The E.U.’s Borders Held Hostage by the State Veto

With E.U. states like Germany, Austria and Poland becoming increasingly active in patrolling their respective borders at the expense of the Schengen Agreement, it makes sense that the proposed E.U. budget announced in July, 2025 includes more money to protect the E.U.’s borders from illegal crossings. This is important because reinstituting controls on the borders of states contributes toward the visual of the E.U. coming apart geographically. Such a set-back may be worse for the E.U. than the secession of Britain was; in fact, letting that state go arguably strengthened the Union because the British government consistently refused to admit that the E.U. is more than a network of countries that the UK happened to belong to, which was the view of the former governor, David Cameron.

Out of the €74 billion in the proposed E.U. budget of President Von der Leyen “earmarked in the MFF to ‘make Europe safer and more secure,’ €26 billion” would “be dedicated to migration management, including issues related to reception of asylum seekers and other non-border related issues.”[1] In the existing 2021-2027 budget, €25 billion in total went to migration, with €14 billion for border management and €11 billion to asylum reception and integration.[2]

With the federal budgets covering so many years, reforms allowing for easier fast-tracking of proposals to augment a current budget may be advisable in the face of some states effectively shedding the open-state-borders Schengen Agreement. Additionally, the stipulation that any state government can veto a proposed federal budget could be revisited, as states differ on how serious infractions are at their respective borders and thus on the merit of increasing federal spending so the concerned states might pull back and revert to the Schengen Agreement, for claims of emergency by the activated state governments have been specious, and perhaps even outright lies.

That unanimity would be needed to pass the proposed federal budget, which in turn would hopefully strengthen the E.U.’s borders sufficiently that certain state governors could relax and withdraw their forces at their respective state borders ignores the political leverage that some state governors have exploited by using their respective vetoes at the federal level. A certain level of maturity all around is requisite to having the veto-mechanism with the understanding that it is to be used only when a state’s interests would likely be vitally impaired with the passage of a piece of legislation. Without such maturity, all kinds of dysfunctional politics and dogmatic obstacles can be expected in the European Council and the Council of the E.U. as the Commission and the Parliament look on in utter disbelief.

Perhaps it is an overstatement to say that a potential implosion of the E.U. from within could be allowed to run its course because of a refusal to exculpate the principle of unanimity, and thus the state veto, from the involvement of the state governments at the federal level. To exclaim, “The E.U. is NOT a federation!” as a kind of instinctual urge is not a retort; rather, it is the sort of stubborn oblique denial that pushes off reform that could save the Union. That some state governments subject to the Schengen Agreement were already using the emergency clause inappropriately when President Von der Leyen released the Commission’s upcoming budget for the E.U. is witness enough that the stubborn insistence by some governors to retain the state veto power at the federal (or Union) level has prevented the E.U. from being able to adequately enforce and fulfill its own competencies (i.e., enumerated powers). 

Is it not unethical to say, here is a power for you but we’re going to stop you along the way from being able to carry it out sufficiently even though it is your power? Is that not unfair, as well as counter-productive for the Union? Or are the circumscribed, petty interests of the parts greater than the interest of the whole where the benefits of collective action could otherwise be realized?

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1. Vincenzo Genovese and Eleonora Vasques, “Lion’s Share of Tripled EU Migration Budget Aimed at Border Management,” Euronews.com, July 18, 2025.
2, Ibid.

Negotiating from Weakness: The Plight of the European Union

To go to much effort to construct an economy on the scale of an empire only to refer instead to the economies within such a union, whether the E.U. or U.S. is to pay excessive homage to an ideology that can be termed Euroskeptic and anti-federalist, respectively. To refer to economies in one union and the economy in the other is just one means by which an ideology can distort a person’s reasoning and perception without the person being conscious of the underlying logical inconsistency. Such an inconsistency is incurred not only in “having it both ways” in the E.U. being a common market even as the states are referred to as economies even though many share a currency and thus a central bank, but also in referring to the federal system as if it were a mere “bloc,” or “network.”  In all of these cases of ideological word-games, the E.U. itself is minimized and thus implicitly marginalized from within. With Russia invading Ukraine and Israel eviscerating the Muslim residents of Gaza, self-marginalization for ideological purposes is indeed costly. Even referring to the federal official who is in charge of foreign policy as a “high representative” is implicitly denigrating and thus counter-productive to the E.U. being able to stand up to Putin and even Netanyahu in 2025.

The full essay is at "Negotiating from Weakness."

E.U. President Von der Leyen Survives A No-Confidence Vote

Falling short of the two-thirds majority needed to pass on July 10, 2025, the no-confidence vote on President Von der Leyen of the Commission in the E.U.’s parliament mustered only 175 representatives in favor while 360 voted against the motion and 18 abstained. Although commentators discussed whether the president was weakened anyway, a more important matter relates to the politics of the vote as distinct from the Parliament’s institutional interests as they relate to the Commission and the European Council. I contend that the Parliament, which represents E.U. citizens, has a vital interest that is vital to the E.U. itself in maintaining a balance between the collective power of the representatives of the citizenry and the power the state governments at the federal level. Parties making deals with Von der Leyen on policy positions undercut the vote as a means of holding the Commission to maintaining that balance.

For example, the Socialists and Democrats Party “extracted a pledge on the next long term budget in exchange for their support.”[1] The right-wing Patriots for Europe Party and Europe of Sovereign Nations Party both voted in favor of removing Von der Leyen, but certainly not because she left made a deal with the states to sidestep the Parliament on certain matters of policy, for those parties favor more power for the state governments at the federal level. In fact, those parties even deny that there is a federal level! Therefore, we cannot assume that the vote of no-confidence was on the matter of the Commission siding with the state governments to marginalize the Parliament.

The Commission under Von der Leyen had “invoked Article 122 of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) to set up SAFE which allows member states to directly approve a Commission proposal ‘if severe difficulties arise in the supply of certain products’ or if a member state is ‘seriously threatened with severe difficulties caused by natural disasters or exceptional occurrences beyond its control.’”[2] Because the Commission and the state governments were able to set up a federal defense-loan program without the approval of the European Parliament, and thus the citizens of the E.U., Roberta Metsola, the head of the Parliament, wrote to Von der Leyen of the “deep concern” in among the representatives that excluding the Parliament meant “putting at risk democratic legitimacy by undermining Parliament’s legislative and scrutiny functions.”[3] The democratic legitimacy of the federal level depends on the involvement of the Parliament, as it is the only institution representing E.U. citizens directly, rather than state governments, which have their own institutional interests even apart from state residents.

It is highly significant that Metsola “stressed that ‘the European Parliament is not questioning the merits of this proposal for a regulation’.”[4] The objection was not one of policy; rather, the concern was based on the democratic viability and overall balance of the E.U. itself as a federal system. By involving policy in the deal-making leading up to the censure vote, certain political parties in the Parliament undercut that institution’s interest in protecting itself against the Commission giving too much power to the state governments at the federal level. The Socialists should not have extracted a political gain from Von der Leyen, and the Green Party members should not have voted on the basis of how much Von der Leyen had prioritized environmental policy. Instead, the parties apprehensive about the Parliament having been circumvented by the state governments and the Commission should have voted to offset the state-rights ideology of the far-right parties in the Parliament. Had this been done, the next Commission would have been very cautious about circumventing the voice of the people by making deals with the governors of the several states. 

