The E.U.’s Parliament and the U.S.’s House of Representatives in Dialogue

On November 1, 2024, “All Saints Day” in Roman Catholic Christianity, the E.U. announced that a peaceful delegation of the elected representatives of the EU’s Parliament would be travelling to Texas during the following week to “meet American counterparts,” which is to say, a delegation of the elected representatives of the US’s House of Representatives.[1] The key word here is counterparts, for the European Parliament is indeed of the same type of legislative body and at the same level in its federal system as is the American House of Representatives.

Both legislative chambers consist of elected representatives who are elected by E.U. and U.S. citizens. Although the respective states are divided into districts, the representatives do not represent the state governments or the states themselves. Just because the state governments map out the districts does not mean that the elected representatives to the federal chamber represent the states. In fact, every party in the Parliament and the House consists of representatives from more than one state. To insist that political parties exist only on the state level, whereas only blocs or nebulous groups exist at the federal level is ideological nonsense geared to “States’ Rights advocates” in the United States and “Euroskeptics” in the European Union. It is significant that members of the European People’s Party in the E.U. Parliament sit together, and the party has members from various states, who, as stated above, do not represent their respective states, but, rather, the E.U. citizens in federal legislative districts. The same is true in the case of the U.S. House.

So it is fitting that a delegation of the members of the E.U.’s Parliament would meet with members of the U.S.’s House. “The inter-parliamentary meeting is usually an opportunity for lawmakers from both sides of the Atlantic to exchange views of their legislative agenda and priorities.”[2] The parity implied here is correct, and thus obviates any ideological claim that a state in one union is equivalent, or on the same political-system level as the other union. In terms of geography alone, Texas and France, and Montana and Germany, are both cases equivalencies. Similar equivalencies pertain to Arizona and California, and Italy and Spain, respectively. In terms of population, whereas many of the respective states of the two unions are in the tens of millions, both unions are in the hundreds of millions. The two clusters evince the qualitative (i.e., a jump, rather than an incremental change) as well as a quantitative difference between the respective state and federal levels.

The E.U’s delegation was set to be chaired by MEP Brando Benifei of the Socialists & Democrats party and the U.S.’s delegation was to be chaired by Rep. Nathaniel Moran of the Republican Party. That the possibility of a U.S. tariff on goods imported from the E.U. was on the agenda, and the E.U.’s executive branch, the Commission, has exclusive authority, or competency, on commercial law in the E.U. does not mean that only economic issues would be discussed, as if the E.U. were a “trading bloc.” The three pillars, or enumerated powers, of the E.U. extend beyond trade and even economics to include social policy and justice, including human rights, for example. The U.S. delegation could enquire of its counterpart whether the recent electoral fraud in the prospective E.U. state of Georgia (not the U.S. state of Georgia, even given the controversy in 2020!) adds to foreign-agents law in significantly reducing Georgia’s chances of gaining statehood. The E.U. delegation could in turn enquire as the viability of U.S. elections, given the accusations in 2020 from within the United States.

In short, both the E.U. and U.S. have federal systems in which governmental sovereignty is “dual,” which is to say that although the respective states have both stated and residual domains of authority, some of them was delegated to the federal institutions, which in both unions comprise governments rather than only multilateral international organizations. To be sure, an element of the latter has been retained in both unions; specifically in the U.S. Senate and the E.U. Council, both of whose members are polities (i.e., the states) rather than representatives of federal citizens. In fact, the citizens have E.U. and U.S. passports, respectively. In general, that the balance of governmental sovereignty is closer to the states in the E.U. than in the U.S. does not mean that the two unions are not both cases of modern (i.e., dual sovereignty) federalism, as distinct from confederalism, in which all of the sovereignty resides with the state governments. In 1603, Althusius distinguished between plena and non-plena federalism with this in mind even though he modeled his theory of federalism on the Holy Roman Empire. Federalism itself was originally confederal, and fit international alliances because the members differed even in terms of the type of government they had. The U.S., and then the E.U. en suite, mixed national and international elements in what is now called modern federalism to distinguish it from confederalism, which is still evinced in international alliances and organizations such as the United Nations.  To conflate either the E.U. or U.S. with such alliances and organizations is to commit a rather basic category mistake. Whether out of ignorance of ideological fervor, such a mistake prevents the two federal unions from looking at each other to gain insights so as to move towards more perfect unions.

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1. Peggy Corlin, “MEPs Seek First Contact with Trump or Harris Regimes in Texas Next Week,” Euronews.com, November 1, 2024.
2. Ibid.

Strengthening the E.U.’s Border Competency: Implications for Federalism

In politics, it’s not a bad idea to consider the impact on the system of government in formulating, voting on, and enacting laws and regulations. It is not enough to make sure that relationships with political donors are not impaired. Nor, in a federal system, is it enough to look at the implications regarding either the state or the federal level. I contend that the implications for the federal system itself should be formally and informally considered.

In the context of the E.U.’s difficulty with securing its borders even after facing unprecedented migrants entering by boat or even walking in the early 2020s, it is understandable that representatives elected by E.U. citizens and sitting in the European Parliament would try to shore up a federal response, given that in the last quarter of 2024, some state officials took action at state borders in violation of E.U. law. Undercutting federal rule-of-law is a good way to trigger a collapse of a federal system, especially one that had only existed for decades rather than centuries.

On October 23, 2024, the European People’s Party joined the Patriots for Europe, the European Conservatives and Reformists, and the ESN parties in voting in favor of an amendment that goes as follows: “The European Parliament demands appropriate funding for external physical barriers at the Union border.”[1] In other words, the far-right parties wanted a wall at the border. Although the amendment passed with 329 of the elected representatives voting for it, the resolution to which the amendment was attached was later voted down. Victor Negrescu of the S&D party told reporters that a resolution is not necessary for the Parliament to be able to negotiation with the Council on what projects to fund. Tomas Tobé, vice chair of the European People’s Party, countered that because “it is our long-standing policy to advocate for E.U. funding for external border infrastructure,” it is “also in line with the position of the European Council: physical barriers are essential for securing the E.U.’s external borders and managing migration policy.”[2] At the very least, formally letting the Council know the will of the Parliament wouldn’t hurt.

