Most delegates in the U.S. Constitutional Convention in 1787
recognized the value of constitutional safeguards against excess democracy, or
mob rule. The U.S. House of Representatives was to be the only democratically
elected federal institution—the U.S. Senate, the U.S. Supreme Court, and even
the U.S. Presidency were to be filled by the state legislatures, the U.S.
President and U.S. Senate, and electors elected by citizens, respectively. The
people were to be represented in the U.S. House and the State governments in
the U.S. Senate. The Constitutional Amendment in the early twentieth century
that made U.S. senators selected by the people
rather than the governments of
the States materially unbalanced the original design. In terms of the selection
of the U.S. president by electors, the political parties captured them such
that whichever party’s candidate wins a State, the electors there are those of
the winning party. Even if the electors could vote contrary to the popular vote
in a State, such voting could only be a rare exception given the party-control.
Hence the electors have not been able to function as intended—as a check
against excess democracy. The case of Russian interference in the presidential
election of 2016 presents an additional use for the Electoral College, were it
to function as designed and intended. Of course, this is a huge assumption to
make, even just in taking into account the American mentality regarding
self-governance.
Suppose, for example, that a presidential election were to
take place only months after an attack by another country, such as the one at
Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. The American people might be inclined to vote
for whichever candidate has promised to nuke the belligerent power off the face
of the Earth. Clearly, such a knee-jerk reaction would not be in the best
interest of the American people. Were the electors in the Electoral College
free of party-affiliation as well as any law requiring them to vote according
to their State’s popular vote in the “presidential election” (i.e., actually for
the electors), the electors of the College could elect another candidate—one not
so inclined to beat the war drum to capitalize on the momentary passions of the
people.
In short, American
voters elect electors by state, and said electors in turn then meet in their respective
state capitols to cast votes for president roughly a month later—that being the
actual presidential election. This
system reflects the delegates' fear that the masses voting directly would be
risky because people have difficulty resisting their immediate passions. Demagogues
running for office can too easily take advantage of the ignorance and
inattention of the electorate, especially when the “campaign season” lasts 14
months!
That a population
even as large as 7 million in the U.S. in 1789, and even more one of 310
million in 2016, must depend on the media for information on candidates—it being
extremely unlikely that all but a tiny fraction of the people could meet the
candidates—adds merit to the value of having electors whose task it is to act as a check on deficiencies in a democratic
election on such a scale. As for the number of electors in the Electoral
College, each State has as many as the total number of its U.S. senators and
U.S. House representatives. The number is few enough that the electors could
actually meet the candidates in person and question them. Additionally, the
electors could more feasibly have access to information on the candidates and
even U.S. intel. In voting for these electors, the American people would be
voting for people whose judgment is deemed to be up to the task.
So it is
fitting, given the purpose and design of the Electoral College, that the
electors could receive U.S. intel on Russia’s interference in the 2016
presidential election. Hillary Clinton’s presidential campaign chairman, John
Podesta, supported a proposal that electors be given “an intelligence briefing
on alleged political interference by Russia.”[1]
A group of 10 electors had written to the Director of National Intelligence to
request a briefing. Those electors cited their role as a “deliberative body”
designed in part to prevent foreign powers from trying to influence elections.[2]
Although I am not aware of any direct reference to foreign interference as an
explicit reason for the Electoral College in the Constitutional Convention (via
Madison’s Notes), the rationale can
fall within the broader one of the College serving as a check on deficiencies
in the presidential election (i.e., the election of electors by the American
people).
As the
American people themselves selected the electors to in turn select the federal
president, the extant federal officials, as agents of the People, were
duty-bound to defer to the electors for such a purpose bearing on the task of
electing the next president. It is up to the electors to decide whether any new
information gained after the presidential election warrants the selection of
someone other than the candidate whose party controls the majority of the
electors (i.e., “won” the Electoral College). It does not necessarily follow
that the electors should select the candidate who came in second.
Hypothetically,
events taking place between the “presidential election” and the electors’ own
vote could warrant the election of another candidate than the one who “won” the
electoral college. New information on either of the major candidates could also
justify such an outcome. The overall point, or aim, is that the best possible
selection is made for the United States and its people. Holding to popular
vote, whether by State or nationwide, pales in comparison, and is not necessarily
optimal. One delegate, for instance, argued at the Convention that “the people
at large . . . will never be sufficiently informed of characters.”[3]
Another delegate said, “The people are uninformed and would be misled by a few
designing men.”[4]
That delegate felt this problem so grave that “the popular mode of electing the
[president] would certainly be worst of all.”[5]
Still another delegate argued that the selection of the president should be “by
those who know most of the eminent characters & qualifications,” not “by
those who know least”—meaning millions of people across an empire.[6]
Such delegates were not themselves government officials, so the recognition of
the limitations of a popular election by people like themselves is itself
awe-inspiringly humble. For a people to recognize its own deficiencies and
design safeguards even at the expense of their own future electoral preferences
renders such a people worthy of self-government. Maturity, in addition to being
educated and virtuous as Jefferson and Adams insisted, is requisite for
self-governance.
I submit
that Americans in 2016 were overwhelmingly—and conveniently—deficient in governmental
maturity. Instead of a willingness to face their own complicity in standing by
or enabling as presidential campaigns had become so sordid and devoid of policy or even debate, a blind charge could be heard immediately after the
election toward a new system based on an unprotected, and thus vulnerable, (nationwide)
popular vote. Legitimacy supposedly hung in the balance, and the People could
not be wrong. So it is ironic that the need for safeguards against the
electorate itself were so easily dismissed. In other words, it is nothing short
of astonishing that such an electorate would assume that an overhaul was not necessary
on how presidents are selected and, moreover, that no safeguards would be
needed for going by a nationwide majority vote. The underlying problem can be
put as a question: Does a people that refuses to recognize the need for
safeguards on itself, even for its own protection (i.e., in its own best
interest) deserve self-government? Can such government function for long without
the electorate being willing and able to keep their system of government in
good condition? What if a people cannot recognize brokenness, whether in itself or in how its president is selected?
Can such a people self-govern for long?
It is much
easier to focus on foreign interference than to be willing to recognize deficiencies
much closer to home. Taking the most comfortable route, rather than making
difficult choices, is lethal for a viable republic especially when the lack of
character is combined with ignorance as to what constitutes good and bad public-governance
systems. It is particularly revealing that a people most in need of safeguards
is most apt to make the convenient assumption that they are not necessary. The
rise and fall of mammoth empires is the stuff of history. Every empire in
history has come and gone. The fall of even a modern-day empire can come from
within, as from a squalid mentality that absolves itself of even the possibility of being wrong about itself.
This, I submit, is the American blight, and plight.
[3] James Madison, Notes
of Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787 Reported by James Madison (New
York: W. W. Norton, 1966): 306.