Generally speaking, protecting the viability of the federal system itself, including the checks and balances at the federal level, does not get done by prioritizing political deals and even particular policies, as if the pushing for certain policies in the aggregate were tantamount to protecting the system of governance itself.

1. Jeremy Fleming-Jones, et al, “Von der Leyen’s EU Commission Survives Parliament Confidence Vote,” Euronews.com, July 10, 2025.
2. Alice Tidey, “MEPs Vote for Parliament to Sue Commission over €150 bn Defense Loan Programme,” Euronews.com, June 25, 2025.

3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.

Russia Benefits from Flawed E.U. Federalism

In the E.U., the 27 state governments are able to wield a veto on most important policy proposals in the European Council. Expecting unanimity where not even consensus is enough is so utterly unrealistic at 27 that it may be time to reconsider whether the E.U. can afford such an easy (and tempting) means by which state governors can exploit the E.U. by essentially holding it hostage. To be sure, like the filibuster in the U.S. Senate, the veto in the European Council represents the residual sovereignty that states in both unions enjoy, but extortion for financial gain by means of threatening or exercising a veto in the European Council (and the committees of the Council of the E.U.) suggests that the continued use of a veto by state governments is too problematic to be continued. Residual sovereignty can find adequate representation by qualified majority voting, which is closer the threshold needed to maintain a filibuster in the U.S. Senate. That the E.U. state of Slovakia maintained its veto on a proposed number of federal sanctions against Russia on July 9, 2025 when the European Court of Human Rights ruled that Russia had violated international law in invading Ukraine is a good indication that the veto had outlived its usefulness and was being used by governors for sordid purposes by using the E.U. rather than strengthening it in foreign affairs.

On the very day when Ukraine’s President Zelensky and Pope Leo “discussed the Vatican as a possible location to host peace talks to end Russia’s full-scale invasion” and Zelensky thanked the pope for the Vatican’s help in reuniting 1,350 of more than 19,500 “children taken by Russia after Moscow’s 2022 invasion,”[1] the judges at the European Court of Human Rights, which is not part of the E.U., ruled that Russia’s government had violated international law not only by shooting down the MH17 commercial airliner, but also in “the murder, torture, rape, destruction of civilian infrastructure and kidnapping of Ukrainian children” in Ukraine.[2] Meanwhile, U.S. President Trump voiced frustration at Russia’s President Putin for not being willing to negotiate an end to the invasion, and Putin unleashed “a new record-breaking barrage of drones and missiles against Ukrainian cities.”[3]

On the very same day, the government of the E.U. state of Slovakia confirmed “that it would for the time being maintain its veto on the new package of sanctions that the European Union intends to impose on Russia in response to the invasion of Ukraine.”[4] The additional sanctions would target “Russia’s financial and energy sectors, including the Nord Stream pipelines.”[5] Countries supplying or financing Russia’s war machine would also be subject to sanctions. Besides being politically tone-deaf, the wayward state government did not object to the economic restrictions per se, but rather, to “the proposed phase-out of all Russian fossil fuels by the end of 2027.”[6] But because qualified majority-voting rather than unanimity applies to the phase-out proposal, the Slovak governor “resorted to sanctions, which require unanimity, to extract concessions from Brussels.”[7] What kind of concessions?  Plain and simply, the extortion of the E.U. for money as “compensation” for anticipated financial damages, even though the legal opinion of E.U.’s executive branch is that the E.U. prohibition of gas from Russia would “act as ‘force majeure’ in court and shield governments and companies against damages.”[8]

At the very least, the state’s governor was politically tone-deaf on July 9, 2025, more concerned with exploiting the veto mechanism for money than with the visuals in advantaging Russia by vetoing sanctions as leverage for the fossil-fuel prohibition that is subject only to qualified majority vote. That Slovakia’s government had no objection to the economic sanctions and yet maintained a veto against them in order to gain leverage on the gas prohibition, effectively making that proposal subject to a veto, shows that the veto mechanism was indeed subject to abuse at the expense of qualified majority voting. This hyperextension of the veto mechanism to a bill subject only to qualified majority voting suggests that the two voting mechanisms cannot coexist. Power abhors obstacles, and qualified majority voting is an obstacle to state governments accustomed to being able to veto federal legislation and foreign-policy proposals. If indeed the governmental sovereignty retained by the states is sufficiently represented in qualified majority voting, which is 55% of the states and 55% of the population of the E.U., the veto power is an excessive block by states on federal action and the benefits to Europe that can come from collective action. Both the value of such benefits in federal legislation and foreign policy and the exploitation by state governments of their veto power at the federal level argue against retaining the veto mechanism. Slovakia has laid bare the imbalance in the E.U.’s federal system as bottom-heavy at the expense of benefits that could be realized by collective action. The abuse of the veto authority is sufficiently evident in a veto that benefits Russia being confirmed on the very same day that the top court in Europe on human rights ruled against Russia’s invasion and the Pope met with Zelensky on a way forward on peace even as Putin continued to stall for time to unleash more bombs.

Abstractly speaking concerning the E.U., the whole is more than the sum of the parts, and the whole suffers to the extent that a part is able to direct the whole. That each part maintains its integrity as a unit does not justify any part in being able to hold the whole hostage for financial gain. It is utterly unrealistic to assume that a policy or law of the whole is or should be in the political and economic interests of every part. Lastly, for a part to put itself above the whole is presumptuous and egocentric, which is to say, selfish. Given the salience of self-interest, which stems from self-love, in human nature, undermining mechanisms designed to curb exploitation by selfishness at the expense of overall good is utterly foolish in any political society.

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1. Gavin Blackburn, “Zelenskyy and Pope Leo XIV Suggest Vatican as Venue for Ukrainian Peace Talks,” Euronews.com, July 9, 2025.
2. Aleksandar Brezar, “Top European Court Rules Russia Violated International Law in Ukraine,” Euronews.com,
July 9, 2025.
3. Jorge Liboreiro, “Slovakia Maintains Veto on New Package of EU Sanctions against Russia,” Euronews.com, July 9, 2025.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.

Elon Musk’s Controversial Politics: Beyond the Financials

As U.S. President Trump signed his “Big Beautiful Bill” into law on July 4, 2025, Elon Musk, shareholder and CEO of Tesla, announced that he would create a new political party (or “group” in European-speak). Musk opposed the projected trillions of dollars that the bill would add to the debt held by the U.S. federal government, though, as CEO of SpaceX, he was fine with cutting a trillion dollars from Medicaid, which provides health coverage to the poorest of the poor, and from food assistance while the defense budget was augmented. Musk’s proposed “America” group would likely draw support from Trump’s “MAGA” base, rather than from moderate Republicans and any Democrats. Whether Musk was more motivated by breaking up the political duopoly of the two major parties, or groups, to increase the practical options for voters or to split Trump’s support and punish the Republican party, such controversial political involvement by a major shareholder CEO is without doubt risky business. This is not to say that CEO’s should not be active politically apart from business strategy, for even business managers are citizens and thus may feel compelled to become active politically. This is to be lauded especially if the motive is out of duty to repair or otherwise improve a political system.

