Tuesday, February 7, 2017

Israel Legalizes Illegal Settlements on Palestinian Land: On the Toll on the Rule of Law


Israel’s legislature passed a law on February 6, 2017 retroactively legalizing Jewish settlements on privately owned Palestinian land. Incredibly, the state’s own attorney general said he would not defend the new law in court because he had determined the law to unconstitutional and in violation of international law. Anat Ben Nun of an anti-settlement group said the law was “deteriorating Israel’s democracy, making stealing an official policy.”[1] Specifically, the Palestinians in the occupied West Bank, including those offered financial compensation for the “long term use of their land” but without being able to reclaim their property under the new law, “are not Israeli citizens and cannot vote for candidates for Israel’s Parliament, or Kenesset.”[2] I submit nevertheless that the underlying casualty in this case is the rule of law itself.

The full essay is at "Israel Legalizes Illegal Settlements."


1. Ian Fisher, “Israel Passes Provocative Legislation to Retroactively Legalize Settlements,” The New York Times, February 7, 2017.
2. Ibid.

Being Partisan in the Pulpit: Going the Extra Mile


The Johnson Amendment, which became law in the U.S. in 1954 and was named for Lyndon Johnson, then a U.S. Senator, “is a provision in the tax code that prohibits tax-exempt organizations from openly supporting political candidates. In the words of the tax code, ‘all section 501(c)(3) organizations are absolutely prohibited from directly or indirectly participating in, or intervening in, any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for elective public office.”[1] I submit that it is in a cleric’s interest to expand this prohibition to include advocating for (or opposing) particular public policies. This general principle would of course be subject to exceptions in which a proposed or enacted policy is strongly anathema to the religious principles of the given religious organization or religion.

The full essay is at "Being Partisan in the Pulpit."



1. Randall Balmer, “The Peril of Being Partisan at the Pulpit,” Stars and Stripes, February 7, 2017.

Friday, February 3, 2017

Can an Electorate Hold Its Political Elite Accountable: The Case of François Fillon


Can a political elite hold itself accountable? Left to its own devices, absent a virtuous citizenry, a political elite is able to exploit a conflict of interest in both wielding the authority of government and using that power even to constrain the elite itself. Unfortunately, even where an electorate is virtuous, the dispersed condition of the popular sovereign is an impediment to galvanizing enough popular will to act as a counter-power to that of a political elite, which is relatively concentrated and well-informed. In early 2017, the problem was on full display in the E.U. state of France, with little the federal government could do given the amount of governmental sovereignty still residing at the state level. So the question is whether an electorate can galvanize enough power to counter that of a political elite.

  François Fillon in trouble for corruption (Christian Hartmann/Reuters)

Just months before the election, France’s leading presidential candidate was “in deep trouble” for payments of nearly €831, 440 “from the public payroll to his wife and children” over the 30 years in which François Fillon employed them.[1] Penelope Fillon “was paid with taxpayer money for a bogus job as a parliamentary assistant to her husband and his deputy” in the state Assembly.[2] Because her husband had “fashioned himself as a stern and honest politician,” the sordid odor of hypocrisy was in the air, yet the practice itself, which was legal at the time, was to “many French politicians” no “big deal.”[3] So from the press and the public came “a wellspring of anger” calling into question the standard operating procedures of the political class.”[4] In short, the response was: “They just don’t get it.”[5] C’est vraiment incroyable. Really incredible.
A political class cannot police itself if its culture is so ensconced in the misuse of funds, even if legal, that the ubiquitous practice is not even recognized as being unethical in nature. On an organizational scale, I have witnessed a university’s culture so dysfunctional—with such passive aggression from the non-academic staff—that the offending creatures would not even recognize themselves in the mirror; even to question them would be perceived as a provocation. Accountability is impossible in such a sordid organization. So, too, a political class with an ingrown sense of presumptuous entitlement cannot possibly hold itself accountable. A perception of wrong-doing is requisite to holding oneself accountable. The decisive question is therefore whether a “wellspring of anger” in a public-at-large can be sufficient to “throw the bastards out.”
Even if a sizable proportion of an electorate votes to “throw the bums out,” other rationales for voting doubtless exist and can dilute the effect such that the culture of the political class can survive. Furthermore, even intense anger today can quickly dissipate, such that the results of an election even just months away show little sign of the earlier sizzling headlines. Even major protests do not necessarily translate into the ballot box. At the time Fillon was facing a harsh reaction in France, more than 250,000 irate people in the state of Romania were protesting after Liviu Dragnea’s governing Social Democratic Party passed a law on January 31, 2017 making “official misconduct punishable by prison time only in cases in which the financial damage is more than 200,000 lei, or about $47,000”—Dragnea himself facing “charges of abouse of power involving a sum” less than 200,000 lei.[6] Here we can see the conflict of interest on full display: Dragnea was using the power of his party in the state legislature such that he would essentially be above the (constraint of) law. Yet even such a blatant case cannot be expected to be punished when the next election comes around. Something more is needed to address the inherent conflict of interest.



