Monday, May 27, 2024

Euroskeptic Federalism: Obstructing the E.U.'s Recognition of Palestine

Just because U.S. federalism deposits foreign policy exclusively with governmental institutions at the federal level does not mean that that domain cannot be shared between state and federal governments in a federal system. This was precisely the case in the E.U. as it struggled to come up with a unified response to Israel having ignored the verdict of the World Court—the UN’s court—ordering Israel to cease and decease from invading Rafah from May 24, 2024 onward. Meanwhile, two of the E.U.’s states were poised to recognize Palestine. Such emphasis on the state governments playing the leading role is fraught with difficulties even though in theory there is on reason why foreign policy cannot be a competency, or domain, that is shared at the state and federal “levels.” In federalism, the federal and state governmental systems are on par, rather than one of the governmental systems being above the other, so “levels” is misleading. Even so, a lot can be said for delegating foreign policy to the federal level. This can be seen from the state and federal reactions in the E.U. as Israel continued its invasion of Rafah just after the World Court had ruled that Israel would be violating international law and the UN’s charter in continuing the offensive.


The full essay is at "The E.U. on Israel."


Saturday, May 25, 2024

An E.U. Political Party Mischaracterizes the Union as an Alliance: Suicide by Mis-Identity

Two weeks before the E.U. election in 2024, far-right parties were projected to do well and thus have more seats in the E.U.’s lower legislative chamber, the European Parliament. Immigration was a key issue in the rising popularity of those parties. Although immigration in both the E.U. and U.S. was in dire need of governmental fixes, the rise of the right in the E.U. came at the expense of the union itself due to an underlying category mistake evinced at least in the European Conservatives and Reformists party. 

Even though it was at the time a political party in the Parliament, the European Conservatives and Reformists party denied its obvious identity as a political party in referring to itself vaguely as a group instead. No doubt according to that party, and other Euroskeptic parties on the right, a mere alliance of countries cannot have political parties, so linguistic gymnastics were resorted to, such that the parties in the European Parliament would be known as “groups,” any of which could be composed of member parties. 

A legislative body, including the E.U.'s parliament,  has political parties even if some call themselves or are called groups whose members are state-level parties. Such "members" are not recognized as such in the Parliament because it does not represent the states; the European Council does that. Even if a party is only in one state, it is a federal party if it exists in and is recognized by the European Parliament because one or more representatives, or Members of Parliament, claim to be of such a party, which in turn is thereby federalized. 

All of such mental twisting was being done of course for ideological purposes so the nobody would dare liken the E.U. to the U.S., or any other empire-scale federal union, such as the former U.S.S.R. Such equivalencies of reason pale next to puffed up egocentricity that wants to claim that a state in one such union is equivalent to an entire union elsewhere in the world. 

Both in terms of scale and the type of federalism, category mistakes have been conveniently promoted by politicians and a willing media in the E.U. and unknowingly parrotted by purblind journalists in the U.S. Because the U.S. began as a military alliance of sovereign counties under the Articles of Confederation and then invented and adopted modern federalism in 1789. those automated journalists should have known at the very least that the E.U. fits modern rather than confederal federalism.

That a union with dual-sovereignty is distinct from a mere alliance is supposedly “unthinkable,” at least it was to Nicola Procaccini, a co-president of the European Conservatives and Reformists party. “It is unthinkable that anyone would argue that the European Union was born as the ECSC and as the European Community, as a federalist state, as a United States of Europe,” he said.[1] However, the E.U. is distinct from the previous European Coal and Steel Cooperative (ECSC) and the European Community. The E.U. began after those two single-issue groups, neither of which included a government—complete with executive, legislative, and judicial governmental bodies, or “arms”/branches. In contrast, the E.U. has not only the European Council, which represents the state governments, but also a parliament, which represents E.U. citizens, the European Court of Justice, and the Commission. Furthermore, governmental sovereignty is divided in the E.U. between the federal and state governments; qualified-majority voting alone involves some sovereignty being at the federal level. So as it turns out, it is not unthinkable, undenkbar, to think of the E.U. as a federal system because it is precisely that—unlike what the ECSC and the EC were.