On the next working day after Musk’s announcement that he would be forming a new political party, “Tesla shares plunged nearly 7 percent . . . as investors registered dismay” at Musk’s “plans to form a third party and his intensifying feud with President Trump.”[1] Even though 7% is not exacting “plunging” or “crushing” Testa shares, beyond the hyperbole of journalists is the point that not avoiding controversy politically has costed Tesla and Musk himself financially. To be sure, billionaires can afford to lose significant wealth and still be left standing comfortably, and even in the case of business practitioners, economic reductionism doesn’t always hold. Also, political involvement can raise stock prices, as, for example, “Musk’s involvement in politics and his financial support for the president’s campaign were once seen by investors as a benefit to Tesla, fueling a steep rise in company shares after the election” in November, 2024.[2] No one but the most cynical would deny, however, that Musk’s chief motivation that led to his involvement in “DOGE” in the White House was for his businesses to benefit even though they did, initially. So that they took a hit when Musk broke from President Trump and then formed the America Party cannot be assessed only as concerns the financial impact on Tesla or SpaceX.

In American history, the notion that wealthy people should devote some time to public service for the benefit of the Union or their respective member-states was once well-known. Both because such people could afford financially to take time off from business and because their experience could be useful in governing, the notion of public duty was beneficial to the public good. Men like Thomas Jefferson and George Washington did not make public service into a career and did not go into politics primarily for its positive financial benefit. As a frustrated General dependent on the sovereign states whose delegates met in the Second Continental Congress, Washington would not have endured such hardships as he did were his motivation simply to benefit himself and his landholdings in Virginia financially. Even though Musk is by no stretch another Washington, more has been involved in Musk’s political motivation than maximizing Tesla’s stock price or gaining government contracts for SpaceX, and even getting back at Donald Trump. Government, moreover, is not just the aggregate of business interests without remainder.

Other billionaires might look to Musk’s example not in terms of his political ideology necessarily, but in terms of having enough financial cushion to weather political-turned-financial pushback from going beyond business to engage in public service—to give back, as it were, so to improve the system of government and add to the public good. It is admittedly very easy to be guided by personal and business financial considerations in delving into politics, whereas being willing to hold those at bay out of a sense of public duty is more difficult, and, frankly, increasing rare as American history has proceeded but not necessarily evolved politically. The notion that duty pertains to citizenship has become increasingly recessive in public discourse and consciousness. This is to say that duty-bound CEO’s are saints; rather, it is to say that we shouldn’t be so surprised when a billionaire businessman jumps into politics not merely for financial reasons, and thus not turn back to shore after a financial hit. Even if motivated by political ideology rather than in saving the union from itself (e.g., public debt), personal and business financial benefit is not the whole story, and the public good can still be a beneficiary. 

Mozi says, "'worthy people [are] those who are well versed in virtuous conduct, discriminating in discussion, and broadly knowledgeable!’ . . . . When the wealthy and eminent in the state heard this they retired and thought to themselves, ‘At first, we could rely on our wealth and eminence, but now the king promotes the righteous and does not turn away the poor and the humble. This being the case, we too must be righteous.'"[3]

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1. Jack Ewing, “Musk’s Idea of 3^rd Party Is Crushing Testla Shares,” The New York Times, July 8, 2025.

2. Ibid.

3. Philip J. Ivanhoe and Bryan W. Van Norden, ed.s, Readings in Classical Chinese Philosophy (New York: Seen Bridges Press, 2001), 58.

Putting a State in Charge of the E.U.

If only Ukraine could become the 51^st member-state of the U.S., rather than the 28^th state of the E.U., given the veto of Viktor Orban of the E.U. state of Hungary on the E.U. annexing Ukraine. Besides the inherent problems that come with relying so much on the principle of unanimity in the European Council and the Council of the E.U., mislabeling the prime minister of the state that chairs the legislative committees known collectively as the Council of the E.U. as the E.U. president not only marginalizes the federal officials, including President Von der Leyen, who, as the head of the E.U.’s executive branch, can rightfully be considered as the president of the European Union. In contrast, government officials of a state chairing legislative committees can hardly be said to collectively be the “presidency” of the European Union. Behind the promotion of this fallacy is the anti-federalist, or Euroskeptic, political ideology that misconstrues the E.U. as merely a network of intergovernmental relations between the states.

Although the E.U., like the U.S., splits governmental sovereignty between two systems—that of the union and that of the states, the two unions have different ways in which state officials participate at the federal level. The official participation roles are greater in E.U. institutions than in U.S. institutions at the union level. In his book, Federal Government, Kenneth Wheare makes the point that federalism has two systems of government, neither of which is a “level” above the other. He is correct because the sovereignty remaining with state governments, which in both unions includes all residual sovereignty, is not “lower” than the exclusive or shared competencies, or enumerated domains of power, delegated to the federal governmental institutions. The fallacy of “levels” is much easier to grasp by looking that the European Union than the United States because of the extent of official roles in certain E.U. governmental institutions for state officials, whereas in the U.S., state officials lost their direct participation when U.S. senators became elected offices rather than by appointment by the respective state chief executives/heads of state/commanders in chief (i.e., “governors” being those who govern) or legislatures. This difference may be why so much governmental sovereignty will not be transferred from the system of state governments to the union’s governmental institutions in the E.U. by 100 or 200 years in the E.U. as in the U.S. as of the 249^th anniversary of the thirteen colonies boldly (as there was considerable risk) declaring themselves to be free and independent countries, then already in a military alliance (i.e., the Continental Congress).

On the day before the 249^th anniversary of 13 British colonies in North America declaring themselves to be sovereign countries, Ukrainian President Zelensky attended “the opening ceremony of the Danish EU Presidency in Aarhus.”[1] Depicting or characterizing Denmark as the “EU Presidency” is misleading, for the reference is to officials of that state chairing policy-domain specific committees rather than standing for the E.U. itself. The exaggeration is at the expense of recognition that the Commission’s head, Von der Leyen, a federal rather than a state official, has a greater claim to speak for the European Union. As president of the E.U.'s executive branch, Von der Leyen delivers the annual State of the Union address at the Parliament chamber, just as the president of the U.S. delivers the State of the Union in the U.S. House of Representatives' chamber. It is revealing that just before the Parliament's vote of confidence in Von der Leyen on July 10, 2025, a lawyer specialized in E.U. law predicted that even if the vote is favorable to Von der Leyen, more "and more [E.U.] citizens will ask themselves, is she really the right person to lead the E.U. in such turbulent times."[2] It is not as though the rotating 6-month "presidency" of whatever state government is chairing the committees known collectively as the Council of the E.U. could claim to be at the helm, and thus step in for a weakened Von der Leyen. 

Generally speaking, putting a state in charge of the E.U. would be loaded with intractable problems. In June of the same year, the governor of the E.U. state of France presumed to speak for the European Union rather than just for his state on foreign policy, effectively (and I suspect intentionally) sidelining the E.U.’s president and its foreign minister, an office that is deliberately mislabeled as the “High Representative” to appease Euroskeptics. 

Regarding the involvement of the state governments at the federal level, the President of the European Council, António Costa, had a greater claim than the chair of legislative committees to be referred to as a president, and Macron of France was not the federal official standing for the European Council. That the governor of the E.U. state of Denmark “vowed to support Ukraine’s accession process” to be annexed by the E.U. and to use the “presidency of the E.U. Council to put ‘maximum pressure’ on Hungary to lift its veto on Ukraine” being annexed by the E.U. is less significant than the pressure than the federal officials António Costa and Ursula von der Leyen could apply on Hungary’s governor.[3] In response the emphasis, for example, of the Danish foreign minister chairing the other state foreign ministers in one of the committees in the Council of the E.U., Viktor Orban could more easily relegate Von der Leyen, Kaja Kallas and António Costa and thus deflate pressure from the E.U. itself, which is greater than a committee of state officials chaired by a Danish state official.