1. Adam Nossiter, “Fillon Scandal Indicts, Foremost, France’s Political Elite,” The New York Times, February 3, 2017; Aurelien Breeden, “Graft Allegations Grow Against Francois Fillon, French Presidential Hopeful,” The New York Times, February 1, 2017.
2. Aurelien Breeden, “Graft Allegations Grow Against Francois Fillon, French Presidential Hopeful,” The New York Times, February 1, 2017
3. Adam Nossiter, “Fillon Scandal Indicts, Foremost, France’s Political Elite,” The New York Times, February 3, 2017
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Palko Karasz, “Protests Rock Romania After Government Weakens Corruption Law,” The New York Times, February 2, 2017.

Thursday, February 2, 2017

Is Democracy Inimical to Prudent Government Budgeting: The U.S. and India Contrasted

At a time when the U.S. Government sported an accumulated debt of roughly $20 trillion, with continued deficits expected to add about $10 trillion more over the next ten years, the most populous democracy in the world, India, laid out a prudent budget proposal—one that had been “extremely well thought-out,” according to Deepak Parekh of the Housing Development Finance Corporation in India.[1]

On February 1, 2017, the government of Prime Minister Narendra Modi made public its budget proposal for the following year. Even as the proposed budget “would significantly increase spending on infrastructure, rural areas and antipoverty programs,” the government’s annual deficit would be reduced to 3.2 percent of GDP from 3.5 percent in the current fiscal year.[2] The budget “included tax cuts for lower income taxpayers and small business, even as it came close to sticking with the country’s target for reducing the budget deficit.”[3] In a democratic system, in which popular pressure is even in theory for increased government spending and lower taxes, increasing discretionary spending need not come at the expense of fiscal discipline. “The economy needs the spending to give consumption a boost, but the government is also giving weight to fiscal prudence,” said Dharmakirti Joshi, chief economist at Crisil, an Indian credit-rating agency.[4] The proposal even adds spending on infrastructure such as roads in rural areas—an investment favorable to attracting foreign direct investment as the stated aim is to increase “efficiency and access to markets while providing jobs.”[5]

Modi’s action against currency on which taxes are not paid in banning the largest currency notes in November, 2016 had led the I.M.F. to cut its predicted growth rate for India by one percentage point for 2017 to 6.6 percent, so Modi must have been facing popular pressure to spur economic growth by distending fiscal policy beyond what prudence would allow. Even as five states prepared to go to the polls beginning on February 4th, the prime minister prudently wanted to demonstrate “strength in advance of national elections in 2019.”[6] Put another way, the pressure to allow the projected deficits to increase as a percent of GDP must have been enormous, yet fiscal discipline prevailed and even allowed for targeted priorities that would take due account of the value of fiscal stimulus. 

Democracy can be strong, meaning self-disciplined, yet there is no guarantee. As Thomas Jefferson and John Adams agreed when they were exchanging letters in retirement, an educated and virtuous citizenry is essential to the continuance of a viable republic whose house is in order. A $20 trillion government debt is indicative that at least one house is not in order, and the case of India demonstrates that the problem is not democracy itself.



[1] Getta Anand, “Arun Jaitley, India’s Finance Chief, Aims to Spur Economy Hit by Cash Shortage,” The New York Times, February 1, 2017.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Ibid.