Functioning of the European Union basic (i.e., constitutional) law. The weakening of the strictures on states in violation has been the norm rather than the exception. In 2024, for example, the Commission suspended the debt limit out of concern that economic growth would be compromised by state governments raising taxes or cutting spending to reduce their respective total debt to below 60% of GDP. That such reasoning could be used at any time undermines the contention that 2024 uniquely justified the Commission’s caution.

I submit that in actuality, the Commission’s officials were coming to the realization after years of state violations that enforcement of the federal regulations was too difficult for such a weak federation. In other words, the state governments still had not delegated enough authority to the Commission that it could hold the states accountable on matters of exclusive federal competencies.

As for shared competencies (i.e., policy domains of authority), the lack of respect of several states for the federal regulations on deficits and debt suggest that the Commission has its work cut out for it in negotiating with state governments on cooperation on shared policies so federal and state policies on a given matter will not work at cross-purposes.

As for the competencies retained by the states, agreeing to shift at least some of them to the federal level (as enumerated federal powers) is needed so there is a check-and-balance between the states and the union. In other words, that state governments have gotten away with serially violating the Stability and Growth Pact suggests that the Commission does not have enough leverage even to enforce federal regulations on states. The overall balance of governmental sovereignty between the union and the states is itself problematic, or at least sub-optimal.

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1. Rory Sullivan, “Sixteen EU Countries to Trigger Clause Increasing Defence Spending,” Euronews.com, 1 May 2025.