In other words, the paralyzing impact of retaining vetoes in the European Council and the Council of the E.U. is exacerbated by falsely portraying a state government as the “Presidency of the E.U.” The Parliament and the Commission even together may be too weak to counter the power of the states in the E.U. governmental system within the federal system; mislabeling a state as the E.U. Presidency only exacerbates the imbalance, even if it is a policy of officials of that state to resist the veto of another state. The E.U. is more than being the simple aggregate of the states, and the European Court of Justice, the European Commission, and the European Parliament are all institutions of the E.U. that manifest the E.U. being more than the sum of its states. Just as balance is important between the system of state governments and the system of the federal government in a federal system, so too balance of power is important between the branches of government, and in this respect the federal government should be distinguished from state government within a federal system because only in the former are some institutions representing states and others represent federal citizens. It is important that the power of the state officials in union institutions not overwhelm the power of federal officials in other union-institutions, lest particular state interests dominate those of the whole. Denmark may have its own economic and political interests with respect to Ukraine, whereas Von der Leyen and Kallas represent the E.U.’s interests rather than those of any state. Overstating the salience of the state governments in E.U. governance at the expense of federal officials.

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1. Evelyn Ann-Marie Dom and Jorge Liboreiro, “Ukraine Will Do ‘Anything’ to Advance EU Accession Talks Despite Hungary Veto, Zelenskyy Says,” Euronews.com, July 3, 2025.
2. Sandor Zsiros, "EU Parliament Censure Vote Leaves von der Leyen Weakened, even in Victory," Euronews.com, July 10, 2025, italics added.

3.  Evelyn Ann-Marie Dom and Jorge Liboreiro, “Ukraine Will Do ‘Anything’ to Advance EU Accession Talks Despite Hungary Veto, Zelenskyy Says,” Euronews.com, July 3, 2025.

E.U. Flag Day

Both the E.U. and U.S. have their respective flag days during the month of June—on the 29^th and 14^th, respectively. This isn’t the only thing that the flags have in common, and what sets both off from the flags of the states. I contend that these similarities and difference regarding political symbols can function as markers for what both unions are as complex polities of polities even as ideologies seek to obfuscate and dissimilate, even dismissing or ignoring the history of both unions. In other words, flags don’t lie; people do.

The first flags of the E.U. and U.S. were both used by their predecessors, rather than being created in 1993 and 1789, respectively. These dates mark when the states gave some of their governmental sovereignty to the union-level judicial, legislative, and executive branches. The first E.U. flag had been used by the European Communities since 1986, and the first U.S. flag had been used beginning in 1777 by the alliance’s Second Continental Congress, and, moreover, under the Articles of Confederation, under which each of the 13 member countries was sovereign after having been colonies in the British Empire until 1776. Crucially, the Declaration of Independence declared the independence each of the 13 colonies, which even while colonies had been in a military alliance like modern-day NATO.

The original E.U. and U.S. flags. The sheer paralellism is astonding, especially given how differently the two unions are perceived today by the general public on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean. 

The E.U. flag contains stars representing its 12 original states and the U.S. flag contains stars representing its 13 original states because all of those states had been sovereign countries and still retained some governmental sovereignty. In fact, in 1993 and 1789, respectively, the states still held most of the governmental sovereignty, with the federal governmental institutions, or branches, being much restricted in their respective exclusive competencies and enumerated powers.

The parallelism itself is astounding, especially given the tendency in Europe to perceive the E.U. incorrectly as a “bloc” or international organization like NATO and NAFTA, and in America to perceive the U.S. like France with a large back-yard rather than an empire-scale union of semi-sovereign polities. This is precisely why the history of the two flags is so important to know, for treating the U.S. as if it would be a state in the E.U. rather than on the same level and scale as the E.U., and treating the E.U. as if it were a temporary “bloc” of sovereign countries for a single purpose like trade or defense as if a trade agreement of military alliance incur rather basic yet invisible category mistakes.

The basic, or qualitative difference between the unions and their respective states can be grasped by the fact that the E.U. flag’s twelve golden stars, “explicitly, and in contrast to” the flags of the states, represent the states and “the ideals of unity, solidarity and harmony,”[1] which are especially important at the union, empire-level because empires are inherently heterogenous (i.e., interstate differences in culture, norms, and values as well as dominant ideologies) whereas the states themselves are relatively homogenous. Rather than a difference in degree, the difference is that of a leap, given that there is a leap in geographical scale between that of a state and a union of many such states. 

That the stars in the E.U. flag are in a circle better stands for unity than does the arrangement of the 13 stars in the original Star-Spangled U.S. flag, but the circle configuration was in the Betsy Ross version, which although not the official flag, was consistent with the specifications in the Flag Act of 1777. The parallelism between the stars in the Ross flag and in the E.U. flag is very strong.

The Betsy Ross Flag, a close up of part of that flag, and the E.U. flag. The close up and the E.U. flag are directly parallel, with only the color of the stars differing. The stars on both flags stand for states.

The value being placed on unity and solidarity at the federal level is more crucial than at the state level, and this is reflected in the fact that the state flags not only do not have stars representing sovereign and then semi-sovereign polities therein, but also do not symbolically highlight unity or solidarity. 

In short, unity and solidarity, which by the way are put at risk by relying too much on the principle of unanimity in having state vetos at the union level, are more valuable at the federal level in an empire-scale union of states than at the state level. Therefore, empire-scale governance contains, or should contain, dynamics that do not exist at the state, or (early-modern, rather than medieval) “kingdom” level, such as in managing diversity of state preferences at the union level.  Interstate differences are more salient in union-level governance than regional differences are in state-level governance, and early-modern federalism, as distinct from confederalism, treats the two levels as qualitiatively different as a result. To conflate them is thus one hell of a category mistake, and yet people on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean do it much too often, given the reasoning potential of the human brain. Yes, ouch! Just for added fun, let's put corrective braces on the crooked teeth of "Brexit" and add some disinfectant mouth-wash to extirpate the bad odor from former British Prime Minister David Cameron's erroneous statement that the E.U. was just one of the international networks that Britain had been in. 

Before the United Kingdom seceded from the E.U., it could be said that the ideological and cultural differences throughout the empire-scale union bearing on political decisions needed to be managed in the European Council, the Council of the E.U., the European Parliament, and the European Commission dwarfed the differences between the four regions or provinces of the United Kingdom that had to be managed at the state level there. Put another way, whereas the original E.U. flag has stars representing the states, the state flag of the United Kingdom does not have stars representing its regions. Nor, for that matter, does the flag of Germany have stars representing its 15 regions. 

The governmental dynamics at the scale of former and existing E.U. states are in crucial respects qualitatively different than the unique dynamics that empire-scale unions of such states must have in order not to fall apart due to pressure from state differences seeking their own expressions yet while there is unity at the union level. This is the balance that renders federalism itself an unstable form of government, yet the best suited form to empire-scale unions of states. Contrasting union from state flags warns us not to conflate state with union-level governance, and thus states with unions of such states.

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1. Andreas Rogal, “European Flag Celebrates 40 Years as Symbol for EU and Predecessor,” Euronews.com, June 29, 2025.