It did hurt the coalition of parties that supported President Von der Leyen’s reelection as President of the E.U.’s executive branch, the Commission, for members of the Renew Europe party could have seen the European People’s Party as betraying the centrist governing coalition in the Parliament by joining the far-right parties there in support of building a wall. But such grumblings may have been overdone, as it was still very unlikely that the EPP would join with the parties on the right on much else, given the daylight between them and the EPP.

Moreover, the resolution served an overriding positive role in fortifying the E.U. itself in regard to its federal system. For it had been a failing policy at the federal level that had prompted more than one state government to exploit the “national emergency” loophole in the Schengen Agreement by patrolling state land-border crossings. In other words, showing signs that the federal government might finally competently secure the E.U.’s borders might get the state violators of Schengen to back off and follow rather than violate the Agreement. The E.U. had only existed for just over thirty years; its federal system was still fluid and thus vulnerable to punctures by state officials heeding popular pressure at home. From abroad, that looks like self-inflicted wounds within the European Union. To some officials of some of the states, most notably Hungary and Slovenia, the Commission may seem to be foreign, but this is not so in state-federal relations within a federal system. For such a system to be viable beyond the short term, the two systems of government—that at the union level and those at the state level—cannot be working against each other without even respecting each other’s laws.

Especially in a new federal system, government officials at both levels would be wise, if they want to continue to get the benefits from the combined power on the world stage, to consider the implications on the federal system itself from any policy proposal or vote. Even as of 2024, European integration politically and economically was not a foregone conclusion. Even though the E.U. had managed by fits and starts rather than in a linear line toward a more perfect union, the threat to the viability of E.U. law, including directives and regulations, was increasing in 2024.

State governments ignoring federal law is an existential threat to any union of states, which is politically distinct from a mere military alliance or trade “bloc,” such as BRICS. Willfully violating federal law could represent more than just a temporary slippage back before bouncing forward again, especially if a few such occurrences gain traction and thus become a de facto norm. Then the de jure federal system is really in trouble, with collapse being even imminent. The category mistake of viewing a federal system in which governmental sovereignty has been divided (i.e., “dual sovereignty”) as an alliance or even worse as a trading association, or “bloc,” can give rise to such destructive opportunistic violations of federal rules, directives, and regulations (i.e., federal law) because they are not viewed as real law. Similarly, the Euroskeptic ideological "word-game" wherein political parties at the federal level are merely "groups" subtly undermines the legitimacy of E.U. law and democracy at the federal level. 

Voting for stronger federal action at the federal borders may have had the effect of reassuring nervous state officials enough that they might return to supporting rather than violating the strictures that hold the Union together. At the time, it could hardly be said with confidence that the E.U. itself would continue as a going concern, so much long-term benefit could be gained by governmental officals at both levels asking themselves how their proposals and actions could impact the federal system itself. 

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1. Vincenzo Genovese and Paula Soler, “EPP and Far Right MEPs Call to Build a Wall at the E.U. Border, Stoking Controversy,” Euronews.com, October 23, 2024.
2. Ibid.

On the American Media’s Hyperbole in Politics

If America can be said to have violent cultures, relatively speaking and especially in countries such as Honduras but also in some U.S. states such as Illinois (e.g., Rockford and south Chicago), the media may simply be reflecting the wider culture in writing of political debates by using words like fight and battle in place of argue and debate. One effect is to exacerbate the problem, culturally speaking. Another effect is to garner more attention, which in turn translates into more revenue from selling advertisements. To the media, the latter counts whereas the former does not; the media can blame the “heated rhetoric” of candidates for office and elected officeholders for an uptick in political violence rather than assume some of the responsibility. I submit that journalists are even more at fault when they magnify the significance of a political event to the point of being mistaken, widely missing the actual mark. The lack of any follow-through in the field wherein one media outlet holds another accountable is also a problem, especially when all of the major outlets are on the proverbial bandwagon.

Before the Harris-Trump U.S. presidential debate in 2024, CNN stated, “Harris’ joyful campaign will Tuesday be hit by the blunt force of reality—a debate with Donald Trump—the most menacing political foe of modern times.”[1] Besides the word Tuesday being awkwardly placed before rather than just after the words, be hit, the journalist’s certainty, as evinced in will be instead of might be hit turned out to be wrong. After the debate, Newsweek titled one of its articles on the debate, “’Trump Was So Bad’: Fox News Voter Panel Declares Harris Debate Winner.”[2] Twelve on the panel thought Harris had won, whereas only five thought that Trump had done so. Time titled its debate analysis piece, “Trump Spent the Debate Walking into Traps Harris Laid for Him.”[3] It was Trump, rather than Harris, who refused after the debate to have another debate. That says it all.

So, where was the headline, “CNN Erred in Declaring Trump the Winner before the Debate”? Even with such a headline somewhere in the public discourse, CNN would probably not smart enough from the virtual slap to resist the temptation to be so certain epistemologically in the future, and I suspect that too many viewers or readers would not recalibrate how much credibility they give to definitive assertions made by CNN in the future. Similarly, too many people tend to believe politicians even with a reputation for being pathological liars as if speaking in front of a microphone and camera mean that the person speaking must be declaring truths.

In short, the refusal of the media companies to hold each other accountable when they get something very, very wrong plus the gullibility of people reading or viewing politicians in public discourse enable journalists (as well as the subterranean politicians) to make outlandish claims, including those that are actually the journalists’ opinions being “reported” as if facts of reason. To claim that Harris’s campaign will be hit is an opinion clothed in a stiff, grizzled suit of fact. Alternatively, the journalist could have interviewed a political analyst, who could have given an informed opinion. That would be reporting.

