Wednesday, June 26, 2019

On the United Technologies-Raytheon Merger: The Macro Level of Analysis

In analyzing a merger, incorporating the macro context is vital. For very large mergers, for instance, public policy concerns inevitably surface even if they are typically ignored not only in merger analyses, but also by in societal and even governmental public discourse. Analysis at this level takes a societal standpoint, including on the relationship of business and government. This does not diminish the salience of firm-level analysis, for even how the respective organizational cultures would mesh is very important to a functional merged company. This is even true regarding the respective business-ethics climates, for it is not a given that a healthy organizational culture dominates an unethical one.

In June, 2019, United Technologies “doubled down on the aerospace market with an all-stock deal to merge with defense contractor Raytheon Co., after UTC executives early chose to exit from the escalator and air-conditioning businesses.”[1] The anticipated combined company, “valued at more than $100 billion after planned spinoffs, would be the world’s second-largest aerospace-and-defense company by sales behind Boeing.”[2] The annual revenue for 2019 would be $74 billion. UTC’s CEO at the time estimated a billion dollars in cost-savings. Additionally, spending on research could be increased.

On the macro scale, the merger would intensify the consolidation in the aerospace and defense industry. Better terms from supplies and the Pentagon had been putting pressure on contractors “to cut costs and invest more of their own money in new technologies, such as space systems and cyber security.”[3] Consolidation has a major drawback, however, in that competition and thus trade can be stifled. Society, through its government, rather than consolidated industries must resolve anti-trust problems, and this is difficult when those industries have significant power over legislative bodies and regulatory agencies. Hence, for example, anti-trust law had not been applied to the five largest American banks even after their complicity in the financial crisis of 2008. In fact, the bankers were able to use government funds to pay themselves bonuses!  So the question can legitimately be raised whether anti-trust law even can be enforced when the consolidated company or industry is not in favor.

If very large consolidated companies can rebuff regulatory attempts to constrain or limit those companies, then even very unethical managements can enjoy perches of power that are worrisome from a societal standpoint. In the late 1990’s, for example, Hughes Aircraft merged with Raytheon Missile Systems. In 2002, dioxane, a carcinogenic chemical that Hughes Aircraft/Raytheon had been using as a solvent, was discovered in the ground water under South Tucson, Arizona. Previously, Hughes had used cancer-causing trichloroethylene since 1981, and several local residents had won settlements on that chemical from Hughes.[4] Perhaps Raytheon’s management fail to use adequate oversight over Hughes, especially given that company’s track record, or was the purchasing company tacitly involved. Something to ponder for a company on the cusp of growing substantially through another merger in 2019, for an environmentally callous group to be so big would indeed be a big deal.

At the company level, a board of directors subservient to management or even a sordid corporate culture, such as that of Enron, can be enough to thwart efforts to clean up from unethical conduct. Wells Fargo, for instance, faced an entrenched corporate culture in “efforts” to stop charging customers for unordered products. Plutocracy, or the rule of wealth, at a governmental level means that such companies can not only continue acting unethically but also extract monopoly or oligarchic rents. In the case of the defense industry, the increasing power of the major contractors can even result in pressure on lawmakers to go to war when diplomacy would have been a better route. Indeed, a government’s spending can become loop-sided in favor of defense because the major contractors are powerful enough to demand it because it is good business. Hence U.S. President Lyndon Johnson kept the Vietnam conflict going in large part because he was getting kick-backs from certain contractors. In short, from being able to evade anti-trust enforcement to being able to pressure or pay off presidents in favor of military engagements, consolidated defense contractors can be said to have too much power. 


[1] Cara Lombardo and Doug Cameron, “Merger to Create Aerospace Giant,” The New York Times, June 10, 2019.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Tony Davis, “South-side Tucsonans Mobilize for Another Water-Pollution Struggle,” Arizona Daily Star, April 16, 2017.