The U.S. Supreme Court Clipping Judicial Overreach

The separation of powers that characterizes governments in the United States assumes that each branch will act to further its own interests, given the salience of self-interest (and self-preservation) in human nature. It is assumed that the checks and balances between legislative, judicial, and executive branches will keep any one branch from dominating the other two, and, moreover, the government itself from becoming tyrannical at the expense of the liberty of the citizenry. It is not assumed or relied upon that a branch will prune itself without external pressure from one of the other branches. Yet the U.S. Supreme Court may have done so in ruling on June 27, 2025 to limit “the ability of lower-court judges to block executive branch policies nationwide.”[1] I contend that any real wing-clipping by 6 of the 9 justices is illusory rather than indicative of the federal judiciary unilaterally restricting itself.

“With their decision, the justices appeared to upend the ability of single federal judges to freeze policies across the country,” according to The New York Times.[2] The appearance is belied by the fact that the ruling would not go into effect for 30 days and “the justices laid out a potential path for challengers, saying that district court judges could consider whether to take up class-action suits seeking to bar enforcement of the executive order on a statewide, regional or even national basis.”[3] The latter basis would essentially enable a district-court federal judge to block an executive order from going into effect anywhere in the United States.  Groups that had challenged the executive order at issue—invalidating birth-right citizenship for children of illegal immigrants—quickly filed class-action suits in Maryland and New Hampshire, with others expected in the following week—well within the 30 days. As for the validity of the executive order itself, the court would decide that in a case scheduled in the court’s next term.

It is interesting that the justices “split along ideological lines” on a matter of judicial process rather than on the substance of the executive order.[4] Perhaps political ideology has more of an imprint on judicial rulings by the U.S. Supreme Court than most people realize. After all, Justice Sandra Day O’Conner wrote the majority opinion for Bush v. Gore (2000) before oral arguments were heard. Might it be that the conservative justices on the bench wanted President Trump to see a win for him even though the national judicial block of his executive order would likely continue uninterrupted? That president had been very critical of Justice Amy Barrett for another ruling, and she wrote the majority opinion on the case on whether district federal judges could block an executive order nationally. Indeed, the president declared himself the winner from the ruling even though the six conservative justices left open a way for district court judges to be able to continue wielding nationwide injunctions to block the president’s policies issued as executive orders.

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1. Abbie Vansickle, “Justices Put Limit on Judges’ Power, In Win for Trump,” The New York Times, June 28, 2025.
2. Ibid., italics added.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.

The E.U. Stance on Tariffs: Pressure from the States

After the U.S. took the decision to impose reciprocal and car tariffs on the E.U., it did not take long for several of the E.U. states to pressure the federal executive branch, the European Commission, to punch holes in the E.U.’s counter-tariffs so favored industries in the E.U. would not face higher prices on supplies from the United States. As in U.S. states, E.U. states have their own dominant industries, whose financial interests it is only natural for government to protect, as jobs translate into votes. But pressuring the E.U.’s federal government to carve out exceptions for imports desired by favored industries at the state level, such as automobiles in the E.U. state of Germany, would deny the E.U. the full benefit of a united front that federalism can provide against other countries. For maximum leverage in trade negotiations, unilaterally removing counter-tariffs is not wise; it is like a person intentionally tripping over himself while trying to get to the grocery store. Given the regional pressures, trade is rightfully one of the enumerated powers, or exclusive competencies, of the E.U. rather than a shared competency or a power retained by the states.

At a basic level, first of all, to pretend that the E.U. is merely a confederation, in which governmental sovereignty still resides exclusively with the state governments, is a much more subtle way of enervating the E.U., whether out of denial or a desire by federal officials to appease purblind Euroskeptic governors, such as Viktor Orban of the E.U. state of Hungary. Fortunately, though for some people regretfully antagonistically, transparency is valued by truth-tellers. Both qualified majority voting and the exclusive and even shared competencies enjoyed by the E.U. government are incompatible with a confederation, not to mention a mere “bloc” or economic treaty like NAFTA. Correctly “mapping” the E.U. is a prerequisite to being able to get “maximum bang for the buck” (an American expression, wherein “buck” strangely means “dollar”) in terms of collective action at the federal level.

On the summer solstice, 2025, which by the way is not the first day of climate summer as some American meteorologists were claiming as if they were deer in headlights or cows chewing cud, the E.U.’s Commission warned state governments that some of their “sensitive goods” would not be shielded “from planned retaliatory tariffs on U.S. goods” because the E.U. was “weary of undermining its negotiating hand in high-stakes trade talks with President Donald Trump, three E.U. diplomats and officials” said.[1] Not to resist the pressure would unilaterally weaken the E.U.’s negotiating leverage even before sitting down to negotiate with the Americans. In a confidential meeting at the Commission, it was determined that acceding to all of the state requests would mean that the E.U. “would only target €25 billion worth of U.S. exports . . . instead of the €95 billion” that the E.U. “initially targeted as a response”.[2] The sheer difference between €25 billion and €95billion attests to the leverage that collective action at a federal level has over the negotiating power that an aggregation of European countries would have. In other words, the dollar value lost in the shielding can point to the power that is gained by collective action from an exclusive competency residing at the federal rather than state level.

In seceding from the E.U., the former E.U. state of Britain lost any future benefits that can be gained from collective action at the federal level of an empire-scale union of states, for even a secessionist state is commensurate in scale and polity-type with the remaining states rather than the union of such states. A leap in scale from (early-modern) kingdom and empire, and a qualitative difference in polity-type between a state and federal union of such states are why Britain is not equivalent to the European Union. In other words, the United Kingdom is not a small E.U.

In conclusion, subtly letting air out of the tire by insisting that the E.U. does not have a federal system or intentionally allowing states to shield certain imports from America at the expense of the federal stance is not exactly putting the best foot forward in arriving at the negotiation table. Given the sheer amount of benefit that would be lost were the Commission to acquiesce to every state request on carve-outs, proposals to expand the federal competencies subject to qualified majority vote instead of unanimity should be considered with greater urgency, and additional enumerated domains of power federalized from the states. Fears of a leviathan “central state” can be allayed by realizing that the E.U. has a federal system of divided sovereignty and that the state governments have significant access to policy-making at the federal level in the European Council and the Council of the E.U. even though the executive branch, the European Parliament and the E.U.’s supreme court provide less access and thus can protect federal prerogatives and thus the benefits obtainable from collective rather than associative action. Unity need not mean uniformity; collective action is possible at the federal level while states can retain the ability to reflect their own interests and cultures as long at the benefits from collective action are not unduly compromised.

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1. Camile Gus and Ari Hawkins, “Brussels Resists Pressure from E.U. [State] Capitals to Shield Exports in U.S. Trade Fight,” Politico.com, June 20, 2025.

2. Ibid.

The E.U. on Anti-Trust Enforcement: The Case of Google

On June 19, 2025, when the European Court of Justice, the E.U.’s supreme court, received a nonbinding opinion from the advocate general, Juliane Kokott, recommending that Google’s appeal against an anti-trust fine of €4 billion be dismissed by the court. The E.U.’s executive branch, the Commission, had found in 2018 that the company had “used the dominance of its mobile Android operating system to throttle competition and reduce consumer choice.”[1] I contend that the company’s written statement in response can be characterized as “stone-deaf” or oblivious to the issue at hand. Such is not an effective way of managing threats in the environment of business. Moreover, the response itself illustrates why governmental action on anti-trust on behalf of market competition is valid and necessary. I contend that the invisible-hand mechanism of a restored competitive market is more reliable than depending on managerial intentions even if they are to be based on motivation that is social-engineered from fines.