To be sure, debating who won a debate is of questionable importance, really. In fact, with few exceptions—one being the Biden-Trump debate in 2024 and another being the Kennedy-Nixon televised debate in 1960—winning a presidential debate typically has not had much impact on races. Costin Ciobanu, a political scientist at the University of London, presented a study in which he found “that presidential debates have a weak influence on vote choice . . . due to the importance of longer-term structural variables.”[4] The recession in 1991, for example, is generally recognized by political scientists as having a strong impact on George H.W. Bush’s loss. A debate may be momentarily titillating, but people tend to vote figuratively speaking with their pocketbooks or wallets.

Even so, The Huffington Post’s headline prior to the Harris-Trump debate was: “Tonight: As High Stakes As It Gets.” Politico characterized the debate beforehand as “historic.” That reporter, a national political correspondent, was so brazen that he admits that there is “hype” ahead of the debate, but even that does not keep him from declaring “just how momentous” the debate “will be” as if its HUGE significance were a well-established fact of reason.[5] The opinion and its underlying judgment were grossly incorrect; the race between Harris and Trump remained a toss-up.

Why the preposterous hyperbole? Journalistic marketing. It is in the media’s financial (and personal) self-interest that the “must-see faceoff” be watched by as many viewers as possible.[6] Besides the questionable ethics of overselling a debate as a momentous, even historical event, and especially if fabrication is involved, lying in doing so, negative implications could be ripple through the electoral system. To the extent that debates are entertaining “tit for tats” rather than informative on policy positions and rationales (i.e., making the underlying values explicit and perhaps even debating them!), building a societal political norm wherein one is supposed to vote on the basis of who the voter thinks won the debate can undermine the credibility of popular sovereignty (i.e., the People’s power in voting) as the basis or bedrock of representative democracy in a republic. Additionally, given the obscenely long duration of modern presidential campaigns in the U.S., hyping each event along the way as if it will be decisive can exhaust voters and turn some off completely. Take for instance the Christmas season, which seems to get longer every year. By Christmas Day, I wouldn’t be surprised if many people are more than ready to turn off the Christmas music and go to a movie in ordinary time. Imagine if every weekend between Halloween and Christmas, people are told that it is a must-celebrate (and must shop) weekend. You don’t want to miss out on the Christmas spirit! By Christmas Eve, it might be time for a nap. By election day, it might be a time for gratitude that the thing is finally over.

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1. Stephen Collinson, “Harris Braces for the Most Critical Moment of her Political Career at Debate with Trump,” CNN.com, September 10, 2024. Although the empirical study’s data came from Europe, many American political analysts have reached the same conclusion regarding the American presidency.
2. Joe Edwards, “’Trump Was So Bad’: Fox News Voter Panel Declares Harris Debate Winner,” Newsweek, September 11, 2024.
3. Phillip Elliott, “Trump Spent the Debate Walking into Traps Harris Laid for Him,” Time, September 10, 2024.
4. Costin Ciobanu, “Do Presidential Debates Matter? Evidence from an Eastern European Context,” Paper presented at the ECPR General Conference, Oslo, 06-09 September, 2017.
5. Brakkton Booker, “It’s a Historic Debate Tonight. No One Really Wants to Talk about It,” Politico, September 10, 2024.
6. Ibid.

Hungary’s Delusion of Sovereignty

On October 3, 2024, The European Commission, the E.U.’s executive branch, filed a legal complaint against the E.U. state of Hungary with the E.U.’s judicial branch—the high court of which being the European Court of Justice (ECJ). The Commission had won a case against the state and recently subtracted the amount of fine issued by the court from the federal money set to go to the state because the Hungarian government was refusing to recognize the verdict. Like Britain before it had seceded from the Union, Hungary was operating under the incorrect premise that it still enjoyed full sovereignty even though every state delegates some of its governmental sovereignty to the Union in becoming a state thereof. In the case of Hungary, the state law at issue in 2024 had in its very name the fundamental problem out of which the state’s disputes with the E.U. were emanating.

 In its written statement, the Commission describes Hungary’s “contentious act,” which “establishes the so-called Sovereignty Protection Office (SPO) to investigate people and organizations suspected of undermining the country’s ‘national sovereignty’ and ‘constitutional identity.’”[1] Assisted by the state’s secret police, the SPO could legally “collect information on individuals or groups that receive funding from abroad and are perceived to influence the democratic debate and electoral processes ‘in the interest of another state’ or ‘foreign organ,’ meaning a non-state actor.[2] Undue political influence from outside the E.U. state could presumably come from another state in the Union or from outside of it. Treating both the same involves making the dubious claim that for one state or people therein to buy political advertising or contribute to a political campaign in another state is anti-democratic.

Furthermore, that such interstate political influence somehow violates Hungary’s sovereignty ignores the fact that every state in the Union has given up some governmental sovereignty even just for qualified majority voting to be allowed at the federal level in the Parliament, the European Council, and the Council of the European Union. Only if every E.U. law, directive, and regulation required the unanimous consent of the state governments, which could legally ignore rulings by the ECJ would the Union be composed of sovereign states, such as the U.S. was under its initial Articles of Confederation from 1777 to 1789.

The claim of Hungary’s government that its sovereignty is violated by political influence from elsewhere in the Union can be answered by pointing out that the state is no longer in fact sovereign anyway because it is in a Union whose federal system rests on dual-sovereignty. Put another way, the states have consolidated politically to an extent for their common good, which includes being able to have more political weight in the world, so interstate political influence can be viewed as part of that intermingling that is actually a good thing for such a federal system. If states are too heterogenous (i.e., different), then achieving united action at the federal level is very difficult. The combined sovereignties that instantiate federal sovereignty is actually partly Hungary’s, so interstate influence does not necessarily violate Hungary’s sovereignty.