Procaccini’s nationalist ideology blocked his mind from grasping the fundamental difference that renders the E.U. as a federal system rather than as a mere alliance wherein sovereignty resides with the states. “We want to go back to the original idea of the European Union,” he said, “which is an alliance of nations doing a few things together, doing those things that nation-states alone wouldn’t be able to do in the best way.”[2] Although the latter refers to the principle of subsidiarity, which, like its counterpart in the basic law of the U.S., is valid, it is incorrect that the E.U. was founded in 1993 as an alliance of still-sovereign countries. Instead, the governmental atom of sovereignty was split, just as I was in 1789 in the United States. In other words, Procaccini was conflating the original idea of the ECSC and the EC with that of the European Union. Going back to Althusius’ Politica (1603), the politician was confusing plena (full) with nonplena (not full) federalism.

The distortive cognitive effect of a fervently held ideology had just a week earlier been referred to by Pope Francis in an interview with the American television show, 60 Minutes. Referring to the socially ideological Roman Catholic bishops, the pope said, “conservative is one who clings to something and does not want to see beyond that. It is a suicidal attitude. Because one thing is to take tradition into account, to consider situations from the past, but quite another is to be closed up inside a dogmatic box.”[3] In fact, the pope said that ideology itself is bad. In falsely claiming that the E.U. was an alliance of sovereign nation-states, Procaccini was trapped in an antiquated dogmatic box at odds with the social reality of the E.U.; his view was thus inherently suicidal to that federal system in denying its very existence.

To be clear, sole E.U. competencies, or enumerated domains of political authority, or law, and the union’s voting mechanism of qualified (by E.U. population and by numbers of states) majority instantiate governmental sovereignty that no longer resides with the state governments. The E.U. is thus not an alliance because in an alliance, all governmental sovereignty is retained by the countries. The splitting up of governmental sovereignty between a federal government and state governments is also not confederal; instead, it evinces what scholars of federalism call modern federalism. Both the U.S. and E.U. are cases of that kind of federalism.

Therefore, just as characterizing the U.S. as an alliance is unthinkable, so too should such a characterization of the E.U., so it is ironic that Procaccini’s dogmatic box contains the unthinkable. If allowed to be imposed on the E.U., Genovese’s distorted ideology would place that union in an impossible position—namely, of being contrary to what it is. Hence that ideology can indeed be characterized as suicidal. Now that truly makes the sordid ideology unthinkable, or at least it should be so.


1. Vincenzo Genovese, “Nicola Procaccini: Reformist Group Seeking Balance of Power Shift in E.U. Parliament,” Euronews, May 24, 2024.
2. Ibid.
3. Norah O’Donnell, “Pope Francis Tells 60 Minutes in Rare Interview: ‘The Globalization of Indifference Is a Very Ugly Disease,” CBSNews.com, May 19, 2024 (accessed May 25, 2024).

Friday, May 17, 2024

Prospects for Civil War in an E.U. State: The Case of Slovakia

As the E.U. was heading toward legislative elections in 2024, the shooting of Slovenia’s prime minister could have served as a wake-up call concerning the silent benefits of having a union that is political, and thus governmental, rather than merely an economic “bloc.” Were civil war likely in Slovakia, given the aggressive political division there, being a semi-sovereign state rather than a fully independent country meant that explicit and implicit buffers existed that could stave off such war. Considering that an assassination had been the trigger for World War I, having a federal system that could quell aggression within a state is no small benefit.

In 2004, Slovakia became an E.U. state, which means that some of its governmental sovereignty went to a federal level. Slovakia’s velvet reputation for having split peacefully from the Czech Republic in the dissolution of Czechoslovakia in 1993 may have masked the ensuing stark political reality under Prime Minister Vladimir Merciar, when Slovakia “found itself at a crossroads, stuck between becoming an autocratic regime with close ties to organized crime or a state based on the rule of law.”[1] In 1995, the country’s secret service kidnapped the president’s son. In 2004, Robert Fico’s political career as a “social democrat fighting corruption and unbridled neoliberalism” was just beginning.[2] Yet after becoming prime minister for the first time in 2006, he was accused “of graft and involvement in the Penta Gorilla affair, Slovakia’s biggest post-communist corruption scandal.”[3] In his second stint as prime minister, he and his government “mainly focused on influencing the judiciary, . . . stopping corruption trials and silencing independent media.”[4] He spoke against the E.U. and Ukraine in the midst of the Russian invasion. With all of the press that Viktor Orban of Hungary was receiving for taking the same positions, it was easy to miss Fico’s stances in the E.U.