The fine of €4 billion is part of a total of €8 billion against Google for anti-trust violations over a decade, including on the company’s digital ad unit. So, a pattern of restraint of trade can be inferred. As if obvious to it, the company statement in reaction to Kokott’s recommendation included, “Android has created more choice for everyone and supports thousands of successful businesses in Europe and around the world.”[2] That the advent of android technology had given consumers another option says nothing about whether Google was also curtailing other options. That many businesses were using android technology is not a rebuttal to the government’s claim that Google was operating in restraint of trade. In fact, that many businesses were using Google’s technology means that the company’s market share, and thus market power, were enough for the company to be able to restrain competition in the industry. In wanting to brag (or advertise), the managers at Google who wrote and approved the statement were unwittingly making the government’s case. Unsuccessful companies do not have sufficient market-power to restrict or curtail competition as John D. Rockefeller’s Standard Oil did in the U.S. until that company was broken up (rather badly) by the U.S. Supreme Court on anti-trust grounds. This example begs the question of whether merely slapping Google with fines is sufficient to arrest the company’s pattern of restraining trade. Both the pattern and the bragging illustrate the tone-deaf feature of greed that narrows cognition and perception. In applying a fine to Google, the E.U. regulators would be naïve in believing that the company’s managers would then be motivated to stop curtailing competition. At the very least, the Commission’s commissioner for competition would still need to watch Google like a hawk.

I contend that it is vital to the public interest, or common good, of a society that competitive markets be protected and even created out of oligopolies by governments; this is a legitimate role for government because price-competition forces suppliers to be price-takers rather than price-setters. Only as the former are suppliers oriented to demand. This crucial role of price in a competitive market was arguably Adam Smith’s best contribution, or “value added,” to economic theory. The “invisible hand” by which buyers and sellers are both price-takers can be understood as an impersonal mechanism that constrains self-interest and even gives rise to unintended beneficial consequences of self-interest as goods and services are allocated efficiently rather than according to the self-interested will of a monopolist.

Even more abstractly, self-interest stems from the sin of self-love, which is the putting of one’s own happiness above love directed to God, so constraining especially narrow self-interest is important so as to obviate the baleful effects from greed that is oriented only to one’s own private benefit. In other words, that such self-interest is based ultimately on the sin of self-idolatry (i.e., worshipping one’s own happiness even at the expense of loving God) means that a society is wise at the very least to constrain even self-interests that are economically aggregated with unintended beneficial consequences. Smith’s “invisible hand” impersonal mechanism, if protected by government anti-trust enforcement, is more reliable, I submit, than even intended beneficial consequences that are conditional on human intention and thus motivation. This is why downsizing Google in the E.U. is preferable to trying to motivate Google’s management to stop restraining competition in its industry by means of fines.

Pierre Nicole, a Jansenist priest in the seventeenth century, argued that self-love can have beneficial consequences. The consequences are intended, but only in so far as the benefits going to others are in one’s own self-interest. Courtesy, for example, although rooted in self-love and thus fully in accord with self-interest, constrains immediate or narrow self-interest that runs unfettered in Hobbes’ state of nature. Simply put, we can get more by being social with other people than by taking their food and even killing them. Smith’s impersonal market mechanism also constrains narrow (or immediate) self-interest, such as raw greed, even though the untended aspect of the invisible hand differs from Nicole’s intended courtesy, and the impersonal aspect of Smith’s market mechanism differs from Nicole’s personal motive to extend courtesy to others because it is in one’s interest to do so. Also, whereas the invisible hand constrains self-interest itself, though competition may ultimately be in a company’s long-term best financial interest, extending courtesy to others only constrains narrow (or immediate) self-interest. In other words, narrow self-interest, in which only private benefits to oneself are sought, is constrained by both approaches and so they can be compared. But courtesy can easily be turned off, as it depends on intention, whereas the invisible hand’s operation does not depend on market participants intentions to constrain their own self-interest. As self-love is a manifestation of the foundational sin of pride, according to Augustine, a person’s intentions to constrain one’s own self-interest in actions cannot be relied upon even though it is laudable when a person assumes an enlightened self-interest and even acts altruistically. In assuming a managerial role in a company, a human being comports oneself to one’s narrow economic role, which willows one’s intentions that go beyond immediate or medium-term financial interests, both in terms of salary and company profitability.

It bears remembering that even though part of the literature on corporate social responsibility in the twentieth century includes ethical principles, CSR programs have become largely marketing. Indeed, the fiduciary duty of managers to the stockholders as a group mandates that the managers be oriented to maximizing profit (and thus dividends and the stock price). This legal infrastructure encases narrow self-interest, which benefits from restraining trade in order to increase market power and profit. Therefore, it should not be surprising that Google’s written reaction to the judicial opinion of the advocate general bears no traces of responsibility to uphold a competitive market for the good of society, but can instead be interpreted as sheer marketing. Lots of businesses use our product! Rockefeller could have said the same. That titan, who viewed himself as a “Christ figure” and a Noah in saving rival refiners from destructive competition in the 1860s by forcing them abord his “combination,” was also found guilty of restraint of trade. His self-deluded intentions certainly could not be trusted by the Supreme Court justices who ruled in favor of breaking up his company. In the 2020’s, the E.U. was surpassing the U.S. on anti-trust enforcement, but even so, I submit that motive-triggering fines are not sufficient to restoring and protecting market competition once there is an egocentric giant in the room.

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1. “Google Hits Setback in Bid to Overturn Multibillion EU Antitrust Fine in Android Case,” APnews.com, June 19, 2025.
2. Ibid.

American Federalism and Equal Protection: Transsexual Children in Tennessee

On June 18, 2025, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a Tennessee law blocking transsexual children from being able to undergo puberty-blockers and gender-changing surgeries does not violate the Equal Protection clause of the U.S. Constitution. The court’s 6-3 opinion in U.S. v. Skrmetti was reported at the time to fall “largely along conservative-liberal lines.”[1] By this is mean ideological lines, both moral and political in nature. Such is grist for the mill for the broad judgment of an electorate, in what is otherwise known as popular sovereignty, which is superior to governmental sovereignty in a republic. Add in the fact that Tennessee is a member-state in a federal system in which the U.S. Supreme Court is on the federal level, and the broad judgment of the electorate takes on more significance to the extent that a federal system of an empire-scale union is in part supposed to take into account and protect interstate ideological differences that defy one-size-fits-all union-level policies. In other words, as cultural heterogeneity can be expected in going from state to state in an empire-scale union-of-states, efforts “from the top” to impose a single policy on every state do not allow the federation to breath. Political pressure could be expected to build over time if such a suffocating tendency eventuates, with the risk of dissolution increasing over time as if depreciation.

Because the U.S. Supreme Court can (and has) contributed to a one-size-fits-all compromising of federalism in favor of the General (i.e., federal) Government, Chief Justice Roberts wisely resisted the temptation (if he felt any) to decide the issue not only for the people of Tennessee, but also for the entire Union. “The voices in these debates raise sincere concerns; the implications for all are profound. The Equal Protection Clause does not resolve these disagreements. Nor does it afford us license to decide them as we see best.”[2] He was deferring to popular sovereignty. Because he did not find discrimination based on sex to exist in the Tennessee law and thus that it does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the federal constitution, he was able to not only defer to an electorate to use its broad judgment, but also allow Tennessee some breathing room within the Union.