Back in February of 2024, the Commission cited “the principle of democracy, the right to private life, the protection of personal data, freedom of expression, information and association, and the presumption of innocence, among others,” as being violated by the state of Hungary presumably because they threaten the state government’s sovereignty.[3] More accurately, they may have been a threat to Viktor Orbán’s party remaining in power in Hungary. The principles of liberty and democracy that the Commission was arguing that the Hungarian government was violating can be viewed as competencies, or domains of authority, that both federal and state governmental institutions could legally act on. Put another way, the Commission was well within its rights to protect democracy at the state level. In the U.S., the executive branch had acted to protect democracy at the state level, as in enforcing civil rights with regard to the access of Black people to schools and voting. Alabama could hardly say that its sovereignty was being violated because the federal institutions had the authority to enforce democracy in the United States.

The very name of Hungary’s Sovereignty Protection Office is wrong, for the state had delegated some of its sovereignty when it joined the European Union. Just days after the Commission announced that it was taking the state of Hungary to court at the federal level (i.e., at the ECJ), the Hungarian trade minister voted no in a vote taken at the Council of the EU on whether the EU should put tarriffs on Chinese electric vehicles. Had the measure passed the Council, Hungary would have had to recognize the tarriffs as valid within the state. This alone means that Hungary had given up some governmental sovereignty when it acceded to the E.U. as a state.  As it happened, too many votes were abstentions, so there was no final vote either way. So the Commission used its exclusive authority, or competency, in commercial law and policy to enact the tarriffs.  So it is not just qualified majority voting in which the E.U.'s state governments were no longer fully sovereign states. That the E.U. has shared and exclusive competencies, or domains in which it can enact laws and regulations, means that the state governments no longer were fully sovereign. Hungary's "National Sovereignty Law" was thus not only contrary to a basic EU value (and norm), but also a misnomer that gives people the wrong idea concerning Hungary in the E.U. 

To pretend to be sovereign still, such as by ignoring a negative verdict by the ECJ, undermines the sovereignty that Hungary and the other states delegated to the Union, and thus in a way their own sovereignty too because the state governments play a significant role at the federal level not only in the European Council and the Council of the E.U., but also in nominating commissioners for the College in the Commission. In this respect, the state government of Hungary was compromising a part of its sovereignty—that which had been combined with parts of the respective sovereignties of the other states. By making interstate political influence illegal in Hungary, Orbán failed to recognize that the sovereignty at the federal-level has a legitimate interest in there being at least some interstate harmonization, and legally includes protection of the basic values of the Union, such as democracy and liberty. If as I suspect he believed that Hungary was still fully sovereign as a country, then it had no business being a state in the European Union. Britain seceded for this reason—David Cameron, as prime minister, had said that the E.U. was just one of the networks that the UK was in. Similarly, Orbán’s Sovereignty Protection Office explicitly belies or undermines Hungary’s claim to be a state in the Union of states. The Union would be better off without that internal contradiction.

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1. Jorge Liboreiro, “Brussels Takes Hungary to Court over Its Controversial ‘National Sovereignty’ Law,” Euronews.com, October 3, 2024.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.

The €35 Billion E.U. Loan to Ukraine: One E.U. State as a Destabilizer

On September 20, 2024, it was announced that the E.U. would “raise a €35 billion loan to support the Ukrainian economy and military.”[1] At a press conference next to Ukraine’s president Zelenskyy, the E.U.’s president said, “Russia keeps targeting your civilian energy infrastructure in a blatant and vicious way to try to plunge your country in the dark.”[2] So the loan stood to impact the Ukrainian people directly and significantly. It would be a shame if the principle of unanimity in the European Council would stand in the way of the Ukrainian people being warm during the upcoming winter. This is a very tangible way for people to grasp just how real the costs are of state governments having vetoes over a significant number of E.U. competencies (i.e., enumerated powers). “The European Union is here to help you in this challenge to keep the lights on, to keep your people warm as winter is just around the corner, and to keep your economy going as you fight for survival,” Von der Leyen said at the news conference.[3] Hungary’s Viktor Orbán stood in the way, however, to securing the collateral for a long enough period to render the loan (an any from the U.S. based on the collateral) secure.

The loan uses Russia’s immobilized assets as collateral, and E.U. sanctions on the assets had to be renewed every six months by unanimity. The concern was that Hungary would use its veto because it is the “most Russia-friendly” E.U. state.[4] Before the announcement, the Commission had proposed alternative asset renewal periods ranging from 36 months to five years. Tellingly, one state government announced that it would wait until after the upcoming U.S. election before considering the options. This made it difficult for the E.U. to give the U.S. legal assurance that the Russian assets in the E.U. would remain frozen—that the collateral would remain under the control of the E.U. rather than go back to Russia. Because the collateral could not be assured going forward, the U.S. Congress would have to approve funding for any American loan to Ukraine secured by the collateral in Europe. Of course, the E.U.’s own loan depended on the collateral too, so the possibility that one state government would veto an extension of the assets being frozen meant that the E.U. risked being “on the hook” should Ukraine fail to pay back the E.U.’s loan.

Incredibly, Andrew Moravcsik of Princeton University spoke at Harvard on the same day as the announcement of the E.U. loan that even though right-wing state governments in the E.U. have a loud bark, their bite is muted, meaning that in terms of government policy the impact is nil. He argued that they had to appease moderates to get enough support to have any impact on actual policy. Yet Hungary’s refusal to consider any of the longer periods to keep the Russian assets frozen in the E.U. meant that the E.U. and U.S. had to assume more risk in lending to Ukraine. One need only point to the refusal of Orbán’s government to pay the €200 million fine levied by the European Court of Justice, the E.U.’s supreme court, because the Hungarian government had violated E.U. law, and to the violation itself, plus Hungary’s threat to bus migrants to the E.U. capital, to know that the ideology of Orbán’s party was indeed having an impact in policy. This had hardly escaped the notice of the Commission and the ECJ. The implication is that the E.U. could ill-afford the principle of unanimity for any E.U. competency; Euro-skeptic ideology could indeed impact policy at the federal level—and, yes, the E.U. had a federal system even in 2024 of dual-sovereignty (hence the union was not an international organization or a “bloc”). Too much sovereignty remained with the state governments in the form of the veto that they could wield in the Council, and the harm can be seen in the possibility that Ukrainians would not have enough heat during the upcoming winter. Is collective action really so bad? Should one state be able to thwart it on ideological grounds?

