Circulating in Congress in the fall of 2012 was a bill that would have allowed "the White House to second-guess major rules and mandate that agencies carefully study the economic effects of new regulation. The change could, in effect, delay a number of rules for the financial industry. Those who support preserving the status quo where Wall Street regulates itself will find much to like in this legislation," said Amit Narang, a regulatory policy advocate at Public Citizen, a nonprofit government watchdog group.[1] President Obama had received $1 million from Goldman Sachs as a campaign contribution in 2008. Yet of how much value to Wall Street is a mere delay in regulation? Some, surely, but not enough to make this the decisive issue here. Rather, I submit that the president's control as chief executive of the regulatory agencies and the added bureaucracy are more salient in this case study.
In terms of Wall Street’s interest, the proposed bill would have permitted the White House only to delay proposed regulations until further explanation is provided; the president would not be able to veto them. The issue from this case can thus be said to be whether the U.S. president as the chief executive in the U.S. Government must have control over even independent agencies such as the SEC. To be tasked with the enforcement of U.S. law and yet not to have the right even to be consulted by agencies as varied as the FCC, the FDIC, the SEC and the CFTC puts the chief executive in a bind—that of constitutional responsibility without the requisite authority.
At a much less significant level, the added bureaucracy could have been a problem, given how much bureaucracy was in the agencies themselves: “at the minimum a 13-point test for rule-making. That includes finding ‘available alternatives to direct regulation,’ evaluating the ‘costs and the benefits,’ drafting ‘each rule to be simple and easy to understand’ and periodically reviewing existing rules to make agencies ‘more effective or less burdensome.’”[2]
At a much less significant level, the added bureaucracy could have been a problem, given how much bureaucracy was in the agencies themselves: “at the minimum a 13-point test for rule-making. That includes finding ‘available alternatives to direct regulation,’ evaluating the ‘costs and the benefits,’ drafting ‘each rule to be simple and easy to understand’ and periodically reviewing existing rules to make agencies ‘more effective or less burdensome.’”[2]
2. Ibid.
