As of late September 2012, more than one hundred members of Congress had lobbied the Federal Reserve and other regulatory agencies on the Volcker Rule, the part of the Dodd-Frank Financial Reform Act of 2010 that prohibits banks from operating like casinos (e.g., trading with proprietary funds, rather than those of customers).[1] The rule stems from the importance of banks in our financial system. In September 2008, the world nearly witnessed the collapse of that system when banks stopped trusting each other (e.g., via commercial paper market) because of the risks that some of the big ones had been taking with mortgage-backed derivative securities and the related insurance swap securities. Awash in healthy-seeming fees, the banks purchased risky subprime mortgages and bundled them into bond-like securities that could be sold to investors.
Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Act, so it makes sense, and indeed is positive from the standpoint of accountability, that lawmakers remain involve as the relevant regulators (who are not elected) translate the broad legislative language into specific rules for banks. However, the newspaper’s report points to a less-than-salubrious practice wherein members of Congress contact regulatory agencies in private and before even the period for public comment. This raises the possibility that Wall Street was using its connections in Congress to weaken the public safeguards in the bill—essentially putting a narrow private interest in front of the public interest that the bill was designed to protect.
Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Act, so it makes sense, and indeed is positive from the standpoint of accountability, that lawmakers remain involve as the relevant regulators (who are not elected) translate the broad legislative language into specific rules for banks. However, the newspaper’s report points to a less-than-salubrious practice wherein members of Congress contact regulatory agencies in private and before even the period for public comment. This raises the possibility that Wall Street was using its connections in Congress to weaken the public safeguards in the bill—essentially putting a narrow private interest in front of the public interest that the bill was designed to protect.
The access purchased comes not only from having information that the regulatory agencies need; banks (and American corporations in general) could contribute unlimited amounts of money from the corporate treasury (rather than from contributions from executives and employees) to “social welfare” non-profit organizations that can spend money on political ads in support of friendly candidates (and against their opponents) without having to divulge the identities of the donors. So Wall Street banks can furtively promote U.S. Senate candidates who support the repeal of the Dodd-Frank Act without any of us knowing it. In fact, the “social welfare” (54c) groups can in turn contribute directly to a candidate’s campaign without divulging the names of the donors. Not even the IRS, which has been concerned about whether the donors pay the required gift tax, bothers the “social welfare” organizations for donor lists after complaints from several U.S. Senators. Nor has the SEC pushed corporations to divulge to their respective stockholders how the political donations have been spent. I suspect that senatorial influence lies behind this inaction too.
It is not as though there were some uncertainty regarding the need for disclosure in a democracy. Even though eight of the nine U.S. Supreme Court justices in Citizens United stress in their opinions the necessity of disclosure, corporations, no doubt well-connected in the halls of power in Washington from the donations already given, have a way to evade the transparency. Political and corporate democracy are both undercut as banks and business corporations can spend unlimited amounts (out of their respective profits) to help “pro-business” candidates for public office. Rather than being speech itself (and thus subject to free-speech constitutional protection), money is power that can be used to skew or otherwise limit the contours of public debate. After the election, the continued influence of the money is also stealth, such as when members of Congress lobby the Federal Reserve to weaken regulation meant to safeguard our financial system from a repeat of the near-collapse in 2008. For deregulation to be urged so soon after a near-depression gives us an indication of how dangerous “money as invisible speech” is to the public good, even if such influence is in the corporate interest.
As creatures of the state, corporations should not have a share in governance, for that function subverts the causal relationship between Creator and creature. That is to say, a corporate management (or board) presuming to influence members of Congress can be likened to the self-idolatry of a creature supposing itself to be God. Interestingly, as going concerns, corporations are immortal, legally speaking. As for us mere mortals, Rousseau reminds us that we are born free but live in chains—only we are under the delusion that we are still free because the confining elements are subterranean qua the furtive influence of great concentrations of private wealth. I suppose one question is whether finite bundles of subjectivity can somehow become aware of that which has been designed to be outside of our awareness, and, if so, whether a society can so move to protect its good in a viable republic.
It is not as though there were some uncertainty regarding the need for disclosure in a democracy. Even though eight of the nine U.S. Supreme Court justices in Citizens United stress in their opinions the necessity of disclosure, corporations, no doubt well-connected in the halls of power in Washington from the donations already given, have a way to evade the transparency. Political and corporate democracy are both undercut as banks and business corporations can spend unlimited amounts (out of their respective profits) to help “pro-business” candidates for public office. Rather than being speech itself (and thus subject to free-speech constitutional protection), money is power that can be used to skew or otherwise limit the contours of public debate. After the election, the continued influence of the money is also stealth, such as when members of Congress lobby the Federal Reserve to weaken regulation meant to safeguard our financial system from a repeat of the near-collapse in 2008. For deregulation to be urged so soon after a near-depression gives us an indication of how dangerous “money as invisible speech” is to the public good, even if such influence is in the corporate interest.
As creatures of the state, corporations should not have a share in governance, for that function subverts the causal relationship between Creator and creature. That is to say, a corporate management (or board) presuming to influence members of Congress can be likened to the self-idolatry of a creature supposing itself to be God. Interestingly, as going concerns, corporations are immortal, legally speaking. As for us mere mortals, Rousseau reminds us that we are born free but live in chains—only we are under the delusion that we are still free because the confining elements are subterranean qua the furtive influence of great concentrations of private wealth. I suppose one question is whether finite bundles of subjectivity can somehow become aware of that which has been designed to be outside of our awareness, and, if so, whether a society can so move to protect its good in a viable republic.
1. Ben Protess, “Behind the Scenes, a Lawmaker Pushes to Curb the Volcker Rule,” The New York Times, September 21, 2012.