It is arguably more likely that the majority of the electorate in Massachusetts, for example, would be against the Tennessee law being adopted in Massachusetts, than that a majority of Tennessee’s citizens would vote to repeal the law. Both of these collective value-judgments being able to be codified into law is vital to the endurance of a federal system in an empire-scale union of states. Therefore, the strict scrutiny that sexual discrimination requires of any court should not be used as a crutch by which to “federalize” law in the United States or to replace the value-judgments of majorities of voters with those of justices. The fact that the decision fell along ideological lines means that value-judgments apart from jurisprudence were also involved in the decision, and thus that Roberts is correct that the contesting “sincere concerns” should not be resolved by fiat, but rather by means of ballots.

This is not to say that a federal court should sidestep cases that do involve significantly harmful sexual, religious, or racial discrimination on a minority, for majority rule is not absolute. Rather, the interests of an electorate and of federalism itself should be considered by judges and justices, especially when the law under the microscope has a legitimate purpose. In the present case, stopping children from blocking puberty is a legitimate societal goal because children are especially vulnerable to not being of mature mind on even themselves. Surgeries are of such consequence that this part of the law was not even contested. This means the law had at least some merit of intent and thus could not be rightly claimed to be intended to discriminate. Although historically some state governments have enacted laws intentioned to discriminate against Black Americans, that such laws were so blatant can be used as a litmus test for federal judges and justices to assess whether a law is inherently and intentionally discriminatory. Just because a particular law impacts only a group rather than everyone does not mean that the law necessarily violates the Equal Protection Clause. Put another way, just because a law costs or benefits only people who meet certain criteria, such as having a disease such as gender dysphoria, does not mean that unless everyone meets those criteria the law is unconstitutional.

In fact, the value of broad value-judgments being made by voters as the basis of a republic and the importance of not succumbing to one-size-fits-all-states trends by federal governmental institutions arguably warrant shifts in federal policy and jurisprudence. For instance, the use of referenda by governments so an electorate can assume an increased role on the level of value-judgments would solidify that foundation of American democracy, with elected representatives taking their cues from the broad strokes to implement them into specifics, whether laws or regulations. Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court could set a precedent whereby it is more difficult for that court to declare a state law unconstitutional under the federal constitution. That that court is a branch of the federal government means that there is at least an implicit conflict of interest on matters bearing on federalism, since justices are both nominated and confirmed by branches of the federal government. I once asked Sandra Day O’Conner why the court had not done more to counter this institutional conflict of interest. She replied, “It takes five,” meaning five justices to agree to do it, and that was a Republican-majority court!  That the U.S. is not a France or Germany with a large back yard, but, rather, of the same scale and federal-type as the E.U., is reason enough for the American state governments to flex their respective wings more so as to reflect or match the broad value-judgments of their electorates. On June 18, 2025, Chief Justice Roberts resisted the temptation to clip Tennessee’s wings and thus incrementally strengthened the federalism of the empire-scale union.

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1. Josh Gerstein, “Supreme Court Upholds Tennessee’s Ban on Gender-Affirming Care for Minors,” Politico.com, June 18, 2025.
2. Ibid.

The E.U. as a Bystander on the Global Stage: A Self-Inflicted Wound

Why has the E.U. been sidelined amid the military tensions in the Middle East? The answer lies with the E.U.’s federal system, rather than the size of its economy or of its population. The E.U. certainly could have more geopolitical sway abroad were it not for a vulnerability being exploited within its own federal system. The vulnerability stems from a refusal by some state officials to recognize and respect the qualitative and quantitative differences between the federal and the state levels of the E.U. Specifically, when the governor (i.e., chief executive and/or head of state) of a state operates as if a federal-level official, especially that of a federal president, the authority of the actual federal president is undercut, hence weakening that person’s ability to convince the heads of foreign governments to include the E.U. president or foreign minister in multilateral negotiations centered on the Middle East, for example. Even unconsciously, foreign leaders may say to themselves, why should we respect the president of the E.U. if she is so easily upstaged by the leader of an E.U. state who is acting as if he were president of the European Commission?  To speak with one voice, and to be able to speak for the E.U. rather than just one state thereof, an E.U. official must be the speaker. Macron of the E.U. state of France cannot speak for the E.U., but Von der Leyen could, provided her space is respected by the governors of the states. This is not to say that this is the only reason why the E.U. has been sidelined from negotiations on Middle East warfare; rather, my contention is that this reason is typically overlooked due to the Euroskeptic ideological delusion that the E.U. does not have a federal system of government even though since 1993, governmental sovereignty has indeed been split between the states and the Union. Perhaps the underlying question here is whether continuing to clutch at the anti-federalist ideology is worth the E.U. continuing to be weakened unnecessarily from within, and thus sidelined from international negotiations that do not center on Europe. Making such blind-spots transparent is indeed a valuable occupation, even if it can be infuriating to people whose interests and ideology are served best if societies look the other way.

In June, 2025, Claude Moniquet, a European formerly in the field of intelligence, told a journalist that the E.U. had been left “sitting on the sidelines” as Israel pummeled Gaza and commenced a bombing in Iran.[1] “Europeans have been pretty much excluded from all major diplomatic manoeuvres around the war in Gaza or the war in Lebanon,” he added.[2] So even though the president of the E.U.’s executive branch, Ursula Von der Leyen, wrote on 13 June 2025, “Diplomatic efforts are crucial to preventing further escalation,” after having spoke with Israel’s president, Isaac Herzog, words are just words if they are from the sidelines rather than after having been dealt a hand of cards at the power-table.[3] I submit that the irrelevance of Von der Leyen’s words is partly due to Emmanuel Macron of the E.U. state of France having “stolen the thunder” by putting himself up as speaking for the E.U. on Gaza.

For instance, during a three-hour televised interview in early May, 2025, Macron said that Europe should consider sanctioning Israel over the humanitarian situation in Gaza, where “hundreds of thousands” were thought to be “facing starvation.”[4] Even though he was understandably frustrated by the lack of sanctions at the federal level, the president of France had no place to speak for Europe, as he was not an E.U. official at the time. To be sure, the thorny problem of the principle of unanimity in the European Council and the Council of Ministers on foreign-policy matters was a factor in the E.U.’s internal-weakness at the federal level, but Macron’s proper orientation was to contend that France should consider sanctioning Israel, if this had not already been done. Indeed, Macron said publicly on 30 May 2025 that France could harden its position on Israel. “The humanitarian blockade is creating a situation that is untenable on the ground,” he said.[5]

Yet two weeks later, Macron was visiting Greenland to represent Europe’s—not just France’s—objection to U.S. President Trump’s desire to make Greenland a U.S. territory. “The situation in Greenland is clearly a wakeup call for all Europeans,” he said as if he were president of the E.U. rather than the governor of an E.U. state.[6] This manner of situating the French president may seem harsh, but I submit that I have properly stated his role from the vantage point of the E.U. and particularly in terms of its federal system, wherein states are both qualitatively and quantitatively distinct from the federal level officials and governmental branches. Von der Leyen could have spoken for E.U. citizens rather than merely residents of the state of France were she to have visited Greenland, but Macron relegated such an opportunity for the E.U., and thus the collective clout that it potentially could have that a state could not. There is a cost, in other words, in a state official refusing to apply self-control when going into the spotlight is tempting. Were the U.S. president to try to invade Greenland, the E.U. president would have more economic clout than France could have with which to pressure Trump to cease and desist in his imperial designs.