Together, Fico and Orban can be viewed as a minority stance in E.U. foreign policy in favor of Russia. With such policy requiring unanimity at the federal level, this minority had the potential of hamstringing any foreign policy at the federal level regarding Russia’s aggression. E.U. states would be free to work at cross purposes, and the power of a united front would be missed. This is an argument for applying qualified majority voting to E.U. foreign policy. Such a stance is more evident than another benefit that the E.U. provides to the states—a benefit highlighted by Slovakia.

The shooting of Fico in May, 2024 stemmed from a climate of hateful political polarization in the state. In the wake of the shooting, some fear of a resulting civil war was voiced in the media. Even though the European Steel and Coal Cooperative had been formed to stave off war between states (most notably involving Germany), the less obvious benefit of the E.U. in being able to step in to stave off war within a state has received little attention. The potential benefit for Europe as a whole resonates with the suggestion made by France’s Macron that the defense capability of the E.U. itself be strengthened. For it to be any good, its deployment would have to be decided by qualified majority vote rather than unanimity. Otherwise, Hungary could use its veto to enable Fico’s party to put away its opposition militarily.

A related benefit of the E.U. with respect to Slovakia does not depend on any additional governmental sovereignty being shifted to the federal level. The fact that some sovereignty had already been delegated to the E.U. by its states means that the likelihood of a civil war in a state is buffered, and thus reduced, simply by being in a federal union that has a legislature, executive branch, and a supreme court. Any one of these governmental branches could take action against Slovakia were civil war to break out. Financial levers alone could do the trick, but so too could informal conversations in the European Council, in which the states themselves, through their respective governors, are the members. As nervous as the E.U. officials are about a war just outside the E.U. is, the prospect of war within the E.U. would surely be galvanizing.

Furthermore, within Slovenia, simply viewing itself as a state rather than a sovereign country could work against forces that would otherwise provoke a civil war. In other words, being a state in a political and economic union is itself a moderating force with respect to political polarization getting out of control. In the early U.S., Shay’s Rebellion in Massachusetts and the Whiskey Rebellion in Pennsylvania were doubtless on the minds of the delegates at the Constitutional Convention in making sure that the U.S. president would be able to call the armies of the then-sovereign states into action to put down rebellions in the future semi-sovereign states. So, there is precedent for the E.U. calling on state militias to quell any rebellions in any of its semi-sovereign states, and even for bolstering a federal military force. As E.U. citizens and residents headed to the polls in 2024, it would be a shame were they to take the E.U. for granted. Going even further, it would be a shame were they to miss an opportunity to voice support for an ever more perfect, and thus strengthened rather than hamstrung, union.


1, Keno Verseck, “Robert Fico Shooting Highlights Slovakia’s Deep Polarization,” Deutsche Welle, May 17, 2024.
2, Ibid.
3, Ibid.
4, Ibid.


Monday, May 13, 2024

Eurovision Song Contest 2024: On the role of Political Ideology in Inconsistencies

Political preferences can be salient in organizing bodies of entertainment events that are billed as non-political in nature. This broad inconsistency can in turn allow for others—some of which may not be obvious. My objective here is to render such inconsistencies transparent so that other “hidden” inconsistencies can be more easily detected in the future. As a prime case study, I have in mind the European Broadcast Union (EBU), and more particularly its approach to the 2024 Eurovision Song Contest.

Firstly, that contest was impacted by the pro-Palestine protests because Israel was allowed to compete. More basic than the issue of Israel’s military incursion into famine-ravished Gaza at the time is that of why a country in the Middle East was part of a European contest. Consider the blatant contradiction evinced in a statement from Deutsche Welle: “The European Broadcasting Union (EBU), which organizes the pan-continental pop competition, ruled that Israel is allowed to compete.”[1] Clearly, the contest went beyond Europe. Once the proverbial cat is out of the bag, why not allow other non-European countries to compete? I submit, with a nod back to Kant, that the logical inconsistency itself is sordid.