I submit that the E.U.’s effort is laudatory but that the E.U. itself contains its own obstacle in continuing with the principle of unanimity in the Council that represents the states. Just imagine the impact on U.S. policies if one state could defeat a measure in the U.S. Senate. Even though the E.U. had fewer states at the time, there were too many for unanimity to be at all realistic on most matters. Empire-scale unions inevitably have states that differ from each other culturally and ideologically. Majority voting and qualified majority voting accommodate this fact, whereas the principle of unanimity does not.

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1. Jorge Liboreiro, “EU to Raise €35 Billion Loan for Ukraine Using Russia’s Frozen Assets, Von der Leyen Says,” Euronews.com, September 20, 2024.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.

Nature Credits in the E.U.

One of benefits of the market mechanism, by which, for example, economic goods are bought and sold, is that self-interest is relied on; people don’t have to be told to buy or sell a product because it can be in their self-interest to do so if the price is right. As an alternative to regulatory standards, a government can create units of pollution-allowance that businesses can purchase so to be lawfully able to pollute in so far as a purchased unit allows. In the E.U.’s emissions trading system, “operators of power plants and factories have to buy tradeable allowances to cover every tonne of carbon dioxide they emit.”[1] Business could buy and sell allowances so as to cover the amount of pollution that is anticipated. In this way, the market mechanism efficiently allocates pollution in line both with the interests of the companies and the public interest—the latter being made concrete in the decision on how much pollution per allowance and how many allowance units to create. Crucially, the company private interests are put within the purview of the public interest; the tail is not directing the dog. In political economies in which political-campaign contributions by businesses are high, especially if unlimited, the tail can indeed wag the dog, such that the public interest is determined by private interests. This is one reason why the Citizens United (2010) U.S. Supreme Court case is so significant. It allows corporations and labor unions to spend unlimited amounts of money on political campaigns and directly on advertisements—both being beneficial to elected officials in positions to curry favor through legislation and regulations favorable to business (or labor). The informal exchanges of political donations and legislation or regulation comprise a market of sorts. So, the market mechanism, which is created or at least regulated by government, can serve for good or ill, from the standpoint of the public interest.  Using the mechanism, such as the E.U. president proposed in 2024, on behalf of ecosystems, is for good rather than ill, and thus using, in effect, the self-interest of farmers could be better than relying on regulatory requirements that farmers expend some money and effort to beef up their local ecosystems.

At a conference on September 13, 2024, a Friday, E.U. President Ursula von der Leyen said, “We need new financial tools to compensate farmers for the extra costs of sustainability and compensate them for taking care of the soil, the land, the water, and the air.”[2] The assumption is that the farmers would not otherwise do so because expending the energy and paying the costs for the externalities would not add to their profits from farming in the short or medium term. The time-value of money too reflects the penchant in human nature for immediate over delayed gratification. To extend the farmers’ “event-horizon” and broaden out their concern to include their vicinity would be the purposes of “the market-based system of ‘nature credits’,” which Von der Leyen hinted “could also be applied beyond the agricultural sector.”[3] This is part of the beauty of the market mechanism: it can be applying to various things, serving various purposes, rather than only pertaining to economic products and services.

Via “nature credits,” a water company could have the incentive as per self-interest to help to take care of a spring that that company depends on, and a fruit company would be more likely to invest in the “essential work of pollinators.”[4] That the language of long-term investment applies raises the question of why farmers in general do not do what manufacturing businesses do as a regular part of business. It would seem that making sure that a principal water source is not lost or that bees stay in the area of the fruit trees would be in the self-interest of the respective companies. Why would compensation by the government be needed to run a sustainable business?  Is the managerial perspective really so delimited that the viability of the business is not included?

Unfortunately, even by 2024, climate change was perceived by many business practitioners still as a gradual and outside process not germane to business. Johan Rockstrom of the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research, said at the same conference, “I can tell you, science is clear today that the ultimate determinant, what regulates the stability of the planet, its ability to stay in a desired equilibrium state is nature.”[5] According to a journalist, Rockstrom was “suggesting that action of biodiversity and climate made sense even if purely pragmatic.”[6] If farmers didn’t yet see it as such, “nature credits” would help render biodiversity pragmatic from an agribusiness standpoint—essentially interiorizing some externalities.

To be sure, even if a private interest broadens out to include some hitherto externalities, that interest is still not the same as the interest of the whole: the public interest. It would still be important to protect the public interest from being captured by a private interest; a large company or an industry that would implicitly presume to be in charge of its own regulation by dictating legislation and regulation to sycophantic government officials should be withstood by them. Even so, expanding the practical purview of private interests is in the interest of the whole, and the market mechanism can be used to make this so.

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1. Robert Hodgson, “Von der Leyen Moots ‘Nature Credits’ Market to Avert Ecosystem Collapse,” Euronews.com, September 13, 2024.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.

Hungary and Texas: Busing Immigrants

Two years after the government of Texas in the U.S. began transferring migrants to other states and to Washington D.C., the government of Hungary announced that it too would bus migrants, but rather than transporting them to other states, the destination would be Brussels exclusively. Although the respective political strategies differ, the two policies both represent the same pressure point in federal systems. The cost of united action at the federal level on public policy is that the states are not as free as otherwise to manifest their respective ideological and cultural views in public policy at the state level. That federal policy or law is often a compromise between the preferences of the states means that political pressure exists not only between states, but between a given state and federal law. This is inherent to federalism because it provides benefits from united action and some ability of states to enact legislation reflecting their respective distinct dominant ideology. Enabling both is one of federalism’s best features, yet it comes with a cost in terms of political tension that is endemic rather than merely episodic. Simply put, no system of government is without drawbacks or downsides. The trick is perhaps in how to manage them so they don’t get so out of control that the federal system itself collapses. In 2024, Viktor Orbán, governor of the E.U. state of Hungary, was testing the limits much more than was Greg Abbott, governor of the U.S. state of Texas, even as Orbán was using Abbott’s playbook.

In June, 2024, the E.U.’s supreme court, the European Court of Justice, handed down a ruling ordering the E.U. state of Hungary to pay a fine of €200 million for breaking federal laws on asylum plus an additional €1 million per day until the state government passes a law conforming with the federal law.[1] Hungary’s requirement that people seeking asylum must first apply for and be granted travel permits violated the federal law requiring that all of the states have the same procedures for granting asylum. Setting up a confrontation with the high court, essentially challenging its very legitimacy, the Hungarian government “missed the first September deadline for paying the €200 million fine.[2] In fact, the state “also demanded compensation for the billions it says it has spent on border protection, including constructing fences protected by razor wire on its southern borders with Serbia and Croatia.”[3] In other word, the state government wanted to be reimbursed by the E.U. for costs incurred by the state to protect the E.U. border that runs along an edge of the state. Thus situated, Hungary is like Texas. Ideologically too, Hungary’s governor was quite similar to the governor of Texas at the time, Greg Abbott.

In fact, Vicktor Orbán likely got his idea to send illegal immigrants from his state to Brussels from Greg Abbott, who had spent more than $148 as of February 21, 2024 in putting more than 102,000 illegal immigrants on buses bound for other states and Washington, D.C.[4] Texas also spent $10 billion on law enforcement and constructing physical barriers at the U.S. border that runs along the edge of Texas, though reimbursement by the U.S. was not demanded.[5] At a news conference at the state capital Budapest, Hungary’s State Secretary Bence Rétvári accused the E.U. in 2024 of wanting to force the state to allow illegal immigrants into the state, and announced that the state government would “offer these illegal migrants, voluntarily, free of charge, one-way travel to Brussels.”[6] He made the announcement in front of a row of passenger buses that would be bound for the E.U. “headquarters in Belgium.”[7] He said, “If Brussels wants illegal migrants, Brussels can have them.”[8] Interestingly, Texas could have had the same strategy: instead of sending buses to lax states as well as to Washington, D.C., all of the buses could have dropped off their passengers at the Washington Mall—at the U.S. headquarters—as Abbott had been so critical of U.S. immigration policy.

Both cases—that of Hungary and Texas—demonstrate what can happen when state governments in a union differ on a matter of public policy not only with each other, but also from a federal policy or law. The degree of unity that is necessary for a union to continue to exist and function viably comes at the expense of ideological differences between states. This tension is endemic to federalism, as that system of government allows for cultural or ideological diversity between states and benefits to the whole that the combined forces of an empire-scale union can provide. In the E.U., the Hungarian government was quite critical in 2024 of Germany’s more lenient practice in allowing migrants to enter the state, yet at the same time the united force of the E.U. was able to give Europeans more power in resisting Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.  In the U.S., the Texan government was critical of California’s “sanctuary cities” in which illegal aliens were not arrested by state police, yet at the same time the united force of the U.S. was also able to stand up to Russia’s president’s militaristic foray into Ukraine. Both cases demonstrate federal systems that are “living and breathing,” allowing for differences between states, such as on abortion in the U.S. and social policy in the E.U., while enabling both unions to have a significant impact internationally.

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1. Angela Skujins, “’We Never Let Them In’: Hungary’s PM Viktor Orbán Demands New Laws Tackling Migration,” Euronews.com, September 6, 2024.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Sergio Martinez-Beltran, “Texas Has Spent More than $148 Million Busing Migrants to Other Parts of the Country,” The Texas Tribune, February 21, 2024.
5. Ibid.
6. Angela Skujins, “’We Never Let Them In’: Hungary’s PM Viktor Orbán Demands New Laws Tackling Migration,” Euronews.com, September 6, 2024.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.

Resolved: Flanders and Wallonia as E.U. States

On August 22, 2024, Bart De Wever of the New Flemish Alliance group in Belgium resigned as his efforts to form a government had stalled. His group had won the most votes in the E.U. state’s most recent election back in June, at which time King Philippe appointed De Wever to find consensus among five groups on policies such as taxation on capital gains. Belgium’s longest period without an elected government is an incredible 592 days, which was set after the previous record of 541 days that had been set after the 2010 elections.[1] With two culturally-different regions, Belgium has been difficult to govern. Being a state in a union could conceivably help Belgium in this regard.

A day after De Wever resigned, a media report insisted that “Belgium must form a government to file a federal budget to the European Commission by September 20, 2024.”[2] Yet it seems easy enough to miss such a deadline. Rather than look for administrative means by which being in the Union could pressure the state to get its act together on governing, the possible impact may be more basic. Put another way, thinking bureaucratically is not sufficiently “outside of the box.”

Theoretically, there being some governmental sovereignty at the federal (i.e., E.U.) level takes the pressure off a state to form a government because not all governmental responsibilities are handled any longer at the state level. In other words, there is less riding on which groups govern the member state. But the amount of sovereignty that had been delegated by the states to the Union by 2024 was not sufficient to relieve enough pressure, given that the 592 and 541 days had occurred when Belgium was in the European Union. Furthermore, the heady game of politics can make virtually anything seem important to political antagonists, even if major decisions of public policy are taken elsewhere.

So, like the efficacy of any administrative means by which the E.U. might attempt to chide a stalled state into forming a government, taking the heat off is also unlikely to succeed. Being in a union presents Belgium instead with the non-ideological alternative of splitting into two E.U. states without them being foreign. In other words, being in a political union effectively relativizes the fallout from splitting up because both Flanders and Wallonia would still be in the Union; neither, after all, would be the smallest state in the Union. The intractability in governing should be a wake-up call, or indication, that maybe the two regions would be better off as separate states; governing together just hasn’t worked out very well.

Of course, opposing such a change, which seems drastic, is the ideology of nationalism and the related difficulty, especially in Europe, of letting go of some history. The same ideology has manifested in the E.U.’s Euroskeptic parties in the European Parliament to the potential detriment of the Union itself. Even conflating the union with a “bloc” is harmful in that Belgians would not realize the extent to which Flanders and Wallonia would still together by virtue of being states in the same union, which is substantially different than a trading bloc or military alliance. Citizens of Flanders and Wallonia would all be E.U. citizens, for example. They could live and work in the other state, and they wouldn’t have to go through customs in traveling back to visit old friends. Additionally, the currency wouldn’t change. They would all still be represented in the European Parliament.

Ironically, Belgians might even have a greater Flemish and Walloon cultural identity due to greater cohesion at the state level. Identifying more at the federal level—leveraging this—could thus make enhanced regional identity stronger rather than weaker. Il faut séparer être ensemble. It is a pity that thinking outside the box is perceived generally as radical, and thus as easily dismissable, and that making substantial rather than merely incremental change is often an up-hill battle, given the intractability of political will and the related momentum of stasis in the status quo, whether it is working or not.

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1. Angela Skujins, “Belgian Government Talks at a Standstill after Resignation of Key Negotiator,” Euronews, August 23, 2024.
2. Ibid.

Public Policy on Housing in the E.U.: On the Impact on Federalism

With rents and the price of houses being historically high in 2024 in the E.U., it is no surprise that housing was a salient issue in the E.U. election campaigns that summer. Legislative action on the state level had been insufficient. Hence, President von der Leyen told the parliament, “I want this Commission to support people where it matters most, and if it matters to Europeans, it matters to Europe.”[1] The Union complementing legislative action by state governments on such an important issue is admittedly a step in the direction of solving an urgent problem, but the impact on the federal system in the future should not be ignored. As important as a pressing issue of the day is, someone should be keeping an eye on the shop itself. The gradual political consolidation of the U.S. federal system over more than two centuries at the expense of federalism is an example of what can happen when policy-makers are too oriented in putting out policy “brush fires” without bothering to ask how the federal system itself could be impacted.

To be sure, homelessness and high house prices and rents had become big problems by 2024. In 2023, an estimated 890,000 people were homeless in the E.U., while over 650,000 people were homeless in the U.S., out of total populations of almost 447 million and 336 million, respectively. Even though less than 1 million out of hundreds of millions looks minor, the trauma of being without a stable shelter, as well as the fear of losing one’s shelter due to a dire change in economic condition, argues in favor of housing being recognized as a human right that governments are obliged to supply where reliance on a market and personal income falls short. Put another way, the sort of existential angst that is triggered by homelessness and, to a much lesser though significant (yet subtle) degree, losing a job (or even knowing that it is possible) belongs in the state of nature rather than in civil society. Where the supply of available units of affordable (i.e., low-income, and no-income) housing is less than the number of homeless in a given geographical area, this argument suggests that government should see to it that the gap is filled. This is, of course, a normative argument, one that has been much more prevalient in the E.U. than in the U.S.

Generally speaking, government targets for new units tend to fall short of those that would be necessary to expunge actualized existential angst. In the E.U. state of Ireland, a local-government official bragged to a journalist in 2024 that the city government would reach its target, and the journalist pointed out that it is insufficient to eliminate homelessness in the city. Both in terms of being shy in having more affordable-housing units built and in standing up to hedge funds that are driving up house prices by buying up some as investment (and even by keeping some units vacant to increase the shortage), local governments have fallen short.

Besides spending money on the construction of new units, government can restrict the use of residential real estate for investment and even as small hotels (e.g. Airbnb). At least as long as homelessness exists, so this argument goes, shelter’s use for speculation is inconsistent with housing as a human right. To be sure, the moneyed interests in a society can be hard for democratically-elected representatives to resist even when a significant number of people are paralyzed by existential angst.  

Not going nearly so far but signaling a shift in societal and governmental priorities, President von der Leyen of the European Commission set up her second portfolio, or term of office, in the summer of 2024 by stressing “the urgency of tackling the housing crisis, proposing the first-ever European affordable housing plan and a commissioner responsible for the policy area, as the Socialists had demanded as a condition for backing her second term.”[2] At the time, “a significant investment gap in social and affordable housing” existed in the Union.[3] In addition to there being the homeless, people were “struggling to find affordable homes,” von der Leyen said at the mid-July plenary in Strasbourg.[4] “Between 2010 and the end of 2023, average rents in the E.U. increased by almost 23% and house prices by nearly 48%, leading to protests in cities.”[5] The general economic interest was being negatively impaired by the housing- (and food-) led cost of living increases.

The E.U. being a federal system of dual sovereignty, like the U.S., von der Leyen had to contend with the “limited competency” of the E.U. in housing; by this I do not mean incompetence. Rather, the federal and state levels could both legislate in housing. Because the states could “only use public funds to target the most vulnerable groups,” space was open for the federal government to legislate to bring the cost of housing down. In other words, the states were oriented to the homeless problem, which arguably represents a greater, or more severe harm in society, so the Union’s activity on the wider problem of high rental and house markets would not usurp the residual sovereignty of the state governments.