This photo, from Euronews.com, illustrates Macron's usurption and how this impacts how the actual E.U. Commission president (pictured on the right) is viewed from abroad as compromised or weakened as a result..

Admittedly, involving state officials in foreign policy is arguably one way in which the E.U.’s federal system is a better case of federalism than the top-heavy American counterpart, but such involvement requires also giving E.U. officials, especially its (executive branch) president and foreign minister, enough authority with which to block state leaders from stealing the show on the societal stage. Although the U.S. had taken the doctrine of federal preemption of state action too far, some preemption would be justified in the E.U., especially as the governors do have a formal role even at the federal level in the European Council and through their ministers in the Council of Ministers on foreign policy. The proclivity to go beyond those federal institutions conflicts with the roles of the E.U. president and foreign minister in being able to lead the E.U. on foreign policy. A similar case of state overreach occurred when the prime minister of Italy sought to manipulate representatives in the European Parliament, which represents E.U. citizens rather than states.  Likewise, a governor of one of the republics in the U.S. can justifiably pressure a U.S. senator representing that governor’s state at the federal level, but the House representatives even in districts located in that state serve the U.S. citizens in those districts rather than the state government.

In short, political overreaching should be guarded against for a federal system to function optimally, such that benefits internationally from collective action at the federal level can be realized while the cultural and ideological interstate differences can be accommodated by there being policy domains retained by the state governments. Stealing the limelight of someone else is not conducive to a federal system being able to work both internally and as a political unit to the outside world. Put bluntly, if France’s Macron wants so to be president of the E.U., let him go through the process of candidacy at the end of Von der Leyen’s second term rather than usurp her role before then.

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1. Jeremy Fleming-Jones, “Europe Left on Diplomatic ‘Sidelines’ in Israel Iran Conflict,” Euronews.com, June 15, 2025.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Gavin Blackburn, “Macron on ‘Crusade against Jewish State,’ Israel Says Following Criticism of Gaza War,” Euronews.com, 30 May 2025.
5. Reuters, “France May Toughen Stance on Israel If It Continues Blocking Gaza Aid, Macron Says,” Reuters.com, May 30, 2025.
6. Emma De Ruiter, “Macron Reaffirms Support for Greenland during Visit Ahead of G7 Summit,” Euronews.com, 15 June, 2025.

Is Healthcare a Human Right?

Humanity still has not come to a consensus on what are entailed specifically within the rubric of human rights. Even in terms of those specifics that have come to be generally held to be human rights, such as in designated war crimes and crimes against humanity by international agreement, the lack of de jure and de facto enforcement render such agreement nugatory in practice. As a result, calls for human rights are in effect calls for warring to stop. The enforcement that goes along with laws legislated by governments render any consensus on what constitutes human rights more substantive in practice. This is undercut, however, in empire-scale polities of polities, such as the E.U. and U.S., to the extent that human rights are carved out at the federal level to applied across differing cultures. Such ideological diversity between the American member-states has triggered drastically-different notions of just what are included as human rights to be played out in Congress. The debate over the government-financed health-insurance program for the poor in 2025 illustrates such a lack of consensus, which in turn suggests that the member-states should play more of a role in how or even whether to provide free insurance to the poor. Sometimes, one size doesn’t fit all. In short, the matter of federalism is very relevant up front, before matters of the proper role of government itself and of human rights are decided. In other words, the qualitative and quantitative differences between a union of states and a state are very relevant up front, lest states eventually peel off in utter frustration with a one-size-fits-all approach to policy-making to fit an empire composed of member-states.

As the U.S. Senate considered changes to the Medicaid program, Republican Sen. Josh Hawley acknowledged “that the main cost-saving provision in the bill—new work requirements on able-bodied adults who receive health care through the Medicaid program—would cause millions of people to lose their coverage. All told, estimates are 10.9 million fewer people would have health coverage under the bill’s proposed changes to Medicaid and the Affordable Care Act.”[1] Millions would be relegated to not getting medical attention or going to the emergency rooms of hospitals mandated to treat the uninsured, who would be strapped with unaffordable medical bills and thus bad credit-reports.

That a significant number of poor people in the United States would lose health-insurance was known and anticipated by the legislators. Speaking on the bill as it was taking shape in the U.S. Senate, Sen. Hawley said, “I know that will reduce the number of people on Medicaid.”[2] What, then, justifies the loss of health coverage? The senator answered this question by adding, “But I’m for that because I want people who are able bodied but not working to work.”[3] In other words, being able to have access to medical services should be conditional on having a job. The conditionality itself means that health care is not a human right because such rights are inherently unconditional.

Some or even many of Sen. Hawley’s constituents doubtless favored excluding medical services from being included among other human rights, perhaps in the belief that people who are able to work but refuse to work do not deserve to be kept alive if they fall sick, which in turn can be based on a belief that only the strong of any species should survive. Sen. Hawley represents Missouri, when is generally conservative. Sen. Warren of Massachusetts, on the other hand, would find that the conditionality and thus the exclusion of medical care from human rights much less popular in her member-state. Such a wide divide by state on this question would be unlikely in the E.U., even between the states of Hungary or Poland and Sweden or the Netherlands. The European notion of subsidiarity would thus be more applicable in this case to the U.S. than the E.U., given the greater diversity of ideology on the question in the United States. In other words, federalizing universal healthcare would come with less ideological tensions between E.U. citizens in different states than between U.S. citizens in different states; there was more consensus within the empire-scale European Union than within the American bloc.

The imposition of work requirements as a condition for the poor having access to medical treatments may be just fine with most people in Texas and Utah, for example, and yet be very objectionable to most people in Vermont and Connecticut. To conflate these various member-states as being ideologically and culturally homogenous is suboptimal and comes with political costs as opposition pressure is likely to result where the federal policy is unpopular; more optimal politically would be transferring the program of Medicaid to the member-states so their respective peoples could tailor the program—or even cancel it—according to their respective political ideologies. The notion that policy in another state should reflect one’s own views is anathema to federalism, and even to there being empire-scale unions of states. Toleration within a union is thus necessary lest one size be applied throughout and eventually republics break off in frustration, as Britain did from the European Union due primarily to anti-federalist sentiment.

In short, finding a large gap from consensus in Congress (or in the E.U.’s legislature) can be an indication that a policy question would be better resolved by the member-states than at the empire-level, given the heterogeneity between states on the question. Congress and the federal president applying work requirements on what most people in some states regard as an unconditional human right may be intolerable emotionally to those people, but so too, Obamacare had been viewed as an intolerable overreach of government to most people in some other states. Behind this chasm, ideological and thus as emotional as cognitive, lies a basic disagreement on just what should constitute human rights, and thus be an obligation of government. In other words, besides different political philosophies of the proper role of government, different moral principles are involved on the question of whether government should pay for healthcare for the poor. In a federal system, the matter of where such a divisive policy question should be decided should be decided before both the proper-role-of-government and the human-rights questions are decided, or else the federal system itself would be compromised and thus put at risk.

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1. Leah Askarinam, “The GOP’s Big Bill Would Bring Changes to Medicaid for Millions,” Apnews.com, June 15, 2025.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.