Secondly, although the EBU subsequently claimed that it did not bar the E.U. flag, attendees were refused entry into the venue if they had the flag. The European Commission had protested the flag being signaled out—I would even say being discriminated against. “Ahead of the final, a spokesperson for the European Broadcasting Union said ticket holders would only be allowed to bring and display flags representing participating countries, as well as the rainbow-colored flag, which symbolizes LGBTQ+ communities.”[2] Besides the decision to include the gay flag being political even though the EBU had claimed to be non-political, the choice discredits the argument that the E.U. flag could not be shown because the E.U. is not a country, for an LGBT “community” is a social group rather than being anything close to a country.

Put another way, a pro-LGBT attendee could show the flag of a social issue, whereas a citizen of the E.U. could not show the flag representing the federal citizenship. E.U. citizens even have an E.U. passport! I suspect that the very notion of E.U. citizenship was ideologically repugnant to whomever in the EBU blocked the flag of the federal union. In other words, singling out the E.U. flag fits with a state’s rights, or Euroskeptic ideology that denies that the E.U. is anything more than a trading “bloc.”

As Euroskeptics would have it, the E.U. would be a confederation, meaning that all of the governmental sovereignty remains with the state governments. Historically, confederations have been used for military alliances, such as those of ancient Athens and Sparta. In contrast, the E.U., like the U.S., includes governmental sovereignty at both the federal and state levels. The qualified majority voting mechanism at the federal level of the E.U. alone involves a delegation of sovereignty from the states because any given state can be bound by federal law even though the state voted against it in the European Council, which, like the U.S. Senate, represents the states. Therefore, E.U. competencies, or enumerated powers, subject to qualified majority voting have been delegated by the states to the federal government. By the way, Euroskeptics are also in denial concerning the fact that a legislature, supreme court, and executive branch at a federal level together constitute a government. Essentially, The EBU fundamentally lacked understanding on the difference between confederalism and modern federalism, and federalism itself, and thus misunderstood the basic nature of the E.U.

That the anti-E.U. ideology is warped relative to the reality of the E.U. resulted in the inconsistencies in allowing in a social issues flag and even the flag of a state in the Middle East yet barring the flag of a government (i.e., a legislature, supreme court, and executive branch) in Europe. To be a citizen thereof and yet be reproved for waving the E.U. flag evinced a basic lack of understanding of what the E.U. is. Ideology can indeed impede and even block understanding. That the EBU would claim to be nonpolitical even as it makes the geo-political assessment to exclude the political flag takes us back to the basic inconsistency.  My main point is that the inconsistencies all stem from political ideology because it tends to warp knowledge and empirical facts to its own ends, confusing an ideal with the way things actually are. Put another way, the self-centered gravity of an ideology can warp knowledge and empirical facts much like black holes warp space and time. This may seem rather profound for a piece on a song contest, but the refusal to allow the federal flag while allowing state flags was not mere entertainment.


1. “Thousands Protest Israel’s Eurovision Participation,” Deutsche Welle, May 10, 2024.
2. “E.U. Slams Eurovision for Banning its Flag from Song Contest,” Deutsche Welle, May 15, 2024.

Saturday, May 11, 2024

Chinese President Xi Exploits a Vulnerability of the E.U.

Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Europe in May, 2024 “amid concerns in Europe over Chinese support for Russia’s war in Ukraine and European markets being flooded with cheap Chinese electric vehicles.”[1] Although these matters were at the time properly matters for the E.U. rather than its states, Xi oriented his visit to the state level, and in particular to states including France and Hungary that had “special bilateral relationships” with China.[2] In other words, the Chinese leader sought to exploit the E.U.’s vulnerability wherein state governments have sufficient sovereignty to undermine the federal level. I contend that the state leaders should have refused to meet with Xi, redirecting him to meet with federal officials.


The full essay is at "China Exploits a Vulnerability of the E.U."

1. Yuchen Li and Wesley Rahn, “Did China’s Xi Jinping Expose Disunity in Europe?” Deutsch Welle (DW.de), May 10, 2024.
2. Ibid.