This is not to trivialize the problem of high housing markets, whether in California or Ireland. “In terms of state aid [at the federal level], we would like to see the recognition of social and affordable housing for all—beyond disadvantaged groups or social groups with fewer opportunities—as a service of general economic interest,” said Christophe Rouillon, president of the PES group in the European Committee of the Regions (CoR).[6] The scope not only of the problem, but also of the legislative means, or power, is such that this “limited competency” of the Union could have a significant impact on shifting more power from the states to the Union. “The E.U. can influence housing through financial regulation, competition law, energy efficiency, regulatory and planning standards, cohesion policy, climate action, urban/rural and social policies,” Rouillon stated.

The impact of federalism should not be lost on policy makers both at the federal and state level even though the primary focus is on the policy issues (i.e., homelessness and high real estate markets). In reaching a fever pitch of societal displeasure, these issues may give us a glimpse into how modern federal systems, which are characterized by split (or dual) governmental sovereignty, tend to consolidate power at the federal level at the expense of the state governments over time. Europeans would be wise to think about whether the E.U., just over 30 years old in 2024, would be as consolidated at the U.S. in 2024 after more than two-hundred more years. Both unions being of vast territorial expanse in 2024, such that states in each union can differ from one another in the same union so much that “one size does not fit all” in public policies, political consolidation comes with significant drawbacks. Additionally, the “check and balance” feature of federalism is rendered inoperative when a federal government has so much power that the state governments cannot counter-balance it. The question of whether the E.U. might end up as consolidated politically as the U.S. is thus not at all trivial.

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1. Paula Soler, “Von der Leyen Promised an EU Commissioner to Tackle the Housing Crisis,” Euronews, August 13, 2024.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid. For those readers who feel the need to substitute “bloc” for “Union,” there is help.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.

The European Union Is Not a Trading Bloc

The European Union can be distinguished fundamentally from the previous European Economic Community in several ways, just as the Articles of Confederation can be distinguished on a fundamental level politically from the U.S. Constitution. Both Europe and America have made a qualitative jump, rather than merely as a matter of degree or further extent. In both cases, politically speaking, governmental sovereignty has been split between a union and state governments. Furthermore, in both cases, the domains of power being handled at the federal level have increased. In the case of the U.S., the coverage has expanded beyond Washington’s Continental Army. In the case of the E.U. even by 2024, the union’s coverage had come to extend well beyond a common market and trade policy to include non-economic domains of power, or competencies, too. In this regard, the E.U.'s federal level resembles a government.

After her reelection as President of the European Commission, the E.U.’s executive branch, in 2024, Ursula von der Leyen had some jobs to fill. Among them, each state was to designate one person to be a commissioner. It was up to the president to assign each person to an area, or domain, of power, which were hardly all economic in nature.

Among the dream jobs, besides Competition and Economic & Financial Affairs is Foreign and Security Policy, which is a traditional domain of a government. To be sure, the Competition Commissioner has considerable power “to block mergers, fine big companies, and ban state subsidies that distort markets—and, unlike most other E.U. commissioners, [the Competition Commissioner] doesn’t need to sign off decisions with governments or [the European Parliament].”[1] This represents a transfer of governmental sovereignty has taken effect from the state governments to that of the European Union (which also means that the E.U. had indeed a government of its own distinct from those of the states). Even though I suspect this is most true for economic portfolios, because a majority of E.U. competencies are subject to qualified majority voting instead of the principle of unanimity, the E.U.’s governmental sovereignty extends beyond the economic domain.

Among the rising stars of portfolios are two: Defense and Enlargement, rather than only Industry and Digital. That defense in particular was projected to be enhanced in Von der Leyen’s second administration supports the point that the E.U. was indeed thought of as a government, even if behind a veil of Euroskeptic (i.e., states’ rights) denial.

Among the golden oldie portfolios are climate, migration and justice, rather than just energy and trade. To be sure, on immigration there was still “a lack of real E.U. power.”[2] But “with concerns about media freedom and judicial independence” on the state level “on the rise,” the justice portfolio could “set a bold new direction in protecting the rule of law” within the union—power that can hardly be reduced to economics. Indeed, in enforcing justice within states rather than only at the federal level, the Justice Commissioner’s position itself supports the point that governmental sovereignty was in fact dual in the E.U. even in 2024.

That there were Commissioners of Agriculture and Budget also points to the E.U. being a government, as governments typically have their own budgets and have agriculture policies. Indeed, having territory, which the E.U. does indeed have, is a hallmark of being a government. The portfolios of Cohesion, Neighborhood, Home Affairs, Environment, Health, and Social Rights all contradict the supposition that the E.U. was economic in nature even as late as 2024. Social rights especially do not reduce to economics, but, rather, are fundamentally political in nature. Whether or not natural rights exist as John Locke argued, governments can institute and protect (as well as take away) social rights. The additional portfolios of Demography, Foresight, the Mediterranean, and “the E.U. way of life” all also go beyond the economic domain. So many portfolios at a high level in the Commission are not expressly or even mostly economic that it cannot be said that the E.U. was an economic organization at least by 2024 when Von der Leyen’s second term began with an emphasis on defense at the federal level, given Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Among the plethora of implications, the European Union cannot be characterized like the EEC was, as a single-issue organization; rather, in part because the federal competencies had grown broadly by 2024, we can speak of there being a federal government. There are of course other reasons why this is so in contradistinction to both the EEC and the American Articles of Confederation, both of which were solely international rather than a blend of national and international as evinced by the E.U. and U.S. Whereas in the U.S., that the U.S. Senate is founded on international principles has been commonly forgotten, most Europeans conveniently look over the fact that the European Parliament is founded on national rather than international principles.

Ideology is a great distorter, especially in politics and religion. To refer to the E.U. as an economic bloc is the epitome of intransigence in the face of political reality. That such a psychosis has been perpetuated by journalists in the service of ideologues, giving the brain sickness (recall Nietzsche’s use of the expression!) a patina of official legitimacy, is truly astonishing given the breadth of portfolios in the Commission alone.

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1. Gerardo Fortuna and Jack Schickler, “Demogra-what? A Definitive Guide to European Commission Portfolios,” Euronews, August 8, 2024.
2. Ibid.