Without doubt, Japan’s
largest power provider, Tokyo Electric Power Co. (Tepco), faced the biggest
challenge of its 50-year-history in "recovering from the damage done to
its nuclear facilities and power systems by a devastating earthquake and
tsunami" in 2011.[1] The New York Times reported
that "foreign nuclear experts, the Japanese press and an increasingly
angry and rattled Japanese public are frustrated by government and power
company officials’ failure to communicate clearly and promptly about the
nuclear crisis. Pointing to conflicting reports, ambiguous language and a
constant refusal to confirm the most basic facts, they suspect officials of withholding
or fudging crucial information about the risks posed by the ravaged Daiichi
plant."[2]
When a spokesperson for Tepco said early in the morning on March
16th "that a fire had broken out at the Daiichi plant’s No. 4 reactor, a
reporter naturally asked how the fire had begun, given that just the day before
the company had reported putting out a fire at that same reactor. The
executive’s answer: ‘We’ll check. . . . We don’t have information here,’ he
explained. After about two hours, the Tepco representative had the information:
Turned out the smoke was coming not from reactor No. 4, but from reactor No. 3.
If Tepco’s information had been delayed and vague, the reporters’ response was
quick and direct. ‘You guys have been saying something different each time!’
one shouted. ‘Don’t tell us things from your impression or thoughts, just tell
us what’s going on. Your unclear answers are really confusing!’"[3]
The full essay is in Cases of Unethical Business, available in print and as an ebook at Amazon.com.
