In the U.S., the boundaries of both federal (e.g., U.S.
House of Representatives) and state legislative districts are redrawn every ten
years after the census to “ensure that each district contains roughly the same
number of people.”[1] Both
major political parties in state legislatures “often remap districts to favor
themselves, either by cramming opposition voters into a single district or by
dividing them so they are the majority in fewer districts.”[2]
I contend that a simple majority vote is problematic, given the irresistible temptation
to redraw the districts for partisan advantage rather than merely to take
account of changes in population.
By a 2-to-1 ruling, the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Wisconsin found in November, 2016 that the Wisconsin Assembly’s
redrawing the legislative chamber’s districts was an unconstitutional partisan
gerrymander favoring the Republican Party. U.S. courts had struck down
gerrymandering on racial grounds, but never on “grounds that they unfairly give
advantage to a political party.”[3]
For the first time, a court offered a clear mathematical formula for measuring
partisanship in a district. The Court found that the legislature’s redrawing of
its districts violated both the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause
of the 14th Amendment because the remapping “aimed to deprive
Democratic voters of their right to be represented.”[4]
The motive here is problematic, for it puts partisan advantage above the duty
to act for the public good by fairly adjusting for changes in population.
In other words, the ability of the party that controls a
legislature to use the census-adjustment responsibility for private (i.e.,
party) ends puts the party in a conflict of interest. The party being in the
majority of a state legislative chamber is sorely tempted to put partisan goals
above the democratic aim of achieving fair districts. Democracy itself suffers
so a majority can remain in the majority.
One solution to this conflict of interest is to require a
2/3rd majority (or majorities in both parties) to approve changes in
the districts. The latter pertain to the entire legislative chamber, as part of
its basis in representative democracy, so it is only fair that at least some of
the minority party approves.
My main point here is that going by simple
majority enables, or sets up, the conflict of interest. Given the overwhelming
force of the partisan temptation, the conflict should be deconstructed. In fact, all institutional conflicts of interest that can reasonably be taken apart should be, due to how ongoing temptation plays out in human psychology/nature.
1. Michael
Wines, “Judges
Find Wisconsin Redistricting Unfairly Favored Republicans,” The New York Times, November 21, 2